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Abstract  
This evaluation study was conducted by Civic Consulting in cooperation with KU 
Leuven CCM in the framework of the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing 
law. It assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added 
value of five EU consumer and marketing law directives – the UCPD, PID, MCAD, 
UCTD, and ID. A range of methodological tools were employed, including legal 
analyses in all Member States, a broad interview process at EU and MS level, an open 
consultation, a survey of qualified entities, and a comprehensive analysis of costs and 
benefits of the legislation covered. The study concludes that the assessed legislative 
framework is considered to be broadly fit for purpose. During the last decade, in spite 
of the financial crisis, consumer trust has increased across the EU, corresponding to 
the significant benefits in terms of improved levels of consumer protection that the 
directives have brought for many Member States. All directives subject to this study 
are also considered to have contributed to removing obstacles to the Internal Market. 
In light of technological innovations in the online environment, and the increase of EU 
cross-border B2C trade, the relevance and the added value of EU action in the area of 
consumer protection has even become more pronounced. Certain problems were also 
identified regarding effectiveness, coherence and, consequently regarding efficiency, 
in terms of overlaps and inconsistencies between rules. Specific recommendations 
focus on improvements of the EU legislative framework regarding unfair commercial 
practices and marketing, contract conclusion and performance, and injunctions.  
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Résumé 
La présente étude d'évaluation a été réalisée par Civic Consulting en coopération avec 
l’institut CCM de l'Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgique) dans le cadre du bilan 
de qualité concernant le droit européen en matière de protection des consommateurs 
et de marketing. Elle évalue l'efficacité, l'efficience, la cohérence, la pertinence et la 
valeur ajoutée européenne de cinq directives relatives au droit européen en matière 
de protection des consommateurs et de marketing, à savoir les directives UCPD, PID, 
MCAD, UCTD et ID. Un ensemble d'outils méthodologiques ont été utilisés, dont des 
analyses juridiques dans l'ensemble des États membres, des entrevues à grande 
échelle aux niveaux européen et des États membres, une consultation ouverte, une 
enquête d'entités qualifiées, et une analyse complète des coûts et avantages liés à la 
législation couverte. L'étude conclut que le cadre législatif évalué est considéré comme 
généralement adapté à l'objectif poursuivi. Malgré la crise financière, sur la dernière 
décennie, la confiance des consommateurs s'est accrue à travers l'Union européenne 
(UE), en correspondance avec les avantages significatifs en termes d'amélioration des 
niveaux de protection des consommateurs obtenus grâce aux Directives pour de 
nombreux États membres. Toutes les directives soumises à la présente sont 
également considérées comme ayant contribué à éliminer les obstacles au marché 
intérieur. Étant donné les innovations technologiques de l'environnement en ligne et 
l'augmentation du commerce européen B2C (business-to-consumer, entreprises vis-à-
vis des consommateurs) transfrontalier, la pertinence et la valeur ajoutée de l'action 
de l'UE dans le domaine de la protection des consommateurs sont même devenues 
encore plus évidentes. Certains problèmes ont également été identifiés en ce qui 
concerne l'efficacité, la cohérence et, par conséquent, l'efficience, en termes de 
chevauchements et de contradictions entre les règles. Les recommandations 
spécifiques se concentrent sur les améliorations du cadre législatif européen 
concernant les pratiques commerciales déloyales et le marketing, la conclusion de 
contrats et leur exécution, et les actions en cessation. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Commission's Directorate General for Justice and Consumers has 
commissioned a study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law, conducted by 
Civic Consulting in cooperation with KU Leuven CCM. This report is the final deliverable 
of the study. 
The report presents the background and methodology of the study, provides detailed 
answers to the evaluation questions, as well as conclusions and recommendations. It 
also describes the work carried out and provides a technical overview of the evaluation 
process. The report consists of four parts:  
Part 1 of the report is structured as follows: 
Section 2 describes the evaluation; 
Section 3 describes the background of the study; 
Section 4 presents the evaluation themes and questions; 
Section 5 describes the methodology of the study; 
Section 6 presents answers to the evaluation questions; 
Section 7 provides the problem definition; and 
Section 8 presents study conclusions and recommendations. 
The Annexes of this part of the report present information on the methodological tools 
applied and other relevant study results. 
Part 2 of the report provides the detailed results of the open public consultation on the 
Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law (consultation report). 
Part 3 of the report presents the 28 country reports prepared in the context of this 
study. 
Part 4 of the report presents additional evidence collected, including:1 
• The results of the survey of qualified entities; 
• The results of the business interviews and of the extrapolation of business 
costs to the EU level; 
• The results of the panel data analysis. 
                                           
1 As is the case with the results of the public online consultation (Part 2) and the country reporting (Part 3), 
the evidence presented in Part 4 feeds into the cross-cutting analysis of Part 1. It presents methodological 
details and a full set of results per analysis, for reference purposes. 
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2. Description of the evaluation 
This section outlines the objectives and scope of the study, as indicated in the TOR. It 
then describes the thematic coverage, and presents the tasks to be performed. 
2.1. The Fitness Check of EU Consumer Law 
According to the TOR of the present study, the Fitness Check of EU consumer law 
covers the following EU consumer and marketing law directives:  
• Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive). 
• Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees (Sales and Guarantees Directive); 
• Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive). 
• Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of 
products offered to consumers (Price Indication Directive); 
• Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising 
(Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive); 
• Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests 
(Injunctions Directive). 
Also relevant are the most recent instrument of the EU horizontal consumer 
legislation, the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU, and existing sector-specific 
consumer protection rules and other EU legislation related to retail commerce (see 
below).  
In contrast, the following are or have recently been subject to separate 
reviews/assessments and therefore outside of the scope of this Fitness Check: 
• Package Travel Directive 90/314/EEC, which will be replaced by a new Directive 
2015/2302/EU as from 1 July 2018;  
• Timeshare Directive 2008/122/EC, which was recently assessed by the 
Commission (report of 16 December 2015);  
• Consumer Protection Co-operation (CPC) Regulation 2006/2004/EC that the 
Commission has proposed to replace with a new CPC Regulation (COM 
(2016)283 final);  
• Communication and Recommendation on Collective Redress – the Commission 
is currently assessing how the Recommendation has been implemented and if 
any further action, potentially including legislative measures, is needed; 
• The Digital Contracts Proposals of December 2015 for two directives fully 
harmonising in a targeted way the rules on remedies for digital content and 
distance sales of tangible goods. These proposals are currently under 
negotiations in the European Parliament and Council2. 
                                           
2 For more information, see "Digital contracts for Europe" at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/digital-
contract-rules/index_en.htm  
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The Fitness Check will assess whether the objectives of the covered directives have 
been efficiently achieved and fully delivered, and whether the directives have 
efficiently achieved consumer protection and market integration objectives. It will 
analyse whether they have usefully contributed to the Single Market by enhancing 
consumers' trust, as well as by removing unjustified regulatory obstacles hindering 
cross-border trade in goods and services. 
In addition, the Fitness Check will assess the complexity and potential for 
rationalisation and improving coherence as well as simplification of the current 
regulatory framework and the reduction of regulatory costs and burdens including 
administrative burdens, while guaranteeing a high level of consumer protection. The 
Fitness Check will also explore whether and to what extent codification or recast of EU 
consumer law into a horizontal EU instrument could bring added clarity, remove 
overlaps, and fill any gaps in order to increase transparency, legal certainty and 
accessibility of the EU acquis in this area. 
The Fitness Check will also identify and recommend ways to facilitate uniform 
enforcement and application of the consumer law directives, for instance through 
further harmonisation, targeted legislative adjustments on procedural aspects and/or 
further guidance for enforcement authorities and stakeholders, self- and co-regulatory 
actions and awareness-raising/training activities. In this respect the Fitness Check will 
consider different aspects of private and public enforcement in particular in domestic 
context. The Fitness Check will further assess how well these legal instruments fit 
within the entire EU regulatory framework in this policy area and sector. 
Several studies are undertaken by the Commission to support the Fitness Check and 
the evaluation of the Consumer Rights Directive. These include: 
• A consumer market study to support the Fitness Check (lot 3) which explores 
to what extent consumers are aware of their rights, are willing and able to 
make use of them, what is the nature and prevalence of problems consumers 
encounter when executing their rights, and what benefits the respective EU law 
instruments bring to consumers; 
• A separate evaluation study of the Consumer Rights Directive, which will feed 
into the Report on the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive; 
• The evaluation study of the Sales and Guarantee Directive (lot 2), which 
assesses the costs and benefits for consumers and traders of aligning the rules 
of the Directive for face-to-face sales of goods to those in the proposed 
Directive on online and other distance sales of goods (which is part of the 
Digital Contracts Proposals);3  
• The present study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law (lot 1 or 
'main study') dealing with the remaining five of the six above-mentioned 
directives subject to Fitness Check. 
The studies are interlinked and serve the overall goal of creating a solid evidence base 
for the Fitness Check.  
2.2. Objectives and thematic scope 
As indicated in the TOR, this evaluation study supports the European Commission’s 
Fitness Check on EU consumer law and assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, 
                                           
3 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/digital-contract-rules/index_en.htm. 
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coherence, relevance and EU added value of the following five EU consumer and 
marketing law directives in line with market and technology developments: 
• Unfair Contract Terms Directive; 
• Unfair Commercial Practices Directive; 
• Price Indication Directive; 
• Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive; and 
• Injunctions Directive. 
The TOR highlight that while the Consumer Rights Directive is not covered by the 
present study as it is subject to a separate evaluation, the present study needs as part 
of the coherence assessment to examine specific aspects of interplay between the 
Consumer Rights Directive and the five directives covered in this study. Furthermore, 
the evaluation of the Sales and Guarantee Directive is carried out through a separate 
study, due to requirements linked to the adoption of the Commission proposal on 
online and other distance sales of goods on 9 December 2015. 
As indicated in the TOR, the present study also addresses the interplay between the 
directives subject to this study with the existing sector-specific consumer protection 
rules in passenger transport, electronic communications, energy and consumer 
financial services and the relevant rules in the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC and 
Services Directive 2006/123/EC. 
2.3. Geographical coverage and time period  
The evaluation study covers the EU 28 and its methodology ensures a geographically 
balanced representation of Member States' authorities, businesses and consumers, 
while providing (insofar as possible) quantifiable and representative results.  
The evaluation covers the current situation, also considering developments in the 
recent past that are relevant for the assessment. 
2.4. Tasks to be performed 
The TOR define six main tasks, of which several consist of multiple sub-tasks, and 
relate to the general and specific evaluation questions presented in the next section. 
The six tasks are: 
• Legal analysis (Task 1); 
• Literature review (Task 2); 
• Consultation – interviews, surveys, stakeholder events and case study 
interviews (Task 3); 
• Costs and benefits analysis (Task 4); 
• Recommendations for future action (Task 5); 
• Establishing problem definition and baseline scenario (Task 6). 
They are described in more detail in the table on the following pages. 
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Table 1: Overview of tasks for the study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law as provided in Terms of Reference 
Task Description  Sub-tasks/details 
1. Legal analysis To respond to the general and specific evaluation questions, the Contractor 
will carry out an analysis of the national horizontal and sector-specific, both 
substantive and procedural consumer law, and civil and commercial law and 
case law, i.e., enforcement decisions of national authorities (consumer 
protection and sector specific regulators) and court rulings, in the 28 EU 
Member States.  
The Contractor will use the information contained in the Commission's 
Consumer Law Databases (Consumer Law Compendium, Unfair Commercial 
Practices databases) and updated information. The Contractor should also 
use the available national case-law databases. 
The analysis should include, for example, comparison of how many 
business-to-consumer (B2C) disputes have been decided by the national 
jurisdictions on the basis of Consumer law directives covered by this study 
in comparison with the total B2C disputes decided on the basis of other 
national legislation. Regarding the transposition of the directives covered 
by this Study into national law, the Contractor will: 
- Produce an overview of the national laws transposing the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Price 
Indication Directive and the Injunctions Directive. Except to the extent 
necessary to fulfil this task, the contractor will not engage in a general 
transposition check of the national transposition laws. 
- On the basis of the texts of national law provisions to be supplied by the 
Commission, the Contractor will provide an overview of national laws of the 
Member States going beyond the minimum harmonisation requirements of 
the directives covered by this study; 
- Update the available information on the national law requirements going 
beyond the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in the areas of 
immovable property and financial services; 
- Update the information on Member States which have entirely or partly 
applied the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B transactions and 
to business transactions with other entities (legal persons, such as schools, 
hospitals, NGOs, civic associations or unions of flat owners, who are acting 
for not-for-profit purposes but do not qualify as "consumers" under the 
current definition). The Contractor will, in particular, update the 
information used in the 2013 Communication and Report of the 
Commission and will take into account the national transposition rules of 
the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive; 
- Update the available information on the transposition and national law 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
 
Civic Consulting  13 
requirements going beyond the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive, where those measures are not an application of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive to B2B; 
- Analyse national laws and self-regulatory measures that control the 
fairness of B2B relations in a way comparable with the rules of the Unfair 
Contracts Terms Directive, including in specific sectors, such as the food 
supply chain, where specific legislative and self-regulatory measures have 
been introduced, and in business transactions with the other above-




To respond to the general and specific evaluation questions, the Contractor 
will analyse the available (both online and offline) legal literature in the 28 
Member States, such as reports by public authorities, consumer and business 
organisations, academic organisations and legal practitioners. The Contractor 
will also analyse relevant reports produced in third countries and international 
organisations which deal with EU consumer law, in particular insofar as they 
describe any effects of EU consumer law on the development of consumer 
protection outside EU. 
Furthermore, the Contractor will analyse the available recent studies and 
surveys to assess and give an overview of the level of traders' and 
consumers' awareness of the rules in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive and the Price Indication Directive, as in particular 
demonstrated by their practical application. 
For each of these directives, the Contractor will also analyse the available 
(both online and offline) sources, at EU level (in particular, Eurobarometer 
surveys, consumer market and conditions scoreboards, other reports) and 
at national level (in particular, reports by enforcement authorities, 
academic research) to compare the situation before their adoption with the 
developments after their adoption and at present. This should include the 
consumer welfare, the level of compliance of businesses, factors that have 
either contributed or stood in the way of achieving their objectives and any 
other major effects. 
Furthermore, using the available resources (such as the ECC reports, 
harmonised complaints database52, Eurobarometer surveys, consumer 
market and conditions scoreboards, other reports) the Contractor will 
establish the trends and evolution of consumer problems within the scope 
of these four Directives – both per directive and subject area whenever 
possible (for example, problems related to unfair commercial practices in 
the energy or in the travel sector). 
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events and case 
study interviews 
To respond to the general and specific evaluation questions, the Contractor 
will carry out as a minimum the following data collection activities in the 28 
Member States, based on questionnaires to be prepared in coordination with 
the Commission: 
- Interview national consumer enforcement authorities, responsible ministries 
and the relevant national regulatory authorities in the selected areas where 
sector-specific EU consumer protection rules exist as well as the European 
Consumer Centres (ECCs); 
- Interview national consumer associations (as well as their EU umbrella 
associations), including associations active in the selected areas where sector-
specific EU consumer protection rules exist; 
- Interview business associations (as well as their EU umbrella associations), 
including associations in the selected areas subject to sector-specific EU 
consumer protection rules (i.e., all major business organisations in each of the 
Member States); 
- Perform "case studies" with individual companies: at least 5 small-size and 5 
micro companies per Member State, active in retail trade and e-commerce as 
well as trading cross-border in the EU. 
The Contractor will prepare, in coordination with the Commission, an 
appropriate questionnaire for each target group. 
A consumer survey (as well as mystery shopping and behavioural 
experiments) on the issues covered in the general and specific evaluation 
questions will be carried by means of a separate study (Consumer Market 
Study). The Commission will provide the Contractor with the outcomes of 
these activities that the Contractor will integrate into its conclusions.  
In the course of the study the Contractor will participate in two stakeholder 
events in Brussels (at the Commission's premises) dedicated to the 
presentation and discussion of 2nd interim report of the study: (1) a 
workshop with the Member States' authorities (provisional time – 
beginning October 2016), and (2) the "Consumer Summit" organised by the 
Commission and dealing with the Fitness Check (provisional dates – 19–20 
October 2016). 
For both events, in consultation with the Commission, the Contractor will 
provide for up to 5 senior speakers (covering their full individual costs) who 
will deliver detailed presentations and, where necessary, moderate certain 
discussions. The Contractor will prepare synthesis reports of these 
stakeholder events and will take their conclusions into account in the final 
report of the study. 
The Commission will organise an online public consultation of 12 weeks. 
The Contractor will translate the replies received in languages other than 
EN, FR, DE into English, analyse and summarise the responses submitted in 
this public consultation. It will prepare a separate analysis of this online 
public consultation (not exceeding 10 pages) for integration into the final 
report. 
Furthermore, the Contractor will draw up the overall synopsis report (not 
exceeding 10 pages, also to be integrated in the final report) covering the 
results of all the different consultation activities that it undertook directly 
as well as those activities in which it was involved (i.e. the online public 
consultation, stakeholder workshops). The synopsis report must consist of 
the following elements: 
Documentation of each consultation activity undertaken, 
Information on which stakeholder groups participated, which interests they 
represented and whether all identified stakeholder groups have been 
reached, 
Description of the results of each consultation activity and, if different 
consultation activities have been undertaken on the same consultation 
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scope, a comparison of their results including interdependencies, 
consistencies or contradictions, 
For ad hoc contributions received outside the formal consultation context, a 
description of the origin of the contributions received including 
identification of the type of stakeholder and their represented interests, 
Feedback on how the results of the consultation have fed into the report. 
In carrying out these consultation activities and in producing the respective 
documents, the Contractor will co-operate closely with the other 
contractors involved in the complementary studies that contribute to the 
Fitness Check mentioned above, including in integrating their output in the 
documents and reports that it will produce. 
4. Costs and 
benefits analysis 
The objective of this analysis is to respond both on a monetary and non-
monetary basis (on economic, social, and environmental aspects) to the 
general and specific evaluation questions to support the assessment of the 
implementation of the individual directives, as well as their combined impact. 
No additional sub-tasks or details provided in the TOR. 
5. 
Recommendations 
for future action  
 
On the basis of the overall findings of the study, the Contractor will make 
recommendations for EU legislative and/or non-legislative actions as regards 
identified gaps, obsolete provisions or codification and recast needs of the 
current rules. In each case, the Contractor will carefully weigh the pros and 
cons. The analysis shall be backed by legal and, where appropriate, economic 
and policy-based arguments assessing the overall expected impacts of the 
different recommendations. 





For this task the contractor will follow the latest Better Regulation Guidelines 
(2015) and the accompanying Toolbox which provides complementary 
guidance on specific impact assessment elements. Based on the results of the 
data gathering and in consultation with the Commission, in the context of this 
task the Contractor will provide: 
1) Description of the problem and why is it a problem (problem definition); 
2) Description of the baseline scenario, i.e. no change to the existing rules 
The problem definition will consider the following aspects: 
What is the issue or problem that may require action? What is the size of 
the problem? 
Why is it a problem? What are the main drivers? 
Who is affected by the problem, in what ways, and to what extent? 
What is the EU dimension of the problem? 
How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? 
Source: Civic Consulting, based on TOR. 
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3. Background of the evaluation 
In this section we describe the background of the Fitness Check. We describe the 
development of the EU consumer acquis before the Fitness Check, the directives 
subject to analysis, and the legal framework and lifecycle of a commercial transaction.  
3.1. Development of the EU consumer acquis until the Fitness Check 
The EU consumer acquis developed in several phases. At the outset, under the 
principle of unanimity, minimum harmonisation directives with little detail were 
adopted. After the Single European Act and the introduction of majority voting in the 
area of internal market, the level of detail of consumer legislation increased greatly. 
The last phase, beginning roughly with the E-Commerce Directive of 2000, was 
marked by the trend towards total harmonisation where Member States could agree 
on a single set of rules. 
The step by step development of EU consumer law had led to inconsistencies in the 
legal framework. Moreover, market studies revealed that in many areas of business, 
cross-border trade and therefore the internal market developed only slowly. Therefore, 
since the 2000s, the EU has attempted to make the system of EU law more coherent, 
one result of which was the Consumer Rights Directive of 2011 with horizontal rules 
for a number of core issues of consumer law, such as the notion of consumer. 
At the same time, it became clear that rules for “normal” goods and services do not 
always fit for financial services, and while there are still common features of “normal” 
consumer law and financial services law, the recent trend has been to deal with them 
in separate legislation, which was, for example, marked by the exemption of financial 
services from the scope of application of the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU 
and also from their different treatment in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
2005/29/EC. Similarly, special rules have been adopted for consumer protection in the 
area of services of general interest because services such as the supply with energy 
and the provision of telecommunication services show some special features as 
compared with “normal” goods and services. 
The special treatment of financial services was also the result of behavioural research 
that provides evidence for special vulnerabilities of consumers in general but 
particularly in that area. Increasing knowledge of “irrational” behaviour of consumers 
is also considered in EU legislation, in particular through the recognition of the 
“vulnerable consumer” in the UCPD but also in other areas of consumer law. 
Assessments of the (then existing) Consumer Acquis have been made before, in 
particular with the Commission's 2007 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer 
Acquis, which prepared the ground for the subsequent proposal for the Consumer 
Rights Directive, and with the Consumer Law Compendium of 2008. That review, 
however, was limited to consumer contract law, while the law of unfair competition 
was, again, developed separately, although instruments of EU consumer contract law 
and of unfair commercial practices law overlap, in particular in regulating the pre-
contractual phase. 
Finally, societal and technological developments, and in particular the “digital 
revolution”, trigger the need for a new and broader assessment of the suitability, or 
“fitness”, of the current legal framework to achieve its goals. 
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3.2. The directives subject to this study 
Five directives are subject to this study: the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
93/13/EEC, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC, the Price Indication 
Directive 98/6/EC, the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive 
2006/114/EC, and the Injunctions Directive 2009/22/EC. Of course, as indicated 
above, these legislative acts cannot be assessed in isolation of each other but also of 
other legislation which does not form part of this assessment, in particular the 
Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EC and the Consumer Sales and Guarantees 
Directive 1999/44/EC. 
Only the Unfair Contract Terms Directive belongs to the area of consumer contract 
law. It protects consumers against the use by traders of standard contract terms 
which are considered to be unfair (see box below for more details). It has been 
reviewed several times, first in 1999 at which time already recommendations were 
made on its improvement, and again in the above-mentioned review of the Consumer 
Acquis.  
The Directive also has, in the interpretation of the Court of Justice, a strong procedural 
dimension. It is within this dimension that it overlaps to a certain extent with the 
Injunctions Directive 2009/22/EC, although the procedural elements of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive reflect the weaker position of consumers rather than 
qualified entities. 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EE, UCTD) 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive applies to business-to-consumer transactions. The 
UCTD protects consumers against the use by traders of standard (not individually 
negotiated) contract terms which, contrary to the requirement of good faith, create a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer. Unfair terms are not binding on the consumer. 
In addition, the Directive requires written contract terms to be drafted in plain and 
intelligible language. Contract terms whose meaning is unclear must be interpreted as 
favourably as possible for the consumer, and contract terms which are not transparent 
and do not allow consumers to understand their rights and obligations under the 
contract may be considered as unfair. 
The UCTD applies to both online and offline environments, and to all products, 
including digital content. It contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of standard 
terms that may be considered as unfair. 
The UCTD is a minimum harmonisation instrument and Member States can provide in 
their national legislation for stricter consumer protection rules. Many of them have 
used this possibility by, for example, introducing ‘black lists’ of unfair terms (contract 
terms considered unfair in all circumstances) and/or ‘grey lists’ of contract terms 
(terms presumed to be unfair unless proven to the contrary). 
 
The Injunctions Directive was first adopted in 1998 and recast in 2009. It imposes on 
Member States the obligation to enable so-called ‘qualified entities’ to seek an 
injunction in front of a court or of an administrative authority to stop an act contrary 
to the EU consumer laws, which harms the collective interests of consumers (see box 
below for more details).  
Being from the same phase of EU consumer law as the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, the Injunctions Directive is a minimum harmonisation instrument, and 
Member States have introduced a variety of collective instruments with effects beyond 
injunctions; an issue that the European Commission has taken up in its 2013 
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Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted 
under Union Law. 
Moreover, private and public law enforcement under the Injunctions Directive has 
been complemented, at the EU level, with the regime of the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Regulation. 
Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC, ID) 
The Injunctions Directive imposes on Member States the obligation to enable qualified 
entities (in particular consumer organisations and/or public bodies) to seek an 
injunction in front of a court or of an administrative authority to stop an act contrary 
to the EU consumer laws (as listed in the Annex to the Directive and as transposed 
into national legal orders of the Member States), which harms the collective interests 
of consumers. Accordingly, the Injunctions Directive provides for a tool of enforcement 
of the consumers' rights granted, among others, by the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, the Sales and Guarantees Directive, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and 
the Consumer Rights Directive.  
It also facilitates the use of injunctions in a cross-border context by allowing a 
qualified entity from one Member State to seek an injunction in another Member State 
where the infringement originated.  
 
Both the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the Injunctions Directive interact, or 
overlap, with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC, and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive also interacts in many ways with other consumer 
contract law instruments such as the Consumer Rights Directive and the Consumer 
Sales and Guarantees Directive. 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive protects consumers against practices by 
businesses which are contrary to requirements of professional diligence and which 
affect consumer behaviour, such as misleading and aggressive commercial practices 
(see box below for more details).  
The Directive interacts with all consumer contract law directives that provide for pre-
contractual information obligations in that it treats a breach of such duties as a 
misleading omission. Moreover, in the case of Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság, the 
Court of Justice has treated erroneous information in an individual case as an unfair 
commercial practice in the terms of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. At the 
same time, at least under some national case law, the use of unfair contract terms 
constitutes an unfair commercial practice in the terms of Directive 2005/29/EC, and 
the same was held to apply to breaches of the Consumer Sales and Guarantees 
Directive. Consequently, the remedies of both the consumer contract law directives 
and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive apply to such breaches. Moreover, the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive is one of the legislative acts which can be 
enforced by use of the Injunctions Directive. 
Member States have adopted or maintained additional rules in the areas of financial 
services and immovable property (which are exempted from the full harmonisation 
approach of the Directive), and also the EU has adopted sector specific legislation in 
these areas such as the Consumer Credit Directive. Moreover, some Member States 
have extended the personal scope of application of the Directive by using the same or 
similar rules for business-to-business relationships. 
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Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC, UCPD) 
The UCPD applies to business-to-consumer transactions. It applies to all commercial 
practices before, during and after the transaction, including in the online environment, 
and to all products, including digital ones. It provides for full harmonisation of Member 
States' legislation that protects consumers against unfair commercial practices 
harming consumers' economic interests, with the exception of the areas of financial 
services and immovable property, where Member States may go further than the 
Directive.  
The Directive protects consumers against unfair commercial practices of traders by: 
providing, in Annex I, a black-list of 31 specific commercial practices which are 
prohibited in all circumstances; prohibiting commercial practices which are considered 
as misleading or aggressive; and prohibiting unfair commercial practices that are 
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence. 
In order to qualify as misleading, aggressive or contrary to the requirements of 
professional diligence, a commercial practice must cause or be likely to cause an 
average consumer to take a transactional decision that he/she would not have taken 
otherwise. This is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis by the competent national 
bodies. The UCPD requires traders to provide consumers with information that they 
need to take an informed transactional decision. In addition, it provides a specific list 
of information requirements for the ‘invitation to purchase’. 
The unfairness of a commercial practice is assessed against the ‘average consumer’ 
benchmark, which has been developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The average 
consumer is ‘reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’, 
taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors. If a commercial practice is 
directed at a particular group of consumers then an average member of that group is 
the benchmark. The Directive also provides specific protection for certain groups of 
consumers defined as particularly vulnerable. 
 
Business-to-business relationships are partially addressed by the Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive 2006/114/EC. Being the successor of the Misleading 
Advertising Directive of 1984 as amended in 1997, its substantive scope of application 
is much more limited than the one of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (see 
box below for more details).  
Overlaps with the regime of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can stem from 
two reasons: First, as mentioned above, some Member States have extended the 
regime of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to business-to-non consumer 
relationships. Second, by using unfair commercial practices against consumers, 
businesses may also violate the interests of their honest competitors, thus, of other 
businesses.  
Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive (2006/114/EC, MCAD) 
The MCAD provides a minimum legal standard of protection of businesses against 
misleading marketing. Member States can provide in their national legislation for 
stricter rules to protect businesses in this area.  
The MCAD also lays down fully harmonised uniform rules on comparative advertising 
ensuring that it compares "like with like", is objective, does not denigrate or discredit 
other companies' trademarks and does not create confusion among traders. Whilst the 
latter rules have fully harmonised the law of the Member States, the rules on 
misleading advertising constitute a minimum standard.  
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As a number of consumer contract law directives and the directives dealing with unfair 
commercial practices, the Price Indication Directive applies at the pre-contractual 
stage. The Price Indication Directive deals with the indication of the selling price and 
the price per unit of measurement of products (see box below for more details).  
It is a minimum harmonisation directive which also includes important regulatory 
options that many Member States have used in their national implementation, and the 
2006 Communication on the Price Indication Directive concluded that due to extensive 
use of those options, the national price indication rules diverge significantly. 
Price Indication Directive (98/6/EC, PID) 
The PID requires traders to indicate the selling price and the price per unit of 
measurement of products offered to consumers, both at the marketing and pre-
contractual stages. The objectives of this Directive are to improve consumer 
information and to facilitate comparison of prices; objectives that are also pursued 
with pre-contractual information obligations.   
The PID provides for minimum rules and it also includes regulatory options for Member 
States to derogate from its requirements, in particular the option to exempt small 
businesses from the obligation to indicate the unit price. 
 
3.3. Legal framework and lifecycle of a commercial transaction  
As the TOR indicate, the five Directives analysed in this Fitness check overlap on the 
time-scale of the lifecycle of a commercial transaction, and they also overlap with 
other EU consumer legislation such as the Consumer Rights Directive.  
Several phases of a commercial transaction can be distinguished, as is depicted in the 
following figure. 
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Figure 1: lifecycle of a commercial transaction 
 
Source: Civic Consulting based on TOR. 
First, there is the stage of promotion and marketing at which the potential contracting 
partner is still unknown. This stage is covered, in business-to-consumer relationships, 
thus when it comes to marketing towards consumers, by the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, otherwise by the (less comprehensive) Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive. If a commercial communication is addressed to 
both consumers and non-consumers, both directives apply cumulatively. 
The Price Indication Directive applies cumulatively with the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, as it deals with the indication of prices with products offered by 
traders to consumers, including during the advertisement stage. As the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive, it aims at improving consumer information, and in 
particular at facilitating the comparison of prices. 
Those general rules are complemented by sector specific advertising rules, such as the 
advertisement rules of the Consumer Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit 
Directive. Moreover, the E-Commerce Directive provides for certain rules that apply 
even before the pre-contractual stage. 
Once the trader offers to purchase a specific product at a stated price, specific 
information obligations of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive for “invitations to 
purchase” come into play. In the pre-contractual stage, they overlap with pre-
contractual information obligations that form part of almost all consumer contract law 
Directives, in particular the Consumer Rights Directive, the Timeshare Directive, the 
Package Travel Directive and all the directives related to financial services, such as 
consumer credit, mortgage credit and payment services. Moreover, the Price 
Indication Directive still applies. Beyond information, rules on specific commercial 
practices such as tying and bundling can be found in sector specific legislation, such as 
Directive 2014/92/EU in relation to basic bank accounts, whilst they are also subject 
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The second phase of a commercial transaction indicated in the figure above is the 
conclusion of the contract, i.e. the formation, the form, the effect and validity of a 
contract. Specific issues regarding the conclusion of B2C contracts (such as the 
confirmation of the contract) are regulated by the Consumer Rights Directive and the 
E-Commerce Directive. 
Rules that apply during the performance of a contract (the third stage of a B2C 
commercial transaction indicated in the figure above) or in the case of non-conformity 
of goods or services with the contract, are dealt with by, for example, the Consumer 
Sales and Guarantees Directive, by financial services legislation such as the Consumer 
Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive and by services of general interest 
legislation such as the Electricity Market Directive or the Gas Market Directive. 
Moreover, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is of great relevance as it deals with the 
fairness and therefore validity of contract terms that regulate the rights and 
obligations of parties during the contract. 
As mentioned above, non-compliance with rules on the contractual stage may at the 
same time constitute an unfair commercial practice, which was one of the novelties 
introduced with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, however, does not (expressly) require Member States to afford the 
individual concerned a remedy. Thus, the same situation may not only come under 
different remedial systems but those remedies may also be pursued by different 
actors. 
In the situation where a dispute between the parties arises, EU law provides for a 
number of instruments including the ADR Directive, which covers disputes concerning 
contractual obligations stemming from sales or service contracts between EU 
consumers and traders, and the ODR Regulation, under which the European 
Commission launched the ODR platform. The other directives do not normally deal 
with this situation except that they require Member States to provide for effective 
penalties and sanctions for the breach of the provisions of a particular legislative act 
that can then be interpreted as the necessity of an effective remedy, as in the recent 
consumer credit law case of LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais.  
In contrast, this is not the realm of the Injunctions Directive that applies 
independently from a dispute between the parties of an individual contract. The 
Injunctions Directive lies somewhat besides the life-cycle of a particular transaction 
since it addresses structural problems at all stages of that life-cycle but at a collective 
level (the cross-cutting nature is indicated in the figure). Thus, with an injunction 
under the Injunctions Directive, a qualified entity may address, for instance, 
misleading lottery advertising, incorrect pre-contractual information or unlawful 
contractual conduct. 
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4. Evaluation themes and questions 
In this section, we provide an analytical summary of the general and specific 
evaluation questions. 
The TOR set out 17 general evaluation questions for the Fitness Check which serve as 
a basis for the 99 specific evaluation questions for the study, grouped into 14 
evaluation themes under the five evaluation criteria effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence, relevance and EU added value. The specific evaluation questions refer to 
the five directives covered by the study or are cross-cutting in nature and form the 
overall structure for the evaluation.  
For an overview of general and specific evaluation questions, please refer to the 
following table. 
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Table 2: Overview of general and specific evaluation questions for the Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law  
Evaluation 
criteria 
General Evaluation Questions in the Terms of 
Reference 
Evaluation themes Specific Evaluation Questions in 
the Terms of Reference 
Effectiveness  What progress has been made over time towards achieving the 
objectives of the directives subject to Fitness Check? Is this 
progress in line with the initial expectations? 
 What is the level of compliance of businesses with their 
provisions? 
 Which main factors (e.g. implementation by Member States, 
action by stakeholders) have contributed to or stood in the way of 
achieving these objectives? 
 Beyond these objectives, have these instruments led to any other 
significant changes, both positive and negative? 
Practical effectiveness of current rules: Rules 
for consumer protection 
UCTD: 6 Evaluation Questions (EQs) 
UCPD: 8 EQs 
PID: 2 EQs 
ID: 6 EQs  
Practical effectiveness of current rules: Rules 
for business protection 
MCAD: 7 EQs 
Practical effectiveness of the current rules in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
Cross-cutting: 2 EQs 
UCTD: 3 EQs 
UCPD: 3 EQs 
MCAD: 4 EQs 
ID: 3 EQS 
Efficiency  What are the costs and benefits (monetary and non-monetary) 
associated with the application of these legal instruments in the 
Member States? 
 What good practices in terms of their cost-effective application 
can be identified? 
 What, if any, specific provisions in these instruments can be 
identified that make a cost-effective implementation more 
difficult and hamper the maximisation of the benefits? In 
particular, what is the (unnecessary/cumulative) regulatory 
burden identified? 
 What are the specific challenges to SMEs, in particular micro 
enterprises, with respect to the implementation of these 
instruments? 
Costs and benefits for consumers 2 EQs  
Costs and benefits for traders 6 EQs 
Coherence 
 
 To what extent have the general principles and requirements set 
out in these legal instruments contributed to the coherence of 
consumer protection policy? To what extent have they proved 
Interplay amongst the information 
requirements in the horizontal consumer law 
instruments 
5 EQs 
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complementary to other Union initiatives in the area of consumer 
protection? 
 What, if any, specific inconsistencies and unjustified overlaps, 
obsolete provisions and/or gaps can be identified in relation to 
the entire EU regulatory framework in this policy area, including 
the forthcoming rules on online and other distance sales of goods 
under the DSM Strategy, and other pieces of Union legislation? 
How do they affect the application/performance of these 
instruments? 
 How do the general EU regulatory framework and the interactions 
between the different instruments subject to Fitness Check affect 
their separate and overall impacts? 
Interplay between the Injunctions Directive 
and other enforcement instruments of 
consumer law 
4 EQs 
Interplay with other EU horizontal legislation 
with a consumer dimension 
2 EQs 
Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer 
protection legislation 
4 EQs 
Relevance  To what extent are the objectives of these instruments still 
relevant and valid? Are there any other objectives that should be 
considered in view of current needs and trends in consumer 
behaviour and in the markets? 
Relevance for transactions other than 
business-to-consumer (B2C) 
UCPD/MCAD: 7 EQs 
UCTD: 8 EQs 
Cross-cutting: 3 EQs 
Potential codification or recast* 3 EQs 
Relevance of the Injunctions procedure ID: 2 EQs (with a total of 11 sub-
questions/items) 
Contractual consequences of unfair 
commercial practices 
3 EQs 




 What has been the EU added value of the consumer law 
directives in the context of national horizontal and sector-specific, 
both substantive and procedural consumer law, and civil and 
commercial law? 
 3 EQs 
Total 17 general EQs  99 specific EQs 
Source: Civic Consulting, based on TOR. (*) Note: While this table reflects the EQs and their structure provided in the TOR, the issue of whether a single horizontal EU instrument could bring added 
clarity, remove overlaps and fill the identified gaps in the existing rules is presented separately in the evaluation due to its general nature and importance for simplification and legal certainty. It has 
also been clarified that the discussion of coherence will consider the issue of cross-border enforcement co-operation, and that information regarding administrative burdens/compliance costs 
reported in the business interviews will be considered in the discussion of efficiency and resulting recommendations.
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5. Methodology  
In this section we provide an overview of the methodological approaches applied for 
implementing the evaluation and addressing the specific tasks provided in the Terms 
of Reference.  
5.1. Structuring the evaluation 
The aims of the structuring phase of the study were to conduct an initial literature 
review and exploratory interviews concerning the functioning of the EU consumer and 
marketing law framework, to refine the intervention logic for the evaluation and to 
finalise the methodological approach and related tools for the next project phases.  
A total of seventeen exploratory interviews were conducted with EC policy officers and 
key stakeholders. During this stage, we also informed key stakeholder organisations at 
both EU and national levels by email about the evaluation and the consultation tools 
planned in the framework of this study. Concurrently, the Commission informed 
members of the Consumer Policy Network (CPN), of the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation network (CPC), of the European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG) 
and of the European Consumer Centres (ECCs) about the launch of the online public 
consultation for the Fitness Check of consumer and marketing law and about the 
studies undertaken by the Commission, including the present study.4 
The intervention logic of the EU consumer and marketing law Directives was refined in 
light of the results of the exploratory research and discussion with the Commission to 
ensure an in-depth understanding of the context within which the Directives were 
adopted, the underlying ‘theory’ of the intervention (how it was expected to work), 
and their practical implementation, including possible implementation issues at the 
Member State level. The analytical framework for the evaluation was also revised in 
light of the exploratory research. The intervention logic of the EU consumer law and 
marketing Directives is presented in Annex VI and the analytical framework of the 
evaluation is presented in Annex VII. 
Based on the results of the structuring phase, the evaluation team confirmed the 
applicability of the methodological approach and prepared the methodological tools, 
such as questionnaires for interviews, and for the survey of qualified entities (see 
below). 
5.2. Legal analysis 
The study comprises country-level legal analysis of the national horizontal and sector-
specific consumer law (both substantial and procedural), civil and commercial law, and 
case law in all 28 Member States as well as a cross-cutting EU level legal analysis. 
For each Member State, the country-level legal analysis was conducted by a legal 
expert (in some cases complemented by a second legal expert or researcher) who 
collected information from the following three main sources: 
                                           
4 For further details, please refer to the synopsis report. 
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• Review of national legal provisions, case law, reports of the Member State’s 
enforcement authorities, etc.; 
• Literature review for the Member State; 
• Interviews with responsible ministries and authorities, consumer 
organisations and ECCs, sectoral regulatory authorities and business 
associations. 
The legal country experts documented the results of their analysis in a reporting 
template, including fact sheets on the transposition of the five Directives and a specific 
table regarding the implementation of the Injunctions Directive.  
The country reports were reviewed and edited following an extensive quality 
assurance protocol, including the application of a check list of quality criteria, a peer 
review by a key legal expert and an English language check.  
The information from the country reports was then processed for use in the cross-
cutting analysis, with the results of the legal analysis at country level directly 
informing the EU level legal analysis. 
5.3. Literature review  
The purpose of the literature review was to analyse the available legal literature, 
analyse studies and surveys to assess the level of traders' and consumers' awareness 
of the rules in the Directives subject to the study, compare the situation before the 
adoption of the Directives with the developments after their adoption and at present, 
and establish trends and evolution of consumer problems within the scope of the 
Directives.  
Throughout the study phases, we identified and reviewed relevant literature, 
including: 
• Cross-cutting and comparative/EU-level reports and analyses; 
• Data sources at the EU and national level for the analysis of levels of 
awareness and key trends since the adoption of key Directives;5 and 
• Relevant literature for each Member State, as the literature review at country-
level was one of the main sources of information for the legal analysis.  
The complete list of the literature reviewed is presented in Annex I. 
5.4. Consultation 
The following data collection activities were carried out as part of the consultation task 
for this study based on tailored questionnaires developed for each target group in 
coordination with the Commission: 
• Interviews with national consumer enforcement authorities, responsible 
ministries and the relevant national regulatory authorities in the selected areas 
where sector-specific EU consumer protection rules exist as well as the 
European Consumer Centres (ECCs) in all 28 Member States; 
                                           
5 For the full results of the analysis of levels of awareness and key trends, please refer to Annex VIII. 
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• Interviews with national consumer associations in all 28 Member States as well 
as their EU umbrella associations, including associations in the selected areas 
subject to sector-specific EU consumer protection rules; 
• Interviews with business associations in all 28 Member States as well as their 
EU umbrella associations, including associations in the selected areas subject to 
sector-specific EU consumer protection rules; 
• Sectoral business interviews with individual companies in all 28 Member 
States; 
• Evidence collection survey of qualified entities.  
The questionnaires are presented in Part 4 of this report. 
Legal country experts and researchers in the Member States contacted responsible 
ministries and authorities, consumer organisations and ECCs, sectoral regulatory 
authorities and business associations by phone or face-to-face,6 and conducted 243 
interviews in total. The results of these interviews fed into the country-level legal 
analysis, which was further analysed and synthesised at the EU level in the cross-
cutting analysis. The list of interviews conducted with relevant organisations in the 
framework of this evaluation is presented in Annex II. 
Business interviews targeting companies in five sectors (large household appliances, 
electronic and ICT products, gas and electricity services, telecommunication services, 
and pre-packaged food and detergents) were conducted to better understand their 
experience with legislation regarding advertising, marketing, standard contract terms 
and price indication, and to collect data concerning related costs and benefits. The 
exercise started in June 2016, and due to low response rates in some countries, the 
deadline for participation had to be extended several times. The interviews were 
conducted by phone using a questionnaire that was developed on the basis of the 
exploratory research and tested during test interviews with businesses.7 The final 
version of the business interview questionnaire is presented in Part 4 of this report. In 
total, 282 business interviews were completed, checked for quality and analysed. The 
results of the business interviews are presented in Part 4 of this report and fed into 
the cross-cutting analysis of costs and benefits.  
The survey of qualified entities was implemented on an online platform and launched 
in June 2016. All the qualified entities identified on the basis of the 2016 Notification 
from the Commission concerning Article 4(3) of the Injunctions Directive and 
complementary research were invited by email to participate. In total, 29 qualified 
entities from 21 Member States completed the questionnaire. The results of the survey 
are presented in Part 4 of this report and fed into the cross-cutting analysis on the 
Injunctions Directive. 
Furthermore, from May to September 2016, the European Commission carried out an 
open public consultation for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law and 
covering also the evaluation of the Consumer Rights Directive. The 436 responses to 
the online survey received from stakeholders across the EU, as well as from non-EU 
countries, were analysed by the study team, both overall and by type of stakeholder. 
Additionally, the 55 open submissions received in the context of the consultation, 
either by email or submitted together with an online survey response, were reviewed 
in depth, categorised according to recurring topics, and summarised by key theme and 
                                           
6 The interviews lasted on average one to several hours, depending on the country and the interviewee. 
7 While the interview questionnaire was designed for interviews to last for around 25-30 minutes on 
average, interviewers often had to contact interviewees several times to complete the questionnaire and ask 
for clarifications. Information was also provided in writing. 
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by type of respondent. The report on the consultation results is presented as Part 2 of 
this report. 
Lastly, initial evaluation results were presented at the Consumer Summit organised by 
the European Commission on 17 October 2016.8  
5.5. Analysis of costs and benefits 
The data for the assessment of costs and benefits of the five Directives subject to this 
evaluation for businesses and consumers was collected from the following sources: 
• Literature review; 
• Sectoral business interviews; 
• Stakeholder interviews (at EU and country level); 
• Survey of qualified entities; 
• Country reporting; 
• Consumer survey to support the Fitness Check undertaken in Lot 3; 
• Eurobarometer survey data. 
The data collected via the different primary and secondary sources of information 
listed above was combined and analysed.  
We conducted a compliance cost analysis, distinguishing between the one-off costs 
incurred by businesses when entering another EU country’s market for the first time to 
sell the company’s products/services and the costs incurred on a regular basis by 
businesses for checking that the company’s advertising/marketing and standard 
contract terms still comply with national legislation, and adjusting business practices 
(if needed), and we extrapolated the results to the EU level. 
We also conducted a panel data analysis with the aim to conclude whether the 
identified changes towards achieving the objectives of the UCPD can be reasonably 
attributed to the Directive itself rather than to any other factors, by focusing on the 
outcome variables of consumer trust and cross-border shopping.  
The methodology and results of the specific analyses conducted for assessing the 
costs and benefits are presented in Part 4 of this report. 
5.6. Overall analysis, conclusions, and recommendations 
Evidence obtained from the different methodological tools served to answer the 
evaluation questions, arrive at conclusions, and develop recommendations for EU 
legislative and/or non-legislative actions as regards identified gaps, obsolete 
provisions or codification needs of the current rules.  
To prepare the basis for the overall analysis, we first processed and cross-checked the 
evidence collected under Tasks 1 to 4. This concerned stakeholder interviews, country 
reporting and country transposition fact sheets, data extracted from the literature, 
results of the open public consultation, data on costs and benefits, results of the 
survey of qualified entities, results of the panel data analysis, and other relevant 
                                           
8 The presentations as well as the outcomes of the workshops are available on the Consumer Summit 
webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=34204. 
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evidence collected. Having a clear overview of results obtained throughout the 
previous tasks separately, we started applying triangulation techniques to corroborate 
the findings across the tools applied. Throughout the study, the evaluation team 
verified the information collected and compared processed information with the source 
documents in order to safeguard the integrity of data and provide a sound evidence 
base for the further evaluation process. This process also allowed the evaluation team 
to identify gaps and contradictions in the data, which were subsequently addressed in 
follow-up correspondence with interviewees and members of the evaluation team. 
We also organised an online workshop on the concepts of 'consumer', 'average 
consumer' and 'vulnerable consumer' on 7 December 2016, where we presented initial 
conclusions of the evaluation regarding these concepts and insights from behavioural 
research, and discussed these results with experts in the areas of consumer policy and 
behaviour, economic decision-making, neuroscience, behavioural law and economics, 
and the key legal experts. The aim of the workshop was to consider whether these 
concepts as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence continue to be valid and fit for purpose and discuss possible options for 
improvement, if needed. We have taken the results of the workshop into account in 
the cross-cutting analysis and the related recommendations. The workshop document 
that was used as the basis for discussion is included in Part 4 of this report. 
The answers to the evaluation questions, the problem definition and the baseline 
scenario were established based on the results of the data gathering. In this process, 
we made sure that the conclusions reflected the findings of the evaluation and that the 
recommendations addressed the problems highlighted in the analysis.  
Further information regarding the methodological approaches applied is provided in 
the context of the specific report sections presenting results by methodological tool. 
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6. Answers to the evaluation questions  
In this section we present the cross-cutting analysis of the evaluation. It combines 
evidence collected from all methodological tools and provides detailed answers to the 
evaluation questions for each of the three analytical clusters: unfair commercial 
practices and marketing, contract conclusion and performance, and injunctions. The 
sections below provide answer to the evaluation questions concerning effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value.  
6.1. Effectiveness 
6.1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing 
 Effectiveness of the UCPD in contributing to a high level of consumer 6.1.1.1.
protection  
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive; 
 
The UCPD prohibits unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices and has a two-
layer structure, testing unfairness against: (i) an exhaustive black list of 31 per se 
misleading or aggressive practices; (ii) general prohibitions of misleading or 
aggressive practices or practices contrary to the requirements of professional diligence 
that affect the consumer' economic behaviour (transactional decisions). Importantly, 
the UCPD is based on full harmonisation, meaning that Member States must adopt 
national provisions replicating exactly the standard set by the Directive and amend or 
repeal national provisions that go further than the Directive.9 
Pursuant to Article 3(1), the UCPD covers all “business-to-consumer commercial 
practices … before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product”. 
The concept of “business-to-consumer commercial practices” (hereinafter also referred 
to as commercial practices) is defined particularly widely as “any act, omission, course 
of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and 
marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a 
product to consumers”. According to settled CJEU case law, this concept covers any 
“commercial acts which clearly form part of an operator’s commercial strategy and 
relate directly to the promotion thereof and its sales development.”10 The UCPD covers 
the full life-cycle of business-to-consumer commercial transactions, i.e. commercial 
practices at the time of promotion, negotiation, conclusion, performance and 
enforcement of the contract. In 2013, the European Commission conducted research 
into how the UCPD was implemented in the Member States and analysed problems in 
how the Directive was applied and enforced. In the resulting 2013 Communication on 
the application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Commission 
concluded that the Directive "has considerably improved consumer protection in and 
across the Member States, while better protecting legitimate businesses from 
competitors who do not play by the rules", and stated that the benefits of the 
Directive mainly stem from its horizontal "safety net" character and its combination of 
principle-based rules with a black list of unfair commercial practices.11  
                                           
9 See also the section of the background of the study. 
10 See the landmark judgment of the CJEU, Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, 23 April 2009, para 50, 
and subsequent UCPD case law. 
11 COM(2013) 138 final.  
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The reasoning behind the Directive's principle-based approach is focused on the 
inability of rigorous rules to regulate adequately each and every case. It allows 
combating of unfair practices that do not fall under any of the black listed items, and 
is ‘future-proof’ in that it allows national authorities and courts to adapt their 
assessments to the rapid evolution of new products, services and selling methods. 
This open text approach of the UCPD also offers leeway to competent authorities to 
develop their enforcement strategy. 
In practice, decisions of enforcement authorities and courts often involve an 
application of the principle-based approach of the Directive, as evidenced in the 
country research. It is, however, not possible to estimate the share of cases involving 
the principle-based approach of the general prohibitions in the total number of cases 
decided on basis of the UCPD. Even general statistical data on the practical application 
of the UCPD in Member States is scarce and often incomplete. In most Member States, 
quantitative court data and ADR statistics are either not available or do not provide a 
sufficient level of detail. Relevant data were available from only 11 countries (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, and 
Slovenia). In five of them, the share of disputes decided on basis of the UCPD was 
20% or more of all B2C cases. The highest share was reported from Estonia, where 
according to Consumer Complaints Committee statistics 98% of the 538 cases in 2015 
were decided on basis of the UCPD (i.e. 527 cases).12 In France, according to statistics 
of the national enforcement body (the DGCCRF) 28% of the 9 960 investigations in 
the same year were conducted on basis of the UCPD (i.e. 2 802 cases).13 Even in 
some countries with a low share of cases decided on basis of the UCPD, the absolute 
number of cases was considerable. For example in Portugal, it is estimated that 1% of 
relevant court cases (10 of 1 000) in 2015 were decided on basis of the UCPD, and 
5% of the ADR cases (750 of 15 000, including the so-called 'Peace Courts'). In other 
countries, though, the absolute number of B2C disputes documented was low (e.g. in 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia less than 30 cases were reported in total in each).14 
To some extent, the principle-based approach is considered to have contributed to 
enforcement difficulties. In the country research for this evaluation some enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders pointed to a key disadvantage: The principle-based 
approach may diminish legal certainty. While several Member States already had a 
principle-based approach within unfair marketing law before the UCPD (including 
Austria, Denmark, Germany) and do not report any problems with its application, in 
other Member States general clauses were at odds with their legal traditions since 
they leave much room for the judiciary to interpret the clauses at the expense of the 
legislator, as is reported from France. The openness of the clauses is reported to 
encourage traders to enter time-consuming discussions on the fairness of a practice 
and the outcome of an action is considered to be uncertain, discouraging enforcement 
bodies from taking action on the basis of the general clause.15 Consumer organisations 
also consider that the principle-based approach does not prevent certain practices that 
border on unfairness but fall just outside the scope of what constitutes an unfair 
commercial practice.16 Especially during the first years of implementation some 
enforcement authorities and courts had difficulties to “circumstantiate” the principle-
based rules of the UCPD to the concrete case. In the meantime, however, they have 
gained more expertise and practical experience to handle the principle-based 
                                           
12 Country report Estonia. 
13 Country report France. 
14 Country reports. 
15 Country report France. 
16 Country report Netherlands. 
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approach.17 Stakeholders have also noted during the country research that the 
European Commission’s Guidance document18 facilitates more effective application of 
the implementing national legislation. 
In some Member States, enforcement authorities are also reported to lack sufficient 
financial and personnel resources, which in turn affects enforcement of the Directive. 
Already the 2013 Communication of the Commission indicated that "Member States 
and stakeholders appear to consider national enforcement of the Directive, in general 
terms, adequate and effective but signal that the lack of resources, the complexity or 
length of internal procedures and the lack of deterrent sanctions threaten to 
undermine its proper application".  
In spite of the reported difficulties with the application of the principle-based 
approach, the country research for this evaluation confirms that the Directive’s 
principle-based rules (in combination with the black list, see next evaluation question) 
are widely considered to provide an effective framework for achieving a high level of 
consumer protection regarding unfair commercial practices. Only in a minority of 
Member States a comprehensive legislative framework concerning unfair commercial 
practices was already in place before the UCPD was implemented (most notably 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Spain, UK).19 In more than two thirds of 
the Member States the UCPD has significantly increased both the comprehensiveness 
of the legislative framework concerning unfair commercial practices and the level of 
protection against unfair commercial practices from the perspective of consumers.  
This is largely acknowledged by stakeholders: a great majority of participants in the 
open public consultation assessed the impact of EU consumer and marketing law on 
the protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices as very or rather 
positive (79%). Nearly all participating consumer associations (19 of 20) assessed the 
impact as very or rather positive (95%, the remaining association marked 
'neutral').20,21 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
                                           
17 E.g. country reports Belgium, Romania. 
18 SWD(2016) 163 final. 
19 In these countries the UCPD mostly brought less or no significant benefits, according to our country 
research. In some countries that relied on outright bans on specific practices, which were abolished under 
the Directive's maximum harmonisation provision, enforcement regarding these practices became even 
more difficult, as reported by stakeholders. For example, commercial practices formerly prohibited by 
French law (sales with gifts, commercial lottery and sweepstake advertising, tied sales) must now be 
reviewed under the general clauses of the implementation legislation of the UCPD. However, this 
abolishment of outright bans on specific practices, even if it creates to some extent legal uncertainty, can 
also benefit consumers (e.g. the more flexible and realistic definition of reference price in French law). 
20 The vast majority of all respondent categories agree that EU consumer and marketing law has had a 
positive impact on the protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices. 95% of consumer 
associations, 81% of consumers and 82% of public authorities indicated a positive impact on this aspect. 
More than 70% of all other respondent categories also indicated a very or rather positive impact in this 
regard. See Report on the open public consultation for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing 
law, Part 2 of this study. 
21 This view was also represented in the outcomes of Workshop 2 on Increasing fairness of commercial 
practices and of contract terms at the 2016 Consumer Summit. The workshop participants generally 
considered the co-existence of the principle-based approach and the black list to be useful against unfair 
commercial practices. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  34 
As mentioned, the UCPD contains a list of 31 misleading and aggressive practices that 
are banned in all circumstances. These are the only practices which can be deemed to 
be unfair vis-à-vis consumers without a case-by-case assessment. In its 2013 
Communication, the Commission stated that the black list has "provided national 
authorities with an effective tool to tackle common unfair practices like bait 
advertising, fake free offers, hidden advertising and direct targeting of children".  
In legal scholarship, the black list is generally considered to generate practical and 
significant benefits.22 For practices on the list there is no need to apply the 
transactional decision test in order to take action, which facilitates enforcement and 
may avoid costly and time-consuming litigation. This assessment is confirmed through 
our country research. Stakeholders often assess the idea of a black list as positive, as 
it provides certainty and offers some clarity, predictability and – simply put – 
examples and illustrations for what is prohibited behaviour of traders. Country reports 
frequently emphasise that the black list has important practical benefits for 
authorities, as well as for consumers and traders: Authorities in many Member States 
(including Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia) consider the black list to be useful and to simplify their work. Reasons 
provided include that they can easily control those commercial practices that are 
blacklisted, that the black list alleviates burden of proof, leads to avoiding arguments 
over whether a particular practice should be considered unfair or not, and simply 
provides a welcome addition to the toolbox for enforcement purposes. Regarding 
consumers, country reports indicate benefits such as the possibility to check the list 
and find out whether certain behaviour of a trader may be suspected as unfair, 
thereby increasing predictability and clarity of consumer protection rules. For traders, 
the black list is considered to facilitate identification of unfair commercial practices and 
thereby increases legal certainty, awareness and compliance. For example, a 
Bulgarian enforcement authority reports that some traders, before undertaking certain 
marketing actions (for example, discount campaigns), are proactively checking the list 
to see whether the planned actions can be qualified as any of the unfair practices 
included into the black list and are in addition searching for experts’ advice from the 
competent authorities regarding this matter.  
In consequence, the introduction of the black list contributed to diminishing the 
presence of such practices on various national markets (reported e.g. from Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland). For example, in the Czech Republic 
stakeholders indicated that a major retailer stopped engaging in all the practices which 
were on the black list, because the Czech Trade Inspection Authority monitors these 
unfair practices very often, and sanctions them very strictly.23 The black list might 
cause rogue traders to stop the blacklisted practices but they might continue other 
genuinely unfair practices that are currently not blacklisted, which supports the view 
that there is a need to provide for a mechanism to quickly adapt the black list (see 
further below). 
In spite of these reported benefits, several factors contribute to limitations in the 
application of the black list:  
• Some of the blacklisted practices are considered to be quite peculiar or 
addressing very specific situations which might not be relevant for the situation 
in the particular Member State.24 Blacklisted practices that are reported to be 
                                           
22 See inter alia B. Keirsbilck, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, 385 e.s., with further references. 
23 Country report Czech Republic. 
24 As is reported from e.g. Denmark, Germany and Finland. 
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irrelevant or incidental in practice include No. 1 ("Claiming to be a signatory to 
a code of conduct when the trader is not") and No. 3 ("Claiming that a code of 
conduct has an endorsement from a public or other body which it does not 
have").25 
• From several countries it is reported that a significant number of blacklisted 
practices are difficult to apply or barely applied in practice, due to the 
vague/open-textured and/or too detailed/narrow conditions of the commercial 
practices included in the black list.26  
• An enforcement authority also highlighted that some of the provisions of the 
black list are formulated in a way which still requires an assessment in concreto 
of the unfairness of the behaviour of the traders, and are therefore not 
considered compatible with the nature of the black list: see e.g. the 
formulations contained in the No. 7 (“falsely stating”), 17 (“falsely claiming”), 
18 (“inaccurate information”), 22 (“falsely claiming”) and 23 (“creating the 
false impression”).27  
However, as regards the latter example of difficulties in applying the black list, the 
advantage of not having to analyse the effect on the transaction decision still remains. 
The black list is further discussed below. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Article 3(9) UCPD provides for an important limitation on the full harmonisation 
character of the UCPD by stating that, in relation to financial services and immovable 
property, Member States may impose requirements which are more restrictive or 
prescriptive than this Directive in the field which it approximates. Thus, minimum 
harmonisation applies to these two sectors. As Recital 9 explains, “financial services 
and immovable property, by reason of their complexity and inherent serious risks, 
necessitate detailed requirements, including positive obligations on traders”.  
A 2011 study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial 
Practices28 provided details regarding Member States' legislation in the areas of 
financial services and immovable property that goes beyond the protective standards 
of the UCPD. It concluded that few Member States have made explicit use of Article 
3(9) UCPD (in the sense of actually including special rules for financial services and/or 
immovable property in their legislation that transposes the UCPD). However, in a 
number of Member States numerous pre-existing and also new rules can be found that 
operate separately from the legislation implementing the UCPD, such as national 
public/state regulatory trading laws, rules of professional regulation, and rules 
belonging to the wider sphere of contract law, in particular pre-contractual information 
duties and prohibitions of certain terms in standard contracts.  
In the context of this evaluation, country reports provide updated information on 
provisions regarding financial services or immovable property in the national laws 
                                           
25 Country report Spain. 
26 E.g. country reports Austria, France, Portugal. 
27 Country reports Italy, Belgium, Greece (where multiple legal bases are sometime used in court or when 
administering fines in situations where the blacklist would have sufficed). 
28 Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices in the EU, Civic 
Consulting 2011. 
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transposing the UCPD going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements, which is 
provided in the following table: 
Table 3: Overview of Member States rules in the national laws transposing 
the UCPD regarding financial services or immovable property going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements  
Country Provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements  
Regarding financial services Regarding immovable property 
Austria No a) No 
Belgium No No 
Bulgaria No No 
Croatia  No No 
Cyprus Yes No 
Czech Republic No No 
Denmark  Yes Yes 
Estonia No No 
Finland No No 
France Yes Yes 
Germany No No 
Greece No No 
Hungary Yes Yes 
Ireland No Yes  
Italy No No 
Latvia No No 
Lithuania No No 
Luxembourg No No 
Malta Yes Yes 
Netherlands Yes No  
Poland No No 
Portugal Yes No data available 
Romania No No 
Slovakia No No 
Slovenia No No 
Spain Yes Yes 
Sweden No No 
United Kingdom Yes Yes 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law - UCPD Notes: See Annex III for 
further details, where provided by the legal country experts. a) Austria: This derogation is not explicitly taken advantage 
of within the UWG, the statute in which the UCPD was implemented. However, a comprehensive look at the provision 
regarding the conduct of financial intermediaries and real estate brokers shows that there are stricter rules to a minor 
extent.  
Based on the table and the findings of the country research the following observations 
can be made:  
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In several Member States (including Cyprus, Denmark, France, Hungary, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and to a very limited extent Austria), stricter 
provisions concerning unfair commercial practices with regard to financial services 
were maintained or introduced, taking advantage of the minimum harmonisation 
clause, whereas a smaller number of Member States seem to have maintained or 
introduced stricter provisions concerning unfair commercial practices with regard to 
immovable property. As mentioned before, such rules can be found in national unfair 
commercial practices law, or outside of it, e.g. in national public/state regulatory 
trading laws, rules of professional regulation etc. It is unclear which practical benefits 
arise for consumers in these countries from maintaining this legislation. Benefits for 
consumers in this group of countries are likely to differ, due to the differences in 
national rules falling under the exemption under Article 3(9) UCPD, and would appear 
to include a higher level of protection in some Member States regarding particular 
vulnerabilities, better enforcement and market transparency, and increased stability of 
financial markets, as concluded by the 2011 Study on the application of Directive 
2005/29/EC.29  
In those Member States that do not make use of the exemption provided by Article 
3(9) UCPD with regard to financial services and immovable property, neither in unfair 
commercial practices law, nor in other relevant legislation (i.e. where no legislation 
would need to be withdrawn if Article 3(9) was deleted), by definition there cannot be 
any practical benefits for consumers from the exemption because national laws are not 
providing a higher level of consumer protection than the UCPD.  
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To which 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The sectors of environmental claims and energy market where specifically selected for 
this study due to the complexity of applying the UCPD.  
In several Member States, the application of the UCPD to environmental claims is not 
an issue since such claims are rarely used or not used at all (e.g. in Czech Republic, 
Greece, Portugal, Latvia), in others the UCPD has not been applied yet regarding such 
claims (e.g. Malta, Slovenia).30 Where there is little or no experience with cases on 
misleading environmental claims, practical benefits of the Directive for consumers in 
this respect cannot be established. 
In contrast, in other Member States, along with increasing consumer sensitivity to 
environmental concerns, the number of environmental claims in packaging and 
                                           
29 The 2011 Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices in the EU In 
concluded that "it would be undesirable to remove the exemptions for financial services and immovable 
property due to: the higher financial risk of financial services and immovable property, as compared to 
other goods and services; the particular inexperience of consumers in these areas, combined with a lack of 
transparency in particular of financial operations; particular vulnerabilities that occur in both sectors that 
make consumers susceptible to both promotional practices and pressure; existing experience of 
enforcement bodies with a nationally grown system; and the functioning and the stability of the financial 
markets as such". 
30 See country reports of the listed countries. 
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marketing materials has increased in the last few years, as have complaints that many 
of these claims are vague or misleading.31  
Relevant cases and complaints identified in the country research for this evaluation 
concern a wide variety of misleading environmental claims and misleading practices in 
the energy market, including:  
• False labelling of food or misleading information on products as being “organic” 
or “bio-product”, "eco", "healthy", "natural", "homemade" (reported e.g. from 
Bulgaria, Croatia);  
• Advertising for rental apartments falsely claiming to be built with ecological 
materials (Bulgaria);  
• Use of the brand ‘PlantBottle’, when the bottle contained only 15 per cent plant 
material (Denmark); 
• Misleading claims about the environmental impact of a herbicide (France); 
• Misleading information about the capacity of a device to save electricity 
("Energy-saving Box", Bulgaria) or devices claimed to reducing the energy bill 
(Greece); 
• Misleading environmental claims in relation to an initiative to install dividers in 
households which are users of district heating system, namely, that installation 
of dividers is obligatory, that they are energy efficient and that in saving the 
energy they also save money (Croatia); 
• Claims like “hair drying against nuclear power” or “ironing for health” because 
the claims suggest that the companies in question are not delivering nuclear 
electricity, although they actually do (Germany); 
• Advertising on fuel-saving properties of fuel that was not sufficiently disclosing 
the conditions to which those fuel-saving properties were subject to (Cyprus); 
• A commercial communication falsely stating that a certain type of fuel is 
capable of saving as much as 1 litre per fuel tank and that using a certain type 
of fuel definitely decreases fuel consumption (Hungary); 
• A claim that there is no CO2 emission from an electric car without noting that 
there is CO2 emission from the production of electricity (Denmark);  
• Claims of selling bio-diesel fuel which were difficult to verify as the criteria for 
labelling a fuel as bio-diesel were intransparent (Greece); 
• The Volkswagen case, where the responsible authority is still working on the 
case, but is likely to base it on the infringement of a prohibition of misleading 
commercial practices (Poland). 
In Member States where environmental claims are more often made or questioned, 
experiences with the application of the UCPD differ: Practical benefits for consumers in 
the application of the UCPD’s rules in tackling misleading environmental claims are 
reported e.g. in Croatia and Lithuania where the application of the UCPD in the energy 
and environmental markets is considered as rather effective. In Italy, the UCPD has 
been applied for tackling both misleading environmental claims and for addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market, and in Germany, interviewed stakeholders 
stressed that the current legal system in Germany is fit to deal with such claims. In 
the Netherlands and Sweden, the relevant authority has not applied the UCPD in the 
                                           
31 European Commission 2014 Consumer market study on environmental claims for non-food products. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/docs/green-claims-
report.pdf 
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context of environmental claims, but in the consumer energy market traders have 
been fined for unfair practices.  
A general theme reported in several of the country reports are practical problems 
when challenging green claims. It often appears difficult to substantiate the misleading 
nature of the commercial practice (as is reported e.g. from Austria, Italy). Expensive 
testing might be required before legal action can be taken. Also, sometimes 
environmental claims are considered to be too vague to be regarded as unfair 
(reported e.g. from a stakeholder in Germany). 
To reduce related uncertainty, the Danish Consumer Ombudsman has issued Guidance 
on Environmental and Ethical Marketing Claims in August 2014.32  
The Commission established a Multi-stakeholder Dialogue on Environmental Claims in 
2012 to investigate the problem. A dedicated Commission market study in 2014 
assessed more than 50 environmental claims against the UCPD requirements and 
found that ‘few’ would be completely in line with the legislation. 
At EU level, the mentioned multi-stakeholder group concluded its work in 2016 with 
agreed Compliance Criteria on Environmental Claims33 to support the application and 
enforcement of the UCPD against misleading and unfounded environmental claims. 
The criteria have fed into the mentioned 2016 UCPD guidance document, which 
contains a detailed section on environmental claims. In the country research, no 
experiences with the application of the guidance in this respect were reported. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
'average consumer' work in practice? Is the concept applied in some countries 
rigidly?] 
The general prohibitions of the UCPD include the “average consumer” benchmark 
(previously developed by the CJEU) as the reference point for assessing whether a 
commercial practice is likely to materially distort economic behaviour (i.e. the 
“transactional decision” test). The “average consumer” is defined in CJEU case law as 
a "reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect" consumer, 
"taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors", as emphasised in Recital 18 
of the Directive. Article 5(2)(b) of the Directive also specifies that when a commercial 
practice is directed at a particular group of consumers, its impact should be assessed 
from the perspective of the average member of the group. The average consumer 
benchmark is a normative benchmark. Nonetheless, this concept clearly contains an 
empirical reference as well. The 2016 revised UCPD Guidance document34 contains 
examples of national courts applying the “average consumer” benchmark, and 
provides further clarifications. The guidance emphasises that the average consumer 
under the UCPD is "not somebody who needs only a low level of protection because 
he/she is always in a position to acquire available information and act wisely on it […] 
the average consumer concept under the UCPD should always be interpreted having in 
mind Article 114 of the Treaty, which provides for a high level of consumer protection. 
                                           
32 Official guidance documents in relation to misleading environmental claims are also reported from other 
countries (e.g. France). See country reports of the mentioned countries. 
33 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/unfair-trade/unfair-practices/files/mdec_compliance_ 
criteria_en.pdf 
34 SWD(2016) 163 final. 
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At the same time, the UCPD is based on the idea that, for instance, a national 
measure prohibiting claims that might deceive only a very credulous, naive or cursory 
consumer […] would be disproportionate and create an unjustified barrier to trade". 
It is notable that CJEU case law and the UCPD had changed the consumer model in 
marketing law in some Member States, as these countries applied previously stricter 
benchmarks. For example, traditionally in Polish law average consumers were often 
seen as not careful and forgetful,35 Austrian law also protected the careless 
consumer,36 and in Germany, historically, the consumer model applied was based on 
an uncritical and superficial consumer. If 10-15% of consumers were misled, this was 
deemed sufficient in order to regard a commercial practice as misleading.37      
However, the country research for this evaluation indicates that the benchmark of the 
average consumer allows in practice a significant degree of flexibility in its application. 
As pointed out in the UCPD guidance document with reference to Recital 18 of the 
Directive, the "average consumer test is not a statistical test. This means that national 
authorities and courts should be able to determine whether a practice is liable to 
mislead the average consumer exercising their own judgment by taking into account 
the general presumed consumers' expectations, without having to commission an 
expert's report or a consumer research poll". In practice, the assessment whether a 
commercial practice is unfair vis-à-vis the “average consumer”, as defined in CJEU 
case law, is very often at the heart of the dispute. In that assessment due account has 
to be taken of the factual context of the commercial practices. For example, the Polish 
Supreme Court refers to the need to look first to the type of consumer product or 
service being advertised, and second to the type of medium used for this 
advertisement. Together, these criteria will allow defining the intended and actual 
recipients of the advertisement. The model of an average consumer will then be 
created based on the qualities that a consumer to whom the advertisement is 
directed, and whom it reaches, should have.38 For example, in Slovakia, it was held 
that the “average consumer” on the internet does not materially differ from the 
average consumer in the “brick and mortar" or “walk-in” shops nowadays, as the great 
number of consumers use the online sales and online services without any special 
education.39 
The country research provides a number of examples how the “average consumer” 
benchmark allows national enforcement authorities and courts to consider the specific 
circumstances in their Member States. For example, Polish courts, taking into account 
the possibility to account for social, cultural and linguistic factors as per Recital 18 of 
the UCPD, held that average Polish consumers due to cultural and social factors have 
a low awareness of law; as well as, that Polish average consumers are not comparable 
with regard to their knowledge, carefulness and awareness to Western European 
average consumers, who for decades have been exposed to consumer education.40 In 
the same vein, when cheap and mass-consumption goods are involved, Portuguese 
case law defines the average consumer as hasty and distracted or absent-minded and 
it also takes into account the targeted population group. The use of the "average 
consumer" benchmark allows authorities and courts to render a flexible decision, 
                                           
35 Country report Poland. 
36 Country report Austria. 
37 Country report Germany. 
38 Country report Poland. 
39 Country report Slovakia. 
40 Country report Poland. 
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specifying the content of this concept in a manner that is best suited for the specific 
case. This is an obvious advantage given to the authorities and courts that are not 
bound by formalistic and overly rigorous rules, when evaluating the nature of the 
supposedly unfair practice, which can be clearly to the benefit of consumers. The 
disadvantage is that nuances of that evaluation often remain unknown to those who 
read the decision, since the precise limits of the concept are usually not uncovered. It 
is noted that for a bystander it may be difficult to grasp how the concept of “average 
consumer” is applied in a particular case by a competent enforcement authority or 
court, as highlighted in the country report Latvia. Sometimes this ambiguity is used 
against consumer protection authorities, as is reported from Estonia, where there is 
currently an administrative procedure pending against an Estonian mobile phone 
operator who is claiming that the regulator is not able to show who is an “average 
consumer” of their services. The regulator had relied on statistics concerning what 
services an average mobile service client is using and what price he or she is ready to 
pay for that.41   
Based on the country research it appears that in a significant number of countries the 
"average consumer" benchmark is considered to work in practice and no major 
problems are reported, at least in the perspective of consumer protection authorities 
or courts (e.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Sweden). On the other hand, from other countries it is reported that authorities and 
courts are unfamiliar with the concept of "average consumer" or apply it rather 
implicitly than explicitly, with no or only few examples of case law or (explicit) 
relevant administrative decisions (e.g. regarding Croatia, Estonia, Denmark, Greece, 
Malta). Few problems with an overly rigid application of the concept are reported, 
although the country report France concludes that some interviewees indicated that 
the concept is applied in the country in a flexible, rather protective way, whereas 
other interviewees (mainly consumer organisations) consider the application to be 
rather strict.  
The results of the open public consultation illustrate that stakeholders are divided in 
their general assessment of the appropriateness of the benchmark. While most 
business organisations (70%) either 'tended to disagree' or 'strongly disagreed' with 
the statement that "the notion of 'average consumer' should be reviewed/updated", 
most public authorities (68%) and consumer associations (70%) either 'strongly 
agreed' or 'tended to agree' that there is need for a review.42 In the interviews 
conducted as part of the country research, consumer organisations in several Member 
States elaborated their concerns. For example, it was noted by the Danish Consumer 
Council that the average consumer in real life is not reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect – and it is usually acting under time 
constraints. It is argued that the many consumer protection rules primarily benefit 
“stronger” consumers and not more vulnerable consumers who really need the 
protection, suggesting that a lower standard for the average consumer should be 
applied. Other consumer organisations often shared a critical view of the "average 
consumer" benchmark in our country research (reported e.g. from Czech Republic, 
Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia), and position papers submitted by some 
consumer organisations in the framework of the open public consultation further 
elaborated: They put into question whether the "‘average consumer-model’ is 
adequate to serve as a standard of consumer protection" (BEUC), suggested that the 
rational and utility-maximising consumer is more "fiction than reality" (VZBV, 
                                           
41 Country report Estonia. 
42 See Report on the open public consultation for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law, 
Part 2 of this study. 
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Germany), and proposed to "modernise the UCPD in line with the way that consumers 
behave in the real world" (Which?, UK).43   
The discussion concerning the appropriateness of the "average consumer" benchmark 
is also led in academic literature, with a number of authors voicing concerns that this 
benchmark does not provide sufficient protection to consumers that are less capable 
and more careless than the average.44 In addition, results of behavioural research – to 
which some of the consumer organisations refer – have significantly put into question 
the model of consumers as rational decision-makers, which to some extent underlies 
the notion of an "average consumer" that is "reasonably well-informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect". Consumers' behavioural biases are widely documented in 
the academic literature45 and have been confirmed by a wide range of behavioural 
experiments, including those commissioned by the European Commission in its recent 
study on consumer vulnerability.46 They are also acknowledged in the above quoted 
UCPD guidance document, which refers to the relevance of behavioural biases such as 
consumer overconfidence when considering self-reported assessments of "well-
informed", "observant" and "circumspect" as indicators for establishing the 
characteristics of the average consumer. There are also national cases that illustrate 
that the idea of the ‘rational decision maker’ as average consumer benchmark leads to 
outcomes that are not favourable for consumers and demand a level of attention that 
is not realistic for real life consumers.47 For example, in a Belgian case about an 
advertisement for an eco-friendly washing product, the question arose of whether the 
advertisement was addressed to anyone shopping in a supermarket or whether it 
targeted eco-conscious consumers and so that the proper benchmark would be the 
average ‘green’ consumer, who is sensitive to environmental considerations.48 
Applying the latter standard to an advertisement that read ‘100% of surfactant of 
plant origin, 100% biodegradable’, a commercial court held that the normally attentive 
and diligent green (online) consumer would be able to understand the link made in the 
advertisement between surfactants and biodegradability and would not be misled by 
the claim. The court thus held that the average green consumer would not make the 
mistake of thinking that the advertised product is entirely biodegradable. They would 
know that the claim of total biodegradability relates only to the surfactant agents 
contained in the washing product, not to the product as a whole. The country report 
for Belgium rightly points out that “this is a rather formidable assumption, not only as 
                                           
43 Position papers submitted by consumer organisations in the framework of the open public consultation in 
the framework of the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law. 
44 See inter alia Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 85; H.-W. Micklitz, “The 
Expulsion of the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law and the Return of Social Elements in Civil 
Law: A Bittersweet Polemic”, J. Consum Policy 2012, 283; Lisa Waddington, “Vulnerable and confused: the 
protection of “vulnerable” consumers under EU law”, European Law Review 2013, 765; Eliza Mik, “The 
erosion of autonomy in online consumer transactions”, Law, Innovation and Technology 2016, 1-38.   
45 E.g. For an overview of relevant results of behavioural economics research see Kahneman,D., Slovic, P., 
and Tversky, A. (Eds.) (1982). Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University 
Press); Kahneman, D., ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics’, American 
Economic Review, 93 (2003), 1449; for a summary treatise see Dowling, J., and Chin-Fang, Y., Modern 
Developments in Behavioral Economics, Singapore World Scientific, 2007; with a specific view to law see 
Sunstein, C., (ed.), Behavioral Law and Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Lunn, P. and Lyons, 
S. (2010); ‘Behavioural Economics and „Vulnerable Consumers": A Summary of Evidence’, Economic and 
Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
46 European Commission, Study on consumer vulnerability across key markets in the European Union Final 
Report, 2016. 
47 See country report Belgium for more examples. 
48 Prés. comm. Nivelles 12 January 2011, case note by C. DESMECHT, Le consommateur moyen: origine et 
portée d’une notion clé, Pratiques du marché, Kluwer, 2011. 
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to consumers’ technical knowledge but also and more importantly as to their level of 
attention and immunity from predictable errors due to mental shortcuts.” 49 
In the Finnish and more generally Nordic tradition, the consumer is thought to be a 
non-professional that glances at marketing rather than carefully considering it as a 
basis for a rational decision. The consumer concept, thus, is not based on the ideal 
‘homo economicus’; rather, the concept is influenced by behavioural economics. The 
Finnish legislator finds that the concept of the ‘average consumer’ in CJEU case law, 
which is understood to be ‘reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and 
circumspect taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors’, is in line with 
the Finnish ‘consumer’ concept. National law continues to refer to the traditional 
concept of ‘consumer’ to avoid confusion. In Finland, it was noted that the CJEU case 
law leaves room for national courts to assess the level of attentiveness a consumer 
pays in different contexts.50 
See also Section 7 on the problem definition and Section 8 on conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts at EU and national level recognised new categories 
of vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Article 5(3) UCPD provides for special protection of consumers who are particularly 
vulnerable because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way 
which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee. In its 2013 Communication 
on the application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Commission 
announced that "further efforts need to be made to strengthen the enforcement of the 
Directive in relation to these categories of vulnerable consumers [children and elderly 
targeted by aggressive practices] who find themselves in a situation of weakness". In 
2016, the Commission paid particular attention to the “vulnerable consumer” 
benchmark in the revised UCPD Guidance document. 
On the basis of the country research for this evaluation, the following conclusions can 
be drawn:  
First of all, the vulnerable consumer benchmark is considered to be of limited 
relevance in practice, as appear to be the practical benefits of this provision for 
                                           
49 There do not seem to be empirical studies demonstrating the behavioural implausibility of the assumption 
of the Court of Nivelles specifically. However, besides common sense, such implausibility would seem to 
result by analogy from a well-documented behavioural phenomenon called ‘attribute substitution’. This 
judgement imperfection refers to the fact that, when confronted with a difficult question, subjects tend to 
answer instead a related but distinct question whose answer comes more readily to mind. For instance, a 
person who is asked “How dangerous is the intersection near your home?” may answer as if they were 
asked how many accidents or near-accidents at that intersection they can readily recall. See A. Tor, The 
Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law (July 11, 2008). Haifa Law Review, Vol. 4, p. 237, 2008, 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1266169, p. 245, citing D. Kahneman and S. Frederick, 
“Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment”, Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman- eds., 2002), p. 51. 
In the case of advertisement for the green washing product, the Court assumes that the average green 
consumer is immune from a phenomenon that could be termed ‘predicate substitution’ [i.e. the average 
consumer would assign the attribute (biodegradability) to the correct predicate (surfactant) rather than to 
the incorrect one (washing product), thereby not falling for a shortcut that comes readily to mind]. On the 
prevalence of mental shortcuts generally, see. D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow, NY: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2011. 
50 Country report Finland. 
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consumers so far.51 By and large, national courts and enforcement authorities seem 
rather reluctant to apply the special rules of Article 5(3) UCPD for consumers needing 
more protection. Article 5(3) UCPD is not frequently used in the decisions of relevant 
authorities and courts. The main explanation appears to be that the average consumer 
benchmark was designed and is clearly perceived as the normal consumer benchmark, 
the vulnerable consumer being the exception to be interpreted strictly. Moreover, 
where practices are directed to a particular target group (e.g. advertising towards 
children), the modulated average consumer benchmark applies, i.e. the benchmark of 
the average member of that target group (as set out in Article 5(2)(b) in fine UCPD). 
National courts and enforcement authorities tend to apply the modulated average 
consumer benchmark, instead of the “vulnerable consumer” benchmark of Article 5(3) 
UCPD. Recital 18 UCPD states: “Where a commercial practice is specifically aimed at a 
particular group of consumers, such as children, it is desirable that the impact of the 
commercial practice be assessed from the perspective of the average member of that 
group.” The fact that consumers do not form a homogenous group justifies a different 
assessment of the unfairness of a practice targeted at a particular group of 
consumers. The country research shows that, in applying this modulated benchmark, 
all relevant circumstances of the case and the vulnerability of the concerned person is 
often taken into account. The modulated average consumer test provides “a means to 
take into account relevant social, cultural or linguistic characteristics of targeted 
groups”52, in line with ECJ case law. 
There is little indication that new categories of vulnerable consumers not listed in the 
UCPD (such as poor/indebted) have been recognised by administrative practice or 
case law within the scope of the UCPD. This should not come as a surprise since the 
list of specific vulnerabilities in Article 5(3) is traditionally considered to be 
exhaustive53 even if the new UCPD Guidance document states that the list of Article 
5(3) is only indicative.  
The country research also indicates that in a broader context (i.e. not necessarily 
regarding unfair commercial practices) the concept of “vulnerable consumers” has 
been used in Member States most notably in respect of persons with mental or 
physical diseases, elderly people, children and young persons, but also in respect of 
unemployed persons, migrants and poor and indebted people. For example in Greece, 
there have been many legislative initiatives for the protection of vulnerable consumers 
during the last years in response to the financial crisis, e.g. related to over-indebted 
households, which has generated a great influx of cases both for courts, consumer 
associations, and relevant authorities (however, this legislation is not related to the 
vulnerability of consumers in the context of unfair practices).54 In several instances 
the issue of vulnerable customers in the energy sector was highlighted in the country 
research, i.e. households that receive allowances for electricity, heating or natural gas 
under certain social law provisions. Taking into account these provisions (having their 
origin in EU law) as well as the fact that e.g. in Bulgaria a significant part of the 
population is below the threshold of “energy poverty” (meaning facing difficulties to 
keep their homes warm at reasonable cost), it is considered likely that the new 
                                           
51 This opinion was also raised in the position papers submitted to the online public consultation: all three 
consumer organisations that submitted position papers, as well as two public authorities, considered the 
current definitions of ‘average consumer’ and ‘vulnerable consumer’ to be of limited effectiveness for 
consumer protection. 
52 European Commission, UCPD Proposal, COM 2003 (356) final, para 30 
53 B. Keirsbilck, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, 290. 
54 Country report Greece. 
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category of “energy poor” consumer will be recognised in national administrative 
practice and case law in the coming years.55 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices? [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
The results of the open public consultation illustrate that stakeholders are again 
divided in their assessment. While 79% of business associations found self- and co-
regulation initiatives to be either “very effective” or “rather effective” in protecting 
consumer rights,56 only 30% of consumer associations found such initiatives to be 
effective in protecting consumer rights (50% found them "rather not effective" or "not 
at all effective"). Public authorities are split, with 39% considering them as "rather 
effective", and 33% having an opposing view. 
According to the country research for this study, experiences vary by Member State 
and sector. In those Member States where there is long-standing tradition of self- and 
co-regulation (including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, etc.), this 
approach seems to work fairly well in addressing unfair commercial practices. From 
Lithuania it was also reported that self- and co-regulation is actively promoted, 
showing positive effects for consumer protection.57 In contrast, in other Member 
States where there is no such tradition (including Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Germany, France, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania etc.) codes of conduct 
appear to be often of limited practical relevance – with notable exceptions such as the 
advertising self-regulatory organisations,58 which exist in most EU Member States, and 
self-regulatory organisations that promote the enforcement of unfair competition law 
by pursuing unfair commercial practices (for example existing in Germany).59 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
In the answer to a previous evaluation question (see above) it was already highlighted 
that there are certain limitations in the application of the black list due to the peculiar 
character or little practical relevance of some of the blacklisted practices, the 
vague/open-ended and/or too detailed/narrow conditions of the commercial practices 
included and the need of an assessment in concreto of the unfairness of the behaviour 
of the traders for some practices. This indicates that there is a need to review the 
                                           
55 Country reports Bulgaria, Greece. 
56 The effectiveness of self- and co-regulation was also emphasised by business stakeholders in their 
position papers submitted to the consultation; see e.g. position papers for EMOTA, FEDMA and the European 
Advertising Standards Alliance. 
57 Country report Lithuania. 
58 Such as the Autorité de Régulation Professionnelle de la Publicité in France, the Conseil de la publicité / 
Raad voor de Reclame in Belgium, the Civil Institute of Advertising Self-Regulation and the Supply Chain 
Initiative in Portugal, or the Rada Pre Reklamu in Slovakia. 
59 The Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs (‘Wettbewerbszentrale’), see country report 
Germany. 
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practices on the UCPD black list and/or include new practices. In the country research 
for this evaluation, especially consumer organisations, but also enforcement agencies 
and some business stakeholders were in favour of an update of the black list of the 
UCPD, to address new problematic practices in the context of digital markets, e-
commerce and innovative marketing methods. However, other of the interviewed 
stakeholders did not report any necessity to extend or modify the black list, and rather 
expressed their opposition to such a move. 
Several options for regular reviews and updates of the black list were identified, either 
through a special mechanism to be included in the Directive and applied for updating 
the black list (e.g. delegated/implementing acts), or the use of generic legislative 
procedures for amendment of the EU/national legislation (i.e. without a special 
mechanism). Another possibility brought forward by some interviewees in the country 
research (mainly consumer organisations) is to change the UCPD into a minimum 
harmonisation directive, affording room for national law and reactions to changes in 
commercial practices. It was noted that it seems to be a challenge that there is only 
one black list for all Member States as there is a vast diversity in traditions and 
marketing cultures in various Member States (e.g. in relation to the regulation of 
sales). In this connection it was also suggested that a notification requirement be 
introduced whereby the Commission and other MS are duly notified of any new unfair 
practices. This would have the benefit of alerting all MS of new practices considered as 
unfair which may possibly also impact other MS, and could feed into an updating of 
the black list in regular intervals. 
The country research identified the following commercial practices currently not 
covered by the black list that are considered to be problematic and were proposed as 
potential candidates for an extended black list. This list summarises suggestions from 
different authorities, consumer organisations and other stakeholders interviewed in 
the Member States.  
Practices related to promotion, marketing, and contract conclusion: 
• Aggressive and misleading commercial practices in direct sales of dietary 
supplements and non-prescription drugs (reported from Austria); 
• Unfair practices related to organised selling events and 'presentations and 
advertisement actions' at restaurants, hotels or during the excursions (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia60); 
• Unfair door-to-door sales practices, e.g. related to energy, gas and water 
(Poland, Slovakia); 
• Creation of consumer credit groups (Hungary); 
• Some aspects of sales promotions, e.g. holding any sales promotions without 
the advanced notice, or false sales promotions (Hungary); 
• The practice of imposing disproportionately high charges compared to the 
service provided (Hungary); 
• Sellers pretending to be an authority or organisation (Sweden);  
• Indicating that the selling company is acting on someone's behalf, which is not 
the case (Sweden);  
                                           
60 In Slovakia for instance, traders organise various ‘presentations and advertisement actions’ in spaces 
accessible to the public, such as restaurants, hotels or during excursions. In reality these actions were 
labelled as e.g. ‘cookery show’ or ‘wine tasting’ and involved very aggressive sales practices. In the Czech 
Republic, such events are frequent and are considered to ae use of misleading practices targeted at 
vulnerable consumer groups. In both countries, the legislator imposed that such events be registered to 
authorities in advance. 
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• Subscription traps, such as luring customers with a gift for free, but in reality, 
the customer agrees to buy 30 pieces of this product (Sweden); 
• Claims that the seller can deliver a product even though they cannot guarantee 
it (Sweden); 
• Claims about a product that blatantly go against current scientific knowledge 
and capabilities (such as claims that a device can turn water into fuel, reported 
from Greece); 
• Subliminal advertising (i.e. promotional messages the recipient is not aware of, 
reported from Slovakia); 
• Hiding (essential) information on a website and making the information only 
accessible after several click-throughs (France);  
• Negative sales methods (with a so called 'negative contractual effect'), where a 
consumer is bound to a contract because of his or her inaction (except for 
renewals of insurance or subscriptions, as reported from Sweden);  
• Violation of a code of conduct to which a professional has adhered (Belgium);   
• Violation of the rules on guarantees contained in Directive 99/44/EC (Belgium);   
Practices related to contract performance/extension: 
• Unfair practices related to digital contracts, e.g. geoblocking and discrimination 
in the delivery of digital content (Bulgaria);  
• Unilateral change of contract requirements without right to termination (Czech 
Republic);  
• Contract switches with prolongation of the contract in an “uninvited” doorstep 
selling situation (Czech Republic);  
• “Tying lending“ of technical equipment with a punitive lending fee in case the 
customer does not return the equipment at the end of the contractual 
relationship (e.g. in the telecommunications sector, reported from Czech 
Republic);  
• Deviation between the actual internet speed and the advertised one (Austria); 
• Practices related to the enforcement of consumer debts, in particular the use of 
humiliation in such contexts (Slovakia)61; 
• Practices of refusing certain means of payment, e.g. cash or certain banknotes 
with high denominations (Belgium); 
Practices related specifically to TV contests/games: 
• Television contests, games or fortune-telling, where practices of non- 
transparent fees, manipulation with connection to TV studio or intentional 
disinformation occur or intentional provision of false or incorrect information 
about the way how to proceed in the game or to solve the task in order to 
prevent the consumer to gain envisaged benefits (Slovakia).  
Practices related specifically to price transparency: 
• Change of price a number of times a day (e.g. the price of gas for cars, as 
reported in the country report Austria); 
• Sales with bonuses (Austria); 
                                           
61 E.g. by sending shaming notices in the envelopes labelled as ‘how to get rid of debts’ or addressed 
explicitly to ‘the debtor’. 
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• Promotional activities where there are problems relating to price transparency, 
e.g. 2-for-1 offers, claims that a product is offered 20% cheaper made without 
specification of how this is to be calculated (Greece);  
• Artificial reduction of prices (“Black Fridays”, reported from Portugal);  
• Advertising that specifically promotes the sale of the tied or bonus product in 
order to distract consumers’ attention from the main contract (Belgium); 
While this list is neither complete nor based on any consensus view (but rather 
summarises suggestions from different authorities, consumer organisations and other 
stakeholders), it highlights that a considerable number of commercial practices could 
be reviewed and further scrutinised to consider a possible blacklisting. Although all of 
the above-mentioned practices were mentioned in the country reports as currently not 
covered by the black list, as being problematic and as being potential candidates for 
an extended black list, several of them appear already covered by the existing black 
list or are rather subject to the rules on unfair contract terms. 
Some practices regarding pricing also seem particularly difficult to address since they 
operate on the fringes of what is allowed under the UCPD, as is highlighted by some of 
the following additional examples identified by the country research: 
• Small letter size of unit price indication (Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, 
Greece). 
• Erroneous or misleading price indication on websites. For example, some 
components of the price are not presented transparently (hidden surcharges) 
(Portugal, Netherlands).  
• Indication of a price that will only apply if a certain method of payment is used, 
or discount that is applied only on a conditional basis, for instance, a 
discounted price applies when the consumer pays in cash, or a discount is only 
applicable to the holders of a loyalty card and for others a higher price will 
apply (Portugal, Lithuania). 
• Price obfuscation, price partitioning and other practices which may confuse 
consumers and which may interfere with their ability to assess the full price, 
concerning e.g. air travel, magazine subscriptions and other revolving and/or 
fixed term contracts (Netherlands).62  
Traders make use of practices such as price obfuscation and price partitioning to boost 
demand for ancillary services and products and to increase demand for the main 
product on offer as well. Price partitioning with locked-in customers is an example, 
where for instance the price for home printer hardware is kept artificially low in order 
to persuade customers to buy a particular brand of printer hardware, while the unit 
price of subsequent printer ink cartridges is kept high. The UCPD does not oblige 
traders to mention a ‘price per printed sheet’. Practices which are not within the PID 
scope also concern dynamic pricing. Since the UCPD does not oblige traders to offer 
their products at identical prices to different customers, traders can offer different 
prices depending on variables such as the time of day of the purchase.63 An example 
of a Member State having rules in this respect is Austria. According to a regulation of 
price increases for motor fuel,64 prices at gas stations can only be changed once a day 
so that consumers can make an informed decision where to buy gas. However, it is 
                                           
62 See generally Van Boom 2011. 
63 Country report Netherlands. 
64 Act on Price Transparency of Motor Fuel (“Preistranzparenzverordnung Treibstoffpreise”) Federal Law 
Gazette (BGBl.) II, No. 246/2011, recently amended by Ordinance of 19.12.2013, Federal Law Gazette 
(BGBl.) II No. 471/2013. 
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disputed among Austrian legal scholars whether this regulation violates the UCPD. The 
Austrian Federal Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) requested the CJEU for 
a preliminary ruling in this matter but later, on 02.03.2016, withdrew this motion.65  
In light of the issues reported concerning the relevance and wording of the practices 
on the current UCPD black list, a key challenge for any revision or extension of the 
black list would be to avoid to the extent possible the use of terms: 
• Which need to be interpreted, or are otherwise vague and open-ended, while 
on the other hand are also not being too narrow or specific; 
• Which need an assessment of the unfairness of the behaviour of the specific 
trader in question. 
It would also appear that in light of the diversity of reported problems and the 
significant consequences of inclusion of specific practices into a revised black list there 
is a need for an open, transparent and inclusive consultation process on possible 
additions.  
 Effectiveness of the UCPD in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 6.1.1.2.
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
As mentioned, the UCPD is based on the principle of full harmonisation. Article 4 
provides: “Member States shall neither restrict the freedom to provide services nor 
restrict the free movement of goods for reasons falling within the field approximated 
by this Directive.” With reference to this provision, the CJEU consistently rules that 
“the Directive fully harmonises those rules at the Community level. Accordingly, […] 
Member States may not adopt stricter rules than those provided for in the Directive, 
even in order to achieve a higher level of consumer protection.”66 A uniform regulatory 
framework harmonising national rules concerning unfair B2C commercial practices was 
established at EU level, in order to eliminate obstacles to the internal market as well 
as to increase legal certainty for both consumers and traders.67 In 2013, the 
Commission came to the conclusion that “by replacing the divergent regulations of the 
Member States on unfair commercial practices with one set of rules, the Directive has 
simplified the regulatory environment and helped to remove obstacles to cross-border 
commerce.”68  
Remarkably, however, the UCPD combines the principle of full harmonisation with a 
principle-based approach. Hence, the issue is whether this approach leads to divergent 
application of these uniform principles and, if so, whether these disparities have a 
negative impact on cross-border trade. It goes without saying that the success of the 
UCPD in terms of removing obstacles to cross-border trade depends on the way the 
uniform principles are applied at the national level: the full harmonisation UCPD 
(uniform law in the books) will not achieve its internal market goal if it is being applied 
                                           
65 VwGH 21. 10. 2015, 2012/17/0097 and ECLI:EU:C:2016:227 for the withdrawal of the case. See country 
report Austria. 
66 Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, Judgment of 23 April 2009, para. 52. 
67 See in particular Recitals 5, 12 and 13 of the Directive. 
68 COM(2013) 138 final. 
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differently throughout the Member States (no uniform law in action). Many legal 
scholars have therefore observed that the Directive’s principle-based approach seems 
to be incompatible with the principle of full harmonisation.69  
However, only in a minority of Member States, it is reported that the principle-based 
approach actually leads to divergent application of the same principles and that this 
divergent application actually has a negative impact on cross-border trade. In 
Denmark, for example, business organisations, the Danish Competition and Consumer 
Authority and the Danish Consumer Ombudsman have emphasised such differences 
that entail that Danish businesses are met with “unfair competition” from foreign 
businesses (marketing that is considered unfair under Danish law, but not under the 
law where the trader is established).70 In Italy, it is concluded that national differences 
play a detrimental role for businesses, as they have to adapt their commercial 
behaviour to different national regulatory environments.71 From other Member States 
the view is reported that the principle-based approach actually leads to divergent 
application of the same principles, but that no major problems due to a resulting 
negative impact on cross-border trade are reported72 or experienced73 by 
stakeholders. For example, in Slovenia, business representatives have not reported 
any impact on cross-border trade due to the existing differences in the application of 
the UCPD; it seems that such differences are taken as a given and a cost of doing 
business and do not influence business strategies.74 The interviews conducted in the 
framework of the study with businesses in all 28 Member States confirm that overall, 
costs of businesses for complying with the national legislation implementing the UCPD 
appear to be limited, as are related costs when expanding business activities to other 
EU Member States.  
Finally, from a number of other Member States it is reported that it not clear whether 
the principle-based approach actually leads to divergent application of the same 
principles (that could in turn have a negative impact on cross-border trade). There are 
no specific statistics or studies about the issue.75  
Where interviewed stakeholders did not consider that the existing differences in the 
application of the UCPD had any impact on cross-border trade, it was sometimes 
added that the absence of any impact on cross-border trade results from the fact that 
companies do not do that much retail business abroad76 and/or the fact that there is 
no real cross-border competition at the retail level in certain sectors.77 Moreover, it is 
sometimes stated that language barriers and other obstacles outside the legal sphere 
(e.g. costs for postage services) may also prevent consumers from purchasing in other 
                                           
69 See inter alia H. Collins, “Harmonisation by example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial 
Practices”, MLR  2010, 89-118; B. Keirsbilck, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and 
Competition Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, 560. 
70 Country report Denmark. 
71 See, for an explicit confirmation of this view, country report Italy. See also country report Czech Republic. 
72 Country reports Slovenia, Czech Republic. 
73 Country reports Estonia, France. 
74 Country report Slovenia.  
75 Country reports Germany, Latvia, Poland, Sweden. 
76 Country reports Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland. 
77 Country reports the Netherlands, Italy. 
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Member States.78 However, as is described in detail in the analysis of levels of 
awareness and trends since the adoption of key Directives,79 cross-border shopping 
over the internet has more than doubled since 2006, due in part to technological 
progress and the mainstreaming of internet shopping in general: In 2014, 16% of all 
Eurobarometer respondents reported that they made an online purchase from another 
EU country, compared to only 6% in 2006.80 Also, in the business interviews 
conducted for this study (which targeted companies that sell products or services to 
consumers in five selected sectors), 28% of respondents indicated to sell their 
products and/or services in other EU Member States, a comparatively high figure. In 
other words, both B2C cross-border shopping and selling has become more prevalent 
in recent years, which could make disparities in the understanding of the principle-
based approach more relevant in the future. However, it would seem that so far CJEU 
jurisprudence, the UCPD Guidance document81 and the exchange of ideas amongst 
national enforcement authorities within the CPC Network contribute to a common 
understanding of the principle-based UCPD across the EU, limiting disparities in its 
application and related impacts.  
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
As mentioned, the UCPD contains an exhaustive black list of 31 outright prohibitions. 
From a theoretical perspective, the black list is more likely to contribute to the free 
movement of goods and services as the rule-based approach provides more legal 
certainty and uniformity than the principle-based approach under the Directive’s 
general clauses. This assessment is confirmed through our country research. 
Stakeholders often assess the black list as positive in terms of the Directive’s goal of 
removing barriers to the internal market. By reducing uncertainty and diversity, the 
uniform black list is a helpful tool for fostering cross-border trade, complementing the 
Directive’s general clauses.82  
In spite of these reported benefits, a number of above-mentioned factors contribute to 
limitations in the application of the black list not only in terms of achieving the goal of 
consumer protection but also in terms of achieving the internal market goals. For 
example, it is reported that in several countries the black list is difficult to apply or 
barely applied in practice.83 It is only to the extent that the black list is relevant for 
uniform application, that it is likely to facilitate the free movement of goods and 
services.84  
                                           
78 Country reports Austria, Germany. 
79 For the full results of the analysis of levels of awareness and key trends, please refer to Annex VIII. 
80 Special Eurobarometer 252 and Flash Eurobarometer 397. 
81 It is notable that seven of the position papers submitted by business stakeholders in the open public 
consultation in the framework of the Fitness Check indicated that guidance documents were very helpful for 
businesses in this regard, e.g. from Assonime, the association of Italian joint stock companies: “The 
adoption of guidance documents by the Commission, both for the UCP and the Consumers’ Rights directives, 
is a useful tool to increase awareness of undertakings and consumers. Guidance by the Commission can also 
promote a greater convergence in the interpretation and application of the substantive rules at the national 
level.” 
82 E.g. country reports Croatia, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia. 
83 E.g. country reports Austria, France, Portugal. 
84 E.g. country reports Cyprus, Czech Republic. 
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From Belgium it is reported that the debate on the compatibility of the regulation of 
blackout periods with the UCPD causes both legal uncertainty and disparities in 
regulation between Member States. Actual effect of such discrepancy on cross-border 
trade is uncertain. On the one hand, regulations such as these, because they pertain 
to certain selling arrangements and do not discriminate between domestic and 
imported goods or between domestic traders and traders from other Member States, 
are presumed innocuous under Keck. On the other hand, the Commission has, not so 
long ago, objected to the prohibition on resale at a loss on grounds of its effect on free 
movement. Business associations in Belgium do not seem to have gathered empirical 
evidence which would go one way or another.85 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade.  
Article 3(9) UCPD provides for a limitation on the full harmonisation character of the 
UCPD by stating that, in relation to financial services and immovable property, 
Member States may impose requirements which are more restrictive or prescriptive 
than this Directive in the field which it approximates. Thus, minimum harmonisation 
applies to these two sectors.  
As mentioned above, in the one group of countries where the minimum harmonisation 
clause is not applied in unfair commercial practices law or other relevant legislation 
(neither in relation to financial services, nor in relation to immovable property), that 
clause quite logically does not imply the creation of barriers to cross-border trade. In 
the second group of Member States that did make use of the minimum harmonisation 
clause, the country research for this study has not identified significant problems in 
this respect, while from a theoretical perspective, it remains possible to make a case 
that the minimum harmonisation clause may have at least some negative effective on 
cross-border trade. It is notable that interviewed stakeholders in several countries 
could not report on practical experience on this issue, so that a definitive conclusion is 
difficult. For example, authorities and other stakeholders in Bulgaria did not report 
such problems; however this may simply be a lack of statistical data available, and 
does not necessarily mean that such problems do not exist.86  
 Effectiveness of the PID in contributing to a high level of consumer 6.1.1.3.
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
Recital 6 of Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of prices of 
products offered to consumers (PID) stresses that the obligation to indicate the selling 
price and the unit price contributes substantially to improving consumer information, 
as this is the easiest way to enable consumers to evaluate and compare the price of 
products in an optimum manner and hence to make informed choices on the basis of 
simple comparisons. 
                                           
85 Country report Belgium. 
86 Country report Bulgaria. 
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The PID is a minimum harmonisation directive (Article 10). It imposes in Article 3 for 
products offered by traders to consumers (to be understood as goods, as the PID does 
not relate to services and real estate) the obligation to indicate (i) the selling price, 
i.e. the final price for a unit of the product, or a given quantity of the product, 
“including VAT and other taxes”. And (ii) subject to certain exceptions, the unit price, 
i.e. the final price, including VAT and all other taxes, for one kg, one litre, etc. The 
Directive contains the possibility for Member States to waive the obligation of unit 
pricing for products for which such indication would not be useful (Article 5) and to 
provide, for a transitional period, a derogation for small shops (Article 6). Pursuant to 
Article 3(4) of the PID any advertisement which mentions the selling price of products 
shall also indicate the unit price subject to Article 5.87 In the context of this evaluation, 
the focus of the assessment as regards the PID is on the obligation to indicate the unit 
price, as the selling price is also covered by the UCPD and the CRD. 
The extent to which consumers are effectively informed about the unit selling price, 
can be assessed at several levels: the extent to which consumers are aware of the 
unit selling price and use it; the extent to which problems with the indication of unit 
prices exist, and the assessment of stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of 
consumer information about the unit selling price.  
Consumer awareness of the unit selling price is only sporadically addressed in 
European consumer surveys. In 2001, 68% of consumers surveyed in the EU15 
indicated that they were at least ‘a little’ interested in being able to use displayed unit 
prices to compare goods.88 According to a Special Eurobarometer conducted in 2010, 
48% of surveyed consumers responded that they consulted the unit price ‘always’ or 
‘often’ when comparing goods.89 In the consumer market study conducted for the 
Fitness Check in 2016, consumers were asked whether they thought it was legal for a 
supermarket to display prices for bottled water per bottle (where the bottle was not 1 
litre) instead of per litre.90 Two-thirds of respondents (67%) correctly answered that 
the supermarket was obliged to show prices per litre. The proportion of correct 
responses was identical in the EU15 and EU13. 58% of consumers in the survey 
indicated that they benefited at least “moderately” from the right to see prices per 
unit, the highest level of benefit indicated for any the Directives under consideration in 
                                           
87 In in a recent judgment Citroën Commerce (C-476/14, EU:C:2016:527, Judgment of 7 July 2016), the 
CJEU has given guidance on the interpretation of the obligation of to indicate the selling price. First, the 
Court derived from Article 3(4) PID (any advertisement which mentions the selling price of products shall 
also indicate the unit price) that, although that provision lays down no general obligation to mention the 
selling price in advertising, nevertheless an advertisement, mentioning both the characteristics of the 
product on offer and a price appearing, will appear to a reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant 
and circumspect consumer, to be the selling price of that product. In such a case, the price so indicated 
must satisfy the requirements of Directive 98/6. Second, while according to Article 2(a) the selling price 
means “the final price for a unit of the product, or a given quantity of the product, including VAT and all 
other taxes”, the Court ruled - against the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi - that costs in connection 
with the transfer of a motor vehicle from the manufacturer to the dealer, which are payable by the 
consumer, must be included in the selling price of that vehicle indicated in an advertisement made by the 
trader when, having regard to all the features of that advertisement, in the eyes of the consumer it sets out 
an offer concerning that vehicle. 
88 Flash Eurobarometer 113. Question: In some shops, unit prices by the kilo or by the litre are displayed in 
addition to the price to pay for the pack, can, or bottle. This gives you a better opportunity to compare 
competing products. Does this double display interest you personally? 
89 Special Eurobarometer 342. For more details, refer to the Section Analysis of levels of awareness and key 
trends since the adoption of key directives, presented in Annex VIII. 
90 Question: You went to the supermarket to buy water. The shelf displayed the prices for some brands per 
bottle and per litre, whilst for others the price was only given per bottle. Should prices also be indicated per 
litre for all of the bottles of water (except where their volume is 1 litre)? [Yes, the supermarket must show 
litre prices for bottles that are not 1 litre bottles, that is the law – No, the supermarket is allowed to choose 
whether or not they show litre prices – Don’t know] 
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this study.91 It can therefore be concluded that a majority of consumers are informed 
about the unit selling price, use this information and consider it beneficial.92,93 
Consumer problems related to the unit selling price are not tracked in 
Eurobarometers. However, the above mentioned 2016 consumer market study found 
that 30% of consumers had encountered problems with the unit price at least 
“sometimes” in the last year, including 11% who had encountered problems “often” or 
“very often”.94 59% of consumers reported that their problems with the unit price 
related to food products, compared to drinks (41%), detergents/cleaning products 
(28%) or other products (8%).  
The existence of problems with unit price indication is confirmed by reports and 
investigations at the national level. In Germany, the Consumer Centres 
(Verbraucherzentralen) conducted a market check of unit price indication in 10 
national supermarket chains in all 16 federal states in 2010. The investigation found 
that 60% (1,929) of the 3,225 price tags examined were not in compliance with price 
indication laws. The main problems identified were:95 
• Unit price missing entirely (19% of price tags checked); 
• Mathematical errors in the unit price calculation (9% of price tags checked); 
• Unit price calculated using the wrong reference, e.g. dehydrated soup priced 
per weight of the soup mix rather than by volume of the end product (34% of 
price tags checked); 
• Unit price calculation not matched with the product, e.g. where the product is 
sold in different sizes with unit prices given as a range, making the unit price of 
any one product unclear (5% of price tags checked). 
In the UK, the consumer organisation Which? filed a ‘super-complaint' regarding 
misleading and confusing unit price indication in supermarkets with the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA) in 2015. As part of their complaint, Which? conducted an 
investigation and commissioned a survey of more than 2000 UK adults on their 
experiences using unit price indications in supermarkets. Three main problems were 
identified in their report:96 
                                           
91 Question: Based on your experience as a consumer, please indicate to what extent you have benefitted 
from the following consumer rights. ‘The right to see the price of products also per unit.’ 
92 In the online public consultation as well, 72% of respondents considered the right to get information 
about the unit price of goods was ‘rather’ or ‘very’ beneficial, including 95% of consumer associations, 89% 
of consumers, and 67% of individual businesses. 
93 The results of the behavioural experiments carried out as part of the consumer market study conducted 
for the Fitness Check in 2016 also showed that respondents were highly aware of the presence of unit 
prices, and that the majority of respondents who were not shown a unit price when asked to make a 
purchase decision reported calculating or estimating the unit price themselves. The results also showed that 
the presence of unit price information reduced the average price paid per unit by the respondent during the 
course of the experiments. 
94 Question: In the past 12 months, have you experienced problem(s) with any goods or services where you 
thought you had a legitimate cause for complaint related to the following five problem types? ‘Lack of 
indication of the unit price.’ 
95 Grundpreisangaben im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel: Eine Gemeinschaftsaktion der Verbraucherzentralen. 
Available at: 
http://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/bericht_grundpreisangaben_29_10_2010.pdf  
96 Which? super-complaint to the Competition and Markets Authority: Misleading and opaque pricing 
practices in the grocery market. Available at: http://www.staticwhich.co.uk/documents/pdf/misleading-
pricing-practices---which-super-complaint-401125.pdf. See also the position paper submitted by Which? to 
the public online consultation.   
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• Unit price not displayed clearly on the grocery price tag, making it difficult for 
consumers to find or read the price (noted by 23% of poll respondents); 
• Unit price of like products displayed in different units. For example, packaged 
food may be priced per weight or per item, or certain goods may be priced per 
100g or 100ml (noted by 35% of poll respondents); 
• Updated unit prices often not provided for products that are part of a special 
offer (noted by 33% of poll respondents). 
In response to the complaint, the CMA commissioned BDRC Continental to conduct a 
qualitative focus group study in the summer of 2015 which confirmed the main results 
of the Which? investigation.97 
Compliance investigations were also carried out in other Member States shortly after 
the transposition of the PID, between 2002 and 2004. Although compliance was found 
to be generally high, authorities in Belgium and Denmark noted problems with 
enforcement, particularly for smaller retailers, as these countries had chosen not to 
use the derogation for small businesses at the time.98 Additionally, in Belgium, Spain 
and Italy, compliance was found to be higher for food products than for non-food 
products.99  
The mentioned evidence from the recent consumer survey and the results of 
investigations in two Member States therefore suggest that consumers continue to 
encounter problems with unit price indication. 
Complementary assessments of the effectiveness of consumer information about the 
unit selling price were provided by stakeholders in the country research for this study. 
In most Member States, consumers are reported to be effectively informed and aware 
about the unit selling price or at least stakeholders consider that there are no major 
problems in this respect. From Bulgaria it was reported that in the last few years there 
has been a significant improvement in informing consumers about the unit selling 
price, especially concerning packaged goods. The enforcement authority in this 
country pointed out that during the early years after entering into force the first set of 
rules on price indication (1999) quite a large volume of the work of the authority was 
related to violations of these rules, whereas such cases are rarely encountered in their 
practice nowadays.100 However, in some countries the assessment is less positive or 
unclear. For example, in Cyprus there was consensus amongst the stakeholders 
interviewed that consumers lack sufficient understanding of the function of the unit 
price, in Malta and Romania there was disagreement amongst interviewed 
stakeholders in this respect, in Hungary problems are reported to occur occasionally 
with regard to the size of the unit price indication or failure to indicate unit prices all 
together,101 and from some countries a lack of evidence was reported (e.g. Spain, 
Italy).102 It is notable that in spite of the mostly positive assessment a number of 
countries report regular complaints regarding price indication (e.g. Croatia, France). 
                                           
97 Pricing practices in the groceries market: CMA response to a super-complaint made by Which? on 21 April 
2015. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/groceries-pricing-super-complaint  
98 The derogation is now in force in Belgium and authorities did not express concerns in the country 
research, see country report Belgium. 
99 Appraisal of Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of unit prices of products offered 
to consumers. Final report prepared for the European Commission by EIM Business & Policy Research. 
100 Country report Bulgaria. 
101 Country report Hungary 
102 Country reports Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Spain. 
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The country research also identified a number of current problems related to price 
indication, from small letter size of unit price indication to sales practices such as 
dynamic pricing, which often are outside the scope of the PID and are mostly 
considered to fall within the UCPD framework (see above).  
In conclusion, the available evidence indicates that by and large consumers appear to 
be effectively informed about the unit selling price. While in the country research 
stakeholder mostly considered price indication rules to be effective and from most 
countries no major problems in this respect were reported, investigations at the 
national level (in the UK and Germany) indicate that a considerable level of 
infringements of price indication rules occurs in practice.  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre?  
A legal obligation to the effect that a price per performance unit is displayed to 
consumers for specific products does not seem to exist in the vast majority of the 
Member States. The most relevant product for which unit prices according to 
performance were reported are detergents. In Belgium a Royal Decree on textile 
detergents of 2012 provides for the obligation to indicate the price per washload 
(following a Code of practice that existed since the early 2000s).103 For this product 
type, performance is often considered to be a more accurate basis for unit pricing, 
especially since there are concentrated detergents on the market which are of much 
smaller volume than traditional, non-concentrated ones, yet they typically have the 
same or even higher performance in terms of number of washloads. For example in 
Bulgaria, a recent survey conducted by a consumer association revealed a big price 
fluctuation between unit price per kilogram and unit price per performance for some of 
the products. The conclusion of the survey based on the conducted tests was that the 
most objective way of presenting the unit prices of detergents is the price per 
performance unit (i.e. per single washload).104 During the open public consultation for 
the Fitness Check, several business stakeholders that provided detailed position 
papers were also of this opinion, as the price per (performance) measure is considered 
to be "more accurate" than price per wieght/volume, and a "unit of measurement 
other than the price per use may be misleading".105 On the other hand, it was 
suggested by some stakeholders in our country research that performance units are 
unreliable, as the number of washloads for detergents depends on various factors like 
the type and program of the washing machine, the hardness of the water and the 
degree of stains on the clothes to be washed. 
From Austria it was reported that prices of detergents are usually indicated by the 
performance of the sold product, and this is considered to be advantageous. Also, 
German law already foresees this kind of price indication for products such as 
household detergent pursuant to Sec. 2 para. 4 cl. 1 PAngV as an option, which allows 
deviation from Sec. 2 para. 3 PAngV and indication of the price in relation to a 
“common usage”. The intention of the German legislature was that the utility of these 
                                           
103 Country report Belgium. 
104 More details about the tests and the survey please find on - http://aktivnipotrebiteli.bg/ [last visited on 
17.07.2016] 
105 See Report on the open public consultation for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law,  
position papers submitted by e.g. BusinessEurope, EuroCommerce and European Brands Association, and 
Feedback to the Fitness Check Roadmap by A.I.S.E.  
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products varies broadly and the relation to a weight does not provide consumers with 
comprehensible information.106 
However, while for example in Cyprus all interviewed stakeholders agreed that the 
unit price should be indicated per performance unit especially where the weight or 
volume of a product is not relevant to its performance, it was also pointed out that if 
that approach is to be followed, it would have to be a legal obligation so that it is used 
by all relevant traders, as otherwise the function of a unit price for better comparison 
of products would be weakened. In contrast, in several other countries there was less 
consensus among stakeholders, with some proposing performance based unit prices 
for specific products and some indicating that the exact weight or quantity of the 
product was still more transparent, because of the ease of comparing with other 
similar products (e.g. in Greece, Malta, Slovakia). In a third group of countries 
stakeholders emphasised that currently the unit price is based on '1 litre' or '1 kg' and 
that both traders and consumers have got used to it, so that there was no need for 
change (e.g. Estonia, Slovenia).  
It was proposed by stakeholders in several countries to provide both types of unit 
prices (on basis of weight and of performance), e.g. in Cyprus, Croatia, Netherlands, 
Romania. This was also seen as an option by a regulator in Poland that otherwise 
opposed performance based unit prices for fear of increased opportunities for 
misleading practices and confusion of consumers. However, other stakeholders warned 
concerning information overload (e.g. in Italy). It is notable that in France already 
some experience with indicating both prices exist. Art. 4 of the loi Hamon107 has 
introduced, on an experimental basis, a double price setting: during three years, from 
Jan 1st 2015 until Dec 31st 2017, sellers can opt to display both the weight/volume 
unit price and the price for the use of certain products. This initiative has been 
criticised for being very difficult to implement (what defines a product’s use and can 
this be measured in advance? What does the concept of ‘économie de fonctionnalité’ 
entail?).108 The initiative has had only very limited success, according to 
stakeholders.109 
In Hungary it is reported that stakeholders agree that unit pricing per performance is 
not necessary.110 Likewise, interviewed stakeholders in Ireland have doubts about the 
practicality of such an obligation,111 and in Greece opinions amongst stakeholders on 
this issue are divided.112 In Luxembourg, a draft based on the detergents Regulation 
648/2004 is reported to be in preparation.113 In Finland, a consensus on introducing 
such an obligation could not be reached, but in 2016 businesses were allowed to 
                                           
106 Gelberg “§ 2 PAngV“, rec. 20 in: Landmann/Rohmer (2016); Weidert/Völker “§ 2 PAnGV“, rec. 18 in: 
Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (2013); Völker “§ 2 PAngV“, rec. 52 in: Völker (2002). 





109 Country report France. 
110 Country report Hungary. 
111
 Country report Ireland. 
112
 Country report Greece. 
113
 Country report Luxembourg.  
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introduce additional information (i.e. in addition to the price per kg or per litre) for the 
purpose of performance comparisons relating to the number of washloads.114 
It can be concluded that stakeholder opinions on the usefulness of the introduction of 
the indication of price per performance unit are divided, and no consensus exists 
regarding the preferred way forward. Most experience in Member States appears to 
exist regarding performance-based unit prices for detergents, where the need for such 
unit pricing is most obvious due to the existence of concentrated and non-
concentrated (traditional) products on the market. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/ derogations (e.g. for small retail shops) 
allowed by the Directive and applied by Member States. [For those countries that 
use derogation for small businesses: Is the derogation relevant? Do companies 
make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of this?] 
The following table presents an overview of which Member States have implemented 
provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements in terms of the 
extension of the application of the PID to other sectors and the use of the regulatory 
choices/derogations, in particular for small retail shops. It indicates that only a 
minority of Member States have extended the application of the PID to other sectors, 
mostly in relation to services. In contrast, a larger number of Member States have 
made use of specific regulatory choices/ derogations, e.g. in relation to specific kinds 
of products such as works of art, places/times of sales such as auctions, or 
packaging.115 
                                           
114 Country report Finland. 
115 See Annex III for further details on extensions and specific derogations provided in the country reports. 
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Table 4: Overview of Member States provisions regarding specific regulatory 
choices/ derogations  
Country Provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
Extension of the 
application to other 
sectors  
Derogation for small 
businesses regarding 
the unit price 
Use of other specific 
regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Austria No Yes Yes 
Belgium No Yes Yes 
Bulgaria No No No 
Croatia  No No No 
Cyprus No No No 
Czech 
Republic Yes No Yes 
Denmark  Yes No Yes 
Estonia No No Yes 
Finland No No No 
France Yes No Yes 
Germany Yes Yes Yes 
Greece No Yes Yes 
Hungary Yes No Yes 
Ireland No No Yes 
Italy No No Yes 
Latvia Yes Yes Yes 
Lithuania No Yes Yes 
Luxembourg Yes Yes Yes 
Malta No Yes Yes 
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes 
Poland No No Yes 
Portugal Yes No Yes 
Romania No No No 
Slovakia No No No 
Slovenia No Yes No 
Spain No No Yes 
Sweden No No No 
United 
Kingdom No Yes Yes 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law - PID. Notes: See Annex III for 
further details on specific derogations provided in the country reports. 
In a few countries (e.g. Cyprus, Portugal) the existing exemption for small businesses 
has been abrogated years ago. In Cyprus this was back in 2005. According to the 
regulator there is however a leniency towards SME. In Portugal the law contained an 
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exemption for itinerant sales. However this exemption has been repealed in 2002. It is 
also reported from some countries in which currently no exemption exists that there is 
a policy of tolerance or lenience regarding small shops by enforcement authorities. 
Where the derogation for small retail shops exists, few practical problems and 
consumer complaints in this respect are reported from stakeholders.116 
 Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses 6.1.1.4.
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses.  
The MCAD consolidates the remaining provisions on B2B misleading advertising and 
comparative advertising after the carve out of B2C unfair commercial practices by the 
UCPD. The MCAD is a hybrid instrument. Its provisions on B2B misleading advertising 
constitute minimum harmonisation. By contrast, its provisions on comparative 
advertising constitute full harmonisation,117 similar to the provisions of the UCPD. The 
CJEU clarified that the MCAD refers to misleading advertising and unlawful 
comparative advertising as two independent infringements. Consequently, in order to 
prohibit misleading advertising, it is not necessary that it constitutes at the same time 
unlawful comparative advertising.118 
In addition, while in view of the existence of the UCPD the misleading advertising 
provisions of the MCAD only aim at the protection of businesses, and not consumers, 
its provisions on comparative advertising have a mixed objective: guaranteeing 
consumers sufficient information through objective comparisons in advertising and 
protecting competitors against unlawful (in particular deceptive or denigrating) 
commercial comparisons. 
The scope of the MCAD is limited to “advertising”, because this was the Union 
legislature’s approach in 1984 (the original Misleading Advertising Directive in which 
the comparative advertising provisions were inserted in 1997). Although the notion of 
“advertising” in Union law (including in the MCAD)119 is rather broad, it is nevertheless 
narrower than that of “commercial practices” in the UCPD. The MCAD prohibits 
misleading advertising in a generic way. No examples are given, only features to be 
taken into account to determine whether an advertisement is misleading (Article 3). 
Comparative advertising120 is authorised provided it fulfils certain (negative 
conditions) (such as not being misleading or denigrating) and positive conditions (such 
as being objective). The price is mentioned expressly as an element that can be the 
                                           
116 It is worth noting, however, that 72% of consumers responding to the public online consultation either 
‘tended to agree’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that introducing an obligation for all businesses to display the unit 
price irrespective of size would improve EU consumer and marketing rules for the benefit of consumers. This 
view was also supported by 80% of consumer associations and 64% of public authorities, compared to 41% 
of individual businesses and 24% of business associations. 
117 Judgment in Pippig, EU:C:2003:203. 
118 Judgment in Posteshop, C-52/13, EU:C:2014 150 (the Italian version of the Directive could have 
suggested otherwise). 
119 See art. 2(a) MCAD: ‘advertising’ means the making of a representation in any form in connection with a 
trade, business, craft or profession in order to promote the supply of goods or services, including immovable 
property, rights and obligations.” 
120 On the notion of comparative advertising see Judgment in Toshiba v Katun, C-112/99, EU:C:2001:566; 
see  F. Henning-Bodewig, “The Notion of Comparative Advertising” in Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Law, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2013, p. 345 et seq. 
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object of comparisons. The lawfulness of price comparisons has been largely defined in 
judgments of the CJEU.121 
The provisions on comparative advertising in the MCAD also affect trade mark law and 
are affected by the protection granted by the Trade Mark law Directive (TMD).122 The 
CJEU has ruled on the use of trade marks in comparative advertising.123  
The case-law of the CJEU shows a rather high level of protection given to the 
reputation of trade marks, in which the consumer interest does not seem to play a 
role. In contrast, the Court’s case-law on the conditions for the lawfulness of 
comparative advertising, in particular with regard to price comparison, is based on the 
premise that comparative advertising shall be authorised as much as possible because 
it is believed to contribute effectively to consumer information. For instance in 
L’Oréal,124 the Court granted a broad protection to well-known trade marks against 
unfair competition (by taking unfairly advantage or affecting the reputation of the 
trade mark), irrespective of whether consumers are harmed. The trade mark 
protection has been strengthened by Directive 2015/2436 (under the previous 
directive 2008/95/EC the protection of well-known trade marks against taking unfairly 
advantage or affecting the reputation of the trade mark was an option for the Member 
States, now it is compulsory). 
As regards the MCAD, its comparative advertising provisions have been declared by 
the CJEU to serve primarily the information of consumers as a result of which the 
Court has stressed that these provisions should be interpreted as much as possible in 
a sense that allows comparative advertising. This raises the question how a right 
balance can be struck between the protection of interests of trade mark owners, that 
flow from the extensive protection of well-known trademarks under the Trade Mark 
Directive, and that of consumers with respect to limitations on advertising for 
alternative goods while these goods may present advantages to them (especially in 
terms of price). 
In its Communication of 27 November 2012 on “Protecting businesses against 
misleading marketing practices and ensuring effective enforcement” and “Review of 
Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising”,125 the 
Commission identifies i.a. the following unfair practices between businesses: 
misleading payment forms, offers to extend internet domain names or protection of 
trademarks, and last but no least misleading directory companies.126 The Commission 
proposed the introduction of a black list and provisions to improve enforcement.  
                                           
121 See especially  Judgment in Lidl Belgium v Colruyt, C-356/04, EU:C:2006:585; Judgment in Lidl SNC v 
Vierzon, C-159/09, EU :C :2010 :696; see G.-L. Ballon, “Comparative advertising: price comparisons”, in 
Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Law, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2013. 
122 Directive 2008/95/EC recast in Directive 2015/2436 to approximate the laws of the Member States 
relating to trade marks. 
123 Judgment in O2 Holdings v Hutchinson, C-533/06, EU :C :2008:339: Judgment in L’Oréal v Bellure, C-
487/07, EU:C:2009:378; see G. Straetmans,”Comparative Advertsing and the Use of Trade marks: 
Confusion, Imitation and Unfair Advantage”, in Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Law, Antwerp, Intersentia, 
2013, 373 et seq. 
124 See Jugment in L’Oréal v Bellure, C-487/07, EU:C:2009:378. 
125 COM(2012) 702 final (based on a public consultation) 
126 For a detailed description of the practices of misleading directory companies, see Misleading practices of 
'directory companies' in the context of current and future internal market legislation aimed at the protection 
of consumers and SMEs, Civic Consulting / European Commission, 2008.  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  62 
The Communication of 27 November 2012 summarises the view of stakeholders as 
follows: Overall, there is almost a consensus among all stakeholder (including MS 
authorities) that, while the MCAD appears to provide a rather solid framework for a 
considerable part of the B2B advertising market, it does not efficiently capture all 
types of misleading marketing practices in all MS. There is a strong call for an 
increased protection of SME’s and independent professionals against misleading 
marketing practices, such as misleading directory companies, and for a cooperation 
mechanism between MS in cross-border cases of misleading marketing.127 The 
following drivers of the problem of cross-border misleading marketing practices are 
mentioned: lack of effective enforcement, unclear and insufficient rules on misleading 
marketing practices, insufficient awareness of SME’s on unlawfulness of misleading 
marketing practices.  
In a recent Communication on “Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-
business food supply chain”,128 the Commission identified the following practices (of 
which SME are the main victims, either by conduct of their suppliers or their clients): 
the retroactive misuse of unspecified, ambiguous or incomplete contract terms, the 
excessive and unpredictable transfer of costs or risks to the counterparty, the use of 
confidential information and the unfair termination or disruption of a commercial 
relationship. In other words, the practices referred to are practices in a contractual 
relationship, more in particular they are examples of B2B unfair contract terms (which 
as such are not regulated at the EU level, while being regulated in some Member 
States, e.g. in Germany); whereas the MCAD (and the UCPD) relate essentially to 
non-contractual practices. 
The country research for the present study corroborate the first finding of the 2011 
public consultation presented in the 2012 MCAD Review Communication of the 
Commission, namely that the MCAD provides a rather solid framework for a 
considerable part of the B2B advertising market,129 but does not corroborate the 
second finding, i.e. a strong call for an increased protection. According to the majority 
of country reports stakeholders are not aware of many complaints, and the limitation 
of the scope of the MCAD to “advertising”, i.e. not extending to commercial practices, 
is not reported to cause major problems. The limitation to “advertising”, as it is 
broadly defined in the MCAD, does therefore not seem to reduce significantly the 
MCAD’s effectiveness as compared to a situation where its provisions would apply to 
e.g. “commercial practices” as in the UCPD. In this regard it is telling that the black 
list the Commission proposed in 2012 to append to the MCAD in order to protect 
businesses against the most common form of unfair commercial practices can all be 
qualified as forms of misleading advertising.  
The practical lack of relevance of the limitation of the MCAD's scope to “advertising” 
can be explained by a number of factors: In several Member States there is one set of 
rules for misleading practices both for B2B and B2C, on the basis of the UCPD. Hence, 
the limitation to "advertising" does not seem to create a regulatory gap in these 
countries. In other Member States, the general clause on unfair competition 
complements the specific protection against misleading advertising. Finally, some 
other country reports stress that the definition of advertising in the MCAD and the 
                                           
127 It is also stressed that NGO’s are not protected, in that they are considered to be neither consumers 
(protected by the UCPD) nor traders (protected by the MCAD).  
128 COM(2014) 472 final. 
129 Also, in the online public consultation conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check, 69% of 
businesses agreed that businesses are currently well-protected against unfair comparative advertising and 
65% agreed that businesses are well-protected against misleading marketing practices, see Part 2 of this 
report. 
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national implementing law,130 or in the national implementing law (said to be going 
beyond the minimum level of the MCAD)131 is broad because it relates to “any form of 
representation”.  
Only a minority of country reports132 indicate that the limitation to advertising limits 
the effective protection of businesses against misleading practices. According to Italian 
stakeholders the implementation of the MCAD provides a sufficient level of protection, 
but at the same time it is said that there is a lack of equilibrium between the 
protection on B2B and B2C relations.133 Some country reports134 expressly mention 
the stakeholders’ opinion that the notion of advertising is broad enough to encompass 
most of the relevant practices or that the notion is in practice extended to practices 
not being advertising in the sense of the Directive. The country reports do not express 
concerns or positions on whether there is a need to regulate practices during contract 
conclusion/ performance in B2B transactions. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Stakeholders in a significant number of Member States confirm that overall the 
principle-based approach of the MCAD is effective.135 The country research also 
indicates that misleading advertising between businesses may often be challenged by 
actions brought under the UCPD, i.a. in situations where both consumers and 
businesses are misled.  
However, several country reports stress the absence of application experience, due to 
lack of administrative enforcement,136 or lack of case law137 or settlements, whereas 
others emphasise do that in particular small enterprises are affected by misleading 
advertisements.138 Also, in some Member States the principle-based approach of the 
MCAD is considered (in line with the experiences reported from some countries 
regarding the principle-based approach of the UCPD) to reduce legal certainty. For 
example, the country report Croatia emphasises that the principle-based approach to 
misleading advertising may prove to be challenging for courts, due to the fact that the 
general clause is open to different interpretations on a case-to case basis.139 In the 
country report Latvia the "lower level of certainty" of the principle-based approach is 
acknowledged, but it is concluded that the "benefits of the approach outweigh this 
                                           
130 Country reports Latvia, United Kingdom. 
131 Country report the Netherlands. 
132 Country report Spain.  
133 Country report Italy. 
134 Country reports Croatia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. 
135 Country reports Austria (where the UCPD is extended to B2B relations), Belgium (at least businesses; 
authorities would prefer more rules or a codification of case law), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark (same 
observation as for Austria), Italy, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, United Kingdom 
136 Country report Poland. 
137 Country report Croatia, Cyprus. 
138 Country report Austria. 
139 Country report Croatia. 
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disadvantage".140 To reduce uncertainty, the Lithuanian legislator established that 
when determining whether advertising is misleading, account is taken of the criteria of 
(i) accuracy, (ii) comprehensiveness and (iii) presentation. The addition of these three 
main pillars allows to methodically, on the basis of these three major criteria, assess 
whether the particular advertising is misleading.141 Another approach to create more 
legal certainty is suggested in the country reports Croatia and Romania, which 
consider, as a potential measure to improve the effectiveness of the MCAD, the 
introduction of a black list of B2B misleading practices (similar to the current approach 
of the UCPD). This is in line with the suggestion in the 2012 MCAD Review 
Communication of the Commission to introduce a black list of the most harmful 
misleading marketing practices (in addition to other proposed measures). A relevant 
question to stakeholders on this issue was also introduced in the open public 
consultation for the Fitness Check, the answers to which show that with 62% a clear 
majority of business respondents (i.e. individual companies) either strongly agree or 
tend to agree that business protection against unfair commercial practices should be 
strengthened by introducing a "black list" of B2B practices that are always prohibited. 
In contrast, less than one-third (27%) of business associations agree with this 
statement, while 47% either tend to disagree or strongly disagree.142 This split of 
opinion is to some degree reflected in the country research for this study: in some 
countries, stakeholders do not perceive a need for further action to improve the 
effectiveness of the MCAD, while others consider that there is a need for additional 
provisions or clarifications (e.g. regarding rules applicable to social media). In some 
countries, misleading practices affecting SMEs have already led to additional legislative 
action. For example in Sweden, the legislator has proposed several amendments in 
private law, marketing law and penal law in order to address the problem of false 
invoices, such as invoices sent out from previously unknown suppliers, invoices 
deliberately designed to resemble an invoice from a reputable supplier and offers that 
have been designed as invoices but where it has been difficult to see that in reality it 
is an offer.143  
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if any, have been providing a 
higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other rules protecting B2B 
transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through extending the UCPD)]? 
The existence of minimum harmonisation provisions on B2B misleading advertising in 
the MCAD, while in B2C relations the UCPD provides maximum harmonisation, might 
potentially lead to the paradoxical situation where businesses are better protected 
than consumers. However, our country research does not indicate that this is the case.  
As indicated above, in several Member States rules of the UCPD apply to B2B relations 
as well. Belgium has extended the general rules on misleading advertising of the UCPD 
(but with somewhat different criteria) as well as the prohibition of certain per se 
misleading practices (such as pyramid schemes and the use of invoices misleadingly 
giving the impression that the addressee has a debt) to B2B relations.144 In Germany 
the protection against confusion given by the UCPD (Article 6(2)(a)) – which applies to 
                                           
140 Country report Latvia. 
141 Country report Lithuania. 
142 Part 2 of this report. 
143 Country report Sweden 
144 Country report Belgium. 
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B2B relations in this country – leads to a higher level of protection of businesses than 
the MCAD.145 Interestingly, as mentioned in the country report Denmark, even where 
similar provisions apply to B2B and B2C relations, it may be that different standards 
are applied depending on whether the marketing is addressed to consumers or to 
businesses.146 Where the UCPD is not applied to B2B relations, specific provisions 
going beyond MCAD minimum harmonisation requirements often reflect a broader 
approach. For example, in Lithuania the national law provides a broader definition of 
“advertising” in comparison with one provided in Article 2(a) of the MCAD,147 and in 
Portugal national legislation relies on the UCPD’s (broader) definition of misleading 
actions.148 Likewise in Hungary in B2B relations the concept is “business practice” 
which corresponds to “commercial practice” in the UCPD.149 In Finland the Market 
Court provides protection in B2B relations by applying the concept of acts “against 
good commercial practices”.150 In Cyprus, the Trade Descriptions Law contains 
provisions comparable to the ones on misleading omissions of the UCPD and to this 
extent, goes beyond the MCAD which does not touch upon misleading omissions.151 
Some country reports also indicate, as highlighted before, that the general clause on 
unfair competition,152 or common law on passing off,153 may provide for additional 
protection for businesses in the field of misleading advertising. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
The comparative advertising provisions of the Directive have given rise to an 
important body of case-law of the CJEU which contributes to a uniform interpretation 
and clarity of the rules and this enhances the full harmonisation character and its 
positive effects (in the light of the rationale of these provisions which is to improve 
consumer information). Apparently, and notwithstanding the full harmonisation 
character of EU provisions on comparative advertising, there are important differences 
between Member States in the occurrence of comparative advertising. The differences 
may, to a certain extent, be explained by the traditional view on the permissibility of 
comparative advertising (under the standards of unfair competition). Allowing this 
form of advertising by clear legal rules does not necessarily seem to lead to an 
increase in practice. In Member States where, before the implementation of the 
Directive, comparative advertising was not allowed, the implementation of the 
Directive is often seen as beneficial (to consumers). In some Member States, this form 
of advertising remains exceptional or is not very often used (e.g. in Austria, Cyprus, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia).154 Stakeholders in Italy contend that 
the strict conditions for comparative advertising posed by the Directive have de facto 
                                           
145 Country report Germany. 
146 Country report Denmark. 
147 Country report Lithuania. 
148 Country report Portugal. 
149 Country report Hungary. 
150 Country report Finland. 
151 Country report Cyprus. 
152 Country reports Greece, Italy, Slovenia. 
153 Country report Ireland. 
154 Country reports Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia. 
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eliminated this type of advertising.155 In France the legislature has not fully respected 
the full harmonisation character.156 In contrast, after the Pippig judgement of the 
CJEU, which found the Austrian conditions for comparative advertising to be stricter 
than those of the MCAD, the UWG (the Austrian law on unfair competition and 
commercial practices) was amended in 2007 and corrected in 2010. The law is now 
believed to be in line with the MCAD.157 In Belgium, finally, where, since the 
implementation of the Directive of 1997, this form of advertising is quite common, the 
authorities are not enthusiastic about full harmonisation. They seem to believe that 
the aim of the rules is not to allow comparative advertising.158 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Only limited information could be identified during the country research concerning 
this issue. In some Member States there is no practical experience in this field,159 
there is no relevant case law or academic literature, or no problems were reported by 
stakeholders.160 While a definitive conclusion cannot be reached on this basis, the 
available evidence suggests that overall the existing comparative advertising rules are 
either not very relevant in countries where this practices is rarely used, or provide an 
effective legal framework to the extent that major problems have not been reported in 
those countries where comparative advertising is more prevalent.  
In several Member States the existing rules are considered to be sufficient to cope 
with modern type of marketing,161 including in the social media.162 From Bulgaria163 it 
is reported that in the practice of the Commission for Protection of Competition there 
are a significant number of cases related to online misleading/comparative 
advertising,164 including social media marketing.165 In contrast, the French country 
                                           
155 Country report Italy.  
156 Country report France: Article L 122-4 C. cons. prohibits comparative advertising on packaging, travel 
tickets, means of payment or admission tickets. 
157 Country report Austria. 
158 Country report Belgium. 
159 Country reports Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden. 
160 Country reports Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain. 
161 Country reports Belgium, Finland. 
162 Country reports Czech Republic, Estonia. 
163 Country report Bulgaria. 
164 Decision № 501/20.04.2011 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 273 / 05.03.2014 
the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 329 / 18.05.2016 the Commission for Protection 
of Competition; Decision № 1478 / 26.11.2014 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision 
06.01.2012 `Civil Case. № 58/2011 Sofia City Court. 
165 Decision № 1137 / 18.09.2013 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 791 / 
29.09.2015 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 250 / 18.03.2015 the Commission 
for Protection of Competition; Decision № 291 / 11.05.2016 the Commission for Protection of Competition; 
Decision № 331 / 16.04.2015 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 860 / 04.11.2015 
the Commission for Protection of Competition 
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report mentions problems with the application of existing rules to modern types of 
online comparative practices.166 Also, some of the position papers submitted to the 
online public consultation in the context of the Fitness Check suggest that additional 
clarification in this area would be welcomed.167 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the Directive provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
According to the country research conducted for this study, answers to this evaluation 
question vary depending on the Member State concerned and mostly either consist of 
a positive assessment of the effectiveness of the current rules168 or a conclusion that a 
lack of data or experience (as mentioned already before) does not allow a definitive 
assessment.169 Often, there appear to be only limited practical experiences in cross-
border enforcement. One report even mentions that, according to a business 
association, businesses would have no interest in conducting cross border comparative 
advertising. Where experience exists, practical problems seem to be considerable: 
Italian enforcement authorities report that they receive several complaints concerning 
cross-border infringements but that they are not able to react adequately, because of 
the lack of adequate instruments concerning cross-border cooperation.170 According to 
a Portuguese enforcement authority, in administrative procedures involving traders 
located in other EU Member-States the trader’s native language must be used in the 
notice. In several cases, the authority indicated, it is not possible to do so due to lack 
of resources. Although many traders do not raise this procedural question, when they 
do so, the procedure is closed. According to the country report, this example 
illustrates the need to simplify the procedural rules applying to cross-border 
infringements.171 Another problem of cross-border enforcement is highlighted by a 
Latvian authority: in some cases foreign traders are using methods of advertising in 
breach of Latvian law, but not of that in other Member States. In such cases, foreign 
authorities cannot impose any sanction, if requested so by Latvian authorities. This 
allows traders to evade any sanction.172 
In contrast the Belgian report mentions that, while a business association stated that 
the current rules on enforcement are insufficient in cross-border cases, there is a 
positive cooperation of government authorities within the Benelux.173 The Finish report 
mentions that, according to business associations, the rules function well. 
                                           
166  Country report France.  
167 E.g. it was stated by EuroCommerce that it “… supports the codification in the MCAD of the CJEU case 
law on comparative advertising [and] calls for the clarification of the conditions under which a retailer can 
lawfully use the following marketing practices involving a price comparison on the basis of the CJEU case 
law: comparison of the price of a selection/basket of products; comparison by a retailer between own-
brands and other brands; operation of price comparison websites by a retailer.” 
168 Country reports Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Malta. 
169 Country reports Cyprus, Ireland, Greece, Lithuania, Sweden, the Netherlands.  
170 Country report Italy. 
171 Country report Portugal. 
172 Country report Latvia. 
173 Country report Belgium. 
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Several country reports conclude that in view of the inapplicability of Regulation 
2006/2004 on Consumer Protection Cooperation to B2B relations cross-border 
enforcement is less effective than it should/could be, or report that stakeholders 
consider it important to extend the scope of application of Regulation 2006/2004 at 
least to the relationships business-to-micro-enterprises and at best to all B2B 
disputes.174 
 Effectiveness of the MCAD in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 6.1.1.5.
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; Whether the 
minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading advertising 
represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
While on a theoretical level disparities in the application of the principle-based 
approach and the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising could have negative effective on cross-border trade, the country research 
for this study identified no significant problems in this respect. In most Member States 
no specific, negative experience in terms of disparities in the understanding of the 
principle-based approach under the MCAD and resulting negative impacts on cross-
border trade could be identified, or stakeholders indicated that no data was available 
in this respect, or they had no opinion due to a lack of practical experience. The 
impacts of the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising were assessed similarly.  
The results of the business interviews conducted in the framework of this study 
confirm that there seem to be no disproportionate burdens on businesses in this 
respect. The reported costs that businesses spend on average when entering another 
EU country’s market for checking compliance with and adjusting their business 
practices to legal requirements of the other Member State related to advertising and 
marketing targeted at businesses were limited overall and typically less than half of 
the costs related to advertising and marketing targeted at consumers (for more 
details, see results of the business interviews in Part 4 of the report, and the answers 
to the evaluation questions related to efficiency below). 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
As to the fully harmonised MCAD provisions on comparative advertising, there do not 
seem to exist many problems. According to the country research the fully harmonised 
provisions on comparative advertising are considered to provide an appropriate legal 
framework, but it also has to be noted that relevant experience of stakeholders seems 
often to be limited, due to the limited use of comparative advertising in some Member 
States (see above), and/or the limited experience with cross-border trade in this 
respect. Several stakeholders have therefore emphasised that there is not sufficient 
information on this issue. 
                                           
174 Country reports Slovakia, Italy. Also, the country reports Croatia and Spain conclude that measures 
should be taken to improve effectiveness of cross-border enforcement by strengthening cooperation among 
competent authorities of Member States.  
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• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
According to the country research, there are either no relevant problems with / 
barriers to cross-border trade reported, or stakeholders had no data/no opinion 
regarding this question, due to the little relevance of cross-border trade in their 
country or the limited experience with cross-border enforcement. Only in some 
countries (e.g. Croatia, Italy), stakeholders suggested that the lack of cross-border 
enforcement mechanism in B2B relations does constitute a barrier to cross-border 
trade, but this view appears to be only partly rooted in the experience of relevant 
practical problems, and also be based on general considerations, e.g. concerning the 
need to institutionalise cooperation between public authorities regarding the 
interpretation of the legislation transposing the MCAD, and to detect and exchange 
information on new practices under the MCAD as well as to ensure sharing of 
experiences. In Latvia, stakeholders emphasised that this was not so much a problem 
of barriers to cross-border trade, but rather a problem of evasion from enforcement by 
certain traders, which may negatively affect cross-border trade indirectly, by distorting 
competition among traders in different Member States.175  
See also the previous evaluation question regarding cross-border enforcement 
(above). 
6.1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
 Effectiveness of the UCTD in contributing to a high level of consumer 6.1.2.1.
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive; 
  
The UCTD was adopted in 1993 after a long period of negotiations and several 
proposals of the Commission. Different traditions existed in the Member States to deal 
with unfair contractual terms; different policy reasons (transactions costs; abuse of a 
weaker party) underpinned national systems for monitoring unfair contract terms. 
Both the scope of the UCTD and the wording of its provisions reflect the need to 
overcome the differences between legal traditions. 
The UCTD controls contract terms which were not individually negotiated. It 
establishes a general norm that considers a contract term unfair if it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer, contrary to the requirement of good faith (Art. 3 
(1), the unfairness test). In addition to the general norm, the UCTD contains an 
indicative list of terms which may be regarded as unfair (Annex, Art. 3 (3)). 
Contract terms reflecting mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and provisions 
or principles of international conventions are excluded from review (Art. 1(2)). In 
addition, review of the main subject matter or adequacy of the price and remuneration 
is excluded, unless such terms were not drafted in plain, intelligible language (Art. 4 
                                           
175 See country report Latvia. 
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(2)). Transparency is moreover required for all written contract terms. In case of 
doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer prevails (Art. 5). 
There can be said to be a principle-based approach of the UCTD in the two broad 
senses to be discussed further below (the range of sectors and terms covered and the 
open-ended fairness test), and in both these senses this principle-based approach can 
be said to be broadly effective in contributing to a high level of consumer protection; 
while there are ways in which this effectiveness could be enhanced. 
In the following, first the effectiveness of the principle-based approach of the UCTD is 
explored in light of the case law of the CJEU, before the results of the country research 
and the assessment of stakeholders concerning the principle-based approach are 
presented, including by considering related problems. Two different dimensions of the 
principle-based approach can be differentiated: 
• The coverage of all sectors and most terms; 
• The open-ended test of unfairness that enables a range of (EU and national) 
fairness criteria to be applied to any given term. 
Concerning the first dimension, there is a principle-based approach in that (subject to 
specific exclusions having no relevance to consumer protection176) the UCTD applies to 
all trade sectors. Art 1 (1) refers simply to ‘contracts concluded between a seller or 
supplier and a consumer’. This catches sale and supply of goods and services; and the 
sale, lease and mortgaging of land.177 The benefits of this principle-based approach 
can be seen by considering the huge range of sectors in which national regulatory 
bodies have been able to carry out work to remove unfair terms.178 Although the 
Directive is effective in that it is basically applicable to all types of contracts, the 
Directive uses the terms “seller and supplier” and “goods and services”, which has led 
to some confusion and diverging national case law (e.g. regarding guarantee or 
suretyship contracts).179 It was already suggested in the Consumer law compendium 
that a more neutral and uniform wording would avoid these discussions. Instead of the 
terms “seller/supplier”, a uniform term could be used for all consumer protecting 
directives, to denote the contractual partner of the consumer, e.g. “business” or 
“professional”180 or “trader”. 
The CJEU has also made clear in Tarçau that it is irrelevant for the application of the 
Directive whether the consumer pays a price.181 This question is particularly relevant 
                                           
176 Contracts relating to employment, succession rights, rights under family law and the incorporation and 
organisation of companies or partnership agreements Preamble, recital 10). 
177 On land, e.g. CJEU in Aziz, C-415/11. 
178 See, e.g., the work of the UK general enforcer, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA): CMA, 
Unfair Contract Terms, CMA37, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unfair-contract-terms-
cma37, the specialist work of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA): FCA, Unfair Contract Terms, at 
https://www.the-fca.org.uk/firms/unfair-contract-terms, note that some land and insurance contracts were 
not always covered by prior UK domestic legislation (Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Schedule 1, 1 (a) & 
(b)), and, see, e.g., work on online contracts in Denmark (Danish report), but also in ia Germany (see 
COJEF report, http://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2016-051_cojef_ii-
enforcement_of_consumer_rights.pdf, p. 23 et seq).   
179 The CJEU has made clear in Bucura, C-348/14 and in Tarcău, C-74/15 that the Directive has a very 
broad scope of application and it applies to ‘all contracts’ between traders and consumers.  Indeed, no 
provision in the directive specifies the type of contract to which it applies. It suffices that that contractual 
relation is concluded for non-professional purposes to qualify as a consumer.   
180 Consumer law compendium, p. 349. 
181 CJEU 19 Nov. 2015, Tarcău, ECLI:EU:C:2015:772, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
documents.jsf?num=C-74/15; Recital 10 Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
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in the case of online services, as there is often no monetary consideration, but ‘only’ 
personal data in return for a service. However, the UCTD also applies in such 
circumstances.182  
Also, Art. 1 (1) simply refers to ‘terms’ of a contract, so there is also a principle-based 
approach in that all terms not positively excluded183 are covered. In contrast to an 
approach where only certain types of terms are tested for fairness,184 the UCTD 
provides a more general principle of fairness. This covers the range of ways in which 
traders might exclude or restrict their liabilities or vary (so as to reduce) their 
responsibilities; or impose unfair obligations and liabilities on consumers: e.g. high 
default charges; price increases; full payment in advance terms; or unfair 
enforcement methods, e.g. allowing entry to the consumer’s home, taking 
possessions, property etc. It is also ‘future-proof’ in that it catches new forms of the 
above sorts of terms, and also other types of terms (e.g. ‘privacy policies’, involving 
the right to use consumer information) which were not even contemplated when the 
UCTD was first adopted – all that matters is that the term is not a positively excluded 
one.  
The UCTD does however refer to ‘contract’ terms, thus triggering the discussion 
whether terms in unilateral notices and terms that do not have contractual status are 
subject to review.185 In some countries, the scope of the review was widened,186 in 
other countries, a broad interpretation in case law assured the same effect.  
It can be concluded that the broad scope of application has certainly contributed to the 
effectiveness of the Directive and the case law of the CJEU has confirmed such broad 
scope of application. The wording of the Directive is however ambiguous and the use 
of the terms “seller and supplier” and “goods and services” has led to some confusion 
and diverging national case law.  
As indicated above, there is also a principle-based approach in that the test of 
unfairness is sufficiently open ended to enable a range of (EU and national) fairness 
criteria to be applied to any given term.  
The open-ended fairness test has provided a platform for a partnership to develop 
between the CJEU and national courts in terms of interpretation and application.187 So, 
                                           
182 E. TERRYN, “‘Consumers, by Definition, Include Us All’ … But Not for Every Transaction”, ERPL 2016, n 2, 
271; M. LOOS & J. LUZAK, ‘Wanted: A Bigger Stick. On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’, Journal of 
Consumer Policy 2015. 
183 I.e. terms reflecting mandatory statutory provisions (art 1 (2)), individually negotiated terms (art 3 (1)) 
and main subject matter and price terms (art 4 (2)).  
184 E.g. the prior UK regime, UCTA 1977, covering only clauses excluding or limiting specific, positively 
defined, types of obligation or liability; and see discussion of this difference in T. Wilhelmsson and C. Willett 
(2016), in G. Howells, I. Ramsay and T. Wilhelmsson, Handbook on International Consumer Law, Elgar, 
ch. 11.  Note, however, UCTA 1977, s 13.   
185 In Belgium, e.g., there is a line of caselaw that excludes the application of the rules on unfair contract 
terms to unilateral promises (Kortged, Antwerpen 8 October 2009, NJW 2010, 708). In another Belgian 
case, a (unilateral) declaration was however considered as an addendum to a contract between a hospital 
and a consumer so that its terms were subject to control (Gent 26 October 2012 TGR 2013, 46). 
186 Thus, in the UK, the Consumer Rights Act extends the scope of the review to a notice ‘to the extent that 
it (a) relates to rights or obligations as between a trader and a consumer, or (b) purports to exclude or 
restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer.’ (s. 61 (4) Consumer Rights Act).   
187 NB that the points here as to this partnership also apply to any aspects of procedural fairness relevant to 
the test, but we focus here on the way in which this partnership developed in relation to substantive 
fairness.   
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in Freiburger Kommunalbauten188, the fundamental ground rules for this partnership 
were laid down. It was said to be for the CJEU to interpret the unfairness test, but "it 
should not rule on the application of these general criteria to a particular term, which 
must be considered in the light of the particular circumstances of the case in 
question."189 Therefore, while the CJEU has the role of unpacking the meaning of the 
concept of fairness, it is for the national court to apply this concept to the term in 
question, taking into account the circumstances – which will include the particular 
facts of the case, and the national legal context.  
However, even early on, it could be seen that the open ended nature of the unfairness 
test, also enabled the CJEU to sometimes go beyond such an interpretive role, and to 
actually apply the test to the facts, e.g. in Océano190 where the CJEU held to be unfair 
a jurisdiction clause, according to which the court at the seller’s place of business had 
jurisdiction in respect of all disputes arising from the contract (meaning the consumer 
would need to travel hundreds of miles to plead their case). In the Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten case, the Court said the clause in Oceano was obviously unfair, 
being solely to the benefit of the trader, and containing no benefit for the consumer, 
making it unnecessary for it to be assessed in a national law context.191 This was the 
earliest example of the flexibility of the principle-based approach being used to 
develop a protective approach to terms affecting the procedural ability of consumers 
to enforce their rights. We see this much more recently in Sebestyén192 where, 
although CJEU left the assessment of unfairness of an arbitration clause to the 
national court, it provided very concrete criteria for this assessment, criteria that 
would be very likely to result in a finding of unfairness.  
More recently, the open ended principle-based approach has allowed the CJEU to 
develop its interpretive role more generally, i.e. beyond jurisdiction and arbitration 
clauses and national procedural rules. These interpretations have been of a rather 
protective nature. In Mohamed Aziz, the Court said that "in order to assess whether 
the imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’, it must be determined 
whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could 
reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to the term concerned in 
individual contract negotiations."193 This ‘agreement’ test again potentially sets a 
reasonably high level of protection, at least if we assume that traders must surely 
appreciate that if consumers were really in a position to negotiate, then they would 
only agree to terms that protected their interests to a reasonable degree.  
At the same time, some national courts have understood the agreement test as being 
less protective. So, in Parking Eye v Beavis,194 the UK Supreme Court has considered 
                                           
188 Case C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v Ludger Hofstetter and 
Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403 (dealing with whether a contractual term in a building contract 
requiring the whole of the price to be paid before the performance by the seller or supplier, could be 
regarded as unfair). 
189 Freiburger Kommunalbauten, para 22. 
190 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero and Salvat 
Editores SA v José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades, José Luis Copano Badillo, Mohammed Berroane and Emilio 
Viñas Feliú [2000] ECR I-4941. 
191 Freiburger Kommunalbauten, para 23. 
192 Case C-342/13 Katalin Sebestyén v Zsolt Csaba Kővári, OTP Bank Nyrt., OTP Faktoring Követeléskezelő 
Zrt, Raiffeisen Bank Zrt [2014].  
193 Case-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d´Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa, para 69. 
194 UKSC 2015/0116 
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it relevant to whether a consumer would have agreed to a term that consumers 
generally accept this term (so apparently taking to be acceptable the power imbalance 
that leads to consumers generally accepting terms). The Supreme Court also 
elaborated on the Aziz test by referring not only to whether ‘the’ consumer would have 
agreed to the term, but to whether a ‘reasonable’ consumer would have agreed to it. 
This seems fine, until we see that the Supreme Court then took the view that such a 
‘reasonable’ consumer would understand the need for an extremely high parking 
charge (£85) for any (even a few minutes) overstay beyond the initially 2 hour free 
period – it being (for the Supreme Court) understandable to the reasonable consumer 
that this was necessary to deter overstays and thereby enable efficient management 
of the parking area.195 One must ask therefore whether the ‘reasonable’ consumer 
concept, at least on its own, leaves too much scope for a non-protective application.  
Just as the open ended principle-based approach of the test of unfairness, has allowed 
for the development of the above general sorts of fairness norms (e.g. based on 
hypothetical agreement), it also leaves space for much more detailed specification by 
the CJEU as to what is ‘fair’ in relation to particular types of term-specification that 
often amounts to quite a high level of protection. This is demonstrated once again by 
the Aziz case, where particular types of term in a mortgage contract were at issue: 
One example is a term allowing for default interest (higher than the standard rate) to 
be charged. Here, fairness is to be assessed by determining whether the default 
interest rate exceeds what would apply under national standards;196 and, if so, 
whether this can be justified on the basis that it is "appropriate for securing the 
attainment of the objectives pursued by it in the Member State concerned and does 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them"197 (presumably this means whether 
the trader has some legitimate interest in exceeding what would normally be allowed, 
e.g. perhaps the normal amount allowed is only what is needed to cover the trader’s 
losses, but perhaps the trader has a legitimate interest in the circumstances, in 
charging more, so as to deter this sort of breach by consumers).198  
So, we see a concept of protection addressing a particular type of problematic credit 
sector term. Again, however, there is the basis of a more general fairness norm for all 
sectors. In other sectors, the issue will not necessarily be default interest. Rather, it 
may simply be a more general default charge of the sort contemplated by Annex, para 
1 (e): ‘requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in compensation’. The Aziz formula offers a way of 
understanding when a sum in any trade sector is ‘disproportionately high’, i.e. when it 
exceeds a national norm, and cannot be justified by reference to any particular 
legitimate interest of the trader.  
Aside from the other credit specific and more generally applicable fairness standards 
that can be taken from Aziz, it is arguable that the foundations are now there for a 
general approach (applicable across all sectors) under which it can be taken that a 
term will often cause significant imbalance and violate the good faith requirement, 
where it significantly deviates from any default position that would otherwise apply.199 
                                           
195 Parking Eye, ibid. 
196 Presumably this might be a general default standard, e.g. that the amount should be a reasonable pre-
estimate of the loss cause to the trader by the consumer’s breach, or a more specific sum laid down by 
statute (see Aziz at para 74).  
197 Para 74. 
198 E.g. the UK Parking Eye case, where the SC believed the £85 charge was necessary to protect the 
legitimate interest of efficient parking management (the question again being whether legitimate interest’ 
needs to be qualified by reference to the same sort of criteria discussed above-see note 17 above, and the 
preceding and subsequent text.  
199 Aziz, and some other country examples.  
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So, if the term excludes or restricts obligations or liabilities that would otherwise be 
owed, under the default rules, by the trader to the consumer, or if it imposes 
obligations or liabilities on the consumer, that would otherwise not be owed, under the 
default rules, then this is the sort of term that may very well cause significant 
imbalance and violate the good faith requirement. The broad logic here seems to be 
that default rules have been set based upon some process of balancing the interests of 
the trader and the consumer, so if a term deviates from such rules, to the detriment 
of the consumer, then it may well be unfair.200 The focus on national default rules 
maintains national autonomy, while also presumably providing a reasonably high level 
of protection, based on the national traditions of protection upon which the default 
rules are based.  
It should be noted also that in Constructora Principado,201 the Court said that 
‘significant imbalance’ does not require significant economic impact on the consumer, 
not even relative to the value of the transaction. It suffices that the term leads to a 
serious impairment of the consumer’s legal position, relative to the relevant national 
law. This further emphasises the significance of national default rules as a fairness 
yardstick, while also emphasising a high level of protection: i.e. that there can be 
significant imbalance based on deviation from a national default rule (in a manner 
seriously detrimental to the consumer), even although there is no serious economic 
detriment to the consumer. 
It can therefore be concluded that the CJEU has unpacked the potential of the 
principle-based approach in developing new substantive fairness norms, to help 
national courts to deliver the consumer protection goals of the UCTD, in ways that are 
anchored in national legal tradition, and thereby has safeguarded the effectiveness of 
the principle-based approach in contributing to a high level of consumer protection.  
The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach has also been confirmed 
through the country research for this evaluation, both in terms of its application in 
specific cases, and the assessment of stakeholders across the EU:  
Decisions of enforcement authorities and courts often involve an application of the 
UCTD illustrating the effectiveness of the Directive's principle-based approach in 
practice. In Bulgaria, most collective actions, the majority of which are injunctions, 
between 2013 and 2015 (between 85% and 100%) were brought on the basis of the 
UCTD.202 In Portugal it is estimated that 40% of relevant court cases (400 of 1 000) in 
2015 were decided on basis of the UCTD, and 15% of the ADR cases (2 250 of 15 000, 
including the so-called 'Peace Courts').203 For Romania, 5 930 cases based on the 
UCTD are reported for the same year.204 A Significant number of cases are also 
reported from most other countries for which statistics were available (Finland, 
France, Lithuania, Slovenia).205 Relevant quantitative data were available from only 11 
                                           
200 T. Wilhelmsson and C. Willett (2016), ‘Unfair Contract Terms’, above.  
201 Case C-226/12 Constructora Principado SA v José Ignacio Menéndez Álvarez [2014]. 
202 Country report Bulgaria. 
203 Country report Portugal. 
204 Country report Romania. 
205 In France, according to statistics of the national enforcement body (the DGCCRF) 5% of the 9 960 
investigations in 2015 were conducted on basis of the UCTD (i.e. 495 cases), in Lithuania, according to 
SCRPA's statistics, 11% of cases (140 of 1 284 cases), and in Slovenia 12% (3 of 25 court cases). In 
Slovenia, the decisions of the courts of first instance are not publicly available, so that the statistics only 
includes decisions of the Administrative Court, Higher Courts and the Supreme Court. See country reports 
France, Lithuania, Slovenia. 
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countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia), as court data and ADR statistics are either not available 
or do not provide a sufficient level of detail in other countries. 
In the interviews conducted with relevant ministries, enforcement authorities, 
consumer associations, business organisations and other stakeholders in all 28 
Member States, the assessment of the principle-based approach of the Directive was 
generally positive: the main advantages cited being the flexibility and breadth of 
coverage, enabling a variety of types of terms in different sectors to be controlled, and 
also the ’future proof’ dimension, i.e. allowing control of new forms of unfair term that 
may develop.  
This positive view was shared by those countries (e.g. Austria, Denmark, France and 
Germany) that had previously used a similar form of general clause aimed at unfair 
terms, and by those (e.g. Italy and the UK) for whom such a clause was more of a 
novelty.  
One problem cited is as to the degree of reception by some national courts, e.g. in the 
Czech Republic, where national courts tend to continue to rely on general Civil Code 
norms and more concrete consumer protection rules (although the enforcement bodies 
are much more acquainted with the UCTD general clause); and, more seriously, in 
Cyprus, where it is reported that the courts are very much wedded to common law 
tradition, and struggle with the general clause, in particular showing a tendency to 
understand the notion of a violation of good faith as requiring subjective wrongdoing 
by the business. Another problem cited (e.g. in Bulgaria) is a lack of enforcement 
resources to make effective use of the general clause across all trade sectors.  
In the public consultation conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check on EU 
consumer and marketing law, consumer associations unanimously agreed that the 
right to be protected against unfair clauses in the small print is 'very beneficial' to 
consumers. The majority (more than 70%) of all other respondent categories were 
also in agreement that the right to be protected against unfair clauses in the small 
print is 'very' or 'rather' beneficial to consumers. 
In summary, the principle based approach appears to be working well, subject to 
problems as to limited enforcement resources to apply it to all trade sectors, and 
problems (some more serious than others) in national judicial reception of the general 
clause.  
A further gap in the principle based approach, which may undermine its effectiveness 
in protecting consumers in certain situations, is that under Art. 4(1) the assessment of 
unfairness involves referring ‘at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the 
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract’. So, no account can be taken 
of the fact that, although the term may have been a fair one to include at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, it has subsequently become unfair to rely on the term, due 
to changing circumstances. This is allowed in Nordic law, where the focus is on 
assessing the fairness of the consequences of applying a term: it not mattering 
whether the unfair consequences are related to the circumstances prevailing when the 
contract was made or to later changes in circumstances.206 This aspect may be of 
increasing importance given the many modern contracts that involve long term 
relationships (e.g. financial services, tenancy etc) and where the scope for detrimental 
changes is significant.207 
                                           
206 See Nordic Contracts Act, s. 36. 
207 T. Wilhelmsson (2016), ‘Unfair Terms’, in G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsson, EU Consumer Law, 
forthcoming. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers [i.e. the practical effectiveness] of the 
indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the Directive, in particular its application in 
practical cases; [Key aspects to consider are: How is the indicative list of the 
Directive interpreted in MS? Does this work in practice or are there problems?] 
The practical relevance of a list of unfair terms in concretising the principle-based 
approach, i.e. in ‘fleshing out’ the broad test of unfairness, by providing examples for 
consumers, businesses, courts and regulators of many of the most important types of 
potentially unfair terms has been stressed by stakeholders throughout the country 
research. Lists add legal certainty and several national enforcers have stressed that 
lists with concrete examples of open norms make it easier to enforce compliance than 
mere open norms. 
An alternative to an indicative list is a ‘black’ list (terms automatically unfair), or a 
‘grey’ list (terms presumed to be unfair-the terms on the indicative list seem to be 
something just short of this, not actually being presumed to be unfair). In those 
countries that have a national black or grey list and that thus provide more protection 
than the Directive (see following section), it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of 
the indicative list of the Directive, as stricter national provisions can be relied on. This 
does, however not mean that the indicative lists have no practical effect, to the 
contrary. 
This is first of all due to the (recent) case law of the CJEU that attaches essential 
importance to the content of the Annex. Thus, in Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v 
Invitel Távközlési Zrt208 the CJEU stated that if “the content of the annex does not 
suffice in itself to establish automatically the unfair nature of a contested term, it is 
nevertheless an essential element on which the competent court may base its 
assessment as to the unfair nature of that term.”209 This has been confirmed in 
several other cases and the CJEU now routinely makes reference to the list to explain 
its reasoning on the test of unfairness.210 This case law of the CJEU has been referred 
to as a reason for giving the indicative list of the Directive greater prominence.211 
The usefulness of the list is also often acknowledged by national courts.212 For 
example, in the Netherlands also in lower case-law the fact that a term falls within the 
scope of a term on the indicative list is frequently seen as an important factor in the 
application of the unfairness test.213,214 In Sweden, where the list is not annexed to 
                                           
208 (C-472/10) April 26, 2012. 
209 Cf. Peabody Trust Governors v Reeve [2008] EWHC 1432 (Ch) at [49] per Gabriel Moss QC “It follows 
from the judgment of the European Court of Justice [in Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft 
& Co KG v Hofstetter (C237/02) April 1, 2004] that even if Mr Bastin is correct in locating the present 
provision both within Schedule 2, paragraph 1(j) as a typically unfair provision but yet one which is  not  to 
be regarded as typically unfair by reason of Schedule 2, paragraph 2(b) , this takes the matter no further 
forward and is of no assistance to him.” 
210 See inter alia REW, Aziz and Banco Popular Español. 
211 E.g. country report UK. 
212 See in the same sense also i.a. the Slovenian country report. 
213 See Loos 2013, no. 345. 
214 An example is Court of Appeal’s-Hertogenbosch 9 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2007:AZ5890 (term 
requiring to notify a lack of conformity within a short period after delivery of a construction work under 
threat of losing a right to claim damages- qualified as a term limiting the legal rights of the consumer in 
case of the trader’s non-performance, as per indicative list 1b). Another example is the evaluation of 
penalty clauses (indicative list, 1e). Dutch courts tend to consider such clauses to be unfair in particular 
where there is no maximum for the penalty, implying that the penalty in theory could be unlimited. See for 
instance District Court Groningen 31 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2010:BM1402, TvC 2010/5, p. 218 (case 
note M.B.M. Loos) (Visa Card Services/X); District Court Assen 20 July 2010, 
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the legal text, but can be found in the travaux preparatoires to the legal text, the 
Market Court has in several cases forbidden companies to use contract terms as they 
have been contrary to the indicative list.215  
In some countries, an indicative list is in practice even used as a black list and 
therefore considered effective. Thus, e.g. in Slovenia, the indicative list of the UCPD 
was transposed in the Consumer Protection Act.216 In principle, it should be applied as 
an indicative list, i.e. the elements of general clause should still be assessed. However, 
it seems that the courts often rely on examples from the list without proving that the 
term is unfair under the general clause.217  
The indicative list is also considered useful in enabling enforcers to deal efficiently with 
unfair terms. An example here is the significant role that the list has played in the 
regulatory practice of the UK enforcement agency. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
and now the Competition and Markets Authority have made use of the indicative list in 
their guidance218 and enforcement activity.219 The CMA has built a great deal of the 
analysis of unfairness around the list, e.g. the most recent guidance document 
contains almost 70 pages of commentary on the list.220 The usefulness of the list for 
the practice of national enforcers was also confirmed in other country reports.221  
Based on the country research it can be concluded that the indicative list is considered 
to have significant practical benefits in terms of consumer protection and legal 
certainty.  
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Key aspects to consider for those MS in 
which a black/grey list exists are: How does the list work in practice? Does it make 
a difference to have such a list?] 
The indicative list of the Directive has been transposed in various ways in the different 
Member States, the Directive being a minimum harmonisation instrument. As the 
following table indicates, most countries have some form of black (automatically 
unfair) or grey (presumed unfair) list, in some cases even both (e.g. Austria, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK). 
                                                                                                                               
ECLI:NL:RBASS:2010:BN4807, NJF 2010, 368 (Visa Card Services/X); District Court Arnhem 15 December 
2010, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2010:BO9665, Prg. 2011/60 (International Card Services B.V./X). 
215 See MD 2000:24, MD 2003:12, MD 2002:23 and MD 2004:22.  
216 Article 24 Consumer Protection Act. 
217 See e.g. Higher Court in Ljubljana, VSL II Cp 1753/2015, from 19 August 2015 and VSL II Cp 1647/2015 
from 4 November 2015; Administrative court, UPRS I U 563/2013 from 1 April 2014. 
218 See, for example, CMA, ‘Contract Terms Guidance: Guidance on the Unfair Terms Provisions in the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015’ (CMA37 (2015)), p.63ff.  
219  See, for example, OFT, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, (OFT311, (2008)). 
220 See the recent 2015 Guidance in particular: https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf 
221 Country report Slovenia. 
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Table 5: Overview of Member States with 'black' or 'grey lists'  
Country Provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
'Black list' of terms considered 
unfair in all circumstances 
'Grey list' of terms which may be 
presumed to be unfair 
Austria Yes Yes 
Belgium Yes No 
Bulgaria Yes No 
Croatia No Yes 
Cyprus Yes Yes 
Czech Republic Yes No 
Denmark  No No 
Estonia Yes Yes 
Finland No No 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Greece Yes No 
Hungary Yes Yes 
Ireland No Yes 
Italy Yes Yes 
Latvia Yes No 
Lithuania No Yes 
Luxembourg Yes No 
Malta Yes No 
Netherlands Yes Yes 
Poland Noa)  Yes 
Portugal Yes Yes 
Romania No Yes 
Slovakia Yesb)  No 
Slovenia No Yes 
Spain Yes Yesc) 
Sweden No No 
United Kingdom Yes Yes 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law - UCTD. Notes: a) UOKiK 
published a registry of court decisions on standard terms and conditions that have been assessed as unfair in abstracto; 
this worked as a de facto black list – even though only a given trader was prohibited from applying this term. b) There is 
not a clear consensus whether the list is ´black´ or ´grey´ one. c) Articles 85 to 90 of the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 
specify a series of clauses that are unfair by combining the technique of "black list" and that of "grey list". Alongside 
clauses whose unfair character results from the application of objective criteria or a mechanical process consisting of 
including a specific case within the rule (black list), other rules cannot be automatically applied because of their 
vagueness and a task of interpretation and assessment is needed (grey list). 
Consumers benefit in being provided with better protection from terms on the black or 
grey lists, without any need for them or the regulator to take time and resources to 
make the case under the general test, where there is always some scope for dispute, 
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e.g. as to whether in the national legal context, and on the facts of the case, the term 
causes significant imbalance, contrary to good faith.  
The black or grey lists were reported to provide more legal certainty than a mere 
indicative list.222 They facilitate the judicial task and provide foreseeability to 
consumers regarding the result of the procedure, and encourage businesses to adapt 
their contractual clauses to the standards legally established.223 Black lists have 
helped to eradicate certain practices considered dangerous for consumers (e.g. 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts).224 
Public enforcers (both with general competence and with sector specific 
competence)225 and consumer organisations226 confirmed that a black list makes it 
easier to combat unfair terms. Black lists are generally considered to provide better 
protection to consumers.227  
Grey lists are considered more effective than a mere indicative list, but provide less 
protection than black lists.228 Thus in e.g. Slovakia, the preference of the black list 
over the grey list has been firmly established by recent court practice. This position 
was possibly strengthened by the overload of consumer cases in the Slovak courts, 
where the list of unfair terms proved to be very helpful. 
From the country research and the results of the open public consultation in the 
framework of the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law, in general a 
preference for a black list – and to a lesser extent grey lists – over a mere indicative 
list, is quite clear for some stakeholder groups (mostly consumer organisations and 
public authorities), which are also strongly in favour of a (limited) black list at EU 
level:229,230 The majority (90%) of consumer associations participating in the 
consultation either strongly agreed or tended to agree that consumer protection 
against unfair contract terms should be strengthened by introducing a black list of 
terms that are always prohibited. 68% of public authorities also agreed with this 
statement. In contrast, 61% of business associations either tended to disagree or 
strongly disagreed.231 Some business organisations only favour such black list at EU 
level if it were to be fully harmonised. In a minimum harmonisation approach, the 
                                           
222 Country reports Germany, Czech republic, Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal.  
223 Country report Spain. 
224 Country report Latvia. 
225 Country reports Bulgaria, Czech Republic.  
226 See position papers submitted to the online public consultation by vzbv, Which? and BEUC. 
227 Country report Netherlands. 
228 In this sense, some stakeholders in Lithuania; country report Slovakia (Lazíková, Števček 2013); country 
report Sweden. 
229 See also country report Lithuania; country report Estonia; country report Slovakia; consultation paper 
Which? (submitted in the open public consultation in the framework of the Fitness Check of EU consumer 
and marketing law). 
230 General support for a black list at the EU level was also among the conclusions of Workshop 2 on 
Increasing fairness of commercial practices and of contract terms at the 2016 Consumer Summit. Some 
workshop participants specified that they would prefer a short black list at a minimum harmonisation level. 
231 It is notable, that half of the responding businesses (49%) agreed with the statement, therefore being 
more positive towards a black list than their organisations. However, only 32 individual businesses had an 
opinion in this respect, compared to 80 business associations, so that this divergence in opinions should not 
be over interpreted. 
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status quo is preferred.232 However, maximum harmonisation is difficult to achieve in 
this area. As long as the contract law of the Member States has not been fully 
harmonised, it is not feasible to fully harmonise unfair contract terms, if only because 
of the importance attached by the CJEU to the default rule to determine the unfairness 
of a clause. The need to maintain a minimum harmonisation approach was stressed 
repeatedly in the country reports.233  
Based on the country research it can be concluded that black and grey lists are 
considered more effective than indicative lists. However, in order to be effective, such 
lists (whether indicative, grey or black) need to be updated regularly, as was stressed 
several times.234 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive; 
According to Art. 5 UCTD, "contracts where all or certain terms offered to the 
consumer are in writing, […] must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language." In 
case of doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer prevails. 
This transparency requirement is to some extent linked to the unfairness test of the 
Directive. It arguably makes sense to think of transparency as being necessary if a 
term is not to be viewed as violating good faith under the UCTD test: i.e. that terms 
must be presented transparently if it is to be said that a trader is ‘dealing fairly and 
equitably’ and taking into account the ‘legitimate interests’ of the consumer.  
This seems to have been recognised by the CJEU and at national level. The CJEU has 
clearly accepted that transparency has a role to play at least sometimes under the 
unfairness test. So, in RWE235 the Court said that where a term reserved the right to 
vary the charge for the supply of gas, the term should "set out in transparent fashion 
the reason for and method of those charges, so that the consumer can foresee, on the 
basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the alterations that may be made". This arguably 
sets quite a high level of transparency. It almost turns the "transparency requirement 
into a kind of duty of disclosure".236  
Of course, this CJEU guidance is specific to particular sorts of terms. So, it is not 
completely clear whether the CJEU considers a good level of transparency to be 
required for all terms under the good faith requirement; or (if transparency is 
generally required), what exactly is needed generally for terms to be viewed as 
transparent. In contrast, some national approaches do provide clear criteria. For 
example, the UK Law Commissions have previously suggested a definition of 
transparency as follows: “'Transparent' means (a) expressed in reasonably plain 
                                           
232 Consultation paper Eurocommerce (submitted in the open public consultation in the framework of the 
Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law). 
233 The minimum harmonisation approach was also stressed by all three consumer organisations that 
submitted position papers to the online public consultation. 
234 Country reports Portugal, Romania, UK. 
235 Case C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV [2013]. 
236 Thomas Wilhelmsson (2016), ‘Unfair Terms’, above. 
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language, (b) legible, (c) presented clearly, and (d) readily available to any person 
likely to be affected by the contract term or notice in question".237 
Before dealing with the issues under Article 5 itself (as to advantages of transparency, 
and the queries as to its functions, and what sanctions are available for a lack of 
transparency), it is important to point out the linkage of transparency to the 
unfairness test (as this is relevant to the above evaluation question about the overall 
effectiveness of the principle-based approach in setting a high level of consumer 
protection under the unfairness test). As we have just seen, transparency is probably 
a requirement of good faith, and in this sense, the principle based approach is 
strengthened. But can transparency sometimes be enough to establish good faith? If 
so, and if (as is arguable) a term cannot be unfair unless there is not only a significant 
imbalance in rights and obligations, but also a violation of good faith, this would mean 
that even if a term is very substantively unfair, and so causes significant substantive 
imbalance, that there is nevertheless no violation of good faith because of the 
transparency. In short, the substantively unfair term is fair because of the 
transparency.  
In response to this, the Aziz ‘agreement’ test refers to what consumers would agree to 
if they could negotiate, which surely refers to what substantive term they would have 
agreed to. So, if the term used is significantly less substantively fair than this, the 
CJEU view seems to be that (transparency notwithstanding) there is violation of the 
good faith requirement. There is further support for this approach in the Sebestyén 
case, where it was said that: "However, even assuming that the general information 
the consumer receives before concluding a contract satisfies the requirement under 
Article 5 that it be plain and intelligible, that fact alone cannot rule out the unfairness 
of a clause such as that at issue in the main proceedings". Now it is true that this 
refers to the relationship between the unfairness test, and the separate ‘plain and 
intelligible language rule’ from Article 5. However, it also implies that plain language 
at least, would not necessarily satisfy the good faith requirement under the general 
test of unfairness.  
The above points notwithstanding, it cannot be said to be absolutely settled beyond all 
doubt, that a term that is sufficiently substantively unfair can be considered to violate 
the good faith requirement, where this term is transparent: in other words, it has not 
been made absolutely clear that transparency cannot legitimise a term that is 
substantively very unfair. In addition, the experience in at least some Member States 
is that the national courts (such as in the UK) have not taken a clear line on this, and 
indeed in others, there may even be a clear notion that a term is fair (or that no 
allegation of unfairness can be put forward) so long as the consumer has signed the 
contract, or has prior knowledge of the terms (Cyprus).238  
Leaving aside the issue of the role of the transparency concept within the unfairness 
test, we now turn to its role under Art. 5. 
 
In general, it can be said that the transparency requirement of the directive has 
contributed to achieving a high level consumer protection. The exact role of the 
transparency requirement in achieving this goal, however, differs in the Member 
States.  
 
                                           
237 Draft Bill, 14 (3), p. 158. See also s 2(1) New Zealand Fair Trading Act: transparent, in relation to a term 
in a contract, means a term that (a) is expressed in reasonably plain language; and (b) is legible; and (c) is 
presented clearly; and (d) is readily available to any party affected by the term. 
238 E.g. the UK, see: C. Willett, ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of EU Consumer Law in the UK’ 
(2012) Cambridge Law Journal, 71 (02) 412-440; C. Willett (2011) The Functions of Transparency in 
Regulating Contract Terms, 60(02):355 - 385. See also country report Cyprus. 
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In several Member States, a large number of cases are reported to be based on this 
provision.239 In addition unfair and intransparent agreements are reported to have 
disappeared from the market.240 It is only in a minority of Member States, that the 
principle is seldom applied by the courts.241 Notwithstanding the fact that the 
transparency principle is in general considered to be effective, continuing problems 
with transparency are reported, especially in specific sectors, including digital 
products, energy, and telecommunications.  
 
The lack of clarity surrounding the provisions on transparency in the UCTD, moreover 
seems to stand in the way of their full effectiveness. A recurring theme in the country 
reports is the uncertainty of this principle and the problems this causes in terms of 
disparity of interpretation, enforcement, but also compliance by traders. Some country 
reports stress that the uncertainty surrounding this principle makes it difficult to 
assess its effectiveness.242 The uncertainty relates to the scope of the principle, its 
interpretation and especially its sanction.  
 
Different functions have been read into the provision of Art. 5 UCTD that contracts 
"must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language". The European Commission as 
early as in its first implementation report, linked the principle of transparency both to 
the ability for the consumer to obtain, prior to the conclusion of the contract, the 
information needed to decide in full knowledge whether to enter the contract; and to a 
possibility to check the content of the contractual provisions.243 Both functions have in 
the meantime been confirmed by the CJEU,244 but neither function is completely clear 
from the wording of the UCTD.  
 
The interpretation of the principle is also reported to be insufficiently clear. Thus, the 
influence of the use of a foreign language is unclear;245 as is the possibility to combat 
terms that are too long or overly complex.246 Businesses also complain about the 
difficulties to forecast whether a term will be considered transparent or not.247 
 
Uncertainty moreover reigns with regard to the sanction for unclear contract terms.248 
A clear sanction is absent. Art. 5 provides merely for a rule on interpretation: where 
there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favorable to the 
                                           
239 E.g. Austria, Denmark (often used regarding subscription traps), Estonia (often used regarding terms in 
insurance contracts), France, Germany, Greece, Portugal. 
240 Country report Czech Republic (hidden arbitration agreements, hidden fines).  
241 E.g. Cyprus, Slovenia. 
242 E.g. The Netherlands. 
243 The first function demands an analysis on the basis of recital 20 (‘"Whereas contracts should be drafted 
in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the 
terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail"). The second 
function demands a reading in the light of the general criterion in Article 3, see: EC Commission, ‘Report on 
the Implementation of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts’ (COM (2000) 248 final), 
p.18. 
244 See ia Case C-26/13 Árpád Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt [2014]; Case C-
96/14 Jean-Claude Van Hove v CNP Assurances SA [2015] and the analysis above. 
245 E.g. country report Sweden. 
246 E.g. country report Poland (UOKiK). 
247 E.g country report Austria. 
248 See e.g. Cyprus (concern of the regulator); France; Italy; The Netherlands.  
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consumer shall prevail.249 This rule can however only be applied for unclear terms that 
can still be interpreted; it is useless for unintelligible terms.  
Several Member States have adopted provisions that are stricter than the provisions of 
the UCTD. Such provisions have at times taken the form of clear rules on incorporation 
and pre-contractual information,250 but also in the form of clear requirements with 
regard to the content of the transparency principle (e.g. in terms of format to be 
used);251 or by adding that terms should also be ‘easily noticeable’,252 and perhaps 
most importantly, in the form of a clear sanction (in addition to the rule of 
interpretation of the Directive). 
 
Given the unclear consequences of a breach of the transparency principle, different 
positions have been taken and defended. Transparency has been dealt with in some 
Member States as an issue of incorporation.253 Intransparent terms are simply no part 
of the contract and therefore not binding. In other Member States, transparency is 
dealt with as part of the unfairness test (Art. 3), albeit in different ways. Both the 
position that a lack of transparency is as such sufficient to conclude that the term is 
unfair and non-binding is defended and applied254 and the position that the lack of 
transparency is as such not sufficient but one of the elements to be taken into account 
when assessing whether a term is unfair.255 Also, pre-contractual liability was 
mentioned as an option in some Member States.256  
The need to clarify the legal consequences of a lack of transparency emerges clearly 
from the country research. This is moreover in line with the conclusions that were 
                                           
249 This rule does not apply in the context of collective procedures of Art. 7(2) UCTD. 
250 Thus, e.g. in Portugal, see PEDRO CAETANO NUNES, “Comunicação de Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais”, 2011, 
p. 518.  
251 Thus e.g. in Slovakia, Section 53c of the CC provides that ´If the consumer contract is made in writing, 
the subject-matter and the price must not be written in smaller letters than other parts of the same 
contract, except for the title of the contract and its parts. The provisions of a consumer contract, as well as 
provisions contained in general commercial terms and conditions or in any other contractual documents 
related to the consumer contract, must not be written in letters that are unreadable for the consumer or 
smaller than as set out in an implementing regulation’. Any contract made contrary to this provision shall be 
invalid. 
252 Thus e.g. Croatia. 
253 E.g. in Portugal, Estonia (§ 37 (3) of the Estonian Law of Obligations Act stipulates that standard terms 
the contents, wording or presentation of which are so uncommon or unintelligible that the other party 
cannot, based on the principle of reasonableness, have expected them to be included in the contract or 
which the party cannot understand without considerable effort are not deemed to be part of the contract). 
254 E.g. in Bulgaria.  
255 E.g. in France; the Netherlands ((cf. Hoge Raad 7 December 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BB5078 (X 
c.s./ABN Amro Bank N.V.); see also for the UK, Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: 
Advice to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at 6.51; the CMA (Consumer and 
Markets Authority) in the UK stresses the link between transparency and good faith: “In order to achieve 
the openness required by good faith, terms should be ‘expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no 
concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate 
disadvantageously’ to the consumer. Consumers should not be assumed necessarily to be able themselves 
to identify (particularly in longer contracts) terms which are important, or which may operate to their 
disadvantage or which would be likely to surprise them, if drawn to their attention”: CMA, ‘Unfair contract 
terms guidance: Guidance on the unfair terms provisions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015’ (July 2015) 
para. 2.22. 
256 E.g. Italy, Belgium. 
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reached in earlier studies. The same conclusion was already reached in the Consumer 
Law Compendium.257  
It can therefore be concluded that while the transparency principle is considered an 
important precondition for a high level of consumer protection, its full effectiveness is 
currently not reached by lack of clarity surrounding the provisions on transparency in 
the UCTD and the unclear consequences of a breach of the transparency principle. 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. 
The following table presents an overview of Member States that have extended the 
application of Directive to individually negotiated terms and to terms on the adequacy 
of the price and the main subject-matter. It indicates that about a quarter of Member 
States have introduced relevant extensions (often either the first or the second 
extension, rarely both). In contrast, in about half of countries the scope of national 
implementation legislation is in line with the Directive in both respects. 
                                           
257 Consumer law compendium, p. 421. 
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Table 6: Overview of MS extension of the application of the Directive 
Country Provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
Extensions of the application of 
Directive to individually 
negotiated terms 
Extensions of the application of 
Directive to terms on the 
adequacy of the price and the 
main subject-matter 
Austria Yes No 
Belgium Yes No 
Bulgaria No No 
Croatia No No 
Cyprus No No 
Czech Republic Yes No 
Denmark  Yes Yes 
Estonia No No 
Finland Yes Yes 
France Yes No 
Germany No No 
Greece No No 
Hungary No No 
Ireland No No 
Italy Yes No 
Latvia No No 
Lithuania No No 
Luxembourg Yes No 
Malta Yes No 
Netherlands No No 
Poland No No 
Portugal No Yes 
Romania No No 
Slovakia No No 
Slovenia No Yes 
Spain No Yes 
Sweden No No 
United Kingdom Yes No 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law - UCTD. Notes: See Annex IV 
for further details provided in the country reports. 
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The first extension concerns individually negotiated terms. The test of unfairness in 
Art. 3 of the UCTD does not apply to individually negotiated terms.258 However, in 
reliance on the minimum clause, several Member States do provide for control of 
individually negotiated terms (see table above). Some Member States have even 
recently extended the scope of application, recognising the need for protection also 
against individually negotiated terms.259  
Already in the first implementation report of the UCTD, this extension was proposed. 
The 2000 implementation report by the European Commission firstly mentioned that in 
the countries in which this exclusion was not transposed, this had not given rise to any 
problems in practice. After fifteen additional years of application to negotiated terms, 
this conclusion still stands. In the country reports, no specific problems were reported 
in those countries that have extended the scope of application. Quite to the contrary, 
the extension was reported to have increased consumer protection. Thus e.g. in 
France, the extension to individually negotiated terms (Art. L 212-1 C.conso.) was 
reported to be important according to different stakeholders since it prevents 
discussions and arguments on the negotiated status of contract clauses and lightens 
the burden of proof placed on the consumer. This point was also made in the reports 
from Austria and Malta, by way of explaining why not implementing the exclusion is 
seen to work well in those countries. The exclusion has recently also been removed in 
the UK, and the same reasoning as to interpretation difficulties and complexities was 
made by the English and Scottish Law Commissions in a report that recommended 
removal of the exclusion.260 In addition, the 2000 implementation report mentioned 
that the exclusion encouraged misinterpretations and leads to abuses in the sense that 
some contracts include "terms by which the consumer declares that he has negotiated 
and expressly accepted the general contractual terms and conditions".261  
The interpretation problems and these abuses continue to occur. The term “non-
negotiated” can be interpreted in different ways262 and a rigid reading of this 
requirement is detrimental to consumers. The risk of ‘pretend’ negotiation is still very 
present: even where terms are in reality standardised, traders seek to deter 
consumers/regulators from challenging them, by pretending/claiming that they are 
individually negotiated (e.g. having set up some formal sham, whereby the consumers 
signs a document acknowledging an alleged negotiation).263 That this occurs in 
practice was confirmed in the country research.264 
The original justification for the exclusion was to respect the freedom of contract ideal, 
specifically the idea that the unfairness problem only applies because of the lack of 
real consent in standard contracts. In consequence this implies that as soon as there 
                                           
258 Art 3 (1). 
259 In the UK, the CRA 2015 now makes it possible to assess negotiated terms and consumer notices (s. 61 
CRA).  
260 English and Scottish Law Commissions, Unfair Terms in Contracts (2005), Law Com 292, Scot Law Com 
199, 31-32 (on removal of the exclusion, Consumer Rights Act, ibid, and see the UK report). 
261 COM (2000) 248 final, Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
262 See for illustrations of the varying caselaw in Italy and the UK (preceding the extension of the control in 
the UK): P. Nebbia, Unfair contract terms in Europe, Oxford, 2007, 116 et seq. 
263 Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts, above; Commission Report on Unfair Terms (2000);  
264 Country report Croatia. 
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is negotiation, this problem disappears.265 However, there will be an important 
number of cases in which the differences in bargaining power remain considerable. 
The consumer is usually less well informed; there may be a lack of true competition in 
the market; and the simple lack of confidence and experience also plays an important 
role. Even if there is negotiation, the resulting terms will still often favour the 
supplier’s interests, and cause just as much detriment to consumers as standard 
terms. The same risk of a significant imbalance is therefore usually present with 
‘negotiated’ terms.266 In the literature, the problem was referred to as the underlying 
hypocrisy of the UCTD: ‘if its purpose is to protect the structurally weaker party to the 
transaction, it is contradictory to imagine that a negotiation process which is based on 
the disparity of the parties can ensure a fair result’.267 This analysis is supported by 
evidence from the country research. The Czech report, for instance, cited the need to 
protect consumers, as a reason for not excluding individually negotiated terms; while 
the French report states that it is unrealistic to expect consumers being capable of 
negotiating general contract terms. Another country not to implement the exclusion is 
Denmark, and a further important point, made in the Danish report, is that the 
general clause very flexible, so that if negotiation has been genuinely fair, and has 
resulted in fair terms, then this can be taken into account.   
It can therefore be concluded that the extension of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms in several Member States has been advantageous for 
consumers. It addresses existing problems as to complexity; and also as to sham 
negotiations, and the perennial imbalance between businesses and consumers, which 
are likely to mean that there is a high risk of a significant imbalance even with 
‘negotiated’ terms. At the same time, there is no evidence from the country reports, 
that extension of the Directive to individually negotiated terms, causes problems in 
application or leads to unintended effects. 
The second extension concerns the application of Directive to terms on the adequacy 
of the price and the main subject-matter. Art 4 (2) UCTD provides that: “Assessment 
of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main 
subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on 
the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in 
so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language.” In several Member States (see 
table above), these exclusions from the test of unfairness do not apply, so the test of 
unfairness applies to price and main subject matter terms as described above, even 
where these terms are in plain and intelligible language.  
Clearly then, these Member States grant a higher level of consumer protection than 
the UCTD does. The adequacy of the price and scope of the main subject matter, can 
be reviewed under the test of unfairness, as such test allows for a review of 
substantive fairness. This allows for control where the price or main subject matter are 
not subjected to market discipline – whether because there is no competition in the 
market, or because, despite the existence of competition (in the sense of various 
traders), consumers are unable to make meaningful comparisons, so that there is no 
pressure on traders to compete on the particular price and main subject matter issues 
in question.268 Equally, it allows for control on other grounds, e.g. to protect low 
income consumers, or support the ‘affordability’ agenda in services of general interest 
                                           
265 H.E. Brander and P. Ulmer, The Community Directive on unfair Terms n Consumer Contracts: Some 
Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission (1991) Common Market Law Rev 28, 
647-662; and T. Wilhelmsson and Willett, ‘Unfair Contract Terms’, above.  
266 See also position papers submitted by Which? and BEUC. 
267 P. Nebbia, Unfair Contract Terms in EC Law, Oxford, 2007, 122-123. 
268 See e.g. position paper submitted by Which?. 
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arguably required for a high level of consumer protection. The ability to provide such 
consumer protection is seen as being important in the countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal and Spain), where the Directive has been extended to price and main subject 
matter terms. In particular, the Danish report emphasises the flexibility of the general 
clause, which enables consideration as to whether the price or main subject matter 
really are genuinely fair (e.g. because they have been subject to market discipline, 
and they do not take advantage of low income consumers), then this can be decided 
under the general clause.   
In conclusion, in the small number of countries where the Directive has been extended 
to price and main subject matter terms, the evidence suggests that this provides 
important consumer protection benefits, especially where these terms are not 
subjected to market discipline, and where other important policies of social cohesion 
are at stake. Further, there is no evidence that extension of the Directive to price and 
main subject matter terms, causes problems in application or leads to unintended 
effects. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
In terms of sanctions, the Directive requires the Member States both to introduce 
individual and collective sanctions. Unfair contract terms shall ‘not be binding’ on the 
consumer (Art. 6 (1)). This neutral wording, more distant from national legal 
traditions, was meant to overcome the different connotations linked to more specific 
legal terms in the different legal traditions. In addition to this sanction, ‘adequate and 
effective means’ must be ensured to prevent the continued use of unfair contract 
terms. Such means must include the possibility for (private or public) organisations 
protecting consumers to stop the continued use of such terms either through an 
application in court or before administrative bodies (Art. 7). 
Considering first the individual sanction, according to which an unfair term is non-
binding. The Directive has been implemented differently in the different Member 
States. Different concepts of ‘nullity’ are used and exist in the different Member 
States, ranging from a ‘relative nullity’, whereby the term initially remains in force 
until the protected contractual partner invokes the nullity; to a ‘protective nullity’ 
whereby the court has jurisdiction to declare the terms void of its own motion and 
whereby the nullity can only be invoked to the advantage of the consumer. In 
addition, in some Member States, unfair contract terms are regarded as not being 
written (fiction of non-existence).269  
 
The CJEU has clarified the meaning and requirements of the sanction that a clause is 
non-binding. The seminal case was Océano that concerned a jurisdiction clause. In this 
decision the CJEU held that "the protection provided for consumers by the Directive 
entails the national court being able to determine of its own motion whether a term of 
a contract (…) is unfair when making its preliminary assessment as to whether a claim 
should be allowed to proceed before the national courts".270 In Cofidis,271 the CJEU 
                                           
269 Consumer law compendium, p. 404.  
270 CJEU 27 June 2000, Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 - Océano Grupo Editorial SA v. Murciano 
Quintero [2000] ECR I-04941, para. (29). 
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extended the competence to review further and made clear that this power to review 
is not limited to jurisdiction clauses. National courts must have the power to review 
the fairness of a clause on their own initiative generally. It followed from Mostaza 
Claro272 and even more clearly Pannon273 that a national court is under an obligation 
to invoke the unfairness of a term of its own motion. Again, such duty is not limited to 
jurisdiction clauses, but extends to other contractual clauses.274 
 
In Invitel, the Court ensured the "consistency of assessment between collective and 
individual actions"275 by also requiring national courts in actions for injunction. Such 
an active role not only implies to duty to invoke the unfairness of a term of their own 
motion, also in actions for injunction, but the Court in Invitel also required "national 
courts of their own motion to draw, including for the future, all the conclusions 
provided for in national law that follow from the finding, in an action for an injunction, 
that a term included in the general terms and conditions of consumer contracts is 
unfair, in order that such a term should not bind consumers who have concluded a 
contract containing those general terms and conditions".276  
 
The obligation to take measures of enquiry seems however limited to the examination 
of whether the Directive is applicable. The obligation to investigate ex officio whether 
a contract term is actually unfair would remain dependent on the availability to the 
court of all legal and factual elements necessary for that task.277 It can furthermore be 
inferred from the recent case Tomášová278 that the failure by a court (adjudicating at 
last instance) to invoke the unfairness of a clause of its own motion can give rise to 
state liability. An infringement of EU law will be sufficiently serious where the decision 
concerned was made in manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the matter.279 
In Tomášová the Court has decided that the existence of a duty to examine, of its own 
motion, the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and 
factual elements necessary for that task, was clear since Pannon.  
                                                                                                                               
271 CJEU 21 November 2002, C-473/00 - Cofidis v. Fredout, [2002] ECR I-10875. 
272 CJEU 26 October 2006, C-168/05 – Elisa María Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-
10421, para. (36). 
273 CJEU 4 June 2009, C-243/08, Pannon, EU:C:2009:350, para. 32. 
274 CJEU 14 June 2012, Banco Español de Crédito, C-618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraphs 42 and 43; 
21 February 2013, Banif Plus Bank, C-472/11, EU:C:2013:88, paragraph 22, and 1 October 2015, ERSTE 
Bank Hungary, C-32/14, EU:C:2015:637, paragraph 41. 
275 CJEU  26 April 2012, Invitel, C 472/10, EU:C:2012:242, paragraph 43; and see also C‑191/15, Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl, para. 56:“Such a different attachment, as regards the law 
designated as applicable, of a term depending on the kind of action brought would have the effect in 
particular of abolishing the consistency of assessment between collective actions and individual actions 
which the Court has established by requiring the national courts of their own motion to draw, including for 
the future, all the conclusions provided for in national law that follow from the finding, in an action for an 
injunction, that a term included in the general terms and conditions of consumer contracts is unfair, in order 
that such a term should not bind consumers who have concluded a contract containing those general terms 
and conditions”. 
276 Invitel, C-472/10, EU:C:2012:242, paragraph 43. 
277 R. STEENNOT, “Public and private enforcement in the field of unfair contract terms”, ERPL 2015 (4), 606 
and V. TRSTENJAK,”Procedural aspects of European Consumer Protection Law and the Case Law of the CJEU”, 
ERPL 2013, 472, CJEU 21 February 2013, C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank, para. 32.  
278 CJEU 28 July 2016, C-168/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:602. 
279 CJEU C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 57. 
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Although this duty to invoke the unfairness ex officio is now clearly established and 
although it is generally considered to contribute to the effectiveness of the sanction of 
the Directive, the actual effectiveness of course depends on whether national courts 
do take up this active role in practice. This varies in the different Member States, as 
evidenced by the country research for this study. In some Member States, there is 
ample awareness of the duty on the courts to take up such active role and evidence 
that courts do invoke the unfairness of the term ex officio (e.g. in Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania); or such rule may even be part of national 
procedural law (e.g. in Slovakia, UK). On the other hand, in other Member States this 
does not seem to happen, as is reported from e.g. Croatia, Cyprus and Slovenia or not 
to a satisfactory extent (e.g. in Czech Republic, France,280 Poland).281  
 
Different reasons have been invoked why national courts do not (sufficiently) comply 
with the obligation to investigate ex officio whether a contract term is unfair: 
• The absence of an explicit law provisions in national law;282  
• The deeply rooted civil procedure rule that courts cannot examine matters not 
pleaded by the parties;283  
• The recent accession to the EU;284  
• The lack of awareness of EU consumer legislation;285  
• The lack of court cases in consumer law in general;286  
• The lack of time and/or means to review the contract terms of their own 
motion.287  
This last reason has been mentioned to be especially problematic in cases that are 
decided in absentia, where courts often do not have the time or the means and where 
the claim may be formulated rather vaguely so that it is not always clear at first sight 
whether a consumer is being sued.288 
In some of the countries in which courts do test unfairness of their own motion (even 
in the absence of a legal rule codifying the CJEU jurisprudence), it was reported that 
decisions of the highest court confirming such a duty have played an important role in 
the awareness and compliance with such duty by lower courts.289  
                                           
280 Notwithstanding the explicit acknowledgement by the Cour de Cassation (after initial resistance) of the 
competence of national courts to apply the test of their own motion (Cass. Civ. 1re, 30 mai 2012, n° 11-
12242). 
281 See country reports of the mentioned countries. 
282 Country reports Bulgaria; Cyprus. 
283 Country reports Cyprus; Czech Republic; Poland. 
284 Country report Croatia. 
285 Country reports Croatia; Poland (no specialised consumer courts). 
286 Country report Croatia. 
287 Country report France. 
288 In this sense, some of the magistrates interviewed in Belgium; also in the Netherlands R de Moor, 
‘Procesrechtelijke en materieelrechtelijke beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de tweede gratis-mobieltjes 
uitspraak van de Hoge Raad’, TvC 2016/5, p. 232-235. 
289 Country report The Netherlands (Hoge Raad 13 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:691, NJ 2014, 274 
(case note H.B. Krans), TvC 2013/6, p. 262 (case notes M.B.M. Loos and R.M.M. de Moor) 
(Heesakkers/Voets)), country report Estonia; country report Latvia. 
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A need for increased awareness (in the form of legal training) and for guidance and 
codification of the exact scope of the obligations of the national courts was expressed 
by numerous stakeholders in the country research. In Latvia e.g., the fact that judges 
are increasingly participating in judicial training programs on consumer law was 
mentioned as one of the reasons for increasingly invoking unfairness ex officio.  
 
The awareness and attention given to this duty in the Member States thus differs 
widely. In the Netherlands, two reports (2010 and 2014) have already been issued by 
a working group of first instance courts, summarising the main principles set out by 
the CJEU and providing guidance (and links to relevant CJEU and national cases) on 
clauses that are frequently used in order to ensure a uniform approach.290 According 
to a survey in 2010, the guidance would broadly be adhered to.291 This guidance did 
however not go unchallenged. The interpretation of some CJEU decisions was 
criticised,292 and the Courts of Appeal considered such guidance by the courts would 
come too close to taking up a regulatory function.293 In the legal doctrine, the 
important number of preliminary references to the Dutch highest court (Hoge Raad) 
on the exact task of judges in invoking unfairness ex officio, was held to illustrate the 
need for clarification.294 The Recommendation of the Law Commission in the UK is 
illustrative for the situation reported in several Member States. As the duty to raise 
unfairness ex officio goes contrary to national procedural law, an express statement in 
the law is deemed necessary.295 Following such recommendation, such duty was 
codified in the 2015 Consumer Rights Acts in the UK.296  
The sanction that a term is non-binding has contributed to achieving a high level of 
consumer protection. Especially the interpretation by the CJEU that the directive 
requires this sanction to be invoked ex officio by the national courts has contributed to 
its effectiveness. The sanction has however not reached its full potential in all Member 
States, due to a lack of awareness of the effects of this sanction and a lack of 
compliance with this duty by national courts in some Member States. 
 




2014.pdf, 3.  
292 C. PAVILLON, “Het LOVCK-rapport ambtshalve toetsing II kritisch getoetst”, TvC 2015-3, 128-136. 
293 www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Rapport-ambtshalve-toetsing-II-versie-november-
2014.pdf, 3. 
294 R. DE MOOR, ‘Procesrechtelijke en materieelrechtelijke beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de tweede 
gratis-mobieltjes uitspraak van de Hoge Raad’, TvC 2016. 
295 The Law Commission thus recommended in 2013: “We think that it would be helpful to have an express 
statement in legislation spelling out the effect of the CJEU case law. Although this is already the law, we 
think that it would be helpful to state it explicitly in order to bring this obligation to the attention of the 
courts. It should be particularly helpful in raising the awareness of the lower courts that this is in fact an 
obligation rather than just a power given to the courts”. Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at 7.90. 
296 S.71 CRA: “Duty of court to consider fairness of term (1) Subsection (2) applies to proceedings before a 
court which relate to a term of a consumer contract. (2) The court must consider whether the term is fair 
even if none of the parties to the proceedings has raised that issue or indicated that it intends to raise it. (3) 
But subsection (2) does not apply unless the court considers that it has before it sufficient legal and factual 
material to enable it to consider the fairness of the term.”  
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• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: Are there Member States in which court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term were extended to all contracts concluded with a given 
trader? If, so, does this work in practice? What are the benefits for 
consumers/businesses? If no such court decisions exist: What are the effects of this 
situation?] 
The limited effect of judgments declaring a term unfair has been mentioned as one of 
the weaknesses of the Directive.297 It is argued that it would contribute to the 
effective protection of consumers to extend res judicata of a decision declaring a term 
unfair and thus non binding to all consumers who have concluded a contract with the 
same seller or supplier, but this is not unequivocally accepted in all Member States 
and by all legal scholars.  
In individual litigation (with in principle a concrete unfairness control) this is even 
more controversial as, in principle, individual circumstances are taken into account 
(Art. 4(1) UCTD). In collective litigation (actions for injunction), an abstract control 
would apply. However, this (doctrinal) distinction between a ‘concrete control’ and an 
‘abstract control’ is not universally accepted.298 It is furthermore important to note 
that the Court of Justice in Amazon stressed the importance of the consistency of 
assessment between individual and collective actions.299 
 
For collective litigation, there is some guidance of the CJEU. In Invitel, the CJEU 
decided that where the unfair nature of a term in the general business conditions has 
been acknowledged in proceedings brought in the public interest and on behalf of 
consumers by a body appointed by national law, national courts are required, of their 
own motion, and also with regard to the future, to take such action thereon as is 
provided for by national law in order to ensure that consumers who have concluded a 
contract with the seller or supplier to which those general business conditions apply 
will not be bound by that term.300 This applies not only to consumers who are parties 
to the action for an injunction but also to consumers who are not parties to the 
procedure but have concluded a contract with that seller or supplier to which the same 
terms apply. 301  
 
The consequences of Invitel are however not entirely clear. Are Member States just 
entitled – on the basis of the minimum harmonisation character of the Directive – to 
introduce an erga omnes (towards all) effect to an action for injunction declaring a 
term unfair or are they obliged to do so? Some scholars argue (on the basis of the 
judgment and the opinion read together) that there is an obligation. They admit 
                                           
297 Consumer law compendium, 431.  
298 See e.g. H. MICKLITZ, “Unfair terms in consumer contracts”, in N. REICH, H. MICKLITZ, P. ROTT, K. TONNER, 
European consumer law, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2014, 148-149 – who pleads for an approximation of control 
standards with a generalisation of individual circumstances. 
299 CJEU 28 July 2016, C‑191/15, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl, para. 56. 
300 CJEU 26 April 2012, C‑472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, para. 44. 
301 CJEU 26 April 2012, C‑472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, para. 41 et 
seq.; V. TRSTENJAK, “Procedural aspects of European Consumer Protection Law and the Case Law of the 
CJEU”, ERPL 2013, 458. 
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however that the operative part of the judgment casts some doubts.302 The case 
concerned an action brought by a national consumer protection authority. As collective 
actions brought by private consumer organisations are also brought to enforce a public 
interest, this seems to justify extending the res judicata effect also in such cases.303 
 
The Court of Justice did furthermore not decide whether this would also apply to 
identical terms being used by other sellers or suppliers. Advocate General Trstenjak 
rejected an erga omnes effect of injunction proceedings brought in the public interest. 
She found an extension to other sellers or suppliers to be contrary to the right to be 
heard / right to a fair trial of other suppliers / sellers not involved in the 
proceedings.304 In the legal literature, different views were expressed.305  
 
The unclear implications of Invitel also entail that discussion exists on whether 
national provisions comply with EU law. Court or administrative decisions in the 
context of collective proceedings are in the vast majority of Member States only 
binding on the businesses who are party to the case.306 Exceptions to this principle 
exist in some Member States.307 This was already documented in the Consumer Law 
Compendium. Other examples follow from the country research for this evaluation. 
Thus, e.g. in Slovakia, sec 53 a, para 1 CC implies that the effect of a court decision 
establishing the unfairness of a term in an individual case is not limited to the 
individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, but to all 
contracts concluded with a given trader.308 Similarly in Romania; declaratory 
judgements on unfairness of contract terms were reported to have erga omnes effect 
since November 1, 2013 when Law 82/2012 entered into force. Erga omnes effect of 
finding the term unfair implies that the business entity is ordered by court to amend 
all its contracts in force with its clients containing the challenged term and the 
contracts prepared to be used in future. However, it does not apply to other business 
entities which apply the same term with their clients. In some Member States 
measures were furthermore taken to ‘implement’ the Invitel decision. Thus, in France 
a qualified entity may not only request the deletion of an unfair clause in a contract 
offered to consumers but also a declaration that such clauses are deemed unwritten in 
any identical contracts used by sellers with other consumers and to order the seller to 
inform consumers at its own expenses and by any appropriate means.309 It was 
reported to be too early to judge the impact of these new rules. 
                                           
302 H. MICKLITZ, N. REICH, The court and sleeping beauty: the revival of the unfair contract terms directive 
(UCTD)", Common Market Law Review 2014, 795. 
303 R. STEENNOT, 612; H. MICKLITZ, N. REICH, 785-796.= 
304 AG , para. 60. 
305 Pro extension: e.g. R. STEENNOT, 2015, 612 (pro extension to other sellers or suppliers using identical 
terms); H. MICKLITZ, N. REICH, 795-796. See on the other hand M. BOTTINO, “Arrêt Invitel: l’effet ultra 
partes des clauses déclarées abusives”, REDC 2012, (587), 593. 
306 Consumer law compendium, 431, confirmed in the country reports for i.a. Austria (sec. 411 Austrian Civil 
Procedure Code, Sec. 12 ABGB); Belgium; Bulgaria (with limited exceptions); Cyprus; Denmark; Estonia; 
Italy; Latvia; the Netherlands.  
307 Consumer law compendium, 431; for example Bulgaria (claims in the collective interest of consumers – 
for consumer who do not opt-out); Croatia (Art. 117 Consumer Protection Act – in the framework of an 
injunction proceeding; Finland (decisions brought to the Market Court by the Consumer Ombudsman); 
Greece (according to art. 10 par.20 of N. 2251/94 the irrevocable decision on a collective action is 
applicable against everyone, even if they were not parties to the trial), also in Hungary the effect of court 
decisions establishing the unfairness of a term has been extended to all contracts of a business concerned . 
308 Country report Slovakia. 
309 Art. L. 524-1(2) and (3), L. 621-2(2), L. 621-8(2) C.conso. 
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In some countries, the initiatives taken to extend the effect of a judgment have been 
met with criticism. Thus, in Greece, art. 10 par.20 of N. 2251/94 provides that the 
irrevocable decision on a collective action is applicable against everyone, even if they 
were not parties to the trial. This rule was criticised in the literature and it was 
reported that the prevailing view is that it should be interpreted strictly not to 
contravene with general (Greek) rules on res judicata. Also in other countries, 
questions are sometimes raised concerning the compatibility of an erga omnes effect 
with certain fundamental rights. The recent CJEU case C-119/15 Biuro podróży 
‘Partner’ is important in this regard, as it answers some of these questions. The case 
concerned the Polish system whereby terms that have been declared unfair are 
included in a public register. Other traders using equivalent terms may be fined for the 
use of such terms. The compatibility with EU law and especially with article 47 of the 
Charter (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) was challenged. The CJEU 
decided that such system is compatible with EU law if there is an effective judicial 
remedy against the decision declaring the terms equivalent and against the decision 
fixing the fine: “Article 6(1) and Article 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC, read in 
conjunction with Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 2009/22/EC […]and in the light of Article 
47 of the Charter […], must be interpreted as not precluding the use of standard 
contract terms with content identical to that of terms which have been declared 
unlawful by a judicial decision having the force of law and which have been entered in 
a national register of unlawful standard contract terms from being regarded, in 
relation to another seller or supplier which was not a party to the proceedings 
culminating in the entry in that register, as an unlawful act, provided, which it is for 
the referring court to verify, that that seller or supplier has an effective judicial 
remedy against the decision declaring the terms compared to be equivalent in terms 
of the question whether, in the light of all relevant circumstances particular to each 
case, those terms are materially identical, having regard in particular to their harmful 
effects for consumers, and against the decision fixing the amount of the fine imposed, 
where applicable.” 
The absence of an erga omnes effect of individual and / or collective proceedings does 
however not mean that individual court decisions do not have influence. Especially 
decisions of the highest courts are followed, even in countries in which there is no 
binding precedent.310 In the countries that have a doctrine of precedent, this doctrine 
may of course impact on other consumers311 also the (formal and informal) 
enforcement activity of national consumer authorities following a court decision may 
impact on other consumers.312 In some countries, traders are reported to follow the 
case law, interestingly especially if the case is also within the competence of an 
administrative body that can impose a fine.313 Also the effect of Supreme Court 
decisions on the behaviour of traders has been stressed.314  
                                           
310 Thus e.g. country report Latvia;  
311 See, for example, in the context of UCTA 1977 RÖHLIG (UK) Ltd v Rock Unique Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 18 
at [23] per Moore-Bick LJ: “In principle the question must be considered separately in each case because 
the circumstances surrounding the contract may differ from case to case, but where a standard condition of 
this kind is involved I do not think that the court should be astute to draw fine distinctions between cases 
that in broad terms are very similar. It is important for those engaged in any commercial activity, whether 
as providers of goods or services or as customers, to know whether a particular clause will generally be 
regarded as reasonable in the context of contracts of a routine kind made between commercial parties.” 
312 See OFT, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, (OFT311, (2008)). 
313 Country report Czech Republic. Also in Finland, actions by the Consumer Ombudsman (other than 
decisions brought to the Market court that have collective effect by law) are reported to have a collective 
effect in practice. The dual role of the Consumer Ombudsman (supervisor of industry-specific contract terms 
and sanctioning authority) enhances the collective effect. 
314 Country report Estonia. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  95 
 
In the vast majority of Member States, court or administrative decisions in the context 
of individual and collective proceedings remain only binding on the businesses who are 
party to the case. This limited effect of judgments and decisions declaring a term 
unfair limits the effectiveness of the Directive. 
 Effectiveness of the UCTD in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 6.1.2.2.
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether these 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
To develop wholly uniform European standards for unfair terms is difficult if (as is the 
case) application of the general clause to the facts is left to national courts. A 
comparative law study revealed several years ago noticeable differences in the way 
the different Member States interpret the general clause.315 The “no show” clause that 
was seen as fair by a Belgian court316 in the coordinated procedure against air carriers 
had for instance been deemed unfair by Austrian, German and Spanish courts.317  
On the other hand, the case law of the CJEU has given significant guidance on the 
general fairness clause. In most Member States no significant problems were caused 
by different national approaches, according to the country research. Stakeholder 
concerns on this issue were however reported from several countries, e.g. France, 
Italy and the Netherlands. These concerns mainly referred to general considerations, 
e.g. in Italy interviewed stakeholders pointed out that national differences in the 
application/implementation of the directives play a detrimental role for businesses, as 
they are committed to adapt their commercial behaviour to different national 
legislations.318 A Dutch ministry suggested that some consumers shopping cross-
border might be affected by the fact that other Member States have different rules for 
standard terms then the Netherlands have. However, the country report also pointed 
out that there is no empirical evidence that unfair terms legislation – let alone 
diverging application or implementation of the UCTD – plays any role in the decision of 
businesses or consumers to conclude cross-border contracts.319 In this context it can 
also be noted that one-off costs of businesses for checking compliance and adapting 
standard contract terms to the national legislation when entering another EU country’s 
market appear to be limited, as the results of the business interviews and the 
assessment of compliance costs revealed.320  
 
                                           
315 Pavillon 2011. 
316 Cess. Pr. Com. Namur 10 mars 2010 - TA c. Brussels Airlines para. 8. 
317 BEUC, Unfair terms in air transport contracts, Letter sent to Mr. Tony Tyler, Chief Executive Officer/IATA 
(Ref. L2013_016/MGO/UPA/rs – 05/02/2013), p. 2-3. 
318 Country report Italy. 
319 Country report Netherlands. 
320 See results of the business interviews and the extrapolation of business costs to EU level in Part 4 of this 
report.  
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• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade;  
If a contract term is considered (conclusively or presumptively) unfair in a given 
country, but not elsewhere, then this could be a barrier to trade for traders from other 
countries who use this term. However, while this theoretical possibility was noted in 
some countries, it was conceded there to be a lack of empirical evidence of any actual 
significant problem; and the general picture conveyed by the country research was 
that there was not a problem. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
If Member States apply the Directive to individually negotiated terms, main subject 
matter or price terms, it was acknowledged in some countries that this might, in 
theory, affect cross border trade (by requiring firms to adapt standard terms for 
different countries). However, the overwhelming message from the country research 
was that no such problems were reported. 
6.1.3. Injunctions 
The Injunctions Directive was first adopted in 1998 and recast in 2009 with a 
consolidated Annex, after a number of amendments relating solely to the Annex. It 
has generally the purpose of improving the enforcement of consumer law (as listed in 
the Annex to the Directive and as transposed into the internal legal orders of the 
Member States), with a view to the better functioning of the internal market. It wants 
to achieve this aim by ensuring the possibility for so-called ‘qualified entities’ 
(consumer organisations and/or public bodies) to seek injunctions and related 
remedies in front of a court or administrative authorities.  
Beyond that general approach to enforcement, the Injunctions Directive imposes on 
Member States the obligation to enable ‘qualified entities’ from other Member States 
to seek an injunction in front of a court or of an administrative authority to stop an 
infringement of said consumer laws that originates in that Member State (an intra-
Community infringement) and that harms the collective interests of consumers.  
Accordingly, the Injunctions Directive provides for a tool of enforcement of the 
consumers' rights granted by other consumer legislation, among others, by the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive, the Sales and Guarantees Directive, and the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive. It facilitates the use of injunctions both domestically and in 
a cross-border context. 
The present section provides for an analysis of the effectiveness of the Injunctions 
Directive in contributing to a high level of consumer protection and in eliminating 
obstacles to the internal market taking into account the impact of national 
enforcement systems of the Member States.  
It covers the scope of application of the injunction procedure and its use across the 
EU, considering the five year period since June 2011. It also describes obstacles to the 
effective use of the injunction procedure across the EU and the effectiveness of 
national measures taken regarding modalities of the injunction procedure relevant to 
these obstacles.  
Furthermore, it describes the impact of the injunction procedure in terms of reduction 
in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and reduction in 
consumers' detriment. 
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The analysis of the effectiveness of the Injunctions Directive is carried out in the light 
of its main objectives, namely:  
• To impose on the MS the availability of injunction procedures (Articles 1 to 3) 
within a prescribed scope of application (EU consumer law as enumerated 
within Annex I to the Directive);  
• To facilitate the use of the injunction procedure for cross-border infringements 
(Article 4);  
• To promote the use of settlements (Article 5); and 
• Ultimately to ensure better enforcement of EU consumer law by reducing the 
number of consumer law infringements and reducing consumers' detriment 
across the EU. 
The analysis of the effectiveness of the Injunctions Directive is structured into six 
parts: 
• The first part concerns the scope of application of the Injunctions Directive and 
the scope of application of injunction procedures as foreseen by national 
legislation of the Member States; 
• The second part considers the use of the injunction procedure in Member 
States, considering the five year period since June 2011; to establish trends, 
data are compared to the previous Commission reports on the application of 
the Injunctions Directive, the extent possible, and the impact of the Directive is 
analysed;  
• The third part analyses obstacles to the effective use of the injunction 
procedure across the EU, as reported by in the country reports and by 
stakeholders; 
• The fourth part considers the role of settlements in stopping infringements to 
consumer law across the EU, including requirements to undertakings by 
traders; 
• The fifth part analyses the impact of injunction procedures in terms of the 
reduction of the numbers of infringements of consumer law and of the 
reduction of consumer detriment; 
• The sixth part considers the practical effectiveness of the current rules in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market and discusses issues that are 
specific to infringements having cross-border implications, such as issues of 
jurisdiction, cross-border enforcement of decisions and sanctions and private 
international law. 
 
 The scope of application of the injunction procedures 6.1.3.1.
• Analysis of the extent to which Member States have extended the scope of 
application of the injunction procedure beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in 
the Annex I to the Injunctions Directive? If yes, what are the additional consumer 
rights covered?  
The scope of application of the Injunctions Directive 
The Injunctions Directive applies to both domestic and intra-Community (or intra-
Union) infringements. Thus, the Directive requires injunction procedures in the laws of 
the Member States and it requires Member States to grant qualified entities from other 
Member States access to those procedures, while establishing minimum standards for 
these procedures. 
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The Injunctions Directive, however, only applies to infringements of specific consumer 
legislation as listed in the Annex I to the Directive and as transposed into the internal 
legal orders of the Member States. Annex I currently contains 15 pieces of legislation: 
• The Doorstep Selling Directive 85/577/EEC and the Distance Selling Directive 
97/7/EC, which are no longer in force, as they have been replaced by the 
Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU. The Consumer Rights Directive has not 
been included in the Annex yet; however, according its Article 31, references to 
repealed Directives shall be construed as references to the Consumer Rights 
Directive.  
• The Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC which has been replaced by 
Directive 2008/48/EC, which has been noted in a footnote to the Annex, rather 
than considered in an amendment; 
• The Broadcasting Directive 89/552/EEC, which has been replaced by the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU, without the Annex having 
been amended; however, according to its Article 34, references to the repealed 
Directive shall be construed as references to the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive. 
• The Package Travel Directive 90/314/EEC which has been replaced by Directive 
2015/2302, without the Annex having been amended; however, according to 
its Article 29, references to the repealed Directive shall be construed as 
references to the new Package Travel Directive 2015/2302. 
• The Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC; 
• The Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44/EC; 
• The Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC; 
• Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for 
human use (Articles 86 to 100); 
• Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial 
services; 
• The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC; 
• The Services Directive 2006/123/EC; 
• The Time-share Directive 2008/122/EC; 
• The ADR Directive 2003/11/EU; and 
• The ODR Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013. 
That list does not cover all EU law that could be classified as consumer law, and part 
of which is listed in the Annex to the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation 
(EU) No. 2006/2004. Of course, it does not either cover national consumer law that is 
not derived from EU law. Member States can, however, extend the scope of 
application of the Injunctions Directive, which is a minimum harmonisation 
instrument, in its national transposition. 
The scope of application of the injunction procedure in the national legal orders of the 
Member States 
Based on the country research for this evaluation, four groups of Member States can 
be differentiated. 
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The first group of Member States, consisting of Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, 
Romania and Sweden, has implemented the scope of application for both national and 
cross-border infringements as in Annex I of the Injunctions Directive.321 
The second group of Member States has added specific, enumerated pieces of 
legislation for both national and cross-border infringements. For example, Malta has 
included legislation on home loans and air passengers’ rights. Croatia has added the 
Bus Passengers Rights Regulation (EU) No. 181/2011. Austria has also extended the 
list to cover particular laws, such as the rules on investment and asset management 
services, payment services and the act of issuing e-money. Luxembourg has added 
price indication law and the general obligation to provide consumers with information 
before they sign a contract. In Belgium, the injunction procedure is used for a variety 
of matters within and beyond consumer law, including the protection of consumers of 
mobile telecommunications services, data protection law and anti-discrimination law. 
The third group has different approaches for national and for cross-border 
infringements. The United Kingdom distinguishes “domestic infringements” from 
“Community infringements” and has vastly extended the scope of application for the 
former but only implemented Annex I of the Injunctions Directive for the latter. 
Similarly, in France and Lithuania, foreign qualified entities are limited to injunctions 
under Annex I of the Injunctions Directive while domestically, the infringement of any 
collective consumer interest is actionable. In the Netherlands, a distinction is made as 
to legal standing. Whereas only qualified entities can initiate injunction procedures in 
other Member States, legal standing in domestic cases is much broader. 
The fourth group, consisting of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain, has 
extended the scope of both domestic and cross-border injunction procedures to 
consumer law in general. In Hungary, the procedure is available for all matters that 
fall under the competence of courts. The extension certainly was widely used in 
Germany, for example in relation to all kinds of information obligations (e.g. related to 
energy efficiency), to rules concerning legal advice to consumers, to protection against 
real estate agents, price transparency rules. In Poland, the extension was used, for 
example, in construction law cases.322 In contrast, in Estonia, despite the extended 
scope of application no injunction suit has been brought outside the scope of 
application of the Injunctions Directive until now.323 
The last solution triggers the question of what ‘consumer protection’ entails. In 
Germany, the extension to consumer law in general led to discussions and litigation 
centring around the issue of whether or not a particular rule falls into the ambit of 
‘consumer protection’.324 One example was data protection law, which German courts 
did not accept to be ‘consumer protection’, whereas the German legislator has in the 
meantime, in February 2016, included data protection expressly into the illustrative 
list of consumer protection laws for which the injunction procedure is available. 
                                           
321 Some country reports regard the addition of the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EC to be an 
extension of the scope of the Directive, whereas this study argues that this Directive is part of the Annex, 
through its Art. 31.  
322 Country report Poland. 
323 Country report Estonia. 
324 For example, BEUC and the Federation of German Consumer Organisations (vzbv) argued in their 
position papers for the public online consultation that the scope of the Injunctions Directive should be 
expanded to cover gas and electricity supply, data protection, transport, financial services, and product 
liability. 
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A detailed overview of the Member States that have extended the scope of application 
of the injunction procedure beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to 
the Injunctions Directive is provided in Annex V below. 
Varieties of injunction procedures in Member States 
With regard to qualified entities, the Injunctions Directive takes into account the 
specific features of national legal systems by leaving the choice between different 
options having equivalent effect to the Member States. According to Article 3, Member 
States can entrust any body or organisation which, being properly constituted 
according to the law of a Member State, has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
provisions referred to in Article 1 are complied with, in particular one or more 
independent public bodies, specifically responsible for protecting the collective 
interests of consumers, and/or organisations whose purpose is to protect the collective 
interests of consumers. Likewise, Member States can decide, according to Article 2(1), 
whether injunctions may be brought in court or in front of one or more administrative 
bodies or both before a court and an administrative body, depending on the 
infringement. 
Beyond the minimum standards of the Injunctions Directive, Member States can also 
allow individuals or business organisations to seek injunctions in the collective interest 
of consumers. Professional organisations are also mentioned as potential enforcers in 
Art. 23(1)(c) of the Consumer Rights Directive. Business organisations have legal 
standing in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Portugal, and 
Spain. Individual consumers can also claim injunctions in Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Poland (i.e. they may notify the President of the UOKiK, who may then 
seek an injunction), Portugal, and Spain.325 
This has led to a variety of different enforcement systems in the Member States. 
In most Member States, the injunction procedure is a court procedure (in Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK). It is an administrative procedure in Latvia, Malta, Poland and 
Romania, and the legislation foresees both forms of the procedure in Estonia, France, 
Hungary and Slovakia. 
In Austria, Germany and Greece, the enforcement of consumer law is entirely in the 
hand of consumer organisations and business organisations, although there are plans 
now in Germany to give consumer law enforcement powers to the Bundeskartellamt 
that is, at the moment, only competent for competition law. In contrast, Latvia seems 
to be the only Member State where only public authorities have enforcement powers. 
In Latvia, only the Consumer Rights Protection Center can bring injunction actions, 
either upon its own initiative or on the basis of a submission of the Association for 
Consumer Rights Protection, which seems to be the only consumer organisations 
entitled to do so.326 
Most Member States have a mixed system in which both public authorities and 
consumer organisations can enforce consumer law at the domestic level. However, not 
all of these Member States have listed both types of enforcers as qualified entities for 
the purposes of Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive. For example, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia have only registered consumer 
organisations as qualified entities listed in the list published in the Official Journal of 
                                           
325 See country reports of the listed countries. It should be noted that their legal standing does not 
necessarily extend to all the infringements within the scope of application of the ID. 
326 See country report Latvia. 
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the EU, whereas at the domestic level, public authorities have enforcement powers as 
well. The reason is probably that public authorities use the CPC Network rather than 
the Injunctions Directive for infringements having cross-border implications. In 
contrast, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden and the UK have only listed 
public authorities as qualified entities for the purposes of the Injunctions Directive, 
whereas consumer organisations can only take action at the domestic level.327 In 
Poland, the injunction proceedings may only be commenced by the President of the 
UOKiK who also has discretion as to when to act, however, in some cases consumer 
organisations may also be involved in the proceedings. With injunctions against unfair 
contract terms in B2C contracts, the entities notifying about the unfairness may be 
allowed to participate in the procedure, if they applied for it and if the President of the 
UOKiK considers that their participation could help clarify matters. Regarding 
infringements of other collective interests of consumers, anyone may notify the 
President of the UOKiK, however in these cases there is no procedure to allow the 
notifying person/entity to participate in the injunction proceedings. 
In Member States, where both public authorities and consumer organisations can 
enforce consumer law, consumer organisations often do not make use of their powers 
but rather approach the authorities, asking them to use their powers, rather than 
using the injunction procedure themselves. For example, in Ireland consumer 
organisations could apply to become enforcers but no consumer organisation has done 
that. In the UK, Which? applied to become an enforcer but has never brought a claim 
in court. The same approach is typical for many underfunded consumer 
organisations.328 In Finland, where there is a mixed system, consumer organisations 
may not bring claims for injunctive relief. Only in a few Member States, a truly mixed 
system exists in practice where both the public authority and consumer organisations 
can seek injunctions against traders, for example in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands and Slovakia.329 
The type of enforcers that Member States have chosen also influences the choice 
between enforcement by way of judicial or administrative procedure. Obviously, 
consumer organisations cannot use administrative powers. Thus, in Member States 
where the enforcement of consumer law is entirely in the hand of consumer 
organisations and business organisations, consumer law is enforced in court 
procedures. 
Public authorities often have administrative powers so that they can themselves issue 
injunction orders and impose fines on traders of their own motion.330 In that case, 
their decisions can be appealed by the trader, usually in the administrative courts if 
the national legal system distinguishes administrative law litigation from private law 
litigation. Some Member States, for example the UK, have introduced a system where 
also the public authority has to apply for an injunction in court. In the Netherlands, 
the consumer authority had to use the court system in case of infringements that were 
not clear-cut, such as the “unfairness” of a term. There has, however, been a recent 
trend in Member States, that have initially only made injunction procedures in court 
                                           
327 See country reports of the listed countries. For an overview of the entities entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction under the Injunctions Directive in the Member States, see Annex V.  
328 Country report Cyprus, at 1.3.1., country report Slovenia. In Slovakia, this is true for interim measures, 
see Country report Slovakia. More generally, it was also reported in the country reports for Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Greece, Lithuania and Malta that consumer organisations/qualified entities have limited financial 
and human resources, see Section 6.4.4. 
329 Country report Lithuania, country report Slovakia. 
330 The country research for the present study does not provide for more precise country information on this 
topic, as these powers are outside the scope of the ID. 
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available, to confer public law powers (injunction orders or fines) to public authorities 
rather than them having to use the civil law injunction procedures in court.331 This 
applies, for example, to the Dutch Autoriteit Consument en Markt332 and to the latest 
reform of Swedish law that allows the Swedish consumer ombudsman to issue binding 
injunction orders in clear-cut cases whereas he only needs to take court action in 
borderline cases. In Poland, in a law reform of 2015, the President of the Polish Office 
of Competition and Consumer Protection was given the authority to act on any 
infringement of collective consumer interests, where he previously had to take judicial 
action.333 In the UK, some regulators have public law enforcement powers whereas 
the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has to apply for an injunction in court. 
Typically, where they have a choice under relevant national legislation, consumer 
authorities prefer to use their regulatory powers to issue injunction or compensation 
orders themselves rather than resorting to the injunction procedure in court because 
these measures are faster and cheaper for them. The injunction procedure has, for 
example, never been used in Cyprus and Romania and rarely been used in Estonia and 
Malta.334 This partly explains the great variety in the use of the injunction procedures 
in the Member States. 
Protection of collective business interests 
Some Member States have extended the scope of application of injunction procedures 
to the protection of business' interests, and given business representatives legal 
standing to protect the collective interests of businesses.335 Such extensions were 
however not discussed further in the country reports, which focused the discussion on 
the scope of the Directive on the coverage of Annex I of the Directive.  
 Use of the injunction procedure across the EU  6.1.3.2.
• Analysis of the use of the injunction procedure across the EU; 
No central database of injunction actions in Member States exists. As the 2012 report 
on the application of the Injunctions Directive highlighted, this is "due to the absence 
of a formal obligation on Member States to maintain a central database of the 
injunctions initiated on their territory and report this information to the 
Commission."336 Within the 2012 Commission report, the estimate of injunction 
actions initiated in the previous 5-year reporting period was based on a survey of 
relevant stakeholders, and for this evaluation, a similar survey of qualified entities was 
conducted in all 28 Member States, based on the list of qualified entities in the 2016 
Notification from the Commission as foreseen by Article 4(3) of the Injunctions 
Directive. In total, 29 qualified entities from 21 Member States responded.337 Of these 
                                           
331 Country report France, Netherlands, UK. 
332 See Pavillon, Public interest litigation in the Netherlands – Recent developments in the collective 
enforcement of consumer rights, in: Schmidt-Kessel, Strünck and Kramme (eds), Im Namen der 
Verbraucher? Kollektive Rechtsdurchsetzung in Europa, 2015, 85, 94. 
333 Country report Poland, at 1.3.1. 
334 Country reports Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Romania.  
335 In Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany (with regard to unfair commercial practices), Italy, 
Portugal (but only in the national legislation related to unfair contract terms). 
336 European Commission. (2012). Report concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interest. 
337 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
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entities, 57% were consumer organisations. The remainder consisted of public 
authorities/bodies (36%) and ‘other’ entities, such as business associations (7%).338 
Given that the survey did not cover all qualified entities listed in the 2016 Notification 
from the Commission, and in line with a caveat noted in the 2012 Commission report, 
the number of documented cases in the following report does therefore not necessarily 
mean that these are the only actions for injunctions that have actually been initiated. 
The table below lists the number of responding qualified entities that initiated 
injunction actions since June 2011, as well as the total number of documented 
injunction actions initiated per year.  
Table 7: Injunction actions initiated since June 2011 
Year Number of qualified entities 
that initiated injunction actions 
Total injunction actions 
initiated 
6/2011 - 12/2011 5 775 
2012 (full year) 8 1 177 
2013 (full year) 9 962 
2014 (full year) 9 1 103 
2015 (full year) 7 995 
1/2016 - 5/2016 5 536 
Total 5 year period 12 5 763 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities. Question: ‘What is the total number of injunction actions initiated 
by your organisation since June 2011?’  
In the five year period since June 2011, responding qualified entities initiated a total of 
5 763 injunction actions. Note that this total does not correspond to the sum of the 
yearly totals—some respondents did not provide yearly answers, and instead only 
provided answers for the total five year period. While in most countries the number of 
reported injunction actions is a few hundred or less, the notable exceptions are 
qualified entities in Germany which reported the highest number of injunction actions 
(4 579) of all Member States, and Latvia (794). The numbers of documented 
injunction actions by country are presented in more detail in the following table. 
                                           
338 For more details concerning the coverage of the survey, refer to Part 4 of this report. 
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Table 8: Injunction actions initiated since June 2011 (by Member State, in 
order of total number of actions) 
Member State Total injunction actions initiated 











Total 5 763 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities. Question: ‘Please indicate the number of injunction actions 
initiated by your organisation since June 2011, differentiating between actions regarding national infringements and 
actions regarding infringements originating in another country.’  
Close to half of the responding qualified entities (14) indicated that they did not 
initiate any injunction actions since June 2011. Reasons due to which entities did not 
initiate any injunction actions included initiating other kinds of actions instead of 
injunctions and insufficient financing (see below for an in depth analysis of obstacles 
to the use of the injunction procedure).  
 
• The three economic sectors most affected by the injunction actions (in order of 
importance);  
In the survey, responding qualified entities elaborated upon the three economic 
sectors that were most affected by the injunction actions initiated by their 
organisation. The figure below presents the sectors that participants indicated in order 
of frequency. Seven responding qualified entities listed ‘other’ sectors such as dry-
cleaning and medicinal products as one of the most affected; another six listed the 
telecommunications sector as one of the most affected sectors. Tourism and package 
travel, online provision of goods, services and digital content, distance selling by 
phone, television, or in person and lending by non-bank institutions each were 
selected three times. 
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Figure 2: Economic sectors most affected by injunction actions 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities. Question: ‘What are the three economic sectors most affected by 
the injunction actions initiated by your organisation since June 2011 (in order of importance)?’ 
Sectors that were never selected as being among the three most affected by 
injunctions included insurance, car sales/rental/parking, passenger transport, food and 
restaurant services, postal services, and timeshare. 
It is notable that the economic sectors most affected by injunction actions are to a 
large extent also the sectors in which respondents to the open public consultation in 
the framework of the Fitness Check assessed injunctions as being most effective: 
While injunctions are viewed as either very effective or rather effective by 35% of 
respondents for the online provision of goods, services and digital content (third 
ranked by qualified entities as being affected by injunction actions), this assessment 
was provided by 33% of respondents for communications and internet access services 
(second ranked by qualified entities), and 30% of respondents for tourism and 
package travel (also third ranked by qualified entities). Injunctions were perceived as 
least effective in the financial services sector, with 27% of respondents considering 
them to be very or rather effective. In all sectors except the online provision of goods, 
services and digital content, more than half of respondents either did not respond or 
selected “no opinion/don’t know”.339 
 
• The three types of allegedly unlawful practice most challenged by the injunction 
actions (in order of importance);  
Responding qualified entities were also asked to specify the three types of unlawful 
practices that were most frequently challenged by the injunction actions their 
organisations initiated. As shown in the figure below, ten responding qualified entities 
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named ‘other’ practices such as non-delivery of goods as one of the most frequently 
challenged, nine listed ‘misleading or aggressive commercial practices’, and eight 
listed ‘unfair contract terms’. ‘Violations of provisions regarding price indication 
regulations’ were never listed as one of the most frequently challenged unlawful 
practices.  
Figure 3: Unlawful practices most frequently challenged by injunction actions 
 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities. Question: ‘What are the three types of unlawful practices most 
frequently challenged by the injunction actions initiated by your organisation since June 2011 (in order of frequency)?’  
Again, these survey results can be compared with the assessment of respondents to 
the open public consultation in the framework of the Fitness Check regarding the 
effectiveness of injunction actions against a variety of illegal practices. According to 
the respondents, injunctions were most effective against the use by traders of unfair 
standard contract terms (44%), use by traders of misleading or aggressive 
commercial practices (44%) and breaches of traders’ obligations related to the 
information they are legally required to provide to consumers (43%). These are also 
the three practices most frequently challenged by injunction actions, according to the 
surveyed qualified entities.  
 
• The number of injunction actions for infringements related to Internet and digital 
technologies;  
Since June 2011, responding qualified entities initiated a total of 656 injunction actions 
for infringements related to internet and digital technologies, according to the qualified 
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• The number of purely national injunction actions (i.e. without any external or cross-
border element); the number of injunction actions related to intra-EU cross-border 
infringements (within the category of actions related to the cross-border 
infringements distinction should be made between actions brought by qualified 
entities in another Member State and actions brought within their own 
jurisdictions); the number of injunction actions having an extra-EU element (e.g. 
traders originating from third countries);  
The responding qualified entities also provided a breakdown of injunction actions 
initiated by their organisations with respect to actions regarding national 
infringements and actions regarding infringements originating in another country. 
Since June 2011, responding qualified entities initiated a total of 2 421 injunctions 
regarding national infringements, 217 injunctions regarding infringements originating 
in another EU country, and 53 injunctions regarding infringements in a non-EU country 
(see the table below). Most actions concerning cross-border infringements were 
brought in the domestic courts of the Member State where the qualified entity is 
domiciled. 
Table 9: Injunction actions initiated since June 2011 – national infringements 
vs. infringements originating in another country 
Infringement Total injunction 
actions initiated 
Percentage of total 
National infringements 2 421 90% 
Infringements originating in another EU 
country 217 8% 
Infringements originating in a non-EU 
country 53 2% 
Total 2 691 100% 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities. Question: ‘Please indicate the number of injunction actions 
initiated by your organisation since June 2011, differentiating between actions regarding national infringements and 
actions regarding infringements originating in another country.’ Note that the sum of these injunctions does not 
correspond to the total sum of injunctions in the previous table, as they refer to different questions in the survey. 
 
• The number of cases in which a settlement with the alleged perpetrator of the 
infringement was reached (distinction should be made between settlements 
reached directly between the qualified entities and traders, and settlements 
reached with the help of the third party, e.g. a court or an out-of-court dispute 
resolution body); 
Responding qualified entities indicated the number of injunction actions initiated by 
their organisation in which a settlement with the alleged perpetrator of the 
infringement was reached since June 2011. In total, 2 509 injunction actions were 
settled directly between the responding qualified entities and traders, while for 331 
injunction actions, settlements were reached with the help of a third party. 
Public authorities appear to be particularly successful in reaching settlements when 
having public law enforcement mechanisms, such as injunction orders and fines, 
available. For example, according to the Irish report, no court action has ever been 
necessary to solve a problem. Similar, in the UK only a few court actions have been 
brought by the responsible consumer authority (the Office of Fair Trading, now the 
CMA). The same was reported from Poland. 
Consumer organisations reach settlements mainly in the case of clear infringements, 
thus, where the trader will predictably lose a lawsuit. 
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• Analysis of the trends in the use of the injunction procedures as defined by the 
Injunctions Directive in terms of their number and characteristics, as described in 
the previous bullet point (e.g. economic sectors affected, unlawful practices 
challenged, national versus cross-border character of injunction actions; the role of 
settlements) compared to the periods covered by the two previous Commission 
reports; 
Trends in the use of the injunction procedure can be analysed in reference to the two 
previous Commission reports on the application of the Injunctions Directive from 2008 
and 2012.  
The following table presents key information from the two reports and the current 
survey:  
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Table 10: Trends in the use of the injunction procedure 
Item 2008 Report from 
the Commissiona) 






Not specified (but 
covering experiences 
since entry into force 
of Directive 98/27/EC)  






Several MS stated 
that [actions for 
injunction] are used 
fairly successfully for 
national 
infringements 
In total, 5632 actions for 
injunction were reported. 
The vast majority of these 
were national.  
In total, 5 763 actions for 
injunction were reported. The 










Respondents reported only 
around 70 injunctions with a 
cross-border dimension  
217 injunctions regarding 
infringements originating in 
another EU country, and 53 
injunctions regarding infrin-




n.a. The economic sectors most 
affected by injunctions are 
telecommunications, 
banking and investments, 
Tourism and package travel. 
Other sectors mentioned by 
several respondents are 
distance selling, insurance, 
energy, non- food consumer 
goods and passenger 
transport.  
Most affected sectors include 
the telecommunications sector, 
tourism and package travel, 
banking and investments, online 
provision of goods, services and 
digital content, distance selling 
by phone, television, or in 
person and lending by non-bank 
institutions. Also important were 
‘other’ sectors such as dry-





[used] in order to 
have misleading 
advertising stopped or 
to annul an unfair 
term in a contract 
In order of importance: 
Unfair contract terms, unfair 
commercial practices and 
misleading advertising. To a 
much lesser extent, 
violations of provisions 
regarding guarantee rules, 
price indication regulations 
or the sending of unsolicited 
e-mails.  
The highest number of entities 
named ‘other’ practices such as 
non-delivery of goods as one of 
the most frequently challenged 
practices, followed by 
misleading or aggressive 
commercial practices, unfair 
contract terms and violations of 




n.a. n.a. In total, 2 509 injunction actions 
were settled directly between 
the responding qualified entities 
and traders, while for 331 
injunction actions, settlements 
were reached with the help of a 
third party. 
Source: a) European Commission (2008). Report concerning the application of Directive 98/27/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interest b) European Commission (2012). 
Report concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interest. c) Civic Consulting survey of qualified entities. 
As the table indicates, the number of injunction actions that concerned national 
infringements appears to have been relatively stable since 2008 (the previous data 
does not allow a comparison). The number of cross-border injunction actions had been 
insignificant from the outset, and has remained low, although it has increased from 70 
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to 217 injunctions from the 2012 report to the current survey.340 These cross-border 
actions, however, have not been taken under the system of the Injunctions Directive 
but by taking action against foreign traders in domestic courts. 
By and large, the most affected sectors are the sectors that had also been mentioned 
in the 2012 report of the European Commission. The telecommunications sector still 
features on top of the ranking and other sectors such as banking and investments, 
tourism and package travel also continue to remain relevant. Likewise, the types of 
infringements that were challenged by way of injunction procedures does not appear 
to have changed significantly, although the category of ‘non-delivery of goods’ does 
not feature in the 2012 report of the European Commission. Misleading and aggressive 
practices and unfair contract terms have remained prominent types of infringements 
since the 2008 report of the European Commission.  
The vast majority of injunction actions (4 579 out of 5 763) is reported from Germany, 
where no other enforcement mechanisms are in place and where the consumer 
organisations are reasonably well funded and litigation costs are limited. Only from 
three other Member States – Lithuania, Austria and Slovakia -, one hundred or more 
injunctive actions have been reported, and the reason is by and large the same: No 
other enforcement mechanisms are in place. In other Member States, enforcement of 
consumer law takes place in other forms. 
 
• Presentation of at least two injunctions cases for each Member State that took 
place after June 2011, considered as the most effective given the consumer 
protection objective (if possible the presentation should cover one case with cross-
border element and one case where a settlement was reached);  
In the survey of qualified entities conducted within this study, responding qualified 
entities were asked to provide comments on the most effective injunction action and 
the second-most effective injunction their organisation initiated since June 2011. 
Examples of responses included an action against a telecommunications operator that 
applied unfair contract terms regarding the notification period requirements preceding 
the automatic continuation of the contract length, as well as an action against online 
shops that failed to reimburse consumers for returned products. The table below 
presents the details regarding the injunction actions initiated by responding qualified 
entities that they consider as being the most or second most effective given the 
consumer protection objective. 
                                           
340 It is unclear whether this indeed represents a trend or is related to the fact that responding organisations 
were not always identical in both surveys. 
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Table 11: Injunction actions initiated by responding qualified entities that 
they consider as being the most or second-most effective 
Country Type of 
entity 







A telecommunications operator providing 
TV services applied unfair contract terms 
regarding the notification period prior to the 




A non-banking financial institution included 
unfair contract terms with respect to 
promissory notes 
No Not indicated 
Germany Consumer 
organisation 
A telecommunications firm provided its 
terms and conditions only in English, which 





Customers of a distance-selling company 
who purchased mattresses were made to 
sign documents that contained credit 
agreements upon delivery of their purchase, 
though they were not informed they were 
signing credit agreements; the 
creditworthiness of these customers also 




Consumers did not receive products they 
ordered or reimbursements for products 




Violations of various provisions regarding 




Telecommunications operators used the 
word ‘unlimited’ to describe offers for SMS, 
minutes and data, when in reality there was 




Unfair terms and commercial practices for 
non-bank institutions and 
telecommunications operators 
No No 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities.  
As the table indicates, only one of the reported effective injunction actions included a 
cross-border element. This concerns an injunction action brought by a German 
consumer organisation in a domestic court against a telecommunications firm which 
provided its terms and conditions only in English. For three of the actions, respondents 
indicated that a settlement was reached (reported from Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Lithuania). 
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 Obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure across the EU the 6.1.3.3.
effectiveness of the Injunctions Directive and of relevant national measures  
• Analysis of the advantages in terms of the effectiveness of the injunction procedure 
of the specific national measures, if taken by MS, regarding the cost of the 
procedure, summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the 
publication of a corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the 
injunction order (Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order; 
Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure across the 
EU, in particular by analysing how much progress in removing obstacles has been 
made and/or new difficulties that emerged compared to periods covered by the two 
previous Commission reports; 
This section analyses the effectiveness of the measures envisaged in the Injunctions 
Directive, remaining obstacles, and also ways in which some Member States have tried 
to overcome these obstacles. 
Obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure stem from different reasons 
as will be shown in the following. Some of these reasons are not touched upon at all in 
the Injunctions Directive or specific consumer law instruments. In other cases, the 
Injunctions Directive itself does contain a rule which may, however, not be strict or 
detailed enough, for example the rule on the publication of decisions. 
Moreover, as a minimum harmonisation instrument, the Injunctions Directive allows 
Member States to maintain or introduce additional measures, and again Member 
States have made use of that freedom.341 
Overview of obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure 
In the survey of qualified entities, respondents were asked to assess a number of 
potential obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure (both with respect 
to national infringements and with respect to infringements originating in another EU 
country) on a scale of one to five (from ‘not at all important obstacle’ to ‘very 
important obstacle’ where only the endpoints of the scale were labelled). Concerning 
the use of the injunction procedure with respect to national infringements, ‘costs and 
the associated financial risks of the injunction procedure’ (with an average rating score 
of 3.6 out of 5) and ‘complexity of the injunction procedure’ (with an average rating 
score of 3.5 out of 5) were viewed by responding qualified entities, on average, as the 
most important obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure with respect 
to national infringements (see the figure below). The answers of respondents differed 
depending on whether the qualified entity had initiated injunction procedures before, 
or not. Responding qualified entities that had initiated injunction actions on average 
viewed the following as the most important obstacles to the effective use of the 
injunction procedure with respect to national infringements (with an average score of 
3.8 out of 5 for each): ‘complexity of the injunction procedure’, ‘limited effectiveness 
of the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction orders’, and ‘difficulties with 
the enforcement of the injunction orders’. Responding qualified entities that did not 
initiate any injunction actions assessed these obstacles on average as less important 
(with average scores of 3.4, 2.9 and 2.6 out of 5 respectively). In contrast, they 
                                           
341 Several of the national measures discussed in the following subsections were also brought up during 
Workshop 3 on Enhancing the effectiveness of the injunction procedure at the 2016 Consumer Summit as 
examples of well-functioning national varieties of the injunctions procedure, including: the option for swift 
out of court settlement, final decision according to the rules applicable to summary proceedings, the erga 
omnes effect of injunctions decisions, the individual’s right to rely on the decision in later proceedings, 
periodic penalties or criminal fines for non-compliance, and a duty to remove the consequences of the 
breach. 
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viewed ‘costs and the associated financial risks of the injunction procedure’ (3.4 out of 
5) as the most important obstacle to the effective use of the injunction procedure with 
respect to national infringements. 
Figure 4: Importance of potential obstacles to the effective use of the 
injunction procedure related to national infringements 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities. Question: ‘On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate the importance of 
the following potential obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure related to national infringements.’ 
Note: respondents were shown a scale from 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Very important) where only the endpoints of 
the scale were labelled. 
Concerning infringements originating in another EU country assessments are similar in 
that the two most important obstacles are again the ‘complexity of the injunction 
procedure' (4.4 out of 5) and the 'costs and the associated financial risks of the 
injunction procedure' (4.2), although the order changed. It is notable that all obstacles 
were ranked higher (i.e. being assessed as a more important obstacle) in the cross-
border context than in the domestic context. It is also notable that 'difficulties to 
enforce injunction orders' is a more relevant obstacle for injunction procedures 
concerning infringements originating in another EU country (considered on average as 
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Costs and associated fin. risks of injunc. proc.
Complexity of the injunc. proc.
Limited effectiveness of sanctions for non-
compliance with injunc. orders
Length of actions
Difficult to enforce injunc. orders
Limited effects of injunc. orders
Average assessment of importance
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Figure 5: Importance of potential obstacles to the effective use of the 
injunction procedure related to cross border infringements 
 
Source: Civic Consulting, Survey of qualified entities. Question: ‘On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate the importance of 
the following potential obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure related to infringements originating in 
another EU country.’ Note: respondents were shown a scale from 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Very important) where 
only the endpoints of the scale were labelled. 
Additional obstacles that were identified in the process of the country research are: 
• Insufficient competence of judges and lack of specialisation of courts in the 
area of consumer law;342 
• Consumer organisations cannot take action themselves but have to apply to a 
consumer protection authority that then has discretion as to whether it wants 
to take action or not;343  
• Lack of awareness of injunction procedures, e.g. by underfunded consumer 
organisations in Member States that mainly rely on public enforcement;344  
• Short prescription periods, as well as deterring sanctions on (allegedly) 
frivolous claims brought by consumer organisations.345 
In the following sub-sections, each of the main obstacles is considered separately, 
including a discussion of measures taken at Member State level to address them. 
 
                                           
342 Country reports Belgium, Bulgaria. 
343 Country report Poland. 
344 Country report Malta. More generally, it was also reported in the country reports for Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania and Slovakia that qualified entities have limited financial and human 
resources, see Section 6.4.4. 
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• The cost and the associated financial risks of injunction procedure;  
Financial risk related to the injunction procedure and in particular court fees and 
lawyers’ fees have been identified as key obstacles to injunction procedures in the 
previous Commission reports on the Injunctions Directive.346 
Court fees and lawyers’ fees for injunction procedures brought by consumer 
organisations and even by public authorities have been named by stakeholders in our 
country research (and also in the open public consultation) as key obstacles to the 
effectiveness of the injunction procedure generally, including domestically.347 As a 
consequence, many qualified entities only litigate bullet-proof cases; which reduces 
their opportunity to clarify and shape the law.348 In that context, a number of country 
reports refer to the fact that qualified entities in their countries lack financial and 
personal resources.349 
The Injunctions Directive or the specific EU consumer law instruments that foresee 
injunction procedures do not touch on the issue of costs. In most Member States, the 
normal cost rules, the loser-pays-principle, apply.350 In Austria, the consumer 
organisation even has to pay for the publication by the trader of the court decision if it 
loses the case. 
Some Member States have considered the public interest function of injunction 
procedures in the collective interest of consumers in their cost rules. Qualified entities 
are exempted from fees for the administrative procedure in Malta and Poland. 
Consumer organisations are exempted from court fees in Hungary, Slovakia and 
Spain. Still, they may have to pay for the defendant trader’s lawyers’ fees if they lose 
the case. In Portugal, consumer organisations had originally been exempted from 
court fees as well but that exemption was repealed in 2008. Nowadays, only the 
relevant public authorities are exempted. 
In Germany, the loser pays principle applies but litigation costs are limited indirectly in 
that courts attach a fairly low value to the litigation of an allegedly unfair term, which 
then limits the court fees as well as the lawyers’ fees that are related to that value.  
In contrast, in systems where a consumer can complain to a consumer protection 
authority, that procedure is free of charge and therefore far more attractive.351 
One related problem is the recovery of expenses for the preparation of the claim, even 
in case of a winning judgment. In most Member States, qualified entities cannot claim 
any kind of compensation or damages for these expenses. Exceptions are France and 
                                           
346 See the 2008 report, at p. 6, and the 2012 report, at p. 11. 
347 Country reports Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovenia; position paper Which? (submitted in the 
open public consultation in the framework of the Fitness Check), at p. 10 f. 
348 Comment from the Which? position paper submitted as part of the open public consultation: “Recognition 
is needed that enforcers - whether consumer organisations or public bodies - pursue injunction actions not 
in their own commercial interest but in the public interest. The cases that proceed to court will be those 
where there is a serious dispute about the law which needs to be resolved in order to provide clarity for 
consumers, traders and enforcers alike. These are the most beneficial cases for shaping the regulatory 
landscape, but they are also the most risky. At present, enforcers are heavily incentivised to bring only 
those actions where they are certain of success.” 
349 See country reports Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia. 
350 For an overview of the situation in the Member States see table in Annex V. 
351 Country report Romania. 
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Greece where consumer organisations can claim the damage to the collective interest 
of consumers or “moral damages” into their own purse.352 Even in Greece, however, 
where consumer organisations can obtain damages part of which, however, go to the 
public purse, the consumer organisations argue in favour of a higher percentage of the 
compensation awarded to them to enable them to cover their expenses and act as an 
incentive to pursue collective action.353 
In contrast, in the Netherlands, according to the case law of the Dutch Supreme 
Court, pre-trial costs of investigation and claim collection can be fully claimed from the 
defendant if the court finds that the defendant indeed acted wrongfully vis-à-vis the 
constituency of the representative organisation, provided the costs are reasonable, it 
was reasonable to incur them and they directly relate to the case. This decision made 
it possible for consumer organisations to claim such pre-trial costs, for example, for 
consultants, evidence, experts and logistics. 354 
In conclusion, and in line with the finding of the previous reports by the European 
Commission on the application of the Injunctions Directive, the country research for 
this study indicates that the loser-pays-principle has a significantly chilling effect on 
the consumer organisations’ activities. Measures such as exempting qualified entities 
from court fees are not very effective if the exemption does not include the 
defendant’s lawyers’ fees too, as they will be much higher than the court fees.355 The 
only system with a cap on lawyers’ fees (indirectly achieved through the limitation of 
the value of collective claims) appears to be Germany, and that measure can be 
regarded as effective, as it has clearly contributed to the large number of injunction 
procedures that German consumer organisations have initiated. 
 
• The length of actions sought by qualified entities in their own jurisdictions and in 
another Member State;  
Length of court procedures has been criticised in some country reports356 and by 
stakeholders.357 It ranks third in the problems mentioned by qualified entities. In 
some cases court proceedings are reported to be so slow that the infringement has 
often ended before a judgment is handed down, even with a summary procedure.358 
                                           
352 See also infra. 
353 However, reservations to this approach have been expressed in Greek academic writing as some authors 
see it as undesirable that collective action could become a vehicle for consumer associations to make a 
profit. See country report Greece. 
354 See country reports of the mentioned countries. 
355 This was also noted by consumer organisations in the position papers submitted to the online public 
consultation, for example, from the UK consumer organisation Which?: “The principal reason why the power 
to take injunctive action has been so little used in the UK is because enforcers face substantial cost risk. 
Court action in the UK is very expensive. Not only does the enforcer have to bear its own costs of bringing 
proceedings, if the enforcer loses the action then it also has to pay the trader’s legal costs, which could be 
very significant. (…) For Which?, the cost of litigating, and our exposure to the risk of paying the trader’s 
costs, has inevitably been a key consideration when contemplating action.” 
356 Country reports Croatia, Greece, Italy, Poland. 
357 See position paper BEUC (submitted in the open public consultation in the framework of the Fitness 
Check), at p. 11. 
358 Country report Bulgaria. 
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Other country reports do not mention the length of actions as a problem as such. A 
lengthy procedure may, of course, reduce the effectiveness of an injunction order that 
only stops infringements from a later point in time onwards. Whether or not that is 
actually the case will depend on additional factors, in particular on the availability of 
additional remedies such as compensation orders that mitigate the negative effects of 
lengthy procedures. 
The Injunctions Directive deals with the length of procedures by requiring that claims 
for the cessation or prohibition of any infringement must be dealt with “with all due 
expediency, where appropriate by way of summary procedure”. 
Member States have chosen different ways to deal with this provision. Some, for 
example Slovakia and Spain, have introduced summary procedures, that is, 
procedures that are faster and less complex than the regular civil procedure. Mixed 
experience with the summary procedure is reported.359 Although the existence of a 
summary procedure is generally welcomed and often made use of,360 it may not 
always be much faster than the normal procedure.361  
In Belgium, a summary procedure is available but it is not used often since the 
ordinary court procedure is considered to be fast enough by the courts. In Portugal, it 
is for the court to determine, within its management powers, the pace of the 
procedure. 
In other Member States, the regular civil procedural law applies. Usually, interim 
procedures will then be available,362 which however pose the problem that the interim 
decision could be overturned by the decision in the main procedure. For example, in 
Germany, the interim procedure is often used in unfair commercial practices cases but 
not in unfair contract terms cases. In Poland, they only seem to be available in unfair 
commercial practices law and concerning the law implementing the Consumer Rights 
Directive but not in unfair contract terms cases.  
Only few Member States have introduced express time limits for the decision on an 
injunction claim. In Romania, the procedure may only take 20 days.363 In Poland, the 
decision must be taken within three months, or four months in complex cases.364  
The overall procedure will of course take longer if the trader appeals the decision. In 
fact, injunction procedures may take very long if the litigation is taken through several 
instances up to the highest court of a Member State, possibly with a detour via the 
Court of Justice. As such, this must be regarded as justified. It should however be 
noted that there is a relationship, in terms of the effectiveness of the injunction 
procedure, between the length of proceedings and the available remedies. If the 
injunction procedure is limited to the pure omission to continue a breach, a lengthy 
procedure means that traders can continue the breach for the duration of the 
litigation; which means for several years, which may cause significant unlawful gains 
and consumer detriment. In that case, the system can only be regarded to be 
effective if that effect is mitigated by ways in which consumers can recover their 
                                           
359 Country reports Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain. 
360 Country report Slovakia. 
361 Country report Bulgaria. 
362 E.g. country reports Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Slovakia. 
363 E.g. country report Romania. 
364 E.g. country report Poland. 
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losses afterwards or in which the qualified entity can recover the consumers` losses 
for them or skim off the unlawful profits (see below). 
Overall, while the availability of speedy procedures can be considered a necessary 
ingredient of effective injunction procedures, given the need to stop infringements of 
the collective consumer possible as fast as possible, it seems clear that not all 
infringements of consumer law are clear-cut, and that in some instances complex legal 
issues need to be resolved. In some cases this may even require the clarification of 
underlying EU consumer law by the Court of Justice. In such cases, the injunction 
procedure can only be regarded as effective if the unlawful situation until the final 
judgment is corrected by way of additional remedies of consumers or qualified 
entities. 
 
• The effects of the injunction orders;  
Stakeholders have argued that the effectiveness of the injunction procedure is limited 
because – in their Member States – the court decision has only effect inter partes 
(between the parties).365 They see it as a problem that, firstly, the qualified entity 
would have to sue each trader individually for the same infringement, for example, for 
identical unfair contract terms. Secondly, consumers may not be able to rely directly 
on a judgment that was handed down in collective proceedings.366 Moreover, it was 
argued that in order to allow individual consumers to rely on judgments that were 
made in collective proceedings, it would be necessary to bar the prescription of their 
claims while the collective proceedings are pending.367 Qualified entities have also 
often mentioned as a deficit that injunctions as such have no compensatory effect.368 
Both problems have also been identified in the 2008 and 2012 reports of the European 
Commission.369 
Finally, limitations have been introduced in some Member States, the compliance of 
which with the Injunctions Directive has been doubted by stakeholders. For instance, 
the Austrian Supreme Court allows traders a transitional period of about four months 
to adjust contracts to the law (as interpreted by the court).370 
These aspects are separately discussed in the following sub-sections.  
The inter partes effect of injunction orders 
The inter partes effect of injunction orders has two dimensions. The first dimension 
relates to the effect on individual consumers that are affected by the infringement of 
consumer law by the defendant in the collective action. The second dimension relates 
to the effect of a decision in an injunction procedure on other traders than the 
defendant who are engaging in the same infringement. 
                                           
365 Country report Austria; position paper BEUC, at p. 11. 
366 See also position paper vzbv (submitted in the open public consultation in the framework of the Fitness 
Check), at p. 21. 
367 See position paper vzbv, at p. 22. 
368 E.g. country reports Austria, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia. See also position paper BEUC, at p. 
12; vzbv, at p. 22. 
369 See 2008 report, at p. 8; 2012 report, at p. 13.m 
370 Country report Austria. 
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The primary effect of an injunction order is, of course, that the trader is prohibited to 
continue the infringement. The Injunctions Directive and the provisions on injunction 
procedures in specific EU consumer law instruments do not explicitly require Member 
States to give decisions effects beyond that immediate relationship; which is in line 
with traditional civil procedural law. 
The prohibition to rely, vis-à-vis a consumer, on a term that was declared unfair in 
collective proceedings would however seem to be required under EU law, according to 
the decision of the Court of Justice in Invitel.371 In its judgment, the Court held that 
where the unfair nature of a term in the trader’s standard terms has been 
acknowledged in collective proceedings, national courts are required, of their own 
motion, and also with regard to the future, to take such action thereon as is provided 
for by national law in order to ensure that consumers who have concluded a contract 
with the seller or supplier to which those standard terms apply will not be bound by 
that term. 
In most Member States, the decision in an injunction procedure, however, still has 
only effect inter partes.372 In practice, this means that even after a decision against a 
trader has been handed down in a collective action brought by a qualified entity, the 
trader may still reject the individual claim, and the consumer may have to litigate 
against that trader for the same issues, which increases their litigation risk and also 
causes costs to the court system as such. For reasons that have been well-researched 
in the past,373 such as rational apathy vis-à-vis smaller claims, many consumers are 
unlikely to engage in such litigation, the result being that consumers do not receive 
compensation for their loss and unlawful profits remain with the trader; which may 
even create an incentive to take a hard stance against consumers even after an 
injunction order. See also the discussion in the efficiency section. 
For example, it was reported from Hungary that in the well-known ‘yellow cheque’ 
case,374 according to a stakeholder, only around 5% of consumers claimed 
compensation from the company. In Germany, Günter Hörmann, the former head of 
the Consumer Centre of Hamburg reported on two mass problems, unfair price 
increasing terms in gas contracts – an issue that reached the Court of Justice in the 
case of RWE375 –, and unfair terms in capital life insurance contracts. Both problems 
were well-known through broad media coverage. With regard to the dominating gas 
supplier in Hamburg, the Consumer Centre of Hamburg represented 54 (out of 
300,000) consumers in a representative action. Another 50,000 consumers protested 
against the price increase but paid and would have therefore had to claim the money 
back, which most did not do. Only around 5,000 consumers refused to pay the 
increased price. Looking at the broader dimension, Hörmann estimated that only 
between 1 and 2m out of approximately 17m gas customers joined the protest, and of 
                                           
371 CJEU, judgment of 26 April 2012, Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési 
Zrt, ECLI:EU:C:2012:242. See also H.-W. Micklitz, in: N. Reich, H.-W. Micklitz, P. Rott and K. Tonner, 
European Consumer Law, 2nd ed. 2014, at para 3.22b; vzbv, at p. 21. 
372 For an overview of the rules in the Member States in this regard, see table in Annex V. 
373 See, for example, Wagner, in: Casper u. a. (eds), Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Sammelklage?, 
41, at 51 ff. See also Civic Consulting, Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress 
mechanisms in the European Union. 
374 In this case a mobile phone company unfairly charged consumers in various ways including by imposing 
a special charge on payments done in post offices by yellow cheques – the so called yellow cheque case. 
The company imposed a charge although the method of payment in question did not actually cost anything 
for the company neither did it provide a separate service for the charge. Metropolitan Court of Appeal 
(Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), decision no. 14. Gf. 40.605/2013/7. 
375 CJEU, judgment of 21.3.2013, Case C-92/11 RWE, ECLI:EU:C:2013:180. 
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those only a small part actually managed not to pay the increased price in the end.376 
In the context of capital life insurance contracts, the Consumer Centre of Hamburg 
had represented 80 customers, for which they achieved compensation of a total of 
74,000 Euro. The damage caused by the defendant alone was estimated to be 
between 1 and 4 billion Euro. Hörmann estimated that only between 100,000 and 
200,000 customers pursued their claims. 
This, however, also seems to be an issue of business culture, and it is reported, for 
example from Finland, that established traders do comply with injunction orders and 
that subsequent litigation by individual consumers is not necessary. Moreover, it would 
seem that public authorities could react more easily with public law instruments such 
as fines if traders do not implement an injunction order on request of consumers. 
Some Member States have made explicit the connection between the injunction 
procedure and the subsequent dealing with claims of individual consumers on the 
same matter. In Hungary, if a court rules that a clause in a contract between a 
company and a consumer is unfair, it may declare this clause null and void in all 
contracts concluded by that company. In Austria, Germany and Slovakia, omission of 
future infringements includes the omission to enforce an unfair term in an already 
concluded consumer contract, for example, charging the consumer an unlawful 
penalty, or the omission to collect money from an unlawful distance selling contract.377 
Thus, consumers can rely, in individual litigation, on a judgment made in collective 
proceedings; which does not mean that traders would necessarily satisfy those 
individual claims without forcing the consumer into litigation.378 The prohibition to 
enforce a term that was declared unfair in an already concluded consumer contract 
also applied in Polish law where the legislator has codified that effect in a law reform 
of 2015.379  
Greece has established a specific instrument, a declaratory action by qualified entities 
on the basis of which individual consumers can notify their claims for damages to the 
trader in writing with supporting evidence.380 Should the trader not respond to the 
notification after 30 days, the consumer can request a court order for payment. A 
similar procedure exists in Hungary. In Lithuania, the facts that are established in the 
injunction order become prejudicial facts and cannot be contested in subsequent 
individual litigation. In Slovenia, the injunction procedure as a court procedure goes 
beyond the Injunctions Directive by providing the possibility to bring an action for 
finding the contract between a defendant and a consumer invalid. 
In other Member States, such as Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and the 
Netherlands the connection is less clear but courts would regard the decision in the 
collective proceedings as strong evidence or informal res judicata for the subsequent 
individual litigation. In the UK, although preventive proceedings do not generally bind 
subsequent individual proceedings by way of res judicata, such an injunction can cover 
existing as well as future contracts. 
                                           
376 G. Hörmann, Massenschäden in der Praxis – aus Sicht der Verbraucherzentralen, Verbraucher und Recht 
2016, 81 f. 
377 See country reports of the mentioned countries. 
378 See Hörmann on the conduct of E.ON even after an injunction order concerning their price increase terms 
in gas supply contracts. 
379 Country report Poland, 1.2.1. 
380 Individual consumers in Greece can only follow this procedure once there is an irrevocable decision on a 
class action (see N.2251/94, art.10 para.20). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  121 
When considering the effectiveness of such a connection between the injunction 
procedure and the subsequent dealing with claims of individual consumers on the 
same matter, a caveat must be made, as already mentioned, in terms of the 
relationship between the right to rely on an injunction order in individual litigation and 
national rules on prescription. In some legal systems, prescription periods are shorter 
than the injunction procedure (through all the instances) may take. For example, in 
Germany, the regular prescription period is three years, beginning at the end of the 
year, in which the infringement occurred, whereas litigation of an injunction claim can 
last much longer than that. In the case of RWE that reached the Court of Justice,381 
the first injunction claim was brought on 30 October 2006, whereas the 
Bundesgerichtshof rendered the last instance on 31 July 2013. Under German law, 
prescription of individual claims is not suspended while a collective action on the same 
issue is pending.382 
Prescription is an issue that the Injunctions Directive does not deal with. It has, 
however, frequently been discussed by the Court of Justice under the heading of the 
“principle of effectiveness”. Generally speaking, EU law of course allows claims to be 
prescribed at one point. The Court of Justice has, however, decided on limitations to 
prescription. For example, in Heininger, the Court indicated that a consumer will not 
be able to make use of a remedy – then: a withdrawal right – until he or she knows 
that that right exists in the first place (on which the trader has to inform the 
consumer).383 In unfair terms cases, the situation will often be similar, because the 
consumer will not know that there is an infringement before a court has clarified this 
by holding the term unfair. Or, if the trader wrongfully rejects a consumer’s complaint, 
giving legal reasons that do not withstand the scrutiny of the courts later, the 
consumer may be inclined to believe the trader and only find out later, once he or she 
obtains knowledge of a judgment on the matter, that the trader’s response was 
incorrect. 
In the context of infringements of consumer law, it is highly likely that a trader that 
does not accept the opinion of a qualified entity concerning the unlawfulness of his 
conduct will not accept claims of individual consumers either. Given that individual 
consumers may have to act before the collective action has been finally decided upon 
so as to avoid prescription of the claim, they would face the full litigation risk and 
would most likely not take action. Again, the result will be that consumers do not 
receive compensation for their loss and unlawful profits remain with the trader; which 
may even create an incentive to delay litigation by taking a case through all the 
instances of the court system. In fact, in the German context, there is ample evidence 
that traders, after years of litigation, settle, or withdraw their appeals, shortly before 
the final judgment of the highest civil court in order to avoid a negative judgment that 
would create legal certainty for consumers and therefore might increase the 
consumers’ readiness to engage in follow-on litigation against the traders in question. 
In brief, a system where individual claims are prescribed before a final decision in the 
collective action is made, appears to be ineffective in protecting the consumers’ 
interests. 
                                           
381 CJEU, judgment of 21/3/2013, Case C-92/11 RWE, ECLI:EU:C:2013:180. 
382 For more details, see Rott, Gutachten zur Erschließung und Bewertung offener Fragen und 
Herausforderungen der deutschen Verbraucherrechtspolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, 2016, http://www.svr-
verbraucherfragen.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Rott-Gutachten.pdf, at 23 f. 
383 CJEU, judgment of 13/12/2001, Case C-481/99 Heininger, ECLI:EU:C:2001:684. 
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The effect on other traders engaging in the same infringement 
The situation under EU law relating to other traders engaging in the same 
infringement is less clear. As mentioned above, most Member States only recognise an 
inter partes effect of decisions in injunction procedures. This means that qualified 
entities have to bring separate claims against all traders that engage in the same 
unlawful practice, for example, by using identical unfair terms; which may exceed 
their human and financial resources and is also a burden to the court system. Indeed, 
experience in the Member States shows that traders often do not stop their own 
practices only because a competitor has been convicted, in an injunction procedure, 
for the same practice. Even more likely, they do not compensate consumers for an 
infringement that was at stake in litigation between a qualified entity and another 
trader but rather try to stress, or to pretend, that their case was different. For 
example, a number of German banks refused to recognise that a judgment of the 
highest civil court, according to which a standard term on credit handling fees 
constituted an unfair term, also applied to their standard terms on credit handling 
fees; which has been confirmed in subsequent litigation. 
Some Member States have reacted to the problem. In Spain, if a specific activity or 
behaviour is deemed illicit, the court shall determine whether this declaration shall 
have procedural effects beyond those who had been parties in the proceedings. Courts 
have concluded that the extension of the effect of a decision on the unfairness of a 
contract term applies to other traders who use the identical term but not to those who 
use similar terms.384 Also, in Greece, the judgment has an erga omnes effect.385 The 
situation may be similar in legal systems with a doctrine of precedent, such as the UK 
as courts are bound by the precedent in their later decisions.386 Moreover, it would 
seem that in Member States where consumer authorities can issue injunction orders 
themselves, they will usually apply, for the sake of consistency, their reasoning in a 
previous case to subsequent cases. 
In Polish law prior to a law reform of 2015, when the specialist court in Warsaw ruled 
that a clause in a contract is unfair in abstracto, this clause was then entered into the 
register of unfair terms. It was claimed in academic writing and also suggested in 
earlier judgements of the Polish Supreme Court that this registered unfair contract 
term could then have an erga omnes effect. This was, however, rejected by the Polish 
Supreme Court in a judgment of November 2015 and this position has been codified 
through a legal reform of 2015. Under the new system of Polish unfair terms control, 
where the President of the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection can 
issue injunction orders by way of administrative decision, the President may of course 
issue injunction orders against all traders using identical terms. The register of unfair 
terms will continue to exist until 2027 but only for cases that have started before 17 
April 2016. Newer unfair terms will not be entered in the register anymore. 
The possibility of Member States to introduce an erga omnes effect of injunction 
decisions was subject of the recent judgment of the Court of Justice in the case of 
Partner.387 The case turned on the previous Polish law, under which judgments by the 
court in Warsaw relating to the unfairness of terms were entered in a public register. 
The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection found that Biuro 
                                           
384 Country report Spain, 1.3.1. 
385 In Greece, the erga omnes effect has been subject to critique as authors thought it to be in conflict with 
the general rules on res judicata. 
386 Country report UK. 
387 CJEU, judgment of 21.12.2016, Case C-119/15 Biuro podróży ‘Partner’ sp. z o.o. sp.k. w Dąbrowie 
Górniczej v Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, ECLI:EU:C:2016:987. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  123 
Partner, who had not been a party to the first proceedings, had used terms in its 
standard conditions of business which were considered equivalent to terms previously 
declared unlawful and then entered in that public register of unfair terms. The 
President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection therefore imposed a 
fine on Biuro Partner.  
The CJEU established that a public national register of unfair contract terms that have 
been considered unfair in court decisions enhances consumer protection provided that 
it is managed in a transparent manner and kept up to date. 
The main point of discussion was, however, whether or not such a procedure was 
compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, more 
specifically, with Article 47 thereof, in so far as the seller or supplier would not have 
the opportunity thereunder to present arguments about the lack of unfairness of the 
standard terms in question and would thereby be deprived of its right to be heard. The 
Court considered both the trader’s right of effective judicial protection including the 
right to be heard and the aims of the UCTD and the Injunctions Directive, which both 
require the Member States to provide for adequate and effective means to prevent the 
continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or 
suppliers. It concluded that a system as the one in question did not disregard the right 
of effective judicial protection provided that that trader has an effective judicial 
remedy against the decision declaring the terms compared to be equivalent in terms 
of the question whether, in the light of all relevant circumstances particular to each 
case, those terms are materially identical, having regard in particular to their harmful 
effects for consumers, and against the decision fixing the amount of the fine imposed, 
where applicable. 
In conclusion, while injunctions as such can be considered an effective remedy to stop 
infringements for the future, as evidenced in the country research for this study, only 
some Member States have introduced broader effects of injunction orders. If relevant 
decisions had an erga omnes effect so that qualified entities would not have to pursue 
identical infringements by various traders individually, this would increase the 
effectiveness of injunctions considerably. Moreover, in many Member States 
injunctions lack the protective effects on individual consumers who are affected by the 
infringement in question. This appears not to be consistent with the interpretation of 
EU unfair contract terms law by the CJEU in Invitel. 
The lack of compensatory effect 
A frequent critique by qualified entities of the remedy of injunction is that it is not 
sufficiently effective and deterrent as it only produces effects for the future but does 
not cover the compensation of the victims of the infringement; which leads to a 
situation where dishonest traders can often keep their unlawfully gained profits, to the 
detriment of consumers.388 In the survey of qualified entities, this issue of additional 
remedies ranked highest on the list of future harmonisation measures that would be 
most beneficial.389 
                                           
388 See Part 2 of this report, Section 6.6.2. From the position paper submitted to the public consultation by 
the vzbv: “In order to avoid incentives to commit infringements, it is necessary in particular to prevent 
enterprises from being able to retain the gains they have made as a result of the infringement. Consumer 
associations should therefore be placed in the position to skim off such illegal gains if or in so far as 
individual compensation of consumers does not occur. Such a claim to skimming off gains should not – as 
hitherto in German law – depend on an intentional infringement. Furthermore, the skimming off of gains 
should in principle be possible as a result of all infringements of European consumer law and in particular 
include infringements in the field of unfair contract terms (general business conditions).” 
389 See figure 40 in Part 4 of this report. 
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Indeed, as was shown above, the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in terms of 
reducing consumer detriment as well as in terms of its preventive, deterrent effect is 
clearly limited if the only legal consequence is the prohibition to continue the 
infringement. Due to the reluctance of consumers to engage in individual litigation, 
traders can easily gain unlawful profits without fear of having to return them. 
This lack of compensatory as well as of deterrent effect has been the reason for 
additional measures that have been introduced by Member States in recent years and 
which can often be claimed as part of the injunction procedure, as described in the 
following.  
For example, the UK has, first, introduced restitution orders in the financial services 
sector. According to s 382 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,390 the court can, 
on application of the FCA or the Secretary of State, order a person that has 
contravened a relevant legal requirement, or been knowingly concerned in the 
contravention of such a requirement, to pay to the Authority such sum as appears to 
the court to be just, having regard to the profits appearing to the court as having 
accrued to him or the extent of the loss or other adverse effect to one or more 
persons. The amounts paid to the FCA following such an order must be paid by the 
FCA to such qualifying person or distributed by it among such qualifying persons as 
the court may direct. In order to establish the amounts accrued on the infringer, or 
the loss suffered by others, the court may also require the infringer to supply it with 
such accounts or other information. Restitution orders thus have a compensatory or 
restitutionary function, in particular in cases where the victims of an infringement do 
not avail of the resources to take individual action.391 Moreover, in academic writing 
they have been attributed a deterrent effect on potential infringer.392 For example, in 
the case of Financial Services Authority v Anderson,393 the Financial Services Authority 
succeeded in claiming restitution of £115 Mio. 
Redress or compensation orders can also be issued as a public law remedy, thus, 
without the involvement of a civil court, by certain UK regulators, in particular by the 
FCA and by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem).394 
Moreover, in the UK, so-called “Enhanced Consumer Measures” have been introduced 
generally in 2015 for injunctions for the breach of consumer law.395 These can be 
obtained together with injunctions in court procedures, and they are fairly flexible. 
Next to redress orders, which include either the compensation of consumers where 
they can be identified or otherwise measures intended to be in the collective interests 
                                           
390 For details, see https://2sbwww27nmts1j4cfl1tbmvh-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/old/Investor%20remedies.jan%202011.rtf. 
391 See Financial Services Authority v Shepherd [2009] EWHC 1167 (Ch), [2009] All ER (D) 15 (Jun), para. 
29. 
392 See Money-Kyrle, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Rights in the United Kingdom, in: Schmidt-Kessel, 
Strünck and Kramme (eds), Im Namen der Verbraucher? Kollektive Rechtsdurchsetzung in Europa (2015), 
45, at 61. 
393 [2010] EWHC 1547 (Ch). On the distribution of the sums paid under s 382(2) FSMA 2000 to the 
depositors of the Ponzi scheme at issue, see Financial Conduct Authority v Anderson [2014] EWHC 3630 
(Ch). 
394 See s 384 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and s 30G ff. Gas Act 1986 and s. 27G ff. Electricity 
Act, introduced by s 144 with schedule 14 Energy Act 2013. For detailed analysis, see C. Hodges, Mass 
Collective Redress: Consumer ADR and Regulatory Techniques, European Review of Private Law 2015, 829; 
P. Rott, Behördliche Rechtsdurchsetzung in Großbritannien, den Niederlanden und der USA, in: H. Schulte-
Nölke (ed.), Neue Wege zur Durchsetzung des Verbraucherrechts, 2017, forthcoming. 
395 See new s 219A Enterprise Act 2002. 
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of consumers, there are the categories of “compliance” and “choice”. “Compliance” 
means measures intended to prevent or reduce the risk of the occurrence or repetition 
of the conduct to which the enforcement order or undertaking relates, whereas 
“choice” refers to measures intended to enable consumers to choose more effectively 
between persons supplying or seeking to supply goods or services. No experience with 
these “Enhanced Consumer Measures” is available yet. 
In Spain, it is possible to bring injunctions together with claims for absolute and 
relative nullity, termination, restitution of profits and damages. These secondary 
actions will be solved by judges responsible for the injunction claim.396 For instance, in 
SAP Alava 21.11.2013 (AC 2014\624), two consumers who had concluded a loan with 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. brought a claim accumulating an injunction to 
declare the nullity of a mortgage-floor clause (principal action) and an action to 
recover the amount unduly paid because of the application of this clause (accessory 
action). The first instance court, the appeal court and the Supreme Court ruled in 
favour of the consumers. STS, 1ª, 25.3.2015 (RJ 2015\735) stated that, when 
according to STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013, a floor clause was deemed unfair and therefore null 
and void, the borrower was entitled to recover interests that had been unduly paid 
from the date in which the STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 had been published. 
In Hungary, the law provides for the possibility of combining the injunction order with 
a restitution order, that is, an order to restore the situation as it was prior to the 
infringement. In Latvia, the enforcement authority has successfully claimed the 
compensation of consumers together with injunction orders in interim court 
procedures. In Estonia, the Consumer Protection Board is entitled to order airlines to 
compensate passengers for cancelled or delayed flights, under the Air Passengers 
Rights Regulation (EC) 261/2004. In Slovenia, draft legislation, according to which 
qualified entities shall obtain the right to claim compensation for consumers is 
currently in the legislative process. 
In Germany and Slovakia, there has been an academic debate about whether the 
obligation to remove the consequences of the breach could also cover the 
reimbursement of unlawfully obtained money.397 Whilst this possibility was rejected by 
a Slovakian court, the German district court of Leipzig has awarded the claim in a case 
where a bank had unlawfully charged consumers 30 Euros each against long 
established case law of the Federal Supreme Court, arguing, amongst others, that the 
individual consumers concerned would be highly unlikely to bring individual claims 
against the bank.398 
In France and Greece, qualified entities cannot claim compensation of consumers but 
they can recover the damage done to the collective interest of consumers. In France, 
as provided under Article L. 621-1 of the Code de la consommation, a registered 
consumer association can bring an action to recover the damage done to the collective 
interest of consumers. The action has no effect on individual claims that consumers 
may wish to bring. Instead, the consumer association can claim damages into its own 
purse. The damages that can be obtained do not correspond with the aggregated 
damages to victims; they are much lower. In Greece, recognised consumer 
associations can sue for “moral damages”. According to the Greek Supreme Court, 
these moral damages have a punitive character, they are not meant to compensate 
the consumers’ losses, and they are not distributed to the consumers who have 
                                           
396 See Article 12.2 of Act 7/1998 for unfair contract terms law; Article 53 of Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007, as amended by Act 3/2014, for general consumer law. 
397 Country report Slovakia. 
398 See LG Leipzig, 10/12/2015, Verbraucher und Recht 2016, 109. 
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suffered damage. Instead, 35% of the awarded damages go to the purse of the 
consumer association, 35% to a second consumer association, and the rest to the 
State budget, where it is used for the purposes of consumer protection. Individual 
consumers do not take part in the litigation and do not benefit directly from the 
litigation. The amounts obtained through this system are higher than in France, and it 
appears to have some deterrent effect on traders although, as mentioned, no 
compensatory effect for consumers. 
Compensation orders, or redress orders, can also be obtained by the relevant 
consumer authority, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in the United States. First, 
the FTC may seek consumer redress from the trader in court for consumer injury that 
was caused in breach of an injunction order issued by the FTC itself. In such a suit, 
the FTC must demonstrate that the conduct was such as "a reasonable man would 
have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent." Second, the same 
applies where the FTC directly brings a claim for an injunction order in court. The court 
can grant monetary equitable relief, that is, restitution and rescission of contracts) to 
remedy past violations.399 
Finally, in the broader context of collective redress mechanisms, Member States have 
introduced various types of collective actions, such as group actions, actions in the 
collective interest of consumer, or skimming-off procedures, some of which have also 
been given in the hand of qualified entities, whereas others can be brought by other 
claimants, such as groups of consumers. This trend continues, and in December 2016, 
the German Ministry of Justice and for Consumer Protection has tabled draft legislation 
for a collective declaratory action (Musterfeststellungsklage) which would grant legal 
standing to qualified entities only. 
Most of these collective redress procedures are entirely independent from injunction 
procedures.400 In Bulgaria, the injunction procedure and the procedures for collective 
redress can be joined into one procedure if the court finds that suitable;401 but they 
are, in principle, distinct procedures, and in practice, courts often keep them 
separate.402 For example, the civil case #3912/2008 District Court-Sofia between 
“Federation of Consumers in Bulgaria” and “Central Heating Company’ Sofia” 
(Топлофикация- София ЕАД) started with joined actions for injunction (Art. 186 of 
the Consumer Protection Act and for consumer collective redress (Art. 188 of the 
Consumer Protection Act, the Sofia City Court however split these actions, kept the 
collective redress one for hearing and sent the injunction one to the District Court-
Sofia. 
In Germany, the skimming-off procedure under unfair competition law will usually only 
be brought as a second step, once the relevant infringement of consumer has first 
been confirmed in an injunction procedure. 
• Publication of the decision and/or the publication of a corrective statement; 
The Injunctions Directive envisages, “where appropriate, measures such as the 
publication of the decision, in full or in part, in such form as deemed adequate and/or 
                                           
399 See Section 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 57b. See also FTC, A Brief Overview 
of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority, sub II. A. 1. (a) and A. 2. 
400 This separation is criticised in the country report Belgium where it is suggested that groups of consumers 
that can bring a group action for redress should also have legal standing in injunction procedures. 
401 See Art. 210 of the Bulgarian Civil Procedural Code. 
402 Country report Bulgaria, Annex A, table 2. 
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the publication of a corrective statement with a view to eliminating the continuing 
effects of the infringement”. 
Publication of the decision or a corrective statement is not an unconditional right of 
qualified entities in all Member States but sometimes publication is at the discretion of 
the court.403 There are Member States where courts seem to be very reluctant to 
order a corrective statement.404 In Portugal, the law provides for the mandatory 
publication of decisions concerning practices that violate consumers’ rights and in 
Finland, all decisions are published on the websites of the Competition and Consumer 
Authority. 
Generally speaking, the publication of the decision or of a corrective statement is 
regarded to be useful both in order to inform consumers and to deter traders who fear 
damage to their reputation.405 The usefulness of the publication of the decision or of a 
corrective statement in reaching these goals, however, appears to depend on 
practicalities. It was reported that the publication must be intelligible to consumers 
who do not necessarily understand legal language.406 Also, it is only useful if 
publication takes place in popular newspapers with wide circulation407 rather than an 
official gazette that consumers would not take notice of.408 Finally, it was argued that 
newspapers must be under an obligation to publish the decision; otherwise, conflicts 
of interest may arise when newspapers are business partners of the infringer.409 
Other country reports refer to the benefits of the publication of decisions but also 
undertakings by traders on the website of the central consumer authority.410  
The practical effectiveness of publication also appears to depend on national business 
culture. The country report Malta stressed that the size of the country matters, and 
that in a small Member State, traders are more sensitive to the risk of negative 
publicity.411 
Overall, from the country research it appears that publication of the decision and, 
where applicable, of a corrective statement is an effective remedy both in terms of 
informing consumers of the infringement and acting as a deterrent to traders who fear 
of bad reputation. Legal uncertainty and discretion by the court with respect to 
publication of the decision may, however, reduce the effectiveness of the remedy. 
Information of “the public” has been complemented in some Member States by 
information of individual consumers that are or have been affected by the 
                                           
403 Country reports Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Spain. See also Annex V for an overview of the measures 
regarding the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a corrective statement in the Member 
States.  
404 Country report Greece. 
405 Country reports France, Lithuania, Poland. 
406 E.g. country report Bulgaria. 
407 Country reports Bulgaria, Italy. 
408 Which is the legal situation in Germany. 
409 E.g. country report Bulgaria. 
410 Country report Latvia. 
411 Country report Malta. 
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infringement. These measures aim at making the individual victim aware of that 
infringement so that he or she can take follow-on action. 
In Poland, the trader can be ordered to inform consumers about the unfairness of a 
standard term. In France, the trader is obliged to inform consumers by all appropriate 
means about the unfairness of contract terms. In Germany, there is a rule, according 
to which the injunction claim includes the claim to remove the consequences of the 
breach. That claim has been interpreted in recent decisions of German instance courts 
to cover the information of individual consumers (by letter) of infringements that 
affected their rights, for example, of the correct legal situation as opposed to the legal 
situation that the trader had explained in a previous letter. 
In conclusion, publication of decisions and of corrective statements can be a useful 
tool but the situation is not satisfactory at the moment in a number of Member States. 
Moreover, publication as such may not be sufficient to make the individual victim of a 
consumer law infringement aware of that infringement so that some Member States 
have added, in appropriate cases, the trader’s duty to inform all victims individually of 
the infringement. 
 
• Sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction orders;  
Generally speaking, close to all Member States foresee sanctions for non-
compliance.412 It has, however, sometimes been doubted that they are sufficiently 
deterrent to discourage continued infringements; a finding that has also been made in 
the 2012 report of the European Commission.413 Stakeholders have asked for making 
the provision of sanctions mandatory.414 
The Directive itself suggests that sanctions for non-compliance with injunction orders 
may be a useful instrument but leaves much leeway to the Member States who should 
foresee, “in so far as the legal system of the Member State concerned so permits”, an 
order against the losing defendant for payments into the public purse or to any 
beneficiary designated in or under national legislation, in the event of failure to comply 
with the decision within a time limit specified by the courts or administrative 
authorities, of a fixed amount for each day’s delay or any other amount provided for in 
national legislation, with a view to ensuring compliance with the decisions (Article 
2(1)(c)). 
In some Member States, mostly but not exclusively with an Anglo-Saxon law 
background, infringement of the injunction order is treated as ‘contempt of court’ or 
as a criminal offence and can be sanctioned with public law fines and even 
imprisonment.415 In France, non-compliance with a court order is punishable by a 
prison term of two years and a fine of EUR 300,000. In Luxembourg, criminal 
sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order can amount up to EUR 
120,000. Moreover, criminal sanctions may have an impact on the incorporation 
permit or licence of the trader.416 In Germany, the sanction is up to EUR 250,000 or 
                                           
412 Except in Estonia, Hungary and Sweden. For more details, also see corresponding overview table in 
Annex V. 
413 See 2012 report, at p. 13 f. See also country reports France and Ireland, and results of the consultation 
in Part 2 of this report. 
414 See position paper BEUC, at p. 12. 
415 Country reports UK, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg. 
416 Country report Luxembourg. 
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imprisonment of up to six months. The amount is determined by the court but can be 
challenged by the qualified entity if the qualified entity feels that it does not have the 
necessary deterrent character.417 
Beyond this, the law of Cyprus provides that, in the case of the infringement of an 
injunction order, the court can also order the payment of compensation to any person 
who suffered damage as a result. 
Generally, the penalty for the infringement of an injunction order is either determined 
by law or it is determined together with the injunction order, but in some Member 
States, in case of a breach the qualified entity needs to apply to the court again to 
obtain a penalty order, the amount of which will depend on the severity of the 
infringement.418 In some Member States, the sanction is calculated per day of breach 
of the order.419 
Generally, sanctions are paid into the public purse rather than to the consumer 
organisation that had obtained the judgment,420 exceptions being Greece and 
France.421 
The threat of a penalty for non-compliance with an injunction order is regarded to be a 
deterrent to the continuation of the breach.422 Occasional earlier problems with 
insufficient sanctions have been resolved by raising the amount of sanctions that can 
be applied.423 
Overall, sanctions for the breach of an injunction order are a necessary element under 
the principle of effectiveness as established by the CJEU. They are also regarded as an 
effective element of the injunction procedure by stakeholders in the country research. 
Thereby, it seems that systems with clear legal rules on sanctions and systems where 
the sanction for breach are determined in the injunction order are considered to be 
more effective than systems where the pursuing of a breach requires a separate court 
procedure to obtain a penalty order. 
 Role of settlements in stopping infringements to consumer law across 6.1.3.4.
the EU  
• Analysis of the advantages in terms of the effectiveness of the injunction procedure 
of the prior consultation; 
According to Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive, Member States may introduce or 
maintain in force provisions whereby the party that intends to seek an injunction can 
only start this procedure after it has tried to achieve the cessation of the infringement 
in consultation with the defendant. In contrast, the Directive does not deal with the 
                                           
417 See OLG Dusseldorf, 24.10.2014, I-6 W 47/14, Verbraucher und Recht 2015, 71. 
418 E.g. country reports Austria, Germany. See also overview table on sanctions for non-compliance in 
Annex V. 
419 Country reports Bulgaria, Poland, Spain. 
420 E.g. country reports Spain, Germany. See also overview table on sanctions for non-compliance in 
Annex V.  
421 See above in the section on the lack of compensatory effect. 
422 E.g. country report Poland. 
423 Country report Latvia. Increased amounts of the sanctions that can be applied are also reported in the 
country reports Estonia and France. 
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requirements relating to the undertaking of the trader that would make a subsequent 
injunction procedure unsuccessful. 
Prior consultation 
Member States have reacted in different ways. Prior consultation is mandatory in 
Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia,424 
Sweden and the UK. It is, however, also encouraged in other Member States by the 
legal environment, such as cost rules. For example, in Germany, consumer 
organisations may risk costs for unnecessary litigation if the trader accepts the claim 
immediately. Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain do not 
require prior consultation at all. 
Even where the law does not require or encourage prior attempts to find an extra-
judicial or otherwise amicable solution, such attempts seem to be common practice. 
Public authorities are reported to normally approach traders informally first, and prior 
consultation of the trader has in a number of Member States been regarded as 
particularly helpful by public authorities as it often avoids formal proceedings; which is 
another reason why the number of injunction procedures in some Member States is 
minimal.425 It is generally seen as useful.426 
In Belgium there is a procedure of reconciliation, where parties try to reach an 
agreement together with a judge. 
In some Member States, public authorities also use the prior consultation of the trader 
to negotiate a settlement that may even involve repayment of unduly collected 
fees.427 
Undertakings 
Generally speaking, an undertaking is the promise of the trader not to engage in the 
relevant practice anymore, for example, not to use a particular term and not to rely on 
it in disputes with consumers. 
Some Member States have adopted specific rules on undertakings, the prime example 
being the UK. In the UK, an enforcer can accept an undertaking and can publish it. If 
the trader does not comply with the undertaking, the enforcer can obtain an 
enforcement order from the court. Thus, the enforcer does not need to show that the 
incriminated conduct actually constitutes an infringement of consumer law. In Latvia, 
undertakings are published in the same way as injunction orders. In Germany, rules 
have been developed by the courts. Under their case law, undertakings only remove 
the risk of continued breach and therefore only make the injunction claim unfounded if 
the trader’s promise is supported by the promise of a sufficiently penalty in the case of 
a breach of the undertaking. 
Trends 
As mentioned above, 2 509 injunction actions were settled directly between the 
responding qualified entities and traders, while for 331 injunction actions, settlements 
                                           
424 In Slovakia, prior consultation with the trader is mandatory only before a request for an interim measure 
to the national authority is filed. 
425 Country reports Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, UK. 
426 See also country report Lithuania. 
427 Country reports Poland, Netherlands. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  131 
were reached with the help of a third party. No trends in the role of settlements can 
be indicated, as the two Commission reports did not provide specific data in this 
respect. 
It seems, however, clear that public authorities are particularly successful in reaching 
settlements when they have deterrent enforcement mechanisms, such as injunction 
orders and fines, available, and as there has been a trend in recent years to make 
such enforcement mechanisms available to public authorities, it should be expected 
that the role of settlements is increasing. 
Consumer organisations reach settlements mainly in the case of clear infringements, 
thus, where the trader will predictably lose a law-suit. In contrast, traders that may 
benefit from lengthy court procedures because they can, in the meantime, benefit 
from infringements and where these benefits are unlikely to be reclaimed by individual 
consumers will be unlikely to be ready to settle. 
 Impact of the Injunctions Directive on EU consumers in terms of reduction 6.1.3.5.
in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and reduction 
in consumers' detriment  
• Analysis of the impact of the Injunctions Directive on EU consumers in terms of 
reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment;428  
The 2012 Report on the application of the Injunctions Directive,429 in particular, 
showed that the introduction – thanks to the Injunctions Directive – of the injunction 
procedure in EU Member States has brought substantial benefits to European 
consumers. This has been confirmed by the results of the survey of qualified entities 
presented above. Injunctions proved to be a successful tool for policing markets, 
especially to ensure fair contract terms. However, as indicated in the previous 
sections, the injunction procedure has been largely used for national infringements 
and is not evenly used across Member States: In several countries the injunction 
procedure is not at all used (in Cyprus, Malta, Romania and Slovenia) or only very 
rarely (in Croatia, Czech Republic and Lithuania). Qualified entities in other countries 
use the injunction procedure to some extent (in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the UK), and only in some countries the 
injunction procedure is considered to be largely used (in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Sweden) – regarding national infringements. Member States where the injunction 
procedure has been used at least to some extent include:430 
• Member States that rely on private enforcement of consumer law and where 
consumer organisations are the main players in the enforcement of consumer 
law (Germany and Austria). 
• Member States with an emphasis on administrative enforcement (e.g. Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, UK). 
• Member States that had a tradition of using injunction procedures preceding 
the Injunctions Directive (e.g. Denmark, France, Netherlands, Italy and 
Sweden). 
                                           
428 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
429 2012 European Commission report concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interest. 
430 For more details, refer to the country reports of the listed countries. 
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In these cases, the injunction procedure is by and large considered being effective in 
reducing the number of infringements to consumer protection rules in a domestic 
context, or at least as being an important part of the "consumer protection armoury", 
as is reported from the UK.  
Regarding settlements, public authorities appear to be particularly successful in 
reaching settlements when having public law enforcement mechanisms, such as 
injunction orders and fines, available.431  
In principle, the reduction in the number of infringements could be expected to also 
lead to a reduction in related consumer detriment. However, this is not possible to 
confirm through quantitative estimates, as hardly any data in this respect could be 
identified in the country research, and only one qualified entity provided an estimate 
in this respect in the survey.432 Of course, in those countries, in which the injunction 
procedure is never or only very rarely used, and in a cross-border context, where the 
number of actions is low, any significant reduction in infringements and resulting 
consumer detriment cannot be expected. 
A similar assessment was made by qualified entities themselves. In the survey, they 
were asked to assess the impact of the injunction procedure on consumers in their 
countries in terms of the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer 
protection rules in the past five years on a scale of one to five (from ‘no reduction at 
all’ to ‘very significant reduction’ where only the endpoints of the scale were labelled), 
with respect to both national infringements and infringements originating in another 
EU country. On average, responding qualified entities rated the impact (from no 
reduction at all to very significant reduction) of the injunction procedure on reducing 
national infringements as 2.4 out of 5; the average assessment of the impact of the 
injunction procedure on reducing infringements originating in other EU countries was 
lower, at 1.2 out of 5 (i.e. close to no reduction at all). On average, responding 
qualified entities that initiated injunctions rated the impact of the injunction procedure 
on reducing national infringements as 2.6 out of 5 (compared to 2.0 out of 5 for 
qualified entities that did not initiate any injunction action) and the impact of the 
injunction procedure on reducing infringements originating in other EU countries at 1.0 
out of 5, i.e. no reduction at all (compared to 1.3 out of 5 for qualified entities that did 
not initiate any injunction action). 
Qualified entities were then asked to assess the impact of the injunction procedure in 
terms of the reduction in consumers’ detriment in the past five years on a scale of one 
to five (‘no reduction at all’ to ‘very significant reduction’), once again with respect to 
both national infringements and infringements originating in another EU country.433 On 
average, responding qualified entities rated the impact of the injunction procedure on 
reducing detriment with respect to national infringements as 2.6 out of 5, while the 
average assessment of the impact of the injunction procedure on reducing detriment 
with respect to infringements originating in other EU countries was 1.3 out of 5. 
Qualified entities were also asked to provide a monetary estimation of the average 
reduction in detriment through the injunction actions their organisations brought 
regarding national infringements since June 2011. 44% of respondents (of which two 
                                           
431 E.g. in Ireland, Poland, the UK. See Section 6.1.3.2. 
432 This organisation estimated the total reduction for all affected consumers per injunction action to be in 
the range of EUR 1 million to EUR 4.99 million. 
433 Survey question: ‘On a scale of 1 to 5, please assess the impact of the injunction procedure on consumers in your 
country in terms of reduction in consumers' detriment in the last five years.’ Respondents were shown a scale from 
1 (No reduction at all) to 5 (Very significant reduction) where only the endpoints of the scale were labelled. 
The score should be interpreted as a rating and not as a robust quantitative measure of the reduction of 
detriment. 
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fifths did indeed initiate injunction actions) answered with ‘no or negligible reduction in 
detriment’, while the other half (56%) answered with ‘don’t know’. 
Finally, the open public consultation conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check 
provides some complementary evidence, although the question did not differentiate 
between domestic and cross-border injunction procedures. Respondents were asked to 
assess the extent to which the right of consumer organisations and public bodies to 
take legal actions which can stop infringements of consumer’s rights (the right to seek 
injunctions) is beneficial to consumers. Consumer associations were close to 
unanimous in their agreement, with 95% of these respondents indicating that this 
right is very or rather beneficial to consumers. Another 81% of consumer respondents 
and 79% of public authorities also agree that this right is beneficial to consumers. 
Least positive were business associations: while 49% view the right to seek 
injunctions as beneficial to consumers, 14% of business associations view this right as 
rather not beneficial or not beneficial at all, and 22% selected “no opinion/don’t 
know”.434 
In other words, all available evidence confirms that while the injunction procedure is 
by and large considered being effective in those countries where their use is common 
(and stakeholders in the consultation agree that the procedure is beneficial for 
consumers), the impact of the Injunctions Directive in terms of its aim to facilitate 
cross-border injunction procedures can still be considered as being minimal. In most 
Member States, the qualified entities have never brought injunctions to deal with 
cross-border infringements, and if they have dealt with cross-border infringements, 
they prefer to use their own courts rather than litigating in a foreign country. Further 
alternative strategies are the use of the CPC Network (as far as consumer protection 
authorities are concerned) and co-operation with partner organisations from other 
Member States. 
 Conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the Injunctions Directive in a 6.1.3.6.
domestic context  
The effectiveness of the injunction procedure very much depends on the particular 
choices that Member States have made. Where Member States have only 
implemented the bare minimum standard, effectiveness is low. 
The costs of court procedures are still an unresolved problem, whereas the German 
example shows that with a limitation on litigation costs, injunction procedures against 
infringements of consumer law become more feasible and larger numbers of them can 
be initiated. Likewise, the length of court procedures is a problem as injunction orders 
as such only produce effects for the future whereas infringements that occur before 
the final judgment may go unsanctioned. Both aspects may contribute to the rise of 
public law enforcement of consumer law, as public authorities can act more speedily 
and cheaper. 
The increased use of public law enforcement may also have contributed to a significant 
number of settlements in the course of prior consultation of the trader. Where 
qualified entities have to litigate in court, traders may see an incentive in a lengthy 
court procedure in order to reap the benefits of an infringement, unless there is a real 
risk of having to return those benefits. 
                                           
434 The Injunctions Directive was also addressed in 12 out of the 38 position papers received by business 
stakeholders (predominantly business associations) as open submissions to the public consultation. Seven 
indicated that they considered the Injunctions Directive to be functioning effectively. The position papers 
submitted by consumer organisations and public authorities commented that while they considered the 
injunction procedure to be a useful tool, its effectiveness could be improved. 
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A clear trend in recent years is the complementation of the injunction procedures with 
additional remedies, in particular with compensation orders, either by courts or by 
public authorities. This reflects the reality that otherwise, consumers have little 
prospect of compensation of the harm they suffered from the infringement. Experience 
with those Member States that had already introduced compensation orders show that 
this instrument is suitable to increase the effectiveness of the injunction procedure 
and reduce consumer detriment significantly.435 
 Practical effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the 6.1.3.7.
Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• The effects of the Injunctions Directive provisions facilitating the use of the 
injunction procedure for cross-border infringements (Article 4 of the Injunctions 
Directive);  
During the country interviews conducted for this evaluation, stakeholders unanimously 
agreed that the Injunctions Directive has not had much effect in the pursuit of cross-
border infringements. In close to all Member States, it has never been used at all.436 
The survey of qualified entities shows one case in the last five years (and four actions 
in another country via cooperation with another qualified entity from another EU 
country);437 which means that there was not a single action under the system of the 
Injunctions Directive. In those Member States where qualified entities have addressed 
cross-border infringements in the last five years, they have only done so by suing 
foreign traders in their domestic courts. 
Consumer protection authorities have made it clear that they prefer to use the CPC 
Network when it comes to cross-border infringements,438 and consumer organisations 
often prefer asking their national authorities to get in touch with other authorities 
through the CPC Network or asking consumer organisations from the trader’s Member 
State to help.439 Also, the activities of the European Consumer Centres were 
mentioned to be useful to pursue cross-border infringements without taking formal 
action.440 
For a better understanding of the limited effect of the Injunctions Directive for cross-
border infringements, it is necessary to analyse in more detail how such infringements 
can be dealt with by qualified entities. They can take action against foreign traders in 
their domestic courts, or they can take action in the courts or in front of administrative 
                                           
435 See the examples presented supra, at 6.1.3.3. under the heading “Lack of compensatory effect”. 
436 In the country research for this study, instances of the use of the cross-border procedure are only 
reported from Spain. 
437 This cross-border action was initiated by a private association who commented with respect to this action 
that they wished to execute a title, but were unsuccessful. See results of the survey of qualified entities, 
Part 4 of this report. 
438 Country reports Denmark, France, Lithuania. See also e.g. the position paper submitted by the Danish 
Ministry of Business and Growth: “The Danish consumer enforcement authorities have never used the 
Injunctions Directive. In connection with the revision of the CPC Regulation it should be considered whether 
the Injunctions Directive is relevant, or if it might be appropriate to incorporate some of the provisions into 
the CPC Regulation.” 
439 E.g. country report Lithuania. 
440 Country report Czech Republic. 
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bodies of the Member State where the trader is domiciled. Both ways pose different 
problems. 
Litigation in the Member State of the trader 
With regard to litigation in the Member State of the trader, qualified entities face so 
severe obstacles that they do not use the system of the Injunctions Directive but 
resort to other mechanisms (if any), in particular the CPC Network (if they have 
access to that instrument) or lawsuits in their domestic courts against foreign traders. 
The complexity of cross-border injunction procedures brought in the Member State 
where the trader is domiciled mainly stems from the application of foreign procedural 
law. According to the principles of international procedural law, each court applies its 
own procedural law (lex fori), and the same applies to administrative bodies. Thus, a 
qualified entity would not reasonably sue in another Member State without seeking 
advice from a lawyer who is domiciled in that Member State. Still, the qualified entity 
would incur travel costs, costs for translations etc. These costs have often been 
mentioned to be an obstacle to the use of the cross-border injunction action.441 
Consumer organisations therefore prefer to litigate in the courts of their own Member 
States.442 
The complexity of the injunction procedure in particular Member States was not 
mentioned by qualified entities as an obstacle, and the reason would seem to be that 
there is no knowledge on the foreign procedural rules of particular Member States in 
the first place. 68% of qualified entities that responded to the survey were not aware 
of the procedural modalities of the injunction procedure in other EU countries, which 
was cited by one responding public authority/body as a key obstacle to the effective 
use of the injunction procedure, as well as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation. 
Consequently, close to two-thirds of responding qualified entities (62%) were unable 
to assess the practicability of procedural modalities of the injunction procedure in 
other EU countries. 
There is no information available either regarding the length of injunction procedures 
in another Member State as such procedures have barely ever been tested by qualified 
entities. It seems obvious, however, that the necessity to arrange for translations and 
the like would add to the duration of an injunction procedure, thereby reducing its 
effectiveness. 
Litigation in the Member State of the qualified entity 
Litigation in the domestic courts is the preferred option of consumer organisations in 
cross-border cases. The clear advantage is that the qualified entity is familiar with the 
applicable procedural law and can use its own language in court. Still, some problems 
remain. 
• Jurisdiction. For qualified entities, it is far more attractive to sue a foreign 
trader in the courts of the Member State where the qualified entity is 
domiciled; which is possible under EU international procedural law. In a conflict 
with the German trader Karl Heinz Henkel, the Austrian consumer organisation 
Verein für Konsumentenrecht (VKI) tried this route and sued Mr. Henkel in the 
Austrian courts; an approach that the Court of Justice confirmed. According to 
the Court of Justice, the VKI could rely on the special rules on jurisdiction in 
                                           
441 Country reports Austria, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia. 
442 E.g. country report Austria. 
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tort law matters.443 According to the old Article 5 No. 3 of Regulation (EC) No. 
44/2001, now Article 7 No. 2 of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012, a person 
domiciled in one Member State can be sued in another Member State in 
matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where 
the harmful event occurred or may occur. The relevant place in this context is 
the Member State in which consumers may suffer harm from an unlawful 
practice. Consequently, almost all law-suits with a cross-border element have 
been brought in the domestic courts of the Member State where the consumer 
organisation is domiciled. In contrast, this option is not available to public law 
enforcement, due to the public international law principle of territoriality. Thus, 
consumer authorities can either bring claims in the civil courts, if their Member 
States allows so (for example, the UK Consumer and Markets Authority), or 
they have to resort to the system of the Injunctions Directive or to the CPC 
Network. 
• The applicable substantive law. Qualified entities have long been deterred from 
cross-border litigation due to uncertainty about the law that applies to an 
injunction procedure, irrespective of whether the qualified entity takes cross-
border action in the foreign or the domestic court;444 a problem that was 
already mentioned in the 2008 and 2012 reports of the European 
Commission.445 Two questions must be distinguished: the law that applies to 
the collective action, and the law that applies to the potential infringement. 
Both were subject to a CJEU preliminary reference procedure from Austria in a 
law-suit that, again, the VKI had brought against Amazon, which is domiciled in 
Luxembourg, and that the Court decided on in July 2016.446 
In line with its above-mentioned judgment in the case of Henkel, the Court of 
Justice treats the injunction claim of a consumer organisation as a non-
contractual obligation because the consumer organisation, unlike individual 
consumers, does not have a contract with the trader. Thus, the rules of the 
Rome II Regulation apply. Article 6(1) of that Regulation determines that the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligation arising out of an act of unfair 
competition shall be the law of the country where competitive relations or the 
collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected. This is 
usually the law of the Member State where also the consumer organisation is 
domiciled, and which it is familiar with. The Court, however, also decided that 
the law that applies to the potential infringement is to be determined 
separately. The reason is the harmonious application of the law. A trader 
should not be punished in a collective action for something that the trader can 
legitimately do in an individual contract. If, for example, a trader can lawfully 
include a choice of law clause in his or her standard terms, according to which 
the contract shall be governed by the law of the Member State where the 
trader is domiciled, that choice of law clause must also be considered in a 
collective action, and the potential infringement must then be assessed under 
the chosen law.447 Consumer organisations therefore may have to research 
foreign consumer law and, depending on the procedural law of the court, may 
even have to convince the court of the correct solution under that foreign law. 
This clearly has a chilling effect on cross-border injunction litigation. 
                                           
443 See CJEU, judgment of 1/10/2002, case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Karl Heinz 
Henkel, ECLI:EU:C:2002:555. 
444 Country report Austria. 
445 See 2008 report, at p. 7; 2012 report, at p. 12. 
446 CJEU, judgment of 28/7/2016, case C-191/15 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon EU Sàrl, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:612. 
447 See CJEU (n. 39) – VKI v. Amazon, at paras .56 ff. 
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• Enforcement in cross-border cases. In principle, once a qualified entity has 
obtained a winning judgment in its own Member State, the Brussels I 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 would seem to facilitate its enforcement in the 
Member State where the trader is domiciled. There is, however, some legal 
uncertainty in this, and, as mentioned before, 'difficulties to enforce injunction 
orders' is the third most important obstacle for injunction procedures 
concerning infringements originating in another EU country, according to the 
qualified entities responding to the survey. First of all, the Brussels I Regulation 
(EU) No. 1215/2012 only applies to decisions in matters of civil and commercial 
law but not to public law decisions. Thus, the system of the Brussels I 
Regulation cannot be applied to injunction orders or fines by consumer 
authorities. Second, the enforcement of sanctions for non-compliance with an 
injunction order issued by a civil court is unclear. Where that sanction has a 
criminal law or public law character, its enforcement through the system of the 
Brussels I Regulation is not possible either. Finally, in the case of a judgment 
from a Member State where the sanction for non-compliance with the judgment 
is not included in the judgment itself but determined in a separate procedure, 
like in Austria and Germany, it is unclear the courts of which Member State 
(the Member State where the original judgment was handed down or the 
Member State where the judgment is to be enforced) are competent to 
determine and enforce those sanctions.448 
 
• The level of awareness of consumer organisations which are qualified entities as 
defined by the Injunctions Directive, regarding the legal possibility to bring 
injunction actions in another Member State and the procedural modalities of the 
injunction procedure in other Member States, as in particular demonstrated by their 
practical application;  
Consumer organisations are, in principle, aware of this possibility but shy away from 
taking action in another Member State because of the costs and the complexity of 
such actions. As a result, consumer organisations from most Member States have 
never taken cross-border actions (as indicated before). Experienced consumer 
organisations from a few Member States, including Austria and Germany, have 
resorted to litigation in the courts of their own Member State against traders from 
other Member States. 
 
• The effectiveness of the Commission measures encouraging consumer 
organisations to better use injunction procedure in a cross-border context (CoJEF I, 
CoJEF II and CLEF).449  
A number of consumer organisations have reported that, in case of a cross-border 
infringement, they have not taken action themselves but have liaised with a partner 
organisation in the Member State in which the trader was domiciled. For example, a 
coordinated "cross-border" action was initiated in May 2009 by a consortium made of 
France’s UFC-Que Choisir, Portugal’s DECO and Belgium’s Test-Achats. The action 
                                           
448 Country report Austria. 
449 The Consumer Justice Enforcement Forum II (CoJEF II) is a project run by BEUC and 10 national 
consumer organisations, predominantly financed (80%) by the Commission under the Civil Justice program 
2007-2013. It is the continuation of the previous CoJEF I and of the Consumer Law Enforcement Forum 
(CLEF).The information on CoJEF may be found at: http://www.cojef-project.eu/. 
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concerned airlines’ general conditions of carriage and was brought before a Belgian 
court.450 
The majority of responding qualified entities, however, have not cooperated on specific 
injunction actions with qualified entities from other EU countries. 71% of responding 
qualified entities have not cooperated with consumer organisations in other EU 
countries on injunction actions, while 72% of participants have not cooperated with 
independent public bodies in other EU countries on such actions. 
Some consumer organisations are reported to have expressed the need for better 
information exchange and coordination between consumer organisations of different 
Member States.451 In fact, the majority (67%) of responding qualified entities have 
not informed qualified entities from other countries if an infringement affected 
consumers from their country since June 2011. 
As to participation in EU financed measures, under half of all respondents (40%) have 
participated in the Consumer Justice Enforcement Forum and the Consumer Law 
Enforcement Forum. In terms of the effectiveness of these measures, 36% of 
responding qualified entities viewed them to be ‘very effective’, stating, for example, 
that these forums facilitate the exchange of best practices and relevant information, 
which is particularly helpful for smaller consumer organisations. It can therefore be 
concluded that the Commission measures have been effective insofar as participants 
from different Member States have been able to exchange best practices and 
information, so that the injunction procedure can be better used. However, these 
measures have not been sufficient to significantly reduce the obstacles to the use of 
the injunction procedure in a cross-border context, which are largely beyond the 
control of the participating organisations (for a detailed analysis of the obstacles, see 
Section 6.1.3.3 above and the problem definition, Section 7). 
6.2. Efficiency  
6.2.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing 
 The economic rationale of providing an EU legal framework regarding unfair 6.2.1.1.
commercial practices and marketing  
From an economic perspective, the behaviour of traders towards consumers with 
respect to communication, advertising, and marketing in general is likely to have a 
large impact on the functioning of consumer markets, or markets more generally, 
since the influence on consumers’ information and decision-making in such markets is 
very significant. Consumer policy has therefore the potential to positively interact with 
market forces in order to foster competition and improve both allocative and 
productive efficiency.  
This efficiency-enhancing function may be performed at the national level, but also at 
the EU level. In general, reasons for taking policy measures at the EU level are 
twofold. First, because within the EU, the size and intensity of cross-border trade are 
high enough (in fact, higher than in any other large trading area in the world)452 to 
make such economic activity in the Single Market vulnerable to inconsistent policy 
                                           
450 Country report France. 
451 Country report Bulgaria. 
452 Wold Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2015, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf  
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choices by Member States or even mere diversity between those choices. Second, 
traders’ behaviour in communicating with consumers and in pre-contracting activity is 
not bound by Member States' borders; thus, it directly impacts cross-border trade, 
leading to issues that national lawmakers and regulators are ill-placed to adequately 
address. 
The trade dimension is fundamental, given the great theoretical and practical 
relevance of cross-border trade in the EU. In 2015, intra-EU28 trade in goods reached 
EUR 3 070 billion.453 Because Member States do not have uniform endowments with 
technologies, production capacities, tastes and preferences, and natural resources, 
some economies are relatively better placed than others for the production of certain 
goods and services. Trade at the European (and international) level allows parties to 
exchange goods and services without the need for each Member State to produce 
everything it is consuming. For businesses, cross-border trade can reduce input costs 
and increase the potential customer base. For consumers, access to goods cross-
border can lower prices and increase choice.454 Consumer policy at EU level therefore 
aims both at a proper functioning of the internal market and at safeguarding a high 
level of consumer protection (see also the intervention logic for the Directives subject 
to this study, Annex VI).  
In the area of unfair commercial practices and marketing, the core challenge for 
consumer policy is how to design and apply an optimal system of information duties 
and behaviour for traders that allows for informed consumer choices and minimises 
the occurrence of misleading and aggressive marketing practices, and at the same 
time does not interfere with the pressures of competitive markets, which, overall, are 
the major factors in attaining optimality in the relationship between traders and 
consumers.  
In the following sub-sections, we will first consider costs and benefits of the legal 
framework regarding unfair commercial practices and marketing for traders before 
assessing them from a consumer perspective.  
  
 Costs and benefits for traders  6.2.1.2.
• Costs and burdens for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under 
the relevant directives (UCPD, MCAD, PID)  
While the directives subject to this evaluation apply to almost all business-to-
consumer transactions (or business-to-business transactions, in the case of the 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive), this does not imply that the costs 
and benefits are uniform in nature and magnitude across economic sectors or size 
classes. To explore them in more detail, a total of 282 business interviews covering all 
                                           
453 Eurostat, Intra-EU28 trade (exports), by Member State, total product, Code: tet00047, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tet00047&language=
en, accessed on 20.1.2017  
454 This is especially obvious in the area of e-commerce. A 2011 study concluded that total welfare gains for 
EU consumers resulting from lower online prices and increased online choice under a hypothetical situation 
of a 15% share of internet retailing (then at 3.5%) and a Single EU consumer Market in the e-commerce of 
goods amount to 204.5 billion Euro per year (equivalent to 1.7% of EU GDP). This was estimated to be four 
times higher compared to a situation where, with a similar share of internet retailing, the (still rather) 
fragmented national consumer markets of the Member States would continue to exist. See: Civic Consulting 
2011, Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and internet marketing and selling 
techniques in the retail of goods. 
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Member States were conducted, focusing on the five following sectors:455 large 
household appliances, electronic and ICT products, gas and electricity services, 
telecommunication services, and pre-packaged food and detergents. Target companies 
were businesses that sell products or services to consumers in the selected sectors. 
While slightly more than two thirds of interviews focused on micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises, the remainder focused on large businesses with 250 or more 
employees. 
The businesses interviewed also differ in their cross-border activity: a minority sells 
their products and/or services in other EU Member States (28%), whereas about three 
quarters restrict their sales to their domestic market (72%).456 The importance of this 
segmentation of traders into those that are active cross-border and those that are not 
is that the first group need to incur certain costs to get informed about the 
requirements for their activity and to direct sales to another Member State, whereas 
these costs are not relevant for the second group. In the following, we first analyse 
the one-off costs for traders when entering another EU country’s market. 
One-off costs when entering another EU country’s market for the first time 
Even in countries that share to a large extent a common legal framework, as is the 
case in the area of consumer protection in EU Member States, regulatory content and 
application of rules differ substantially. Businesses need to assess whether their 
existing practices (promotion materials, marketing strategies, and the like) comply 
with the rules in the new market and, if there is no perfect compliance, whether and 
how to make changes and adjustments in existing practices so as to satisfy the 
requirements in the new national market. The size of those one-off costs when 
entering another EU country’s market for the first time will depend on many factors 
that have to do with the density and complexity of the regulatory requirements in the 
target Member State, as well as the flexibility of the business organisation and the 
specific practice at stake, and with the scale and reach of the intended operations in 
the new market. What is clear is that costs will be incurred, which may include 
external legal advice as to the requirements in the new market and the compliance of 
the intended practices with them.  
In the business interviews, we explored these one-off costs incurred by businesses for 
checking compliance with and adjusting business practices to the national legislation 
regarding advertising/marketing and standard contract terms when entering another 
EU country’s market, expressed in terms of working days of professional staff time 
(e.g. legal or management), working days of administrative or sales staff time, and 
Euro amounts for other costs (e.g. related to legal advice). After monetising labour 
costs, total one-off costs per business per country entered were calculated. The table 
below presents one-off costs per business by sector, based on median values, for 
businesses that sell their products and/or services in other EU Member States. 
                                           
455 On average, two interviews per sector were conducted in each Member State. For more details on the 
interviews and the methodology applied, refer to Part 4 of this study. 
456 The reasons for companies to choose not to sell cross-border are manifold. Roughly a quarter (26%) of 
the businesses that do not sell their products/services in other EU countries indicated that it is ’too 
complicated’. Other reasons cited by businesses for not selling products/services in other EU countries 
include differences in legal requirements regarding advertising/marketing and standard contract terms 
(15%) and other differences in legal requirements (17%). More than four in ten businesses (45%) also cited 
’other obstacles’, by which most businesses meant that it was not part of their current strategy to sell their 
products/services in other EU countries. 
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Table 12: One-off costs for checking compliance with and adjusting business 
practices to the national legislation regarding advertising/marketing and 
standard contract terms when entering another EU country’s market (per 
business) 
Sector Median labour 
costs for 
professional 











costs, e.g. for 










appliances  1 357 620 333 2 310 
Electronic and ICT 
products  946 465 316 1 727 
Gas and electricity 
services  3 943 1 086 7 000 12 029 
Telecommunication 
services  3 470 2 016 3 111 8 597 
Pre-packaged food and 
detergents 1 262 155 1 111 2 528 
Source: Civic Consulting based on business interviews. Sample of interviewed businesses that sell their products and/or 
services in other EU Member States (N = 9 in the sector for large household appliances; 19 in the sector for electronic 
and ICT products; 8 in the sector for gas and electricity services; 9 in the sector for telecommunication services; and 23 
in the sector for pre-packaged food and detergents). Notes: These best estimates are based on median values, 
irrespective of size class. The median is the value separating the higher half of the sample from the lower half. For 
detailed results and additional explanatory notes, refer to Part 4 of this report.  
Overall, costs are highest for businesses in the two network services sectors. Total 
one-off costs for compliance checks and adjusting business practices when entering 
another EU country’s market are highest in the sector for gas and electricity services, 
with median one-off costs of EUR 12 029 per business that sells its services to 
consumers in other EU countries, followed by the sector for telecommunication 
services, with median one-off costs of EUR 8 597 per business that sells its services to 
consumers in other EU countries. Total one-off costs per business are similar in the 
sectors for pre-packaged food and detergents and large household appliances, with 
median one-off costs of EUR 2 528 and EUR 2 310, respectively, and are lowest in the 
sector for electronic and ICT products, with median one-off costs of EUR 1 727.  
These results can be compared to the assessment made in the recent Impact 
Assessment for the Digital Contracts Proposals (2015)457 that looked into contract-law 
related costs incurred by EU traders engaged in cross-border B2C trade for entering 
the market of one Member State. The Impact Assessment focused on the costs related 
to the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive, which is not covered by this study. 
Based on the results of the responses gathered in the context of a SME Panel Survey, 
it estimated the one-off contract law-related costs due to differences in contract law 
rules at around EUR 9 000 per business for entering the market of one Member State.  
The costs listed in the table above exclude costs related to the translation of contracts 
and correspond to costs when entering one other EU country’s market. Total costs 
may therefore be substantial if a trader plans to operate at an EU-wide level. 
                                           
457 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/digital-contract-rules/index_en.htm.  
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It also has to be emphasised that it is practically impossible for businesses to attribute 
their costs to specific EU legal instruments. Therefore the interviews explored more 
generally the costs for checking compliance with and adjusting business practices to 
legal requirements in the other EU country's market regarding advertising/marketing 
and standard contract terms. Consequently, the estimates provided are likely to cover 
the combined effects of national legislation and the underlying EU directives affecting 
this area (most notably the UCPD, UCTD and MCAD, but also sectoral legislation).  
As indicated in the business interviews, of these costs, two thirds or more relate to 
compliance checks and adjusting business practices concerning advertising and 
marketing (of which the larger part is related to advertising and marketing targeting 
consumers).458 In absolute terms, median one-off costs with respect to compliance 
checks and adjusting business practices concerning advertising and marketing 
targeted toward both consumers and businesses are therefore estimated to range 
between EUR 1 160 and EUR 8 060 per business across the five sectors covered.459 
These are sizable amounts which suggest that a reduction in those costs per country 
could positively impact the costs faced by cross-border active businesses in entering 
additional markets within the Single Market. The growing trend in cross-border online 
demand by consumers, and the increased confidence by consumers in purchasing 
from EU traders in a different Member State (see the analysis of levels of awareness 
and key trends, Annex VIII Section on general trends in cross-border purchases) seem 
to reinforce the importance of measures allowing cross-border sellers to reduce their 
costs of doing business in other Member States. 
The determinants of these costs can be further considered taking the example of the 
UCPD. The UCPD is a full harmonisation directive,460 and this is reflected especially in 
the general substantive clauses it contains, and in the blacklisting of certain practices 
in Annex 1. This means that in the context of marketing practices targeted to 
consumers, the UCPD has reduced legal diversity across Member States. However, this 
reduction is not (and could not be) complete. Firstly, because enforcement is still 
being carried out at the national level. And secondly, because legal culture, tradition 
and experience still influence how the Directive's general clauses are given content, 
even taking into consideration the potentially harmonising effects of CJEU case law. 
Therefore, even if the legal standard is set at the same level for all Member States, 
the law as outcome may well differ to some degree. Thus, traders operating across the 
border in a new market will not be able to entirely do away with investing time, effort, 
and money in verifying how the courts and public authorities in a given Member State 
understand the meaning of the rules on commercial practices and how, in light of such 
rules, they consider a given type of practice. But it is very likely that such an exercise 
is facilitated, and thus less costly, as a result of the harmonisation of pre-existing 
rules accomplished by the UCPD. The scope and the degree of diversity in this area 
                                           
458 Only for two of the five sectors a sufficient number of estimates was available: In the pre-packaged food 
and detergent sector, businesses that sell their products/services in other EU countries indicated that they 
spend the highest share (62%) of their one-off costs for compliance checks and adjusting business practices 
when entering another EU country’s market on advertising and marketing targeted at consumers, and about 
22% of these costs to advertising and marketing targeted at businesses (with the remaining 17% of costs 
relating to standard contract terms in consumer contracts). Businesses in the electronic and ICT sector also 
spend the highest share of their one-off costs related to advertising and marketing targeted at consumers, 
although this share amounts to less than half of these costs (49%). In this sector, businesses spend the 
lowest share of their one-off costs for compliance checks and adjusting business practices on advertising 
and marketing targeted at businesses (17%) and about a third of their one-off costs on standard contract 
terms in consumer contracts. For more details, see Part 4 of this report. 
459 Based on an estimated share of two thirds of the one-off costs. Not for all sectors an estimate was 
available. 
460 Except for the sectors of immovable property and financial services. The other directives considered here 
(MCAD and PID) are based on minimum harmonisation. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  143 
have been narrowed, and thus the ensuing analysis, compliance and adjustment costs 
are likely to have come down correspondingly.  
The extent of this reduction is difficult to quantify, as the interviewed businesses 
typically considered the requirements of the overall legal framework concerning unfair 
commercial practices and marketing as a whole, not differentiating between specific 
directives and whether rules were originating at EU or domestic level. However, as the 
analysis of benefits (below) indicates, a large majority of interviewed businesses that 
sell their products/services in other EU countries indicated that they benefitted most 
from the harmonised legislation that facilitates selling cross-border to consumers in 
other EU countries (with 63% indicating they benefitted at least slightly in this 
respect), implying a recognition of this cost reduction effect. This is also emphasised 
by the fact that in open public consultation conducted for the Fitness Check many 
business stakeholders advocated for pursuing full harmonisation where possible in 
order to eliminate barriers to cross-border trade.461 
Costs incurred by businesses on a regular basis 
Of the sample of interviewed traders, almost three-quarters do not operate cross-
border in the EU, and these may also face compliance costs in the area of commercial 
practices and marketing (both in terms of checking and verifying compliance in the 
country where they operate, and in terms of adjustment and changing practices). In 
the business interviews, these regular costs of businesses were also explored.462 73% 
of the interviewed businesses reported checking that advertising/marketing and 
standard contract terms still comply with national legislation at least once per year, 
whereas 19% indicated that they never check compliance. The table below presents 
the total annual costs for compliance checks and adjusting business practices incurred 
by these businesses that check for compliance on a regular basis, calculated on the 
basis of median values, by sector (as above, including both costs related to 
advertising/marketing and standard contract terms).  
                                           
461 See Part 2 of this study. 
462 The analysis includes both businesses not operating cross-border, and those that do, as both incur 
regular costs in this respect. For the latter category it was clarified that costs invested when entering 
another EU country's market are not to be considered in the estimate, to avoid double-counting.  
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Table 13: Annual total costs incurred for checking that the company’s 
advertising/marketing and standard contract terms still comply with national 
legislation and adjusting business practices if needed (per business – total 























Large household appliances  946 357 516 1 819 
Electronic and ICT products  1 577 620 735 2 933 
Gas and electricity services 2 997 2 171 5 420 10 588 
Telecommunication services 4 101 465 10 400 14 966 
Pre-packaged food and 
detergents 946 310 1 833 3 090 
Source: Civic Consulting based on business interviews. Sample of interviewed businesses that check for compliance on a 
regular basis (N = 19 in the sector for large household appliances; 40 in the sector for electronic and ICT products; 51 in 
the sector for gas and electricity services; 35 in the sector for telecommunication services; and 39 in the sector for pre-
packaged food and detergents). Notes: These best estimates are based on median values, irrespective of size class. The 
median is the value separating the higher half of the sample from the lower half. Interviewed businesses were asked to 
report total amounts for all EU countries they target, including the country in which they are registered.  
Similar to the pattern for the one-off costs presented above, regular compliance costs 
are substantially higher in the two network services sectors. Results also indicate that 
median annual costs increase with size in nearly all sectors, with the exception of 
small deviations in the sectors for pre-packaged food and detergents and 
telecommunication services. The table below present results by size class of 
enterprises (see detailed results in Part 4).  
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Table 14: Annual total costs incurred for checking that the company’s 
advertising/marketing and standard contract terms still comply with national 
legislation and adjusting business practices if needed (per business by size 













appliances  194 2 225 1 700 54 806  347   3 954  
Electronic and ICT 
products  864 3 541 3 569 16 098  1 523   6 930  
Gas and 
electricity services 3 840 7 966 11 667 20 182  7 066   25 261  
Telecommunica-




118 2 723 5 780 14 865  541   7 899  
Source: Civic Consulting based on business interviews. Sample of interviewed businesses that check for compliance on a 
regular basis: 19 in the sector for large household appliances; 40 in the sector for electronic and ICT products; 51 in the 
sector for gas and electricity services; 35 in the sector for telecommunication services; and 39 in the sector for pre-
packaged food and detergents. Notes: These estimates are based on median values. The median is the value separating 
the higher half of the sample from the lower half. Interviewed businesses were asked to report total amounts for all EU 
countries they target, including the country in which they are registered. 
Subsequently, the results obtained at the business level for the selected sectors were 
extrapolated to the EU level, covering costs for regular compliance checks regarding 
advertising/marketing and standard contract terms.463 In total, the annual costs 
incurred by businesses in the EU28 for checking that their advertising/marketing and 
standard contract terms still comply with national legislation and adjusting business 
practices if needed amount to EUR 278 million in the five sectors reviewed (best 
estimate).464  
Of these costs, the largest share of 46% is caused by compliance checks and adjusting 
business practices related to advertising and marketing targeted at consumers and 
16% is related to advertising and marketing targeted at businesses, with the 
remaining share of 39% of costs being related to standard contract terms in consumer 
contracts. This is similar to the pattern observed at company level regarding the one-
off costs when entering another EU country’s market. 
The costs of regular compliance checks therefore appear very proportionate compared 
to the approximate annual turnover of EUR 1 180 billion in these five sectors,465 when 
taking into account the importance of these rules for the functioning of consumer 
                                           
463 The methodology of the extrapolation and detailed results are presented in Part 4 of this report. 
464 For an estimated number of 962 261 businesses in the five selected sectors. Note however that the total 
costs at the EU level are calculated based on costs per business by size class, which vary greatly as shown 
in the previous table, and on the number of businesses per sector and size class, which has a strong 
influence on the results; for more details see Part 4 of this report. 
465 2013 data for turnover. The comparison at the sector level is not straightforward due to data limitations. 
In some cases, Eurostat data on turnover is available only at NACE 2 group level, while we have used more 
granular data, i.e. at class level, for the extrapolation. 
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markets. The estimated overall costs of regular compliance checks amount to 
approximately 0.024 percent of turnover, with 0.011 percent relating to rules 
concerning advertising and marketing targeted at consumers, 0.004 percent relating 
to rules concerning advertising and marketing targeted at businesses, and 0.009 
percent relating to rules concerning standard contract terms.  
It has to be emphasised that these estimates refer to the overall compliance costs for 
businesses related to the national legal framework, and therefore are caused by the 
combined effects of EU and Member States legislation in the area of consumer and 
marketing law as well as sectoral legislation. Member States legislation may add 
additional requirements (where minimum harmonisation applies), and national case 
law and interpretation of the general clauses will affect both areas where minimum 
harmonisation prevails, and where fully harmonised rules exist. Furthermore, in those 
sectors where relevant sector specific EU consumer protection legislation exists, in 
particular, gas and electricity services and telecommunications, the company 
estimates about their costs are likely to also include requirements from such sectorial 
EU legislation and their national implementation. 
Because of this combined effect of national and EU legislation, the costs estimated 
above cannot directly be attributed to specific EU directives. It is likely that, when the 
UCPD and the other relevant EU directives were transposed into national legislation, 
this had an impact on these regular costs since the existing rules, at least to some 
extent, had to be revised and changed to comply with the new EU requirements. After 
this phase, however, there is no indication that the directives would increase such 
costs in absence of major legislative changes. It is even possible (although not 
certain) to anticipate that the “Europeanisation” of a large bulk of the substance of the 
rules dealing with commercial practices brought stability and consistency to this area, 
and thus, reduced the need for and cost of such regular compliance checking and 
adjustment. 
Costs for (unit) price indication were separately assessed and are not included in the 
previous estimate. There is incidental evidence from the country research that 
compliance with the obligations of the PID is less of a burden for large retailers, due to 
economies of scale. Existing exemptions for small retailers seem to alleviate the 
burden on those retailers. The business interviews conducted for this study give some 
additional insights.466 The interviews focused on the costs for businesses in the pre-
packaged food and detergents sector (for which unit price indication is most relevant) 
and explored amongst other burdens the specific costs of providing price information 
at points of sale and/or on websites. 75% of relevant businesses interviewed across 
the EU reported that they indicate unit prices for pre-packaged food and/or detergents 
to consumers to comply with legislation, while 15% do not and 9% either did not 
know or did not provide an answer. On the basis of the quantitative data provided, 
median costs (e.g. to prepare and change price labels) of interviewed businesses that 
indicate unit prices in the pre-packaged food and detergents sector, are EUR 2 178 per 
business per year (covering staff costs and other costs such as for electronic price 
labels).467 Respondents indicated that, on average, 30% of these costs are specifically 
related to unit price indication. These figures are comparatively low, which is partly 
explained by the fact that in line with the size distribution of companies in the food 
retail sector the business interviews focused mostly on SMEs and that large companies 
in the sector that were interviewed had difficulties providing estimates regarding the 
cost of price indication. Other reasons include that price information is often provided 
automatically either on websites or in some cases on electronic labels, using special 
                                           
466 For more details on the business interviews, refer to Part 4 of this report. 
467 Due to data limitations, costs could not be broken down further by size class, however results of the 
interviews are presented by size class in Part 4. 
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software, which reduces related costs. In spite of these data limitations – and with the 
caveat that the interviews regarding price indication only covered the especially 
affected food retail sector – it appears reasonable to conclude that the costs of (unit) 
price indication do not seem to imply disproportionate burdens on businesses.  
The proportionate character of the costs of consumer protection legislation, of which 
the UCPD is an essential element, has also been recognised by businesses. In a 2014 
survey (the only year that such a question was asked in the Eurobarometer) a large 
majority of traders agreed that in their own country compliance with consumer 
legislation is easy (72%) and that the costs of compliance are reasonable (67%), 
although traders selling in other EU countries were less likely to agree that this applied 
when selling cross-border. Only a slight majority of traders operating cross-border 
agreed that compliance in other EU countries was easy (57%) and that the related 
costs were reasonable (52%). 
Figure 6: Percentage of traders agreeing that compliance with consumer 
legislation is easy and the costs are reasonable, EU28 in 2014. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 396. Question: I will read you three statements about compliance with consumer 
legislation in (OUR COUNTRY). Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with 
each of them: ‘It is easy to comply with consumer legislation in your sector.’ / ‘The costs of compliance with consumer 
legislation in your sector are reasonable.’ Note: For ‘own country’ data, the proportion is calculated out of all traders; 
for ‘other EU countries’, the proportion is calculated only out of traders who indicated that they sell cross-border. 
These results illustrate that compliance with the rules in other EU countries is 
considered to be more burdensome, which is consistent with the above described 
estimate of considerable one-off costs for entering a new market, which are in addition 
to the regular compliance checks.  
 
• Benefits for traders due to the relevant directives (UCPD, PID, MCAD) 
 
The segmentation between traders active in cross-border trade and those focused on 
their domestic market is very relevant also for the benefits from the EU legislative 
framework in the area of commercial practices and marketing. Not only the costs they 





























In other EU countries (of traders who sell cross-border)
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harmonising EU rules, but also the advantages they may obtain from the directives are 
different in nature and dimension. This is not only to be expected in theoretical terms, 
but is also supported by the results from the business interviews: across all potential 
benefits that were listed in a respective question, between 63% and 46% of the 
businesses that sell their products/services in other EU countries indicated that they 
benefited at least slightly from the EU legislative framework subject to the Fitness 
Check. In particular, these businesses indicated that they benefited most from the 
harmonised legislation that facilitates selling cross-border to consumers in other EU 
countries, followed by the level playing field that was created across the EU for 
businesses regarding contracts with consumers by safeguarding that standard contract 
terms are fair. In contrast, the benefits of having harmonised rules in the EU in view 
of selling cross-border were ranked last among the sample of businesses that only 
operates domestically. Only between 51% and 29% of the businesses that do not sell 
their products/services in other EU countries indicated that they benefited at least 
slightly from the legal framework, a significantly lower proportion than in the sample 
of businesses that sell their products/services in other EU countries.468  
Traders operating cross-border are clearly the ones reaping the most tangible 
benefits, since their costs caused by legal diversity between Member States are likely 
to decrease as a result of the EU legislative framework reducing the level of legal 
fragmentation. Those who do not engage in business with counterparties in other 
Member States are substantially less affected by legal diversity across Europe, and 
thus their costs will be affected less. The benefits they may experience may arise from 
a more stable and consistent legal framework as a result of it being Europeanised, 
something that was referred to in the previous sub-section.  
As to the MCAD, slightly more than half of the interviewed businesses indicated that 
they benefitted at least slightly from the legal framework in this respect. According to 
the evidence collected in the Commission’s public consultation in 2011 as to 
misleading marketing practices affecting businesses, a substantial portion of existing 
problems seem to be linked to scam operations (such as misleading payment forms, 
e.g. fake invoices for unsolicited goods or services) against which the current EU 
legislative framework is less effective (see section effectiveness of the MCAD, above). 
Resulting benefits in this respect are therefore likely to be limited. It is true, however, 
that online review platforms, identified in the 2014 Flash Eurobarometer as a growing 
source of concern among traders,469 have the potential to affect commercial practices 
among traders in a more intense way, and therefore to potentially bring new benefits 
of an EU legal framework against misleading B2B practices.  
 Costs and benefits for consumers  6.2.1.3.
• Costs for consumers stemming from both the minimum harmonised and the fully 
harmonised consumer rules (UCPD, PID, MCAD)  
From an economic viewpoint, two different kinds of consumers’ costs can potentially 
arise from the legislative framework for unfair commercial practices and marketing. 
First, costs may accrue due to the insufficient functioning of the framework, i.e. 
through the unfair commercial practices of traders which are not prevented by the 
legal framework. Second, traders may pass on their costs of compliance with the legal 
framework to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
                                           
468 See detailed results in Part 4 of this report. 
469 Flash Eurobarometer 396, see analysis of levels of awareness and key trends since the adoption of key 
directives in Annex VIII.   
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The first type of costs refers to the welfare losses that consumers may have 
experienced as a result of economic transactions over goods and services that they 
would not have entered into, or would have agreed to only at different prices and/or 
terms, if their economic behaviour had not been distorted by the (unfair) practice. 
That is, the costs for consumers arising from the failure of the legislative framework 
regarding unfair commercial practices and marketing to avoid certain practices or 
actions by traders that are actually harmful and detrimental to consumers. In this 
context, it is notable that unfair commercial practices continue to exist on EU markets 
to a significant degree.  
The figure below shows the development over time of common types of unfair 
commercial practices that consumers have reported experiencing. 
Figure 7: Percentage of consumers reporting that they experienced common 
types of unfair commercial practices within the last 12 months, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometers 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 282, 299, 332, 358 and 397. Question 2008 – 2012: 
Have any of the following happened to you in the past 12 months? ‘You came across misleading or deceptive 
advertisements, statements or offers’ / ‘You came across fraudulent advertisements, statements or offers.’ Only in 2006 
– 2011: ‘You came across unsolicited commercial advertisements, statements or offers (cold calls, spam emails, 
commercial SMS, etc.)’. Note: EU% comprises the EU25 in 2006 and the EU27 thereafter. 
Referring to the figure above, unsolicited advertisements were the most prevalent 
practice, with 69% of consumers reporting an experience with unsolicited advertising 
within the last 12 months before the option was dropped from the Eurobarometer 
survey in 2011. The levels of reported misleading and fraudulent advertising both 
show slight increases from 2008 to 2012, in the order of 2 percentage points for 
misleading advertising and 5 percentage points for fraudulent advertising. 
The continuing relevance of unfair commercial practices in consumer markets was also 
confirmed by the consumer market study conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016. 
When asked about their experience with types of problems in the last 12 months, 33% 
of consumers responded that they had experienced misleading or aggressive practices 
at least “sometimes” within the last 12 months, including 15% who had responded 
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often”.470 These problems were most likely to relate to telecom services (36%), 
financial/insurance services (23%) or utilities (18%).  
It is very likely that these reported unfair commercial practices lead to consumer 
detriment, although there are no estimates available in this respect (see also the 
discussion of enforcement, below).   
The second category of costs for consumers refers to the possible negative impact on 
consumers of increased compliance costs for the trader brought about by the 
legislative framework. In turn, traders may pass on their increased business costs to 
the counterparty in the transaction (i.e. their customers), so that consumers end up 
paying more for the goods and services they buy. The passing-on of the costs created 
or raised by consumer protection legislation, including rules concerning unfair 
commercial practices and marketing to consumers, would depend on the impact of 
these legal measures on price elasticities and on supply and demand functions. The 
degree to which costs are actually passed on will also depend on other factors such as 
the pricing policy of traders and competitive pressure they face, which will likely differ 
by sector and Member State. It is therefore not possible to assess the extent to which 
the mentioned costs of the legislative framework concerning unfair commercial 
practices and marketing in B2C transactions are passed on to consumers. Even if they 
would be fully passed on, the effect on prices would likely be minor, considering that 
regular costs in this respect were estimated at approximately 0.011 percent of 
turnover for the five sectors in which business interviews were conducted (best 
estimate for combined effect of national and EU legal framework regarding unfair 
commercial practices and marketing to consumers, see above).471 It also is important 
to note that passing-on in itself (if it occurs) is not necessarily undesirable, and the 
efficiency judgement on the legal measure raising traders’ costs depends ultimately on 
it being socially efficient:472 in this context socially efficient means that the costs to 
consumers caused by the passing-on of traders' compliance costs, together with the 
compliance costs that were absorbed by the traders themselves, are lower than the 
welfare losses due to unfair commercial practices that were prevented by the 
legislative framework.    
The argument above also applies to potential savings by traders and their effect on 
consumer prices. The interviewed businesses that operate cross-border in Europe 
indicated that about two thirds of the one-off costs of entering another EU country's 
market (both in terms of checking and verifying requirements, and in terms of 
adjustment and change) are related to advertising and marketing to consumers or to 
other traders, which suggests that savings in these compliance costs are likely to be 
relevant. Since the UCPD and MCAD have very likely produced some reduction in the 
dispersion of the content of legal requirements across Member States, it is to be 
expected that there will be costs savings for traders, and indirectly, also savings in 
consumers’ costs as well, to the extent that these savings are passed on. 
                                           
470 Question: In the past 12 months, have you experienced problem(s) with any goods or services where 
you thought you had a legitimate cause for complaint related to the following five problem types? 
‘Misleading or aggressive commercial practices.’ 
471 If costs of the legislative framework were considerably higher than the estimates calculated in the 
framework of this study, additional effects on the market would need to be considered: In this case the 
higher prices and (consequently due to the elasticity of demand) lower quantities of good produced would 
drive some consumers out of the market, and possibly some traders out of business given the higher costs 
of undertaking the activity. However, in light of the business interviews and the results of the extrapolation 
on business costs this seems not to be a major concern, see also the previously quoted assessment of 67% 
of surveyed business that costs for complying with consumer legislation are 'reasonable' (Flash 
Eurobarometer 396). 
472 See, Craswell, 1991, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller 
Relationships. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  151 
  
• Benefits for consumers stemming from both the minimum harmonised and the fully 
harmonised consumer rules in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection 
against unfair commercial practices (UCPD, PID, MCAD) 
The EU legislative framework in the area of commercial practices and marketing is a 
key element of EU consumer policy. It intends to ensure a high level of consumer 
protection (in line with Art. 169 TFEU) regarding their economic interests. The aim of 
the UCPD is to provide a (fully harmonised) set of rules concerning the commercial 
practices of traders that can affect the economic welfare of consumers. These rules 
provide that a given action, campaign or conduct of a trader, if found to be “unfair”, 
will trigger certain negative consequences for the trader engaged in the practice (Arts. 
11 and ff. UCPD). The UCPD, though, requires relevance or impact of the practice in 
order for the practice to be deemed unfair, that is, commercial practices that do 
matter for the actual response and behaviour of consumers (the transactional decision 
test, see effectiveness section). It therefore restricts and deters commercial practices 
vis-à-vis consumers only when these practices are harmful to them. If there is no 
harm, or only negligible harm, to engage the machinery of legal intervention would be 
a waste of scarce resources. Thus, the UCPD tries to reduce the level of harm to 
consumers, implying an increase of economic welfare for those consumers who had 
been, or could have been, harmed by the unfair practice. 
In different ways, the same is true for the MCAD and PID. Although the MCAD aims at 
the protection of traders (Art. 1, Art. 5 MCAD), it seems clear that in an indirect way 
the reduction in misleading advertising between traders would also reduce its level 
vis-à-vis consumers (think of non-targeted advertising campaigns, or a possible spill-
overs of findings under the MCAD for assessing unfair commercial practices in a B2C 
context).  
As to PID, the price transparency that it promotes allows consumers to increase 
awareness as to the unit price (and by implication the true economic consequences of 
purchases) and thus to be better placed to shop around and find better alternatives in 
terms of price/quantity ratios. Again, the aim is that of improving decision-making of 
consumers, eliminating or reducing actions and factors that would distort these 
processes. 
In other words, the benefits for consumers from the protection against unfair 
commercial practices mainly derive from an improved functioning of the market in 
terms of outcomes for consumers, by deterring harmful practices and increasing 
transparency and reducing influences that potentially distort economic decision 
making, thereby increasing consumer welfare. 
It is notable that consumers may in addition benefit from a reduction of traders’ costs 
due to reductions in compliance costs linked to legal disparity between Member States 
(see above).   
6.2.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
 The economic rationale of providing an EU legal framework regarding 6.2.2.1.
standard contract terms  
Transaction costs are real costs in the economy. Thus, reducing the costs of preparing, 
negotiating and drafting the terms of contracts between the parties with help of 
standard contract terms is, ceteris paribus, a worthwhile and socially desirable 
endeavour. These cost savings are not only privately beneficial for the trader, but are 
also true reductions in social costs, and consumers, depending on the market 
structure, are likely to benefit from such reductions in the form of lower contract 
prices as traders will be facing lower costs of doing business. 
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It is obvious that there are powerful market forces (cost reduction pressures) that lead 
to the use of standard terms in contracts, that is, terms of the agreement that are not 
subject to individual negotiation and drafting, but are written in advance by one of the 
parties, and then "inserted" into each and every single contract that is signed by the 
drafter. In many contracts, the bulk of the terms governing the transaction will be 
"boilerplate", that is, repeated ad infinitum in all contracts.473 Indeed, the use of 
standard terms dominates contracting between traders and consumers, but it is also 
rampant in contracts between traders. 
Of course, contracting standardisation through standard terms does not only have the 
upside of decreasing transaction costs. It creates – or exacerbates – costs of its own. 
It is also prone to acute informational problems and asymmetries. If there is no 
individual negotiation of terms, the drafter will possess an informational advantage 
over that content that may add onto a previously existing advantage as a trader. From 
an economic perspective, thus, the uses and abuses of standard terms in contracts 
with consumers involve asymmetries of information between contracting parties, 
though this observation does not mean that the only sensible solutions in the setting 
of standard form contracts are duties to reveal information. In any event, it is clear 
that the content of the contract is not the product of the joint preferences of both 
parties, since by definition the standard terms are not subject to negotiation, and in 
practice, they are rarely, if ever, read by the consumer. 
An additional problem is that in most circumstances searching for information about 
quality of the substance of standard terms does not actually work. If the consumer 
would be informed about the quality of standard terms simply by reading them, rules 
mandating disclosure and clarity in order for the standard terms to be incorporated to 
the individual contract may be sufficient. However, economic literature has challenged 
the added value of incorporation rules and mandates of disclosure and intelligibility, at 
least when understood as formal requirements. With these types of requirements it is 
intended that the drafter adopts measures to increase knowledge of the conditions by 
the consumer (i.e., that the cost of the consumer of becoming informed about the 
substantive terms be reduced). However, it is rational for the consumer to remain 
ignorant of the clauses as they anyhow cannot be changed, a strategy that can be 
easily anticipated by the drafter, who can then select the level of quality most 
beneficial to themselves, and not to the joint welfare of the parties. Competition 
among traders will not decrease this problem, given the rational ignorance by 
consumers, who would concentrate on the more obvious dimensions of the transaction 
(e.g. price, brand, etc).  
This is not only a theoretical observation. There is various evidence available that in 
electronic transactions and in other forms of contracting which rely on standard terms 
governing the transaction, consumers do not commonly read the contract terms 
before entering into the contract; they do not have the capacity, or the willingness, to 
read and understand the implications of standard contract terms; they do not value 
the opportunity to read the terms prior to contract; nor do they typically value the 
more advantageous contract terms that they may hypothetically be able to find if they 
read standard contract terms in advance and shop around for more favourable 
ones.474 This does not imply that increased transparency and shorter terms and 
conditions are irrelevant in practice: A recent consumer market study commissioned 
by the European Commission concluded that shortening and simplifying terms and 
                                           
473 See Ben-Shahar, 2006, Foreword to Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium. 
474 See, Hillman and Rachlinski, 2002, Standard Form Contracting in the Electronic Age; Hillman, 2007, 
Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of e-Standard Terms Backfire?”, in Omri Ben-
Shahar (ed.), Boilerplate. The Foundation of Market Contracts; Marotta-Wurgler, 2009, Are “Pay Now, 
Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements; Ben-Shahar, 2009, 
The Myth of 'Opportunity to Read. 
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conditions has positive effects, including improvements in the proportion of consumers 
who read the terms and conditions.475 In addition, the results of the behavioural 
experiments conducted in the Consumer market study to support the Fitness Check of 
EU consumer law also found that standard (long) T&Cs were read less thoroughly by 
participants than summarised T&Cs, that participants read a higher proportion of the 
text of the summarised T&Cs, and that participants were better able to distinguish 
between fair and unfair T&Cs in their comprehension of the legal fairness of terms, in 
fairness perceptions and in intentions to buy from the seller, when presented with 
summarised T&Cs.476 It can also be argued that if certain “key terms” important for 
the overall welfare that the consumer expects to get from the transaction were to be 
presented separately and clearly (e.g. in a short summary of a structure that is similar 
for all contracts of this product category), this targeted transparency could be 
expected to improve consumer welfare. The reason is that if consumers were aware of 
the low quality of the key terms offered by a trader, and they could easily compare 
them with the terms offered by other traders, this will have a negative impact on the 
first trader’s revenue, if consumers as a consequence prefer traders with higher 
quality terms.477  
In other words, while transparency and presentation of standard contract terms can 
be improved and this would be beneficial for consumer welfare, the available empirical 
evidence does not indicate that imposing duties to disclose standard contract terms, to 
provide consumers with opportunities to read, and to draft the terms in a clear 
manner alone will sufficiently address the mentioned problem of asymmetries of 
information between the contracting parties. Even with substantial improvements in 
this respect a large majority of consumers are likely to continue to be ignorant about 
the quality of the standard contract terms offered. 
The contracting process involving standard terms therefore does not by itself result in 
the level of quality in the bundle of rights and obligations of the parties that will be 
desirable in a societal perspective, i.e. there is a market failure as to the content of 
standard terms. It is clear that the potential detriment to consumers can be very large 
through unfair standard contract terms. This is certainly the case when the transaction 
is of great importance to the welfare of the consumer (e.g. a mortgage, or of a 
personal loan that may lead the consumer to bankruptcy in case of default). But also 
in transactions of smaller size, the consequences may be significant if the unfair terms 
also imply the raising of switching costs, and thus the likelihood of being trapped in a 
long-term contract that reduces the welfare of the consumer. This market failure can 
be addressed by mandating certain minimum levels of quality (in terms of consumer 
rights) in non-negotiated terms, or the banning of certain terms that are deemed 
unfair given their impact on the situation of the consumer, an approach many 
countries have taken. Legislators in EU Member States and third countries have 
introduced minimum levels of quality in standard terms, through several means: black 
lists of prohibited terms that are always considered being below the minimum 
acceptable level of consumer rights, grey lists of presumptively prohibited terms, 
general notions and tests of unfairness. 
                                           
475 For example, in the online experiments conducted in the framework of the study, when terms and 
conditions were extremely short and simple 26.5% of consumers report to have read the full terms and 
conditions compared to only 10.5% when the T&Cs were long and complex (the study was conducted in 12 
Member States with 1000 respondents in each Member State). See European Commission 2016, Study on 
consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions (T&Cs), Final report. 
476 Behavioural experiments on consumers’ responses towards unfair contract terms, 2016 consumer market 
study to support the Fitness Check of EU consumer law. 
477 See Artigot, Ganuza, Gomez and Penalva, 2015, Product liability should reward firm transparency. See 
also recommendations. 
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At the EU level, the UCTD provides minimum harmonisation in this area. The UCTD 
has as a goal, in economic terms, of regulating the substantive quality of non-
negotiated terms in contracts, with a broad horizontal scope of application, so that 
virtually all types of contract and all economic sectors are affected (see effectiveness, 
above). The UCTD can therefore be expected to have significant impacts for traders, 
as well as for consumers. The specific costs and benefits for both sides are discussed 
in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
 Costs and benefits for traders  6.2.2.2.
• Costs and burdens for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under 
the UCTD  
While the UCTD applies to almost all business-to-consumer transactions, this does not 
imply that the costs are uniform in nature and magnitude across economic sectors or 
size classes (in line with what has been indicated before regarding the UCPD). This has 
been empirically supported through the business interviews conducted in the 
framework of this study (see results presented above). One reason for these 
differences is the extent to which standard terms are used in specific sectors: While in 
the interviews conducted for this study the large majority of businesses (87% of the 
overall sample) do use standard written terms, in some sectors their use is less 
common. The majority of businesses that do not use standard terms were in the 
goods sector, mostly the pre-packaged food and detergent sector (where close to two 
thirds of interviewed businesses reported not using standard terms). Other reasons for 
differences in costs include the degree of complexity and variation of terms necessary 
for different product categories, which may vary between sectors. 
In addition, as indicated before, costs also depend on whether traders sell their 
products and/or services in other EU Member States, or restrict their sales to their 
domestic market. In the following discussion, therefore, both situations are again 
considered separately, focusing in each case on assessing costs for checking 
compliance with and adjusting business practices to the national legislation regarding 
standard contract terms.478  
One-off costs when entering another EU country’s market for the first time 
If a trader decides to enter another EU country’s market for the first time, it is likely 
that standard contract terms will have to be adapted, e.g. due to specific national 
legislation going beyond the UCTD (such as a national black list of unfair terms), 
national guidance in this respect, or case law. In our business interviews, the costs for 
checking compliance with and adapting standard contract terms to the national 
legislation and adjusting business practices as a result (e.g. using different standard 
contract terms) were again estimated in terms of working days of professional staff 
time), working days of administrative or sales staff time, and Euro amounts for other 
costs (e.g. related to legal advice).479 After monetising labour costs, total one-off costs 
per business were calculated. Table 12 above presents one-off costs when entering 
another EU country’s market for the first time per business by sector. On average, as 
                                           
478 Additional costs for traders may also be caused by the reduced variety of contract terms that can be 
used due to the limitations provided the legislation against unfair terms. However, the size and nature of 
these costs are very hard to establish on a general basis. It is also likely that related costs of traders would 
be at least offset by corresponding welfare gains of consumers, to the extent that the reduction of variety of 
standard terms is mainly related to terms that are considered to be unfair under all circumstances. This 
issue is therefore discussed in the sub-section regarding the costs for consumers below.  
479 Costs for translation were not included in the estimate. 
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reported by interviewed businesses, of these costs, up to one third is related to 
standard contract terms (for those sectors for which estimates were available). In 
absolute terms, this corresponds to median costs of between EUR 570 and EUR 3 970 
per business for the five sectors covered.480 These estimates refer to the one-off 
compliance costs for businesses related to the national legal framework regarding 
unfair contract terms when entering one other EU country’s market for the first time. 
As minimum harmonisation applies for the UCTD, Member States legislation may add 
additional requirements, and because of the combined effect of EU and Member 
States' sectoral and horizontal legislation, the estimated costs cannot directly be 
attributed to the UCTD alone. 
However, it is likely that EU harmonising rules have a direct impact upon those costs. 
The UCTD has brought down the level of legal disparity between Member States to 
some extent, as has the case law of the CJEU. The impact on such compliance costs 
must have been positive in view of entering another EU national market (compared to 
a situation where rules concerning unfair contract terms were only based on national 
law). As indicated before, this is recognised by the interviewed businesses, of which 
nearly two thirds assessed that they benefitted at least slightly from the harmonised 
legislation that facilitates selling cross-border to consumers in other EU countries, 
implying recognition of this cost reduction effect. 
Costs incurred by businesses on a regular basis 
Traders typically incur costs to verify compliance with legislation and engage in 
necessary adjustments on a regular basis, including concerning their practices and 
terms in the area of standard contracts, even for traders operating in a purely 
domestic context.481 Table 13 above presents annual costs for compliance checks and 
adjusting business practices incurred by businesses, by sector and by size class. On 
average, of these costs, 39% are related to standard contract terms. In total, the 
annual costs incurred by businesses in the EU28 for checking that standard contract 
terms still comply with legislation and for adjusting business practices are estimated at 
EUR 108 million in the five sectors reviewed, equivalent to 0.009 percent of annual 
turnover (best estimate). As indicated before, these costs are caused by the combined 
effects of EU and Member States legislation in this area, which are difficult to 
disentangle, as businesses do not categorise their costs according to the EU or 
national origin of specific rules.  
The following considerations, however, give insight into the relative importance of EU 
and Member States legislation in causing these (regularly incurring) costs: It is likely 
that when the UCTD was transposed into national legislation after its adoption in 1993, 
this had an impact on the regular costs incurred by businesses even in a domestic 
context, since the existing rules, at least to some extent, had to be revised and 
changed to comply with the new EU requirements concerning standard contract terms. 
After this phase, however, the UCTD and other sector-specific legislation with 
relevance for standard contract terms would only increase such regular costs in case 
of legislative changes at EU level or changes in national legislation induced by relevant 
CJEU case law.  
The relevance of the costs of EU legislation in the area of standard contract terms for 
businesses has also to be considered in comparison to a hypothetical situation in 
which no such EU level legislation would exist. It is reasonable to assume that Member 
                                           
480 Based on an estimated share of one third of the one-off costs. Not for all sectors an estimate was 
available. 
481 As indicated above, roughly three quarters of the interviewed businesses (both purely domestic and 
cross-border traders) reported checking that advertising/marketing and standard contract terms still comply 
with national legislation at least once per year. 
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States would in this case have national rules concerning standard contract terms in 
place, because the above mentioned market failure requires regulatory measures of 
some kind. These national rules would also likely be updated regularly to adjust them 
to changing business practices etc., so that the fact that regular checks would have to 
be conducted by businesses that intend to be compliant with legislation would remain 
unchanged under this scenario. The additional costs caused by the EU legislation in 
comparison to this (counterfactual) scenario are therefore likely to be limited. It could 
even be argued that the existence of an EU legislative framework increases the 
stability and the consistency of the benchmark against which to assess the practices 
and terms used by traders, both in their domestic markets and in the other EU 
markets they serve, so that regular costs are reduced. This effect, however, is difficult 
to prove. 
   
• Benefits for traders due to the UCTD 
 
As indicated before, standardised contracts (whether regulated by national or EU 
legislation) reduce transaction costs for traders. When a trader faces a multitude of 
contract negotiation and drafting processes with different contracting parties, there 
are substantial economies of scale to be achieved if the contracting process becomes 
standardised and not tailor-made. The average transaction cost of an agreement goes 
down, even dramatically, if substantial portions of the cost are incurred only once (i.e. 
only when drafting the standard terms) for all contracts of a given kind that the trader 
is likely to enter into. Additionally, standardisation and centralisation of contract 
drafting and writing is likely to lead also to some degree of reduction in agency costs 
that traders have to face in their operations, since contracting is typically delegated to 
decisions and actions by employees, managers, and in general, agents of the trader as 
an entity.482  
Traders that are active in cross-border transactions may benefit from the EU 
legislative framework in the area of standard contracts in two additional ways. First, 
the UCTD allows additional economies of scale in the investments made by traders on 
contract drafting and communication, and on compliance with legal requirements, by 
making the set of legal requirements more homogeneous (although not entirely so) 
across European markets. This makes such investments more productive, and thus 
improves the return traders obtain from them. This would suggest (to some extent) 
higher levels of investment in ensuring adequate drafting and communication, and 
improving consistency with legal requirements in the content of standard terms under 
the UCTD compared to a situation of unrestricted legal diversity across Member 
States. 
Second, competition among traders in the EU may be improved. The UCTD creates a 
level playing field independently of the country of origin. Moreover, the UCTD may 
help to restrict contract terms which impose high switching costs on consumers (i.e., 
clauses and terms that reduce the ability of new entrants to lure existing consumers 
from an established trader) by a finding of unfairness with respect to those terms. 
With this, entry and competition may become more vigorous. This effect may be 
particularly attractive both for new traders and for traders entering new markets in 
other EU Member States.  
                                           
482 The term agency costs refers in economics to all the costs arising from possible deviations by agents 
from the goals of the organisations for which they work (the principal), and include costs not just from the 
deviations themselves, but also of monitoring and assessing compliance to goals. Gibbons and Roberts, 
2013, Economic Theories of Incentives in Organizations, in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), 
Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.  
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 Costs and benefits for consumers  6.2.2.3.
• Costs for consumers stemming from both the minimum harmonised and the fully 
harmonised consumer rules (UCTD) 
The sources of potential costs for consumers arising from the EU framework on 
standard terms in consumer contracts are mainly two: The reduced variety of terms in 
standard contracts as result of the unfairness test and the possibility that traders pass 
on their costs for compliance with the legal framework to consumers through higher 
prices.   
The first source of potential costs to consumers is that the outcome of the unfairness 
test under the UCTD and the national implementation legislation may result in 
excluding certain contractual content from the terms that are not individually 
negotiated. Consumers do not have the same preferences, and certain groups or types 
among them may prefer a given term (say, A), whereas other types may prefer an 
alternative term (say, B). If traders offer two types of contracts, one with standard 
term A, the other with standard term B, and one of them (B, for instance) is deemed 
unfair with respect to some consumers, it may be dropped altogether, forcing those 
consumers who prefer term B (and for whom the term may not be unfair) to contract 
under term A, potentially reducing their surplus from the transaction. A practical 
example for differing consumer preferences for specific contract terms are mortgage 
contracts. Different terms – such as fixed rate vs. adjustable rate, large down 
payment vs. low or zero down payment,483 sizable termination fees vs. no termination 
fees, easy acceleration of loan in case of non-payment vs. hard acceleration conditions 
– may be preferred by different types of borrowers depending on age, income level 
and profile, risk aversion, etc.484 Thus, elimination of alternatives due to an unfair 
term assessment made with respect to one type of borrower may inefficiently reduce 
term variety for other borrowers. Such a reduction of the variety of standard contract 
terms is not necessarily welfare-enhancing for all groups of consumers. However, the 
reduction in variety is likely to be socially beneficial in many other cases, especially 
regarding those terms that can be considered as unfair under all possible 
circumstances. 
The second type of potential costs for consumers results from the increase in 
transaction costs concerning consumer contracts that the rules on disclosure and 
drafting of non-negotiated terms in the UCTD (mainly art. 5 UCTD) and the 
implementing national provisions (that often are more detailed and exacting in these 
matters) may impose on traders. It is clear that standard terms constitute a 
transaction-costs saving “technology”, and interferences with their use, clearly in 
terms of drafting and communication, may increase contracting costs for traders. If 
traders are able to pass on all or part of these additional costs, consumers may end up 
paying up more for the goods and services they buy using standard term contracts. As 
has been discussed above, the regular costs for traders for checking compliance with 
the legal framework with respect to standard contract terms are estimated to be 
equivalent to 0.009 percent of annual turnover (in the five sectors for which data was 
collected). While these costs could be expected to only lead to minor effects on 
consumer prices, even if they would be fully passed on,485 this does not imply that the 
                                           
483 Some of these issues have been addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreting 
UCTD: Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa, 14.3.2013 (C-415/11); Banco 
Primus v. Gutiérrez García, 26.1.2017 (C-421/14). 
484 See, Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2014, Household Risk Management and Actual Mortgage Choice in the 
Euro Area, ECB Working Paper 1631) showing how those variables influence the choice of different terms of 
the mortgage contract using a large database of European mortgages in several Member States. 
485 See discussion in the section of price effects from the legislative framework regarding unfair commercial 
practices and marketing above.  
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UCTD and its national implementation legislation cannot have very significant 
economic repercussions, for traders, and for consumers. This is illustrated in the next 
sub-section.  
 
• Benefits for consumers stemming from both the minimum harmonised and the fully 
harmonised consumer rules in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection 
against unfair contract terms (UCTD)  
The UCTD is a horizontal measure that covers virtually all economic sectors and all 
possible standard terms in consumer contracts. The benefits that consumers may 
derive from a legal instrument that allows them to get rid of contract terms that are 
detrimental and unbalanced are very large, covering a wide range of circumstances 
and economic transactions. This includes fundamental transactions in the economic life 
of a consumer, such as a mortgage contract, or a sizable personal loan. Here, the 
terms of the contract determine the impact of the transaction on the surplus that the 
consumer will derive, and may determine the sign (positive or negative) and the size 
of that surplus. Very few consumer policy measures have the potential to influence the 
economic welfare of consumers to such an extent and with such a wide scope of 
application as the UCTD. An illustration of this large potential impact for consumer 
welfare of the EU legislative framework on unfair contract terms can be found in the 
Spanish experience from mortgage contracts. Foreclosure proceedings, penalty 
interest, and floor clauses in adjustable interest rate mortgages have been strongly 
affected by the UCTD and its interpretation by the CJEU and Spanish courts. The UCTD 
therefore plays an essential role in the economic welfare of Spanish borrowing 
consumers, as has been illustrated again through a recent judgement by the CJEU 
which will lead to large pay-backs of Spanish banks to consumers due to an unfair 
term in their mortgage loan agreements.486 Obviously, this very significant impact of 
the UCTD is the product of a specific set of circumstances (the Spanish housing boom, 
the banking crisis, the pre-existing Spanish legal and regulatory environment, etc.), 
rather than a general manifestation of the benefits of the UCTD for consumers. It is, 
however, a meaningful example that illustrates the magnitude of the economic impact 
that the UCTD and its implementing legislation may have on consumer markets in 
Europe in specific situations.  
It can be concluded that the benefits of the UCTD for consumers mainly derive from 
preventing and stopping abuses of standard terms in contracts, which involve 
asymmetries of information between contracting parties leading to market failure. The 
obligations of the UCTD for traders concerning transparency and fairness of standard 
contract terms and the possibility to declare the nullity of an unfair contract term 
address this market failure and thereby increase consumer welfare. 
Again, consumers may also benefit from a reduction of traders’ costs due to a 
reduction in compliance costs linked to legal disparity between Member States, as the 
harmonising effect of the UCTD (and the related CJEU case law) is significant in spite 
of its minimum harmonisation character. In addition, it can be argued that the 
potential benefits for consumers from the reduction in transaction costs for traders 
due the use of standard contract terms can partly be attributed to the UCTD 
framework, as the willingness of consumers to accept standard contract terms is likely 
                                           
486 Judgement in Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15 (Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco, 
Palacios Martínez v. BBVA and Banco Popular Español v. Irles López). In its judgement, the CJEU 
"overruled" national case law that limited the temporal effects of the declaration of nullity of an unfair term 
(in this case 'floor clauses' in mortgage loan agreements establishing a minimum rate below which the 
variable rate of interest cannot fall). According to an estimate published by El País, banks will have to pay 
back an estimated amount of EUR 3 to 5 billion, see: http://economia.elpais.com/economia/ 
2016/12/21/actualidad/1482306332_458117.html.   
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  159 
dependent to some degree on their trust in minimum levels of quality regarding the 
protection of their rights.   
6.2.3. Injunctions 
 The economic rationale of providing an EU legal framework regarding 6.2.3.1.
injunctions  
It is well-known from an economic perspective that decentralised, disperse, individual 
action for enforcing consumer protection legislation may result in significant under-
deterrence of infringements. This is the outcome of a combination of factors. First, 
infringement of a given rule may not be detected by the affected consumers, due to a 
wide variety of circumstances: long-tail effects of the infringement make it detectable 
only after a long time; the negative effects of the trader decision may be only a low-
probability event; the loss for the consumer may not be manifest to many consumers, 
e.g. consumers may not see the link between the misleading character of the 
advertising and how it manipulated their economic behaviour, or between the 
unfairness of the clause and its consequences. Moreover, consumers may not be 
adequately informed about the legal consequences of the infringement and the 
remedies provided to them. 
Second, even if the affected consumers are aware of the loss and are also informed 
about the remedies, consumers may rationally decide to forego legal actions and the 
ensuing remedies. The reason would lie in the negative balance of costs and benefits 
of such legal action, compared with remaining passive, and letting bygones be 
bygones. The individual loss incurred by the consumer considering legal action may be 
reduced in case of a successful outcome – but this is something that the individual 
consumer will rationally not include in the calculation prior to deciding to pursue legal 
action. The reason is that this private benefit of initiating legal proceedings against the 
potentially liable trader (i.e. the damages awarded by court) is not certain, but 
probabilistic. It needs to be discounted by the probability that the trader, in the end, is 
not found liable, due to factual or legal reasons. On the cost side, however, there are 
the fixed costs of litigation, both monetary and not (time and inconvenience) 
associated with the redress activity.  
Third, the classical collective action problem identified by Olson 50 years ago will 
induce individual consumers to choose a level of legal action that is sub-optimal in a 
societal perspective.487 The underlying reason relates to the public good nature of the 
enforcement effect that individual legal action brings about. Legal action does not only 
provide private benefits, in the form of a damage payment, or the interruption of an 
action or activity detrimental to the individual consumer who decides to pursue legal 
claims. Legal action serves also to produce two types of (at least initially) non-rival 
and non-excludable benefits: the action, if successful, creates a beneficial precedent 
favouring parties in similar circumstances, and also serves to enforce the substantive 
rules of consumer law, thus imposing costs on infringing traders and benefiting all 
similarly situated consumers. These collective benefits in precedent and enforcement, 
which constitute a 'public good' in the economic sense of the term, will be subject to 
the well-known collective action failures: suboptimal incentives to contribute through 
legal action to the provision of the collective good, and coordination failures to 
collectively organise provision.  
In view of the above, legal actions initiated by suitable organisations (typically, 
consumers’ associations) or other representative bodies may help alleviate the 
enforcement shortcomings from decentralised consumer redress. These collective 
                                           
487 Mancur Olson, 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
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actions allow for the exploitation of the significant economies of scale in the process of 
preparing and litigating cases, and provide a mechanism, at least in theory, to reduce 
the coordination and transaction costs of bringing together different affected 
consumers. 
This explains the presence of collective enforcement in the area of consumer law, as 
well as in other settings similarly prone to the disadvantages of individual 
enforcement.  
Efficiency aspects of collective enforcement can be illustrated with the following 
example: The country reports for the present study include an estimation of the costs 
borne by consumers for obtaining redress when invoking the unfairness of terms that 
inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to compensation in a contract that 
they concluded, based on a hypothetical example.488 Taking into account lawyer’s 
fees, court fees and other costs associated with the first instance court procedure for 
this hypothetical example, the costs for a lower court procedure borne by an individual 
consumer are estimated at EUR 1 095 on average across Member States, within a 
range between EUR 0 and EUR 7 569.489 In the case of injunction actions, efficiency 
largely relates to the fact that one action can be brought instead of a number of 
individual actions for each consumer concerned by the same problem. In the 
hypothetical case introduced above, if 100 affected consumers would go to court, the 
sum of the costs for their individual actions would be EUR 109 500. The overall costs 
of an injunction action, which depend on the cost rules in the Member State in which 
the action is brought, could be expected to be significantly lower than the sum of costs 
for individual actions, in particular in Member States where special cost rules apply to 
limit costs (e.g. in Germany, see Section 6.1.3.3), but also in other Member States 
due to economies of scale (e.g. with respect to lawyers’ fees). This simplified 
calculation does not take into account the amount of time saved or the reduced levels 
of stress for consumers that would also likely ensue. In addition, importantly, another 
benefit of an injunction action that cannot be measured is the number of potential 
future cases prevented as a result of the injunction order. While injunctions therefore 
produce benefits for the future, they do not however cover the compensation of the 
victims of the infringement in their current form, which may reduce their 
attractiveness for consumers and their organisations (see section 6.1.3.3 on this). 
At the EU level, the potential impact of consumer law infringements on cross-border 
trade, and more specifically, of the under-deterrence of those infringements 
associated with the failures of individual legal action on the Single Market provide 
grounds for an EU legislative framework for injunctions. The heightened importance of 
the exposure of cross-border trade to the effects of collective enforcement actions of 
consumer law is revealed in different ways.  
                                           
488 Hypothetical example: A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid 
EUR 2000 per person. The holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning 
in the hotel was not working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on 
top of that, they were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator 
and asked for compensation amounting to a total of EUR 5000 (EUR 4000 for the cost of the package and 
EUR 1000 for lost time and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them EUR 1000 only, 
pointing to a provision in the contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. 
When the consumer asked, her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit 
the trader's liability in case of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer 
decided to take the tour operator to court to enforce her rights (Example adapted from 
http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfaircontract-terms/index_en.htm). 
489 Conservative cost estimates based on data provided by legal country experts (not available for IE, SE, 
UK), including lawyer’s fees, court fees and other costs, and not including potential costs of appeal or of 
losing, Estimates are based on lower bounds where ranges were provided and a value of EUR 0 was 
assigned to lawyer’s fees in countries where a lawyer is not required. 
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First, cross-border B2C transactions are always more sensitive to the uncertainty 
concerning rights and remedies available to the consumer, and to the lack of adequate 
incentives to comply caused by the failure of private action. Consumers’ trust in the 
reputation and behaviour of traders from their own Member State is typically higher 
than for traders from other Member States (although the emergence of successful 
cross-border traders in the EU indicates that this may change to some extent). Thus, 
the need to rely on specific mechanisms to safeguard trust in B2C transactions 
appears to be larger in the cross-border context than in the purely domestic context.  
Second, the obstacles of collective enforcement are higher for cross-border 
infringements than for national infringements. This is supported by the results of the 
survey of qualified entities, in which qualified entities assessed the potential obstacles 
to the effective use of the injunctions procedure related to cross border infringements 
on average as being significantly more important than concerning national 
infringements.490 It is also supported by the analysis of obstacles to the use of 
injunctions (see section on effectiveness of the ID, above). 
Third, even if the collective enforcement actions actually being brought engage 
infringements of consumer law with no direct cross-border effects, there are spill-
overs to other Member States' markets through two channels: Given the substantive 
harmonisation of the consumer laws of the Member States by means of EU legislative 
measures (inter alia, UCPD and UCTD), the outcomes of “national” injunction actions 
will have some bearing on future actions in different Member States, at least 
potentially; and infringing behaviour is rarely purely national in the sense of being 
disconnected or not reflected in similar patterns in other markets, especially in those 
Member States that are close in legal and economic terms. 
The result of the survey of qualified entities also shows that injunctive actions have 
mostly focused on national infringements. For the reasons described, this does not 
mean that such proceedings and the ensuing outcomes are devoid of relevant 
implications for the situation in other EU markets, and thus for cross-border trade. 
As in previous sub-sections, we will first consider costs and benefits of the legal 
framework regarding injunctions for traders, before assessing them in a consumer 
perspective.491 
 Costs and benefits for traders  6.2.3.2.
• Costs and burdens for traders due to ID 
 
For traders that comply with the substantive requirements of consumer law,492 the 
Injunctions Directive and its national implementation legislation do not lead to any 
costs, except those of checking on a regular basis that business practices are indeed 
compliant. The costs for these regular checks have been analysed and presented in 
the previous sub-sections.  
                                           
490 See results of the survey of qualified entities in Part 4 of this report. 
491 It is notable that the rationale described above is not limited to the actions for injunction envisaged in 
the Injunctions Directive, such as orders implying cessation and prohibition of an infringement in the sense 
of the Injunctions Directive (Art. 2). The same reasoning applies to actions for damages, for fines or other 
sanctions, for corrective measures, etc. 
492 Costs that may result from non-compliance of a specific trader with consumer law provisions (e.g. court 
costs, damages to be paid) are by definition not relevant in the discussion of administrative burdens and 
compliance costs.  
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The only possible additional costs caused by the ID for compliant traders are the 
possibility of being subject to unmeritorious claims. It could be argued that the lower 
cost of bringing claims under a collective mechanism (per affected consumer) makes it 
more likely that unmeritorious claims will be filed in the expectation of obtaining a 
positive settlement amount from the (by hypothesis, law-abiding) defendant. Probably 
this effect is lower in a pure injunctive action than when the collective action also 
concerns damages to the affected consumers etc. While evidence for unmeritorious 
claims in the context of class action suits exists in the US,493 this evaluation has not 
identified any evidence for unmeritorious claims brought in the EU by qualified entities 
under the ID. An illustrative example is Germany, where the highest number of 
injunction actions is reported (4 579 injunction actions initiated in the five year period 
since June 2011, about four times the number of reported actions in all other Member 
States combined).494 In this country, frivolous claims for injunctions are inadmissible. 
Thus, even if there is an infringement, the court will not grant the injunction if the 
claim is frivolous.495 It is also notable that consumer organisations have to be 
accepted as a qualified entity, and they would risk their status if they bring 
unmeritorious claims, therefore reducing any incentive that might exist in this respect. 
Therefore, the costs of unmeritorious claims under the Injunctions Directive for 
traders in the evaluation period appear to have been insignificant or non-existant.  
 
• Benefits for traders due to the ID 
 
A source of potential benefits from concentrated litigation under injunctive action 
proceedings within the scope of ID is the avoidance of possibly contradictory outcomes 
under individual enforcement actions,496 and thus, enhanced legal certainty for 
traders. In effect, if the cost of individual action is not prohibitive compared to the 
expected private benefit, a trader may encounter a very large number of individual 
claims by separate consumers, in many different places and at very different times. 
Those different individual actions by consumers may receive diverse, even 
contradictory, responses from the courts who adjudicate the individual disputes. Delay 
and uncertainty concerning the legal treatment and the legal consequences of a past 
business decision impose significant costs on the trader who took it, especially if 
similar choices have to be made in the future. Thus, ceteris paribus, a trader may 
prefer the unified and consistent resolution of all possible individual cases in one single 
proceeding, even if they are spread across several European markets.  
It could also be argued that the per-case litigation cost for the trader under a 
collective action for injunction would be lower than having to face a multitude of 
individual cases. This in turn, however, depends on the number of consumers that 
would actually sue the trader on an individual basis. As the consistent and long-
                                           
493 See an analysis by Johnston (2016, High Cost, Little Compensation, No Harm to Deter: New Evidence on 
Class Actions Under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes), who looks into a sample of all consumer class 
actions filed in the Northern District of Illinois over the period 2010-2012 (totalling 510), under four federal 
consumer protection statutes (the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(TCPA)), and finds that for most case types, only 15 percent or less of the class receive compensation, and 
the aggregate compensation paid to the class is far less than the stated or nominal class settlement fund 
amount.  
494 See effectiveness section, above, and the results of the survey of qualified entities, Part 4 of this report. 
495 See also footnote 972 below. 
496 Assuming that the collective action and individual actions are linked, as is the case in some but not all 
Member States and as is not yet (expressly) required by the Injunctions Directive. 
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standing opposition against collective redress mechanisms by business associations 
illustrates,497 businesses themselves do not seem to consider these theoretical 
benefits as being relevant in practice. 
 Costs and benefits for consumers  6.2.3.3.
• Costs for consumers stemming from both the minimum harmonised and the fully 
harmonised consumer rules (ID) 
The most relevant costs for consumers stemming from the ID would result from the 
lack of effective realisation of the goals of the EU legislative framework in this area. In 
other words, these are the costs caused by the lack of effectiveness of injunction 
actions, which results from the identified obstacles to the use of the procedure in the 
national context, and even more clearly in the cross-border context (see effectiveness 
section, above). Given that enforcement by consumers through individual litigation 
results in inefficiently low levels of deterrence of infringing behaviour, and public 
enforcement has inherent limitations, such insufficient levels of enforcement will lead 
to welfare losses for consumers due to continuing violations of consumer protection 
legislation as well as high enforcement costs for society, as the potential for 
economies of scale in enforcement through collective actions is not used (see also next 
sub-section).  
 
• Benefits for consumers stemming from both the minimum harmonised and the fully 
harmonised consumer rules (ID)  
The actual benefits for consumers from the EU consumer and marketing law 
framework would depend on the combination of the adequacy of the substantive rules 
in the framework with the level of enforcement of the rules. It is obvious that however 
adequate the substantive provisions may be, if the level of enforcement is insufficient, 
the harmful behaviour for consumers would not be adequately deterred, and thus 
consumers’ economic welfare would be lower than it should be. Lack of sufficient 
enforcement would substantially deprive consumers of the expected benefit of the 
substantive rules, since under-deterrence would mean that unfair – and likely 
consumer welfare-decreasing – commercial practices and unfair contract terms will not 
be prevented, as the traders engaging in them would not actually face sufficiently 
serious consequences for the infringement of the substantive rules.  
Enforcement may come through different means. The affected consumer may 
privately and individually initiate legal action against the responsible trader. Public 
authorities entrusted with consumer protection in this field may initiate proceedings to 
assess unfairness and eventually sanction unfair practices. Or entities and 
organisations having legitimate interest in combatting unfair commercial practices 
may take legal action against the responsible trader under the ID (see Art. 1 and 3 
ID). 
The effectiveness of those enforcement channels depends on a variety of factors, 
which, in addition, may differ widely across Member States, since a meaningful 
number of them have not been approximated through EU rules. For instance, for 
individual consumer action, the amount of individual detriment and the cost of access 
to the civil justice system are decisive factors which differ greatly among Member 
States. As to public enforcement, national variation will be very large due to 
institutional diversity, distribution of powers between central, regional and local 
authorities, funding, staffing and powers of consumer protection authorities and the 
                                           
497 See also the results of the open public consultation in Part 2 of this report. 
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like. It is important to recall that the issue of tight funding for consumer protection 
agencies has often been raised in the country interviews for this study, which casts 
doubt on how effective public enforcement may be under scarce funding scenarios. 
Despite this, consumer confidence in public authorities protecting consumer rights 
remains reasonably high and has even slightly increased during recent years.498 
Finally, consumer and marketing law can be enforced through mechanisms to protect 
the collective interest of consumers, such as injunctions. The most obvious and 
relevant benefit for consumers as a group refers to the enhanced enforcement of the 
underlying substantive rule in consumer law: if individual action by dispersed 
consumers in cases where the infringing trader’s behaviour has widespread effects 
leads to insufficient levels of (and in the extreme case, to zero) deterrence of the 
harmful behaviour, then collective actions, including injunctions that stop the 
behaviour and prohibit it for the future, are very likely to improve this situation. These 
efficiency gains result from enhanced enforcement of the substantive rules, and the 
ensuing increased levels of deterrence of undesirable traders’ behaviour.  
The above are gains brought about by the improved enforcement levels, but do not 
refer to the enforcement process itself. With respect to the latter, there is a second set 
of benefits: collective injunctive actions are a more economical way to achieve a given 
level of enforcement. There are high fixed costs associated with enforcing consumer 
law rules, both for the parties and for the public, given the important level of public 
subsidy in litigation. This implies the presence of significant economies of scale that 
can be exploited if the high fixed costs can be spread out over a large number of 
individual cases arising from the same, or very similar, sets of factual circumstances, 
even if these affect different individual consumers. The sharing of legal services by 
lawyers and other legal professionals, the sharing of judicial and experts’ time, and 
the reduction in time taken by litigation from both claimants and defendants bring 
down the costs per case, and thereby the costs per unit of increased deterrence of the 
undesirable behaviour, as well as the costs of achieving a certain level of law 
enforcement.  
Thus, the collective actions for injunctions according to the ID allow society (and 
therefore consumers) to attain a given degree of enforcement at lower costs, both to 
the parties involved and to the public, or, equivalently, to attain higher levels of 
enforcement for the same total cost. However, the deficiencies of the ID, which limit 
its effectiveness especially in a cross-border context (see effectiveness section above), 
reduce these potential benefits to a significant degree.  
As indicated before, a considerable proportion of consumers in the EU continue to 
experience unfair commercial practices, both well-known forms (unsolicited ads, 
deceptive practices, scams) as well as some recent problems in the area of 
commercial practices (comparison tools). The same is true regarding unfair contract 
terms.499 However, the principle-based approach of the EU directives regarding unfair 
commercial practices (the UCPD) and unfair contract terms (the UCTD) provides by 
and large an effective framework for achieving a high level of consumer protection, as 
concluded by this evaluation (although the effectiveness of both directives can be 
increased, see recommendations). The continued existence of unfair commercial 
practices and unfair contract terms on the market therefore points at persisting 
                                           
498 In a series of Eurobarometers, the proportion of respondents expressing trust in public authorities rose 
slightly from 2006 to 2014, from 57% to 61%. This trend is largely driven by changes in the EU15, which 
showed a larger increase in trust of public authorities compared to the EU12/13 (8 percentage point 
increase from 2008 to 2014 compared to 6 percentage point increase). Source: Special Eurobarometers 252 
and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 282, 299, 332, 358 and 397. 
499 See above and the analysis of levels of awareness and key trends since the adoption of key directives in 
Annex VIII. 
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shortcomings in the level of enforcement,500 as has been recognised by both business 
associations and consumer organisations responding to the open public consultation in 
the framework of the Fitness Check, as well as during the discussions at the EU 
Consumer Summit in October 2016, with a call for more effective and consistent 
enforcement of the directives.501 The persistence of problems with unfair commercial 
practices and contract terms does therefore not question the benefits to consumers 
achieved by the legal framework in this area of EU consumer policy, but rather 
indicates that the resulting welfare effects can be further increased through improved 
enforcement, including by reducing the obstacles to collective actions.  
6.3. Coherence 
6.3.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing 
 Interplay between UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 6.3.1.1.
and the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law 
instruments (in the advertising stage)  
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at different 
stages of the transaction, in particular as demonstrated by their practical 
application; [Note: The focus is here on the advertising stage. Key aspects to 
consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do traders 
implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD useful 
in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements of the 
CRD?] 
For “invitations to purchase”, Article 7(4) UCPD regards certain pieces of information 
as “material”. This means that traders will need to provide consumers with this 
information.502 Failing to provide consumers with information required by Article 7(4) 
in the case of an invitation to purchase is a misleading omission, if this failure is likely 
to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he or she would not 
have taken otherwise.503 Hence, Article 7(4) UCPD establishes an indirect duty to 
disclose information in the specific context of “invitations to purchase”, subject to the 
well-known transactional decision test.  
In the 2016 UCPD Guidance, the European Commission stressed that, in order not to 
place unnecessary or disproportionate information burdens on traders, the 
requirements of Article 7(4) are not static and require different pieces of information 
depending on the situation. This follows, in particular, from the clarifications made 
both in Articles 7(1), 7(3) and 7(4) that the factual context and limits of the 
communication medium used should be taken into account.504 In addition, under the 
                                           
500 Another factor are continuing innovations by traders, which include new practices that are considered to 
be unfair by authorities or courts (but where a certain time lag between introduction of the practice on the 
market and the official categorisation as being an 'unfair practice' may exist). 
501 See Part 2 of this report and outcomes of the 2016 European Consumer Summit available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=34204. 
502 UCPD Guidance document, 52. 
503 UCPD Guidance document, 74. 
504 UCPD Guidance document, 75. 
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introductory part of Article 7(4), traders do not need to provide information in 
invitations to purchase that is already apparent from the context.505 
According to Article 2(i) UCPD, “invitation to purchase” means “a commercial 
communication which indicates characteristics of the product and the price in a way 
appropriate to the means of the commercial communication used and thereby enables 
the consumer to make a purchase”. In the Ving Sverige case, the CJEU held “that, for 
a commercial communication to be capable of being categorised as an invitation to 
purchase, it is not necessary for it to include an actual opportunity to purchase or for 
it to appear in proximity to and at the same time as such an opportunity.”506 It follows 
that the concept is narrower than “advertising”, “marketing” or “commercial 
communication”. As soon as the information given in a “commercial communication” is 
sufficient to enable the consumer to take a decision as to whether to purchase the 
advertised product for the advertised price, the pieces of information mentioned in 
Article 7(4) must be provided (if it not otherwise apparent from the context).507 An 
“invitation to purchase” does not necessarily imply that the next step for the consumer 
is to enter into a contract with a trader.508 It follows that the concept does not simply 
refer to the precontractual stage in the strict sense (i.e. the very moment before the 
contract is signed). 
In the 2016 UCPD Guidance, the European Commission explained that this distinction 
between the stage of “invitation to purchase” and the “precontractual stage” is 
particularly important in relation to the interplay between the Article 7(4) UCPD and 
Article 5 CRD concerning on-premises contracts and Article 6 CRD concerning off-
premises and distance contracts. Article 5/6 CRD imposes a positive obligation on 
traders to provide the consumer, before he or she enters into a contract (i.e. at the 
precontractual stage), with certain pieces of information, in a clear and 
comprehensible manner, unless if already apparent from the context. The amount of 
information that must be provided at the precontractual stage (under Article 5/6 CRD) 
is clearly more comprehensive than that required in the context of an invitation to 
purchase (under Article 7(4) UCPD). Moreover, Article 5/6 CRD takes a minimum 
harmonisation approach, which means that Member States can maintain or introduce 
additional precontractual information requirements; this is not possible under the full 
harmonisation approach of Article 7(4) UCPD.509 Finally, Article 5/6 CRD does not 
contain the requirement that the failure to provide the required information be likely 
to cause the average consumer to take a different transactional decision. As pointed 
out by the European Commission, complying with the more comprehensive 
information requirements of Article 5/6 CRD should normally also ensure compliance 
with Article 7(4) UCPD, as far as the content of the information is concerned.510  
                                           
505 UCPD Guidance document, 73. 
506 Case C-122/10 Konsumentombudsmannen v Ving Sverige AB, Judgement of 12 May 2011, paragraph 32. 
507 UCPD Guidance document, 52. 
508 UCPD Guidance document, 52. 
509 UCPD Guidance document, 19-20, where the Commission clarified that, for commercial practices falling 
under the fully harmonised UCPD, the minimum harmonisation clause of Article 5(4) CRD means that 
Member States may adopt or retain additional precontractual information requirements for on-premises 
contracts that go beyond the UCPD, as long as these national requirements only apply to on-premises 
contracts and at the pre-contractual stage (i.e. before the contract is signed). 
510 UCPD Guidance document, 20; CRD Guidance document, 17. The UCPD will still be applicable when 
assessing any misleading or aggressive commercial practices by a trader on the form and presentation of 
this information to the consumer. See UCPD Guidance document, 74-80, for the pieces of information to be 
provided in the context of an invitation to purchase. 
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On the basis of the country research and other evidence collected, the following 
conclusions can be drawn as to the level of traders’ awareness of Article 7(4) UCPD 
and Article 5/6 CRD: 
In a large number of Member States the level of awareness of traders as regards 
Article 7(4) UCPD is generally considered to be fairly high.511 Yet, bigger traders are 
more likely to be aware of the information requirements and to implement them.512 
The same holds for members of trade associations.513 They also have a reputation 
which is at stake if they contravene the legal standards.514 By contrast, the level of 
awareness amongst SMEs appears to be lower.515 The same holds for online-traders, 
who reportedly often fail to meet the exact requirements and especially the indication 
of the final price often causes considerable problems in practice.516 The country 
research confirms the Commission’s experience that in practice the requirement to 
state the total price in an invitation to purchase is not always complied with.517  
In a small number of Member States, the general level of awareness of traders as 
regards Article 7(4) UCPD is considered to be relatively low,518 and because of this 
reason there has been little practical application of these rules.519 In another small 
group of Member States, the extent to which traders are aware of these information 
requirements and the extent to which these requirements are met in practice are not 
clear.520 
In comparison, the level of awareness of traders as regards the more recent Article 
5/6 CRD seems to be equally high if not higher than the level of awareness of Article 
7(4) UCPD, and it was also noted by stakeholders that nowadays the focus is very 
much on compliance with Article 5/6 CRD.521 One of the reasons might be that positive 
information duties are much more effective than a prohibition of misleading omissions, 
indirectly establishing a general duty to provide essential information, subject to a 
transactional decision test.522 Under Article 7(4) UCPD, the failure to provide the 
required information must be likely to cause the average consumer to take a 
transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise, whereas the breach of the 
                                           
511 E.g. country reports Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria (but one consumer organisation disagreed), France, 
Germany, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland (view of trade associations), Romania, Sweden. 
512 E.g. country reports Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Malta, Lithuania, Slovakia. 
513 E.g. country reports France, Lithuania, the Netherlands. 
514 Country report the Netherlands. 
515 E.g. country reports Estonia, Malta. 
516 Country report Austria. See also e.g. country report Czech Republic. 
517 E.g. country reports Austria, Croatia (view of consumer assocations and ECC), Latvia. See also 
Commission Guidance, 77. 
518 E.g. country reports Cyprus (view of the Regulator), Latvia. 
519 Country report Malta (with the exception of high levels of awareness in specific sectors, according to 
sector-specific authorities). 
520 E.g. country reports Spain, United Kingdom. 
521 Country reports Estonia, Poland (view of consumer associations). 
522 Country report Slovenia (view of stakeholders). 
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positive information duties of Article 5/6 CRD is much easier to prove (because there 
is no transactional decision test).523  
As regards the interplay between Article 7(4) UCPD and Article 5/6 CRD, the results of 
the country research can be summarised as follows:  
• In a small group of Member States the prevailing opinion seems to be that 
Article 7(4) UCPD is useful and not redundant in the light of the more 
comprehensive precontractual information requirements of Article 5/6 CRD.524 
It was mentioned that Article 7(4) UCPD targets a specific situation at the B2C 
advertising stage (“invitation to purchase”) whereas Article 5/6 CRD imposes 
more detailed precontractual information requirements (before the contract is 
signed).525 In this perspective, Article 7(4) UCPD should remain in force despite 
all the information requirements of the CRD, as the information requirements 
under the UCPD play a role in the earlier stages of the relationship.526 Parallel 
information requirements do not create confusion for consumers and are rather 
informative.527,528 Any overlap and friction between the UCPD and the CRD 
should not be removed, since the goals of these directives are different 
(preventing misleading practices versus having clarity on what the contract 
concluded actually entails).529 It was said to be unlikely that the current 
overlap of information requirements would constitute a burden for traders or 
consumers, considering that traders knowing what information to provide will 
provide it just once and fulfil both requirements at once. Moreover, it may be 
easier for courts and enforcement authorities to have separate lists of 
information requirements, to better know what to enforce, in which situation 
and under which law. The overlap between information requirements in the 
UCPD and CRD is therefore not considered problematic, and need to change the 
law is not seen.530 
• In another group of Member States, the information requirements laid down by 
Article 7(4) UCPD are considered not useful and redundant in view of the more 
comprehensive precontractual information requirements laid down in Article 
5/6 CRD.531,532 In this perspective, it would seem reasonable to have all 
                                           
523 Country report France. 
524 E.g. country reports Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia (view of consumer assocations and ECC), Lithuania (view 
of enforcement authority), Malta, Romania. 
525 Country reports Bulgaria, Cyprus. 
526 Country report the Netherlands (view of consumer organisations). 
527 Country report Estonia (view of consumer association). 
528 This view was also supported by the results of the behavioural experiments that were conducted as a 
part of the 2016 consumer market study for the Fitness Check. The results of the behavioural experiments 
showed that respondents did not feel overwhelmed by the information required by the UCPD. 
“Arrangements for complaint handling” and “geographical address of the seller” were the only items that 
respondents indicated they would not need to see in an advertisement. 
529 Country report the Netherlands (view of the enforcement authority). 
530 Country report Poland (view of trade associations). 
531 E.g. country report Hungary (view of the relevant ministry). 
532 This was also the view suggested by the participants of Workshop 1 on Simplifying consumer information 
requirements at the 2016 Consumer Summit. The participants also suggested that information should be 
improved through simplified language and clear requirements for printed text (size, font, etc.). 
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information to be provided to the consumers regulated in one act, which would 
be beneficial for both businesses and consumers.533 
• In a third group of Member States, the view seems to be that the information 
requirements imposed by Article 7(4) UCPD need a more precise coordination 
with the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements of 
Article 5/6 CRD.534 It is noted that there is some uncertainty in relation to the 
precise meaning of the concept of “invitation to purchase”.535 In this 
perspective, the overlap between Article 7(4) UCPD and Article 5/6 CRD may 
create confusion not only among consumers and businesses, but also among 
courts and enforcement authorities.536 It is not always clear what type of 
information with what kind of specificity should be given at what stage of the 
marketing and contracting process.537  
Both the second and the third perspective on the interplay between Article 7(4) UCPD 
and Article 5/6 CRD would imply that a change to current rules would be 
recommended to increase coherence. This appears to the most prevalent view, as the 
results of the open public consultation confirm: the majority of all respondent 
categories either strongly agree or tend to agree that the marketing/pre-contractual 
information requirements currently included in the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, Price Indication Directive and Consumer Rights Directive should be 
regrouped and streamlined. For example, 67% of consumer respondents, 68% of 
public authorities, 62% of business respondents (companies) and 56% of business 
associations agreed with this statement.538 Especially business stakeholders were 
strongly in favour of streamlining, simplifying and consolidating the current consumer 
acquis, as long as this was accomplished in a balanced and proportionate way that did 
not place additional burdens or regulations on EU businesses (as illustrated by 16 
submitted position papers). Two of the three consumer organisations that provided 
position papers in the framework of the open public consultation agreed with the 
business stakeholders that there was room to streamline and consolidate consumer 
legislation where possible, as long as this did not lead to an overall lower level of 
protection for consumers. Both consumer organisations mentioned the pre-contractual 
information requirements in particular as an area that could be further consolidated.  
In this context it was also emphasised by stakeholders in the country research that 
the amount of information that must be provided to consumers under Article 7(4) 
UCPD and/or Article 5/6 CRD is pushing the “information-model” to its limits, creating 
“information overload” and confusion amongst consumers and also creating costs for 
businesses.539 Taking into account the insights of behavioural economics, there should 
be a critical analysis of what type of information with what kind of specificity should be 
given at what stage of the marketing and contracting process. For example, it was 
suggested that all information does not necessarily have to be included in an 
“invitation to purchase”; it should be enough that information is provided before the 
actual purchase.540 It is not the role of advertising to provide such detailed information 
                                           
533 E.g. country report Slovenia (view of the relevant ministry). 
534 E.g. country reports Germany (view of the stakeholders), Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden. 
535 Country reports Denmark, the Netherlands. 
536 Country report Italy. 
537 Country report the Netherlands (view of the enforcement authority). 
538 See Part 2 of this report. 
539 E.g. country reports Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Slovakia, Portugal, Sweden. 
540 Country report Sweden. 
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such as right to withdrawal so early on, but rather its role is to attract the 
consumer.541 Likewise, it was stated that, at the advertising stage, there is no direct 
dialogue with the consumer and that at this stage only the really essential information 
should be mandatory. By contrast, in the pre-contractual phase, when a one-on-one 
dialogue with the consumer starts, there should be a more extensive obligation to 
inform consumers.542 This was also stressed in legal scholarship, coming to the 
conclusion that the best way forward would be to delete Article 7(4) UCPD.543  
The results of the open public consultation emphasise the support for a gradual 
approach for information provision according to the different stages of the transaction, 
at least among business stakeholders: The majority of business associations (81%), 
business respondents (65%) and “other” respondents (69%) either strongly agree or 
tend to agree that the information given to consumers at the advertising stage should 
focus on the essentials while more detailed information should be required only at the 
moment before the contract is concluded. However, only 45% of consumer 
associations and 28% of consumer respondents agree with this statement, with 50% 
of both consumer associations and consumers respondents either tending to disagree 
or strongly disagreeing in this respect.  
 
• Any costs arising due this multiplicity of information obligations. [Key aspects to 
consider are: Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and 
the E-commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs 
arising for public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of 
information obligations?] 
The information requirements set out in Article 7(4) UCPD are complemented not only 
by the information requirements of Article 5 CRD, but also by a number of information 
requirements laid down in the Services Directive and in the E-Commerce Directive.  
The information requirements in Article 22 of the Services Directive apply in addition 
to the information required for invitations to purchase under Article 7(4) UCPD.544 
However, it should be noted that Article 22 of the Services Directive refers to 
information that should be made available to service recipients in all types of relations 
(B2C and B2B) and does not specifically target the marketing or contracting stage, 
whereas Article 7(4) UCPD is only applicable to B2C transactions and more specifically 
to “invitations to purchase”.545 Moreover, under Article 22 of the Services Directive, 
certain pieces of information must only be provided at the recipient’s request.546 The 
E-Commerce Directive applies to information society services, which can include the 
services provided by operators of websites and online platforms which allow 
consumers to buy a good or service. Article 5 lays down general information 
requirements for service providers, while Article 6 lays down information to be 
provided in commercial communications. The lists of items set out in these two 
                                           
541 Country report Greece (government authorities and business associations). 
542 Country report Belgium (views of businesses). 
543 See B. Keirsbilck, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices”, EJCL, 
2013, p. 233 et seq. (see p. 264). See also country report Belgium. 
544 UCPD Guidance document, 22. 
545 Country report Cyprus. 
546 Country report Bulgaria; CRD Guidance document, 18 
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Articles are minimum lists.547 By contrast, the full harmonisation Article 7(4) UCPD 
applies to all types of B2C invitations to purchase, whether offline or online.  
On the basis of the country research, the following conclusions can be drawn as 
regards the practical experiences with the above-mentioned multiplicity of information 
requirements and any costs arising therefrom: 
In several Member States the view of stakeholders is that the scopes of the various 
information requirements in UCPD, Services Directive and E-Commerce Directive do 
not overlap (significantly) or at least that there have not been practical problems 
reported in this respect, and that, hence, no related costs are incurred by businesses 
or by public authorities.548 In other countries, it is admitted that costs can arise for 
businesses, as the fragmentation in advertising law requires resort to and review of 
multiple laws and regulations.549 Moreover, where different authorities are competent 
to enforce the various implementing provisions, there may be coordination issues that 
tend to increase costs.550 It was also reported that the interplay between the UCPD 
and the E-Commerce Directive is considered particularly ineffective.551 An example of 
overlap and conflict between the UCPD and E-Commerce Directive is mentioned in 
several country reports: Art. 5 E-Commerce Directive provides that information should 
be given on ‘whether prices are inclusive of tax and delivery costs’, whereas Art. 7(4) 
UCPD provides that prices in an invitation to purchase shall be inclusive of tax and 
costs.552 Such discrepancies are considered not desirable and may also affect 
enforcement (and related costs), as the legal framework is said to be extremely 
complicated to operate for supervisory authorities (as stated by one of them).553 
Even for the European Commission it was not particularly easy to give an overview of 
the various information requirements under the UCPD, the CRD, the Services Directive 
and the E-Commerce Directive in its CRD Guidance document.554 Of particular concern 
in this context is also Article 6(8) CRD, according to which the information 
requirements in relation to distance contracts are in addition to the information 
requirements in the Services Directive and in the E-Commerce Directive and do not 
prevent Member States from imposing additional information requirements in 
accordance with those directives.555 It is noted that the broad space left to the 
Member States can create relevant problems in the cross-border trade and is in 
evident contrast with the targeted full harmonisation approach.556 Overall, it would 
                                           
547 UCPD Guidance document, 22-23.  
548 E.g. country reports Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia. 
549 E.g. country report Cyprus. 
550 E.g. country reports Cyprus, Malta. 
551 E.g. country report France (view of one stakeholder regarding platforms in particular). 
552 See e.g. country reports Netherlands and Lithuania. The full text of the required indication according to 
Article 7(4)(c) UCPD is: "the price inclusive of taxes, or where the nature of the product means that the 
price cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the manner in which the price is calculated, as well as, 
where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges or, where these charges cannot 
reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact that such additional charges may be payable." 
553 Country report Netherlands. 
554 CRD Guidance document, pp.16-29 (Pre-contractual information), p.19 (Overlapping information 
requirements) and pp.73-80 (Annex II). 
555 See also CRD Guidance document, 19 
556 E.g. country report Italy. 
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seem that there is a clear need for information requirements under the different 
directives to be coordinated properly, to reduce the multiplicity of information 
obligations and resulting costs due to their complexity, both for businesses and 
enforcement authorities. 
For an in-depth discussion of costs of businesses related to compliance with the legal 
framework in advertising and marketing, refer to the evaluation questions related to 
efficiency, Section 6.2 above. 
 Interplay between PID information requirements and the information 6.3.1.2.
requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments (in the 
advertising stage)  
• The burden for businesses arising from obligations under the Price Indication 
Directive at different stages of the transaction (i.e. advertising and pre-contractual 
stage);  
There is incidental evidence from the country research that compliance with the 
obligations of the PID is less of a burden for large retailers, due to economies of scale. 
Existing exemptions for small retailers seem to alleviate the burden on those retailers. 
While the interviews with business associations and other stakeholders in all EU 
Member States and the literature reviewed did not provide further data on the burden 
for businesses arising from the obligations under the PID at the advertising and pre-
contractual stages, the business interviews conducted for this study give some 
detailed insights.557 On basis of the interview results it was concluded that the costs of 
(unit) price indication do not seem to imply disproportionate burdens on businesses 
(see above, efficiency, Section 6.2).  
In this context reference can be made to the recent judgment of the CJEU in Citroën 
Commerce.558 The CJEU confirmed that although Article 3(4) lays down no general 
obligation to mention the selling price, where an advertisement mentions both the 
characteristics of the product on offer and a price, this will be regarded by a 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer, to be 
the selling price of that product. In such a case, the price so indicated must satisfy the 
requirements of the PID.559 In this particular case this amounted to the obligation to 
indicate the final price within the meaning of Article 2(a) of the PID, including costs to 
be paid by the consumer for the delivery of the good. With regard to the relationship 
between the UCPD and the PID the Court reminded that under Article 3(4) of the 
UCPD in the case of conflict between the provisions of the directive and the other rules 
of EU law regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the latter are to 
prevail and apply to those specific aspects. Hence the indication, in an advertisement, 
of the selling price a total price is governed by the PID and the UCPD cannot apply as 
regards that aspect. For that reason in that case Article 7(4)(c) of the UCPD (invitation 
to purchase) needed not be interpreted.560  
That being said it is not clear to what extent the obligation to indicate the (final) price 
in advertisements adds an important burden to the obligations arising for businesses 
from other information duties. 
                                           
557 For more details on the business interviews, refer to Part 4 of this report. 
558 Judgment in Citroên Commerce, C-476/14, EU:C:2016:527. 
559 Paragraph 30 of the judgment.  
560 Paragraphs 42-46 of the judgment. 
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• The consumer benefits of receiving the information required under the Price 
Indication Directive at different stages of the transaction;  
See answers to the evaluation questions regarding effectiveness (Section 6.1) and the 
discussion of benefits of the legal framework in advertising and marketing for 
consumers in the efficiency section (Section 6.2). 
 
• The effect on cross-border trade of the divergences between national laws due to 
the minimum harmonisation character and the use of regulatory options under the 
Price Indication Directive. 
The research conducted for this evaluation did not provide evidence that the 
divergences between national laws due to the minimum harmonisation character and 
the use of regulatory options under the Price Indication Directive have a significant 
effect on cross-border trade. However, some business stakeholders have argued in 
their written submissions to the open public consultation that the PID should in 
general be made more consistent across the EU with respect to derogations and units, 
as in their view different national rules have made it confusing and difficult to apply 
them in practice, especially for retailers that sell online cross-border.561  
 Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  6.3.1.3.
• Analyse the awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation regarding unfair commercial practices and information obligations 
regarding advertising by businesses, consumers and the specific public enforcement 
bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by their practical 
application. [Key question here is: Is the UCPD applied in practice by national 
authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair commercial practices in the 
regulated sectors?] 
The UCPD is a framework directive that works as a "safety net" ensuring that a high 
common level of consumer protection against unfair commercial practices can be 
maintained in all sectors, including by complementing and filling gaps in other EU 
law.562 Article 3(4) UCPD read in conjunction with Recital 10 implies that a provision of 
EU law will prevail over the UCPD if all of the following three conditions are fulfilled: it 
has the status of EU law, it regulates a specific aspect of commercial practices, and 
there is a conflict between the two provisions or the content of the other EU law 
provision overlaps with the content of the relevant UCPD provision, for instance by 
regulating the conduct at stake in a more detailed manner and/or by being applicable 
to a specific sector. Where all three conditions set out above are fulfilled, the UCPD 
will not apply to the specific aspect of the commercial practice regulated, for example, 
by a sector-specific rule.563 The UCPD continues nonetheless to remain relevant to 
                                           
561 For example, EuroCommerce stated: “As with other minimum harmonisation Directives, EuroCommerce 
thinks that the numerous derogations, which allow member states to adopt different national rules have 
made it confusing and difficult to apply in practice, especially for retailers that sell online cross-border. In 
particular, Article 10 (minimum harmonisation) and Article 6 (exemptions for non-food products) created 
obstacles in cross-border trade.” The three consumer organisations that provided written submissions were 
also unanimous in the desire to see the PID be made more consistent with respect to accepted units and 
exemptions. This view was supported by two public authorities that in their written submissions suggested 
that the PID be implemented more consistently across the EU with respect to units and derogations. 
562 UCPD Guidance document, 14. 
563 UCPD Guidance document, 15. 
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assess other possible aspects of the commercial practice not covered by the sector-
specific provisions, such as, for example, aggressive behaviour by a trader.564  
As regards the awareness of the UCPD requirements by businesses, consumers and 
the specific public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors (electronic 
communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial services), the 
following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the country research: 
First, it appears that consumers’ awareness of the UCPD’s applicability in the regulated 
sectors is generally considered insufficient, whereas the general awareness of the 
UCPD requirements seems to be higher. Consumers do not seem adequately informed 
that the UCPD complements other EU legislation that regulates specific aspects of 
unfair commercial practices and that the UCPD thus also applies in regulated sectors.  
Second, it appears that businesses are generally considered to be quite well aware of 
the application of the UCPD in the regulated sectors. They are obliged to comply with 
the UCPD and, as a result, they would be well-informed of its requirements. However, 
awareness and compliance appear to be two different things. Violations of the UCPD 
requirements are common in the regulated sectors.565 Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that a small number of stakeholders mentioned a lack of awareness by traders. 
According to a Dutch ministry, for instance, companies active in the regulated sectors 
tend to look at sector-specific legislation and may believe that horizontal EU consumer 
legislation such as the UCPD is not applicable to their sector. This issue was also 
reported by Sweden, particularly in the financial sector.566  
Third, it appears that enforcement authorities are generally considered to have a fairly 
good knowledge of the interaction between the UCPD and sector-specific legislation. 
However, the enforcement system does not always work properly (see further below).  
In sum, businesses and enforcement bodies are generally considered to be aware of 
the combined application of the two sets of rules in the regulated sectors. The 
awareness of consumers of the UCPD requirements in the regulated sectors, however, 
seems be insufficient. 
 
• Specify whether in Member States it is the same authority which is responsible for 
the enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law (UCPD) and the sector specific 
rules, or whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of 
rules; [If different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an 
institutionalised cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for 
                                           
564 UCPD Guidance document, 15. 
565 For instance, the Second consumer market study on the functioning of the retail electricity markets for 
consumers in the EU found that a third (34%) of consumers surveyed disagreed that advertising from 
electricity companies does not deceive, mislead or omit relevant information and 77% agreed  that 
electricity companies made their tariffs appear more attractive than they really were to encourage 
customers to switch, and that many stakeholders considered unfair commercial practices by electricity 
companies to be, overall, “common”. In the area of financial services, the 2016 Consumer Markets 
Scoreboard points to a lack of compliance by business, shown e.g. in the EU sweep conducted in March 
2014 that found that relevant product information on consumer credit was not provided to consumers on 
more than 20% of the surveyed websites in 11 Member States. In the area of telecommunication services, 
the 2012 Consumer  market  study  on  the functioning  of  the  market  for  internet access and provision 
from a consumer perspective also reported that 48% of the national regulatory authorities, consumer 
organisations, members of  the  Consumer  Protection Cooperation  Network,  and  ADR  entities  that  
responded  to  the study’s  stakeholder  survey  indicated  that  in  their  view  unfair  commercial  practices  
in  their country are common. 
566 Country reports Netherlands and Sweden. 
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enforcement affect the use of UCPD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the 
previous bullet?]  
In the UCPD Guidance document, the Commission stressed that Article 3(4) UCPD 
bears an impact on the public enforcement of the UCPD. “Based on Article 11, in order 
to ensure the proper enforcement of EU consumer protection laws, Member States 
should ensure coordination in good faith between the different competent enforcement 
authorities. In those Member States where different authorities are responsible for 
enforcing the UCPD and sector-specific legislation, the authorities should closely 
cooperate to ensure that the findings of their respective investigations into the same 
trader and/or commercial practice are consistent.”567 On the basis of the country 
reports, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
In the vast majority of the Member States, different authorities are responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal consumer law and the sector-specific rules.568 In 
general, one centralised authority is competent to enforce the UCPD (regardless of the 
sector), while the sector-specific rules are enforced by another authority or other 
authorities.  
In countries such as Bulgaria the cooperation between the various competent 
authorities is regulated by legal provisions in multiple legal acts.569 Some countries 
have established a cooperation mechanism for the separate authorities. The Italian 
enforcement bodies, for instance, often cooperate via memoranda of understanding.570 
In Romania certain protocols exist in the energy and telecommunications sector; as 
from 2016 a specific legal framework on institutional cooperation is in place.571 Such 
cooperation protocols also exist in the Netherlands572 and the Czech Republic.573 
In other countries like Latvia cooperation takes place informally via regular meetings 
and discussions.574 In France the enforcement bodies work closely together and often 
exchange information or redirect consumers towards the competent body if necessary. 
In Cyprus, there is no institutional arrangement for cooperation, but the competent 
authorities cooperate unofficially. This mainly involves mutual consultation and each 
authority referring a case that falls within the competence of another authority to the 
competent authority.575 Furthermore, Malta indicated not to have a formal cooperation 
mechanism.576 The same holds for Poland577 and Portugal.578 
                                           
567 UCPD Guidance document, 17. 
568 See various country reports, with country report Spain as a remarkable exception (mentioned having 
only one (general) enforcement body). 
569 Country report Bulgaria. 
570 Country report Italy. 
571 Country report Romania. 
572 Country report the Netherlands. 
573 Country report Czech Republic. 
574 Country report Latvia. 
575 Country report Croatia. 
576 Country report Malta. 
577 Country report Poland. 
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It should be noted that certain Member States created a separate regime for the 
financial sector. In Slovakia there is one general authority (the Slovak Trade 
Inspection) that supervises the compliance with the UCPD. However, a separate body, 
namely the National Bank of Slovakia, is authorised to enforce the horizontal 
consumer protection legislation as well as the sector-specific rules in the financial 
sector.579 Romania also established a different regime for the financial sector. The 
Romanian National Authority for Consumer Protection (NACP) has the power to 
enforce the UCTD in general and in the regulated sectors. Separate bodies enforce the 
sector-specific rules (but not the horizontal legislation) in the regulated sectors. 
However, the NACP is authorised to enforce both the horizontal consumer protection 
legislation and the sector-specific rules in the financial sector.580 
In answer to the key question, the institutional arrangements for enforcement indeed 
sometimes affect the use of the UCPD in the regulated sectors. It appears from the 
country reports that the cooperation between the different bodies is not always 
efficient.581 As indicated earlier, the powers of the enforcement bodies usually depend 
on whether horizontal or sector-specific legislation was infringed. Consequently, it is 
not always clear for consumers to which body they should address a complaint. 
Consumers tend to recognise that their rights were violated, but do not know which 
specific rule was breached.582 Thus, if the respective powers of the enforcement 
bodies depend on which rule was breached, consumers may not know which body is 
responsible. It appears that a consumer that wants to exercise the rights under the 
UCPD in a regulated sector, but wrongly addresses the sector-specific enforcement 
body, is not always redirected to the competent body. Furthermore, it should be 
mentioned that the sector-specific legislation sometimes overlaps with the general 
principles set out by the UCPD. Because of the overlapping provisions, different bodies 
could consider themselves authorised. This way, businesses could be fined twice by 
different bodies on the basis of different regulation.  
In conclusion, the country research established that the majority of the Member 
States has divided the responsibility to enforce the UCPD and sector-specific rules 
between different authorities. It appears that this indeed causes some problems 
regarding the application of the general consumer legislation in the regulated sectors.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
unfair commercial practices and information obligations regarding advertising [Key 
aspects to consider are: How do they work together with the sectoral legislation? 
Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]; What are the benefits of the 
complementary application of the UCPD in the regulated sectors? What are the 
costs due to its complementary application with the sectoral EU consumer 
protection legislation? Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the 
EU sector-specific rules and horizontal EU consumer law concerning unfair 
commercial practices and information obligations regarding advertising. 
                                                                                                                               
578 Country report Portugal. Despite the lack of formal cooperation mechanisms, some authorities admit to 
using informal mechanisms, such as bilateral meetings or meetings within the Centre of Studies on Public 
Law and Regulation (CEDIPRE). 
579 Country report Slovakia. 
580 Country report Romania. 
581 See also e.g. country report Czech Republic. 
582 E.g. country report Austria. 
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On the basis of the available country reports, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
In the majority of Member States the interplay between the horizontal UCPD and the 
sector-specific rules is generally considered to provide for a clear and coherent legal 
framework concerning unfair commercial practices and information obligations 
regarding advertising. Most stakeholders consider the legal framework rather clear 
and coherent.583 General rules and sector-specific rules do not interfere and 
complement each other. Article 3(4) UCPD clearly provides that in case of conflict 
between the UCPD and sector-specific rules, the latter prevail. Conflicts between the 
general and the sector-specific rules are scarce anyhow.584 The combination of the 
UCPD and the sector-specific rules therefore seems to work fairly well in practice. 
The overall perception is that the complementary application of the UCPD and sector-
specific rules in the regulated sectors generally benefits consumers. As intended by 
the legislator, the UCPD works as a "safety net" ensuring that a high common level of 
consumer protection against unfair commercial practices can be maintained in all 
sectors, including by complementing and filling gaps in other EU law. The specific 
legislation usually does not tackle every problem, particularly in dynamic sectors like 
financial regulation, energy and transport. As the UCPD is applicable in each situation, 
potential gaps in the sector-specific regulation are filled. Vice versa, the sole 
application of the UCPD in the regulated sectors would not always be sufficient. The 
value of sector-specific legislation is widely recognised. The sector-specific legislation 
thus tends to protect consumers in the regulated areas, in case the horizontal 
legislative framework is not sufficient.585  
In the country research, stakeholders in most countries could not provide any 
assessment regarding possible costs for businesses due to the complementary 
application of the UCPD with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation. The few 
stakeholders that had an opinion, often differed in their view: While in Portugal, a 
business association emphasised that the existence of horizontal rules and sectoral 
legislation results in costs for traders, in the Czech Republic stakeholders were not 
sure to what extent there are costs due to the complementary application, and in 
Romania no costs were mentioned by stakeholders, as there were no overlaps in their 
opinion.586  
However, it is reported in a number of Member States that the application of 
numerous (overlapping) texts jeopardises the clarity of the legal framework.587 A 
French respondent spoke of a “mille-feuille” (literally: thousand-leaf, a French pastry) 
of provisions in the field of unfair commercial practices.588 The wide range of 
legislation in different texts and sectors could hinder the general understanding of 
problems in practice, thereby creating legal uncertainty for consumers and 
businesses.589 In the UK, stakeholders argued in a more general note that “neither 
                                           
583 However, stakeholders referred to in the country reports Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus and UK mentioned that 
the overall clarity and coherence of the legal framework should be improved. 
584 Country report France. 
585 See also J. STUYCK, “Consumer concepts in EU secondary law”, paper 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/ccm/bochumfeb2014def.docx. 
586 Country reports Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania. 
587 See in particular country reports Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus and UK.  
588 Country report France. 
589 Country report Spain; See also B. J. DRIJBER in M. ROGGENKAMP and H. BJORNEBYE, “European Energy & 
Law Report”, Volume X, Intersentia, 14. 
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domestically (CRA 2015) nor at EU level legislation (Consumer Rights Directive 2011) 
[has] gone far enough to consolidate the complexity of the law in consumer 
protection, [and] unsurprisingly, perhaps, consumers seem either reluctant or less 
than willing to engage with the full suite of remedies.”  
In many Member States, the perception is that there is in any event ample room for 
reducing overlaps in information requirements. There are many different information 
requirements that could need coordination and revision (see also above).590 The 
country research shows that there may also be a need for some further clarification of 
the interplay between the UCPD and the sector-specific rules.591 In this respect, it is 
found that the new UCPD guidance document provides helpful insight to understand 
the interplay.592 Importantly, it is often stated that the main problem is not so much 
the overlaps or conflicts between the UCPD and sector-specific rules but rather the still 
existing competence gaps and conflicts between different enforcement authorities (see 
answer to the previous evaluation question).593 
6.3.2. Contract conclusion and performance  
 Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  6.3.2.1.
• Analyse the awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation concerning unfair contract terms and contractual transparency 
requirements by businesses, consumers and the specific public enforcement bodies 
in the relevant sectors, in particular as demonstrated by their practical application; 
[Key question here is: Is the UCTD applied in practice by national authorities and 
courts as a legal basis to combat the use of unfair contract terms in the regulated 
sectors?] 
On the basis of the country research, it appears the majority of the stakeholders 
believe that the awareness of consumers is insufficient.594 Most consumers seem not 
to be adequately informed of the existence of the general unfair contract terms 
regime, let alone know that this general regime also applies to the regulated 
sectors.595 This unawareness of consumers was also acknowledged by several legal 
scholars596 and is recognised in the case law of the CJEU.597 Some countries have 
                                           
590 Country reports Austria, Denmark, Italy. 
591 E.g. country report Cyprus.  
592 Country reports Cyprus, Denmark. 
593 Country reports Czech Republic, Italy, Malta, Romania. 
594 On the contrary, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Italy mentioned that, in the financial sector, the horizontal 
consumer legislation is often applied and consumers seem to be more aware of their rights. 
595 This is also supported by responses to the online public consultation. Respondents were asked about the 
interplay between horizontal EU consumer law and EU sector-specific rules in five different sectors (financial 
services, passenger transport, electronic communication, energy and environmental protection). There was 
no sector in which a majority of respondents agreed that consumers were aware of the complementary 
application of EU consumer and marketing laws in that sector. 
596 H-W. MICKLITZ and N. REICH, “The Court and sleeping beauty: the revival of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive (UCTD)” in Common Market Law Review 51, 2014, 777, 2014; A. VAN OEVELEN, S. RUTTEN and F. 
DUPON, “Ambtshalve inroepbaarheid van Europees consumentenrechtenrecht, materieelrechtelijk en 
procesrechtelijk beschouwd” in G. STRAETMANS and M. ROZIE (eds.), Doorwerking van het Europese recht in 
de nationale rechterlijke praktijk, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2012, 96; E. SWAENEPOEL, “De onrechtmatige 
bedingen : evolutie naar het ambtshalve opwerpen van de relatieve nietigheid?, DCCR 2005, 79; J. STUYCK, 
“Consumer concepts in EU secondary law”, 11, paper 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/ccm/bochumfeb2014def.docx. 
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already tried to address this problem. France for instance has established a specific 
body responsible for informing consumers, regardless of the sector. Furthermore, 
Lithuania states the number of consumers showing interest in consumer protection 
legislation increased during the last year, due to active campaigns.598 Such a 
campaign was also organised by the EU in 2014. This Consumer Rights Awareness 
Campaign aimed to increase the knowledge of consumer rights by both consumers 
and traders.599 
In contrast, businesses in most countries are considered to be quite well aware of the 
application of the horizontal EU consumer legislation in the regulated sectors. They are 
obliged to comply with the (legislation implementing the) UCTD and as a result, they 
should be well-informed of its requirements. Although the knowledge of businesses is 
deemed sufficient by most stakeholders, violations of the legislation on unfair contract 
terms occur frequently.600 The cases referred to the CJEU confirm this, often 
concerning the financial sector, the energy sector and the telecom sector. Also in the 
air transport sector, there are an important series of cases where the Member States 
condemn the use of unfair terms in air transport contracts. BEUC noted that a 
significant number of the terms scrutinised and deemed unfair by the national courts 
were based on the IATA Recommended Practice 1724 (hereinafter the IATA RP 
1724).601 It appears the IATA recommends the use of passenger contract terms which 
are legally unfair in many European countries. For instance, article 3.3 of the IATA RP 
1724 obliges a passenger to strictly respect the order of the flight itinerary. If he 
misses or does not take one leg of a return flight, the company may automatically 
cancel the remaining leg and rescind the contract. This clause was determined unfair 
by several judgements in different Member States. To express its concern, BEUC sent 
a letter to the IATA in 2013 asking them to amend their recommendations.602 
Unfortunately, at a meeting later in 2013, the IATA did not signal any intention to 
revise the RP 1724.603 Although the country reports did not mention this issue, the 
public consultation showed some concern as to the application of the UCTD in the 
transport sector in general. According to certain respondents, transport is one of the 
areas where the highest amount of consumer complaints appears. Consumers, but 
also traders seem not always aware of the application of the UCTD in this sector. In 
addition, they believe that cooperation between the various enforcement bodies in the 
area of passenger transport could be improved. However, the open public 
consultation, as well as the country reports explicitly pointed to the benefits of the 
application of the UCTD in the air transport sector.604 
                                                                                                                               
597 C-473/00 Cofidis, see also cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo, consideration 26 referred to the 
ignorance of the law by consumers.  
598 Information campaigns were also organized by, amongst others, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. See COM(2000) 248 final, 10 on this issue. 
599 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/events/140317_en.htm 
600 COM(2000) 248 final, 35. 
601 The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is the leading international representative body of the 
airline industry. 
602 BEUC, Unfair terms in air transport contracts, Letter sent to Mr. Tony Tyler, Chief Executive Officer/IATA 
(Ref. L2013_016/MGO/UPA/rs – 05/02/2013), p. 1-2. 
603 See BEUC presentation of 27 May 2013 on Unfair terms in air transport contracts, 
http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2013-00451-01-e.pdf. 
604 Part 2 of this report; Country report Slovakia; Country report Sweden. 
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Several countries reported that in some sectors standard contracts are subject to an 
ex ante control, which reduces the opportunities for traders to apply unfair terms (e.g. 
in the Romanian energy sector service providers cannot apply unfair terms in their 
contracts, since they have to submit those contracts to the authorities for approval 
before offering them to consumers). Nevertheless, it should be noted that a small 
number of stakeholders mentioned a lack of awareness by traders. According to the 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, for instance, companies active in the regulated 
sectors believe horizontal EU consumer legislation such as UCTD is not applicable to 
their sector and tend to only take into account the sector-specific legislation. This 
issue was also reported by Sweden, particularly in the financial sector.  
As regards the enforcement bodies, most reports considered the knowledge of the 
interaction between the various rules sufficient. However, (mainly) due to issues in the 
organisational structure, the enforcement system does not always work properly. A lot 
of Member States empowered different authorities with the enforcement of the UCTD 
in general, and the enforcement of the sector-specific rules. Due to a lack of 
collaboration between those authorities, a few of them are experiencing difficulties in 
enforcing the horizontal rules in the regulated sectors. This topic will be discussed 
below.  
In summary, the stakeholders believed that businesses and enforcement bodies are 
generally aware of the combined application of the two sets of rules in the regulated 
sectors. It is the awareness (or rather lack of awareness) of consumers of the 
requirements of the UCTD-both in the regulated sectors and also in general-that turns 
out to be an important concern. 
 
• Specify whether in Member States it is the same authority which is responsible for 
the enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law (UCTD) and the sector-specific 
rules, or whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of 
rules; [If different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an 
institutionalised cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for 
enforcement affect the use of UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the 
previous bullet?]  
As has been pointed out before (in the context of the discussion of the enforcement of 
the UCPD), in the vast majority of the Member States, different bodies are responsible 
for the enforcement of the horizontal consumer law and the sector-specific rules.605 In 
general, one centralised body is authorised to enforce the UCTD (regardless of the 
sector), while the sector-specific rules are enforced by another body or other bodies. 
In other words, the latter have no power to deal with violations of the provisions of 
the UCTD in the regulated sectors if those provisions are not as such included in the 
sector-specific rules. 
Some countries have established a cooperation mechanism for the separate 
authorities. The Italian enforcement bodies, for instance, often cooperate via 
memoranda of understanding. In Romania certain protocols exist in the energy and 
telecommunications sector. Such cooperation protocols also exist in the Netherlands. 
In Bulgaria the collaboration between the authorities is even regulated by multiple 
legal acts. By way of example, the Bulgarian Energy and Water Regulatory 
Commission is obliged to send drafts of terms and conditions on the delivery of central 
                                           
605 See different country reports. However, the Spanish country report mentioned having only one (general) 
enforcement body. 
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heating and electricity to the Commission for Consumer Protection for review, before 
approving them.606 
In other countries like Latvia cooperation takes place informally via regular meetings 
and discussions. In France the enforcement bodies work closely together and often 
exchange information or redirect consumers towards the competent body if necessary. 
A Cypriot stakeholder mentioned Cyprus has no institutional arrangement for 
cooperation, but highlighted that the competent authorities cooperate unofficially. This 
mainly involves mutual consultation and each authority referring a case that falls 
within the competence of another authority to the competent authority. Furthermore, 
Malta indicated not to have a formal cooperation mechanism. However, the Maltese 
stakeholders pointed out that some of the specific regulators in the sector of electronic 
telecommunications, e-commerce and postal services, also referred to as ‘qualified 
entities’, can request other authorities to issue injunction orders if there is a breach of 
the UCTD in the sector they supervise.  
It should be noted that certain Member States created a separate regime for the 
financial sector. In Slovakia there is one general authority (the Slovak Trade 
Inspection) that supervises compliance with the UCTD. However, a separate body, 
namely the National Bank of Slovakia, is authorised to enforce the horizontal 
consumer protection legislation as well as the sector-specific rules in the financial 
sector. Romania also established a different regime for the financial sector. The 
Romanian National Authority for Consumer Protection (NACP) has the power to 
enforce the UCTD in general and in the regulated sectors. Separate bodies enforce the 
sector-specific rules (but not the horizontal legislation) in the regulated sectors. 
However, the NACP is authorised to enforce both the horizontal consumer protection 
legislation and the sector-specific rules in the financial sector. 
In answer to the key question, the institutional arrangements for enforcement indeed 
sometimes affect the use of the UCTD in the regulated sectors, as was already 
concluded for the UCPD. It appears from the country reports that the cooperation 
between the different bodies is not always efficient.607 As indicated earlier, the powers 
of the enforcement bodies usually depend on whether horizontal or sector-specific 
legislation was infringed. Consequently, it is not always clear for consumers which 
body they should address. Consumers tend to recognise that their rights were 
violated, but do not know which specific rule was breached.608 Thus, if the respective 
powers of the enforcement bodies depend on which rule was breached, consumers 
may not know which body is responsible. It appears that a consumer that wants to 
exercise the rights included in the UCTD in a regulated sector, but wrongly addresses 
the sector-specific enforcement body, is not always redirected to the competent body. 
Hence, a Greek consumer authority stated that the referral from authority to authority 
can be time-consuming and frustrating for consumers. Further, the Finnish consumer 
authorities pointed out that the more scattered the regulation and the supervision 
duties are, the higher the costs of supervision.609  
A Maltese consumer organisation mentioned that “ideally there should be one national 
authority able to act in a comprehensive manner, applying where necessary the 
                                           
606 Article 148 (2) of the Bulgarian Consumer Protection Act 
607 Additionally, in the online public consultation, approximately one-third of respondents agreed that 
cooperation between the various public enforcement authorities in charge of consumer protection in each of 
the five sectors considered (financial services, passenger transport, electronic communication, energy and 
environmental protection) should be strengthened. 
608 Country report Austria. 
609 Country reports Greece, Finland. 
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national norms which transpose […] the UCTD and sector-specific consumer protection 
norms.”610 Whether this is the best way forward is debatable. The workload for this 
one body could be too high. Certain countries, like Slovakia, mentioned that their 
‘general’ body is already overloaded and does not have sufficient employees to cover 
its broad competencies in the field of consumer protection. 
An alternative solution could be to give the sector-specific regulators the ability to 
enforce both the sector-specific and the general consumer legislation in the regulated 
sectors. This approach was suggested by the same Maltese consumer organisation. 
The direct application of the UCTD by the sector-specific regulators could avoid overlap 
in enforcement powers, could lead to better coordination and could reduce costs 
related to parallel investigations by different regulatory authorities. In addition, it 
would perhaps be easier for consumers to simply address the body that is responsible 
in the respective sector than to verify whether a horizontal or sector-specific rule was 
violated. Moreover, competent authorities would be able to handle every aspect of a 
case and would not need to transfer it to another body if a violation of, for example, 
the UCTD occurs. This would be more efficient. 
 
Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and sector-
specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning unfair 
contract terms and contractual transparency requirements; What are the benefits of 
the complementary application of the UCTD in the regulated sectors? What are the 
costs due to its complementary application with the sectoral EU consumer protection 
legislation? Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-
specific rules and horizontal EU consumer law concerning unfair contract terms and 
contractual transparency requirements. 
The EU sector-specific consumer legislation often contains provisions relating to unfair 
contract terms or transparency requirements. Directive 2009/72/EC concerning 
electricity, for instance, stipulates Member States have to ensure that consumers 
“receive transparent information on applicable prices and tariffs and on standard 
terms and conditions, in respect of access to and use of electricity services”.611 
According to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, all information (and thus 
also a standard contract) addressed to clients or potential clients has to be fair, clear 
and not misleading.612 And Directive 2009/73/EC concerning natural gas partly covers 
the same aspects as the UCTD, as it requires Member States to ensure a high level of 
consumer protection with respect to the transparency of contractual terms and 
conditions.613 When assessing the transparency of a contract in a regulated sector, the 
CJEU thus often applies both the horizontal and sector-specific consumer legislation.614 
For example, in C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG the Court examined whether price increases 
of natural gas are compatible with, on the one hand, the transparency requirements of 
                                           
610 This is the case in Spain. 
611 Annex I Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC. 
612 Article 19 (2) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC; V. 
COLAERT, “De rechtsverhouding financiële dienstverlener – belegger”, 294. 
613 Annex I of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC; B. J. 
DRIJBER in M. ROGGENKAMP and H. BJORNEBYE, “European Energy & Law Report”, Volume X, Intersentia, 13. 
614 See also C-453/10 Perenicova where the ECJ applied the UCTD in a case on consumer credit. 
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Articles 4(2) and 5 of the UCTD and, on the other hand, the similar provisions of 
Directive 2003/55/EC.615  
In our country research and interviews, stakeholders commented regarding the clarity 
and coherence of the two sets of rules.616 Most stakeholders indeed consider the legal 
framework rather clear and coherent.617 In a number of Member States however it 
was emphasised that the different sets of regulation overlap regularly.618 In this 
respect in Cyprus it was noted that this is often due to the fact that the horizontal and 
sector-specific legislation is enforced or overseen by different authorities.619 By way of 
an example the Cypriot Office of the Commissioner of Electronic Communications and 
Postal Regulation referred to the Cypriot Law 112(I)/2004, which empowers the 
Commissioner to regulate all consumer protection issues pertaining to electronic 
communications by issuing decrees or decisions. On this basis, the Commissioner 
issued a sector-specific decree (the Consumer Protection Decree 42/2013) with regard 
to the appropriate content of contracts in this area. Understandably, this matter is 
closely connected and even overlaps with the issues governed by the UCTD for which 
the Cypriot Regulator is responsible. Hence unfair contract terms in this area are 
governed by both general and specific legislation, enforced or overseen by different 
authorities. As noted above, such overlap does also occur at the EU-level.  
Apart from the problems concerning overlapping legislation combined with the 
organisation of the enforcement bodies we mentioned earlier, we will focus on two 
practical issues due to combined application that also came forward in the country 
research. 
Firstly, certain Member States reported that the application of numerous (overlapping) 
texts jeopardises the clarity of the legal framework.620 The wide range of legislation in 
different texts and sectors could hinder the general understanding of problems in 
practice, thereby creating legal uncertainty for consumers and businesses.621 
Consumers do not always find their way in the tangled web of legislation. Further, 
according to stakeholders in the Netherlands the requirements of the UCTD do not 
always match well with the specific financial legislation, which is not developed with 
consumer protection as a primary objective. Consequently, the instruments in part 
overlap and are sometimes even contradictory.622  
Secondly, issues could arise when the different sets of rules apply simultaneously. The 
hierarchy between the UCTD and the sector-specific legislation is not regulated by the 
                                           
615 C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG; Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
98/30/EC, O.J. 2003, L 176/57 (now Directive 2009/73/EC). 
616 It should be noted however that the majority of the stakeholders mainly focused on the correlation 
between the UCPD and the sector-specific rules and referred to the overlap of information requirements in 
particular. This aspect was dealt with above in Section 6.3.1. 
617 The stakeholders answering the questions in the Slovakian, Spanish, Cypriot and UK country reports 
mentioned that the overall clarity and coherence of the legal framework should be improved. 
618 See also B. J. DRIJBER in M. ROGGENKAMP and H. BJORNEBYE, “European Energy & Law Report”, Volume X, 
Intersentia, 13. 
619 Country report Cyprus. 
620 See in particular country reports Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus and UK.  
621 Country report Spain; See also B. J. DRIJBER in M. ROGGENKAMP and H. BJORNEBYE, “European Energy & 
Law Report”, Volume X, Intersentia, 14. 
622 Country report Netherlands. 
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UCTD itself. The sector-specific rules often state that their requirements apply 
“without prejudice” to the UCTD.623 This formula makes clear that the UCTD is not as 
such excluded by the sector-specific legislation and should be applied simultaneously. 
Nonetheless, this formula does not indicate how conflicting provisions should be 
handled. The country report for Slovakia points out that the CJEU does not provide 
much clarification on this point. As mentioned earlier, in C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG, 
the Court applied both Directive 2003/55/EC and the UCTD to assess the transparency 
requirements of a particular gas supply contract. The Court analysed the text of 
Directive 2003/55/EC which states that its requirements apply “without prejudice” to 
the UCTD, but did not elaborate on how to handle any potential conflicts between the 
UCTD and the sector-specific legislation. In the same context Advocate General 
Trstenjak mentioned in her Opinion that “the transparency rule in Article 3(3) of 
Directive 2003/55 laid down for general terms and conditions is a specially regulated 
example in the sector of the internal market for energy of the transparency 
requirement already secured under Directive 93/13.”624 Neither the Court nor the 
Advocate General explained whether the horizontal or sector-specific legislation 
prevails if a conflict emerges.625 This should not come as a surprise, since there was in 
casu no conflict and both directives complemented each other. There was thus no 
need to establish a hierarchy.  
Since the UCTD consists of general norms and an indicative list of unfair terms, it is 
usually easily compatible with the sector-specific legislation. A “without prejudice” 
formula in the sector-specific legislation could therefore be sufficient. However, a 
conflict between the UCTD and the sector-specific legislation is not entirely 
unconceivable, for instance when a sector-specific provision establishes a sanction for 
an unfair term, different from the one provided for in the UCTD.626 This issue could 
also appear in case of conflicting interpretation rules. Since neither the UCTD, nor the 
sector-specific rules regulate how conflicting provisions should be managed, such issue 
is to be handled by applying the general principles of legal interpretation on a case-by-
case basis, from which the result will not always be clear and foreseeable to traders. 
Consequently, it could be useful for the European legislator to clarify the hierarchy 
between the horizontal and the sector-specific legislation. 
It appears that some stakeholders would indeed like the European Union to set out 
guidelines regarding the interplay between the horizontal and sector-specific consumer 
legislation. In Dutch law, for instance, specific legislation normally takes precedence 
over generic (horizontal) legislation. A Dutch ministry stated that it is unclear whether 
such a rule also applies at the European level. Another Dutch stakeholder indicated 
that the interaction between both rules is not transparent at the moment. This could 
cause problems and may prevent the regulator from timeously intervening in the 
market. Furthermore, the Croatian regulatory authority stated that further clarification 
about this issue would be valuable, especially with respect to the natural gas sector. 
The Slovakian country report notes that the case law of the Court of Justice is not 
always that helpful in this context, criticising the approach of the Court, which was 
considered to have mixed the horizontal and sector-specific rules concerning unfair 
contracts. In particular, it referred to C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb, C-359/11 Schulz & 
                                           
623 Annex I of Directive 2009/72/EC for instance states its requirements apply to the respective contracts 
without prejudice of the Community rules on consumer protection (including the UCTD). 
624 C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG; Opinion Advocate General V. Trstenjak of 13 September 2012; H-W. MICKLITZ 
and N. REICH, “The Court and sleeping beauty: the revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)” in 
Common Market Law Review 51, 771-808, 2014. 
625 Country report Slovakia. 
626 See for instance article 5 and article 6.1 of the UCTD which could be incompatible with sector-specific 
legislation that provides for a moderation (instead of declaring the term non-binding). 
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Egbringhoff and C-400/11 Egbringhoff.627 The Slovenian report argued that any future 
horizontal legislation should contain a list (e.g. in an annex) of all the EU sector-
specific rules it affects. 
A few Member States already tried to cope with the issues caused by overlapping or 
conflicting provisions. In Spain, the coordination of the general and sector-specific 
consumer legislation is regulated by a royal decree.628 Article 59.2 of this decree 
stipulates that the general consumer protection rules are applicable anywhere and in 
any sector, unless the sectoral or special rules establish a higher level of consumer 
protection and those rules comply with EU law. Since the notion ‘higher level of 
consumer protection’ is rather subject to interpretation, this approach might not be 
the best way to proceed. A better solution may be to have the specific legislation take 
precedence over the general (horizontal) legislation in case of a conflict, as is the case 
in the Netherlands. The same approach was used in the Consumer Rights directive, 
which expressly states: “If any provision of this Directive conflicts with a provision of 
another Union act governing specific sectors, the provision of that other Union act 
shall prevail and shall apply to those specific sectors.”629 Further overlaps and 
contradictions could also be reduced by making different competent bodies work 
closely together. In Latvia for example, consumer legislation is drafted with the 
participation of all authorities involved, ensuring consistence and clarity of the rules.630 
Some country reports noted that the use of the same definition for ‘consumer’ in the 
horizontal and sector-specific legislation would improve the coherence between the 
different sets of rules.631 Lastly, Finnish government officials requested more 
cooperation and communication between the DG working groups in charge of the 
different regulation in order to avoid cross-cutting or intersectional issues.632 
This being said, it is important to point out that applying both the horizontal and 
sector-specific legislation in the regulated sectors has its advantages. The overall 
perception is that the combined application generally benefits consumers. The specific 
legislation usually does not tackle every problem, particularly in dynamic sectors like 
financial regulation, energy and transport. As the (principle based) UCTD is applicable 
in any sector, potential gaps in the sector-specific regulation are filled. Accordingly 
consumers benefit from a minimum level of protection in all circumstances, enhancing 
the legal certainty for those consumers. The UCTD acts as a ‘safety net’ with general 
clauses that are flexible and able to embrace new situations whereas sector-specific 
rules are usually more rigid. Vice versa, the sole application of the UCTD in the 
regulated sectors would not always be sufficient. By way of example, in C-359/11 and 
C-400/11 Schulz-Egbringhoff, the content of the contracts at issue was determined by 
mandatory German legislative provisions. Therefore, the contracts fell outside the 
scope of the UCTD, but the consumer concerned was nonetheless protected by the 
sector-specific legislation.633 In the Dutch country report, a Dutch consumer 
organisation also recognised the value of the sector-specific legislation. “The existence 
                                           
627 See above. 
628 Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007. 
629 Article 3(2) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. 
630 Country report Latvia. 
631 Country reports Luxembourg and Greece. 
632 Country report Finland. 
633 C-359/11 and C-400/11 Schulz-Egbringhoff, paragraphs 52 and 53.  
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of specific unfair terms, such as terms forbidding consumers to make use of a return 
ticket for their return flight if they have not also made use of the outbound flight – 
such terms are difficult to combat with the general ban on unfair terms”, the 
organisation argued. The sector-specific legislation thus tends to protect consumers in 
the regulated areas, where the horizontal legislative framework is not sufficient.634  
It can be concluded that mostly the legal framework for unfair contract terms and 
contractual transparency requirements is considered to be rather clear and coherent. 
Still, it appears that certain stakeholders would like the European Union to set out 
guidelines regarding the interplay between the horizontal and sector-specific consumer 
legislation. The current provisions do not determine how conflicts between the 
different sets of rules that apply simultaneously should be handled, nor does the case 
law of the ECJ provide legal certainty in this regard. Indeed, the UCTD is overall 
compatible with the sector-specific legislation and causes no severe issues at the 
moment. However, any future problems could be prevented by clear EU guidance – 
similar to Article 3(2) of Consumer Rights Directive – on the hierarchy between the 
horizontal and sector-specific legislation. 
6.3.3. Injunctions 
 Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement 6.3.3.1.
instruments of consumer law  
• What is the legal and practical interplay between the Injunctions Directive and the 
CPC Regulation, in particular what has been the impact of the application of the 
CPC Regulation on the use of injunction procedure, as defined by the Directive and 
in particular on the number of injunction actions for infringements having a cross-
border dimension brought by public bodies and organisations? Is there a need for 
any further steps in order to ensure the coherence between those two legislative 
acts, taking into account the works on the CPC Regulation review?  
The Injunctions Directive and the CPC Regulation differ in their respective scopes of 
application in relation to those who can use them and to the types of consumer law 
infringements that they cover. 
First, only public authorities can make use of the CPC Regulation, whereas consumer 
organisations can only take cross-border action by way of the Injunctions Directive or 
by using none of the two instruments, namely by suing the foreign trader in their 
domestic courts, or by way of informal co-operation with a befriended consumer 
organisation in the Member State where the trader is domiciled. 
Second, from the legal instruments that are within the scope of application of the 
Injunctions Directive, only the Services Directive 2006/123/EC is missing in the CPC 
Regulation. In contrast, the CPC Regulation covers a number of instruments that are 
not listed in the Annex of the Injunctions Directive, namely the Price Indication 
Directive 98/6/EC, the Data Protection Directive 2002/58/EC, the Air Passengers 
Rights Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004, the Boat Passengers Rights Regulation (EC) No. 
1177/2010, the Railways Passengers Rights Regulation (EC) No. 1177/2010, the Bus 
Passengers Rights Regulation (EU) No. 181/2011 and finally the Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive 2006/114/EEC. 
                                           
634 See also J. STUYCK, “Consumer concepts in EU secondary law”, paper 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/ccm/bochumfeb2014def.docx. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  187 
Thus, there are a number of cases where the qualified entity that wants to take action 
does not have a choice in the first place, because the problem at hand is only covered 
by the one or the other enforcement system. 
If they have a choice, consumer authorities prefer to use the CPC Network when it 
comes to cross-border infringements.635 Consumer organisations who cannot use the 
CPC Network sometimes ask their national authorities to get in touch with other 
authorities through the CPC Network, or they ask consumer organisations from the 
trader’s Member State for help.636 
The potential need for any further steps in order to ensure the coherence between 
Injunctions Directive and the CPC Regulation is further discussed in subsequent 
section. 
 
• What is the legal and practical interplay between the Injunctions Directive and the 
enforcement provisions provided by other EU Consumer Law Directives subject to 
Fitness Check and by the Consumer Rights Directive?  
The legal and practical interplay between the Injunctions Directive and the 
enforcement provisions provided by other EU Consumer Law Directives subject to 
Fitness Check and by the Consumer Rights Directive is both relevant at the EU level, 
and at the domestic level. The following sub-sections focus on areas where 
incoherence between these provisions is observed, based on the results of the country 
research conducted for this evaluation. 
Incoherence at EU level 
Besides the Injunctions Directive, some of the EU consumer law directives contain 
provisions relating to injunction procedures in the respective areas. The start was 
made by the Misleading Advertising Directive 84/450/EEC that was replaced by the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC, which also provides for injunctions 
in Art. 11. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC deals with injunctions in 
Article 7(2), and so did the Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC in Article 11. That latter 
Directive has, however, been replaced by the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EC, 
Article 23 of which does not contain a specific provision on injunctions but a broader 
notion of collective enforcement by national authorities, consumer organisations or 
both. 
Otherwise, all consumer law instruments require Member States to ensure effective, 
dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for infringements, and injunctions, thus the 
prohibition to stop an infringement in the future, appear to be the very least that this 
requirement implies. 
The texts of the Injunctions Directive and the provisions relating to enforcement 
procedures foreseen by other EU law Directives differ. As to the injunction procedure 
as such, Article 2(1)(a) of the Injunctions Directive foresees an order requiring the 
cessation or prohibition of any infringement. That same type of measure is mentioned 
in Article 11(1) of the UCPD. Article 7 of the UCTD refers to the prevention of the 
continued use of unfair terms; which could be interpreted more broadly. Finally, Article 
23 of the CRD is entirely open about the kind of collective enforcement measures that 
are to be taken to ensure the application of the related rules in the Member States. 
                                           
635 E.g. country reports Denmark, Finland, France, Lithuania. 
636 Country report Lithuania. 
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Under Article 2(1)(a) of the Injunctions Directive, injunction procedures are to be 
handled ‘with all due expediency, where appropriate by way of summary procedure’. 
Article 11(1) of the UCPD requires Member States to make provision for measures to 
be taken ‘under an accelerated procedure’ either with interim effect or with definitive 
defect, to the choice of the Member State. The other directives do not deal explicitly 
with accelerated procedures. 
In terms of publication, under Article 2(1)(b) of the Injunctions Directive, qualified 
entities can seek, where appropriate, measures such as the publication of the decision, 
in full or in part, in such form as deemed adequate and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement with a view to eliminating the continuing effects of the 
infringement. The corresponding provision of Article 11(1) of the UCPD reads: 
‘Member States may confer upon the courts or administrative authorities powers 
enabling them, with a view to eliminating the continuing effects of unfair commercial 
practices the cessation of which has been ordered by a final decision: a) to require 
publication of that decision in full or in part and in such form as they deem adequate, 
b) to require in addition the publication of a corrective statement.’ Article 7 UCTD does 
not mention publication, nor does Article 23 of the Consumer Rights Directive. 
Article 2(1)(c) of the Injunctions Directive deals with sanctions for the breach of an 
injunction order in the following way: Sanctions are at the discretion of the Member 
States (‘in so far as the legal system of the Member State concerned so permits’). 
They may foresee an order against the losing defendant for payments into the public 
purse or to any beneficiary designated in or under national legislation, in the event of 
failure to comply with the decision within a time limit specified by the courts or 
administrative authorities, of a fixed amount for each day’s delay or any other amount 
provided for in national legislation, with a view to ensuring compliance with the 
decisions. The UCTD and the CRD do not mention sanctions for the breach of an order. 
Article 7 of the UCTD requires Member States to ensure the availability of adequate 
and effective means ‘to prevent the continued use of unfair terms’, whereas Article 23 
of the CRD merely refers to action under national law ‘to ensure that the national 
provisions transposing this Directive are applied’; which may of course entail sanctions 
for the breach of an order, as this would seem to be a necessary element of an 
effective enforcement system. 
Finally, there are certain differences as to the enforcement bodies. Article 3 of the 
Injunctions Directive mentions any body or organisation which, being properly 
constituted according to the law of a Member State, has a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that the provisions referred to in Article 1 are complied with, in particular one 
or more independent public bodies, specifically responsible for protecting the collective 
interests of consumers, and/or organisations whose purpose is to protect the collective 
interests of consumers; which is an open formula as the words ‘in particular’ 
demonstrate. Article 7(2) UCTD is also open by referring to ‘persons or organisations, 
having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers’. Article 11(2) 
mentions persons or organisations regarded under national law as having a legitimate 
interest in combating unfair commercial practices but explicitly also refers to 
competitors. Article 23(1) refers to one or more of the following bodies, as determined 
by national law, may take action under national law and lists public bodies or their 
representatives, consumer organisations but also professional organisations. All the 
directives have in common that they leave the choice of enforcers to the Member 
States, and all of them only require Member States to have at least one category of 
enforcers in place while they also allow a combination of several enforcers, including 
business organisations. Competitors are only explicitly mentioned in the UCPD but it 
should be noted that breaches of other directives will often constitute unfair 
commercial practices at the same time. 
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Incoherence at the domestic level 
Coherence in the implementation measures of Member States differs.637 In some 
Member States, the different procedures envisaged by the Injunctions Directive and 
by specific legislation come under different legal provisions but follow by and large the 
same rules.638  
Differences are sometimes (traditionally) made between unfair commercial practices 
law and the injunction procedure implementing the Injunctions Directive. For example, 
in Germany, injunction procedures under unfair commercial practices law can be filed 
by the trader’s competitors, whereas they do not have legal standing under the 
Injunctions Act. Prescription periods differ between unfair commercial practices law 
and (other) injunctions in the collective interest of consumers. Both procedures can be 
used by consumer organisations though. Enforcers also differ from one area to the 
other in Spanish law. 
In other Member States, the regimes of the national implementation of the Injunctions 
Directive and the national implementations of the UCPD, the UCTD and the CRD all 
differ. For example, in Cyprus, the prior consultation of the trader is required under 
the national implementation of the Injunctions Directive but not in the injunction 
procedures in the specific injunction procedures; which has been reported to create 
legal uncertainty.639 
Where consumer law is entirely or mainly enforced by public authorities, they have 
often sector-specific competences.640 The same applies, to some extent, to consumer 
organisations that are sometimes specialised, for example, in the area of energy or 
railways services. 
 
• Is there a need for any further steps in order to ensure the coherence between the 
abovementioned legislative acts, also in the context of the possible 
codification/recast of EU Consumer law? 
Experience in those Member States that have extended the scope of application of the 
Injunctions Directive shows that injunction procedures have been used in the past in a 
far broader range of consumer law infringements than those listed in the Annex of the 
Injunctions Directive or the CPC Network Regulation. 
An example of a legislative act that is listed in the CPC Network Regulation but not in 
the Injunctions Directive and that has featured in domestic injunction procedures 
brought by consumer organisations is the Data Protection Directive.641 
The country research did not identify any valid reason why some pieces of legislation 
should qualify as consumer law under the CPC Network Regulation but not under the 
                                           
637 See table in Annex V of this report for an overview. 
638 E.g. country reports Germany, Latvia. 
639 Country report Cyprus, 1.3.3. No other problems in other Member States were identified or reported in 
the context of this study. 
640 Country report Malta. 
641 See LG Dusseldorf, 9/3/2016, Verbraucher und Recht 2016, 230, on the Facebook ‚like button‘. 
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Injunctions Directive. This was also emphasised by some stakeholders.642 In the online 
public consultation, 50% or more of all respondent categories other than business 
associations agreed that there was a need to ensure coherence between the 
Injunctions Directive and other provisions on the enforcement of consumer rights, 
including 65% of consumer associations and 50% of public authorities. Regarding 
business associations, 28% agreed, 20% disagreed, and 52% had no opinion/did not 
answer to this item. Some consumer stakeholders that argued in favour of the 
extension of the scope of application of the Injunctions Directive also suggested that 
both Annexes could be turned into exemplary rather than exclusive lists so as to be 
sufficiently open for future development.643 
Other than a streamlining of the Annexes of both the CPC Regulation and Injunctions 
Directive, this evaluation has not identified a need to change the current system that 
leaves the decision on the best strategy in the individual case in terms of choice 
between the two legal instruments as a basis for enforcement actions to the qualified 
entity. Regarding the interplay between the Injunctions Directive and the enforcement 
provisions of other Directives, the identified differences between the directives do not 
seem to be based on any clear rationale, and an alignment of enforcement provisions 
could therefore contribute to simplification and coherence of the EU consumer law 
framework. 
See also Section 8, conclusions and recommendations. 
6.4. Relevance 
6.4.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
 Relevance for business-to-business transactions  6.4.1.1.
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for the cross-border trade; Whether it is appropriate 
to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C transactions in the area of 
commercial practices and to what extent both regimes could be aligned;  
As mentioned, the UCPD applies pursuant to Article 3(1) to business-to-consumer 
commercial practices before, during and after a commercial transaction. According to 
Recital 6 UCPD, “it neither covers nor affects the national laws on unfair commercial 
practices … which relate to a transaction between traders …”. Hence, business-to-
business commercial practices are not covered by the UCPD.  
Such B2B commercial practices are partly regulated under the MCAD which, pursuant 
to Article 8(1), does not preclude Member States from retaining or adopting provisions 
with a view to ensuring more extensive protection, with regard to misleading 
advertising, for traders and competitors. Of course, Member States may extend, under 
their national laws, the protection granted under the UCPD to B2B commercial 
practices. A number of Member States currently apply the rules provided for in the 
                                           
642 E.g. in the position paper submitted to the online public consultation by BEUC: “There is no valid reason 
to restrict the [Injunctions] Directive to consumer protection measures which are currently listed in the 
annex. For instance, areas such as product liability, data protection, transport or financial services, should 
also be covered.” 
643 See, for example, the position paper submitted to the online public consultation by the Federation of 
German Consumer Organisations (vzbv). 
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UCPD also to B2B relations.644 First of all, Austria and Sweden have extended all UCPD 
provisions to B2B transactions. In Denmark, businesses are protected by provisions on 
both misleading and aggressive practices. France only extends the general prohibition 
of misleading actions and the blacklisted misleading practices to B2B transactions. In 
Germany, parts of the Directive also apply to business-to-business commercial 
practices. In Italy, the provisions implementing the UCPD apply not only to B2C 
commercial practices but also to commercial practices between businesses and so-
called “micro-enterprises” (defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 
persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed 
EUR 2 million). In Belgium, certain practices on the blacklist are also blacklisted in B2B 
transactions; in addition, an outright prohibition of the practices of misleading 
directory companies was introduced. This example was partly followed in the 
Netherlands, where an important statutory extension of the UCPD regime to B2B 
situations was introduced in 2016. Likewise, in Portugal, the legislation implementing 
the UCPD was amended in 2015 so as to broaden its scope to cover some misleading 
actions in B2B relations. In the Czech Republic, the UCPD is also extended to B2B 
transactions.645 
The extension of the UCPD to B2B transactions and other measures to improve 
protection of businesses against unfair commercial practices have been discussed 
since many years. Already in Recital 8 UCPD, it is indicated that “the Commission 
should carefully examine the need for Community action in the field of unfair 
competition beyond the remit of this Directive and, if necessary, make a legislative 
proposal to cover these other aspects of unfair competition.” In its November 2012 
Communication “Protecting businesses against misleading marketing practices and 
ensuring effective enforcement – Review of the MCAD” the Commission announced 
that it would come up in due time with a Proposal to amend the MCAD in order to 
address “the problem of unfair business-to-business practices”. The Commission 
proposed the introduction of a black list of the most common and harmful B2B 
marketing practices (practices of misleading directory companies, misleading payment 
forms, offers to extend internet domain names or protection of trademarks, etc.) and 
provisions to improve cross-border enforcement. Eventually, the Commission did not 
adopt the announced Proposal for a Business Marketing Directive. Neither did the 
Commission eventually propose a cooperation mechanism among MS authorities in 
cross-border cases of misleading advertising. 
This study explored stakeholder opinions, an analysis of compliance costs of 
businesses and other evidence concerning the questions whether an extension of the 
UCPD to B2B transactions or a revision/extension of the MCAD would bring benefits for 
the cross-border trade, and whether such a legislative change is needed with a view of 
ensuring more extensive protection for traders and competitors. On the basis of the 
country research, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
From several countries it is reported that, from a theoretical perspective, an extension 
of the UCPD to B2B transactions or a revision/extension of the MCAD could bring 
benefits for the cross-border trade.646 It would help to create a level playing field 
among Member States in B2B transactions and facilitate cross-border B2B marketing 
campaigns.647 However, it was often added that relevant data as regards the 
                                           
644 See Annex III of this report for a summary of the extension of UCPD provisions to B2B relations, as well 
as additional protection going beyond the MCAD. 
645 See country reports of the mentioned countries. 
646 Country reports Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia. 
647 Country report Latvia (although it was immediately added that on the other hand it is not without 
problems); country report Malta (view of two business organisations) 
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(negative) impact of the current approach at the EU level on B2B cross-border trade 
are lacking.648 In a number of Member States, no problems in cross-border B2B 
marketing were reported.649 Moreover, it is difficult to predict and highly uncertain to 
what extent such a legislative change would facilitate cross-border trade in practice.650 
Hence, it was impossible to make an equivocal conclusion whether such an extension 
could bring those very benefits.651  
It is notable in this context that current costs for businesses related to the MCAD are 
significantly lower than costs related to the UCPD, as the business interviews 
conducted for this study indicated.652 In terms of one-off costs for checking 
compliance and adapting advertising/marketing and standard contract terms to the 
national legislation when entering another EU country’s market (as well as adjusting 
business practices, where needed), average costs related to advertising and marketing 
targeted at businesses are in none of the selected sectors/company size classes higher 
than 30 percent of the total costs, typically being half or less of the cost share 
indicated by interviewed businesses for advertising and marketing targeted at 
consumers. A similar picture can be observed regarding regular checks of businesses 
that advertising/marketing and standard contract terms still comply with national 
legislation in those countries in which they operate (and adjusting business practices, 
if needed), with the share of average costs related to advertising and marketing 
targeted at businesses being never above 20% of the total costs in any of the 
sectors/size classes scrutinised. In other words, the potential benefits of creating a 
more level playing field and facilitate cross-border B2B marketing campaigns in terms 
of reducing costs for businesses seem to be limited. However, in case the number of 
B2B cross-border marketing campaigns would notably increase, even this relatively 
low share of costs could become more relevant. It is also conceivable that an 
extension of the UCPD to B2B relations (but not necessarily a revision/extension of the 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive) could be expected to lead to 
reduced compliance costs for businesses that target both businesses and consumers in 
advertising/marketing, as in this case there would be no need (and no related costs) 
for checking compliance with a separate B2B legislative framework, both in a domestic 
and in a cross-border context. Only those companies that exclusively target 
businesses in their advertising/marketing could be expected to have increased 
compliance costs, as they would now have to comply with the more comprehensive 
rules of the UCPD.    
The results of the country research indicate that the general perception among 
stakeholders is that there is no need for a fully-fledged extension of the UCPD to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the MCAD with a view to ensuring more 
extensive protection for traders and competitors.653 The UCPD was designed with the 
goal of raising the level of consumer protection.654 Its justification lies in the special 
needs of natural persons acting for non-professional purposes and their weaker 
                                           
648 Country report Austria.  
649 Country reports Cyprus, Denmark.  
650 Country reports Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia. 
651 Country report Latvia, Lithuania. 
652 See results of the business interviews in Part 4 of this report. 
653 Country reports Czech Republic (majority of stakeholders), Denmark (majority of stakeholders), Estonia 
(most respondents), Finland (business associations), France (most respondents), Germany (majority of 
stakeholders), Latvia, Poland (business associations), Romania (business associations), Slovakia (majority 
of stakeholders). 
654 Country report Austria (view of business organisations and ministries). 
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position vis-à-vis traders; this justification does not apply to traders.655 The B2B-
relationship as opposed to the B2C-relationship is not fundamentally unbalanced.656,657 
A higher degree of diligence is to be expected than in B2C transactions.658 It is 
generally considered not appropriate that businesses and consumers should be equally 
protected across the board. The analysis of the written submissions to the open public 
consultation conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check show that many 
business stakeholders were opposed to the idea of extending consumer law to B2B 
relations.659  
An additional and more pragmatic argument that is being made in a number of 
Member States is that the extension of the UCPD would require notable additional 
resources for enforcement authorities as currently they would not be equipped to 
handle the increased workload.660 More fundamentally, the view is that public 
enforcement of unfair commercial practices in B2B transactions should be avoided and 
that preference should in any event be given to private enforcement.661 
However, several stakeholders in a minority of countries are of the opinion that an 
extension of the UCPD is needed for systematic reasons. It is considered not 
appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2C and B2B transactions;662 this 
would contribute to a clearer and more uniform regulatory framework of the law of 
unfair competition which would be beneficial per se;663 and this would allow reaching a 
high level of harmonisation in the internal market.664 In this regard, reference is made 
to the view of some legal scholars that the current division of B2C and B2B regimes at 
the national level is an artificial one. Commercial practices of a trader may target and 
reach different addressees.665 Certain scholars have argued that the best way forward 
at the EU level would be to create a unified legal regime to fight unfair commercial 
practices (including illegitimate comparative advertising) applicable to B2C and B2B 
commercial practices. As a matter of principle, the criteria for determining the 
unfairness of a practice should be uniform, irrespective of whom is targeted, 
addressed or reached by it.666  
                                           
655 Country report Poland (view of business organisations). 
656 Country reports France (view of business organisations and consumer associations), Belgium (view of 
business organisations). 
657 See e.g. the position argued in the paper submitted by EuroCommerce to the online public consultation 
regarding the difficulty in identifying the “stronger” and “weaker” party in B2B transactions.  
658 Country report United Kingdom (view of Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy). 
659 8 written submissions suggested this, see Part 2 of this report. 
660 Country reports Lithuania; Malta (view of consumer organisation). 
661 Country report Bulgaria (view of some stakeholders). 
662 E.g. country report Croatia (view of a business association); country report Malta (view of two business 
organisations). 
663 Country reports Slovenia, Belgium, Greece. 
664 Country report Spain. 
665 Country report Lithuania. 
666 See B. Keirsbilck, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices”, EJCL, 
2013, p. 233 et seq. (see p. 240 and 254), adding that an extension of the UCPD would require much more 
research and some important amendments to the UCPD provisions, with to avoiding any undesirable impact 
on national laws of unfair competition, and on national contract laws. 
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Based on the research conducted for the study, several options for further aligning the 
legal regimes for B2B and B2C transactions in the area of commercial practices could 
be identified:  
• The UCPD’s general prohibition of unfair practices could be extended to B2B 
relations or a general prohibition of unfair B2B practices in the MCAD could be 
introduced. This could be combined with the extension of the UCPD’s general 
prohibition of aggressive B2C practices to B2B relations or the introduction of a 
general prohibition of aggressive B2B practices in the MCAD. The main 
argument for these options would lie in the mentioned more unified approach 
and the expected lower compliance costs for businesses that advertise to both 
businesses and consumers (only for the first option, an extension of the UCPD 
to B2B, see above). Along these lines, these options could be complemented 
with an extension of the UCPD’s general prohibitions of misleading B2C 
practices to B2B relations or the alignment of the general prohibition of 
misleading B2B practices in the MCAD with the UCPD. However, it is unclear to 
which extent these benefits would be relevant at a practical level, as no major 
problem with the current situation in terms of cross-border 
advertising/marketing targeted at businesses are reported. Also, as indicated 
above, most stakeholders do not see a need in this respect. 
• A B2B blacklist of unfair practices could be introduced. It is acknowledged in at 
least some Member States that SMEs may need additional protection because 
they have a level of competence or bargaining power similar to those of 
consumers.667 As mentioned, Italy extended the UCPD to relations between 
businesses and “micro-enterprises”.668 Also, previous studies and the country 
research demonstrate that businesses (especially SMEs) face a number of 
common and harmful misleading B2B marketing practices. The creation of a 
B2B blacklist combating such practices is therefore suggested in a number of 
Member States.669 In some Member States, however, the need for such a B2B 
blacklist was not seen.670 A split of opinions can also be noted in the results of 
the open public consultation, which show that the majority of business 
respondents from individual companies (60%) either strongly agree or tend to 
agree that business protection against unfair commercial practices should be 
strengthened by introducing a "black list" of B2B practices that are always 
prohibited. In contrast, less than one-third (27%) of responding business 
associations agree with this statement, while 47% either tend to disagree or 
strongly disagree.671 While the creation of a B2B black list at EU level is 
therefore likely to be controversial,672 it appears to be an option for aligning 
the legal regimes for B2B and B2C transactions in the area of commercial 
practices to some degree, in line with the identified needs.  
• B2C and B2B rules on misleading practices could be aligned. Before the 
adoption of the UCPD in 2005, the MCAD’s general prohibition of misleading 
advertising applied to any advertising, whether addressed to consumers or 
                                           
667 Country report Latvia. 
668 However, it is often noted in this regard that it is impossible to set objective and fair criteria allowing to 
separate those traders that are in need of additional protection from those that do not need additional 
protection (“slippery slope”). Country report Latvia, Poland 
669 Country report Slovakia. 
670 Country report Germany. 
671 See Part 2 of this report. 
672 See also country report United Kingdom. 
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businesses (integrated approach). It is only since 2005 that EU law takes a 
dualistic approach in the field of unfair practices, with the UCPD covering 
(unfair) B2C practices and the MCAD covering (misleading) B2B advertising. An 
alignment of B2C and B2B rules on misleading practices would reintroduce an 
integrated approach in this area, which could be expected to generate benefits 
from an enforcement point of view. Mass (misleading) advertising is often 
directed at both consumers and businesses. In private enforcement cases the 
dualistic approach can cause a problem in that the judge might be called to 
apply to different sets of rules to the same facts. This option would be a partial 
alignment only, if it were not to include the introduction of a general prohibition 
of unfair/aggressive practices in B2B transactions. 
Options for aligning B2C and B2B rules are further discussed below in Section 8.  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should it cover also unfair commercial practices during 
and after the transaction;  
This issue was not considered in past studies on the reform of the MCAD.  
The results of the open public consultation show that two-thirds of business 
respondents (63%) either strongly agree or tend to agree that business protection 
against unfair commercial practices should be extended to practices happening not 
just at the marketing stage but also after the signature of the contract (22% 
disagree). In contrast, only 28% of business associations agree with this statement, 
while a plurality (34%) disagrees.673 
The country research also revealed widely differing views concerning whether or not 
there is a need for better protection of businesses against unfair commercial practices 
during and after the transaction. While stakeholders in some Member States see a 
need for such an extension,674 stakeholders in other Member States do not consider a 
better protection of businesses against unfair commercial practices during and after 
the transaction to be necessary.675 Other emphasise that there are no studies or that 
there is no sufficient experience to make recommendation.676  
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
See answer to the first evaluation question of this section (above). 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
                                           
673 See Part 2 of this report. 
674 Country reports Bulgaria, Croatia; Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain; in Ireland a 
policymaker was welcoming such an extension. 
675 Country reports Cyprus, Czech Republic; Denmark, Estonia, France, Poland, Slovenia. 
676 Country reports Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden.  
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In the 2012 MCAD public consultation a majority of respondents was of the opinion 
that existing mechanisms in the Member States against misleading business-to-
business advertising were not effective and that sanctions provided by national law 
should be strengthened.677 
It can be observed that in some countries there are already alternative forms of 
enforcement available to businesses. In Austria, associations of traders that are 
sufficiently representative can bring actions for injunctions against unfair commercial 
practices.678 According to other country reports judicial procedures are to be 
preferred.679 In several countries stakeholders had no opinion680 or emphasised that 
there is no specific experience in this respect.681  
In some Member States stakeholders advocate an extension of Regulation 2006/2004 
to business relationships (see previous evaluation question regarding cross-border 
enforcement, above). In other Member States this was not welcomed.682 In Member 
States where the enforcement of rules to protect the interests of businesses is not a 
task for the state such extension might cause problems. Improved voluntary 
enforcement could therefore be an alternative option, e.g. by strengthening cross-
border cooperation of existing self-regulation bodies in the advertising field. However 
B2B marketing practices that are borderline fraudulent would not be effectively 
covered by self-regulation, as the relevant companies are unlikely to voluntarily 
adhere to the decisions of self-regulation schemes. 
  
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Stakeholders interviewed at the country level often did not perceive a need to develop 
contractual consequences linked to breaches of the MCAD. Some country reports refer 
to the existing remedies (under general contract law) that are believed to be 
sufficient.683 The Czech legal system has developed contractual consequences of 
relevant breaches: “A person whose right has been jeopardised or violated by unfair 
competition may request the violator to refrain from competing unfairly or to remove a 
defective state.“ Not only can adequate satisfaction be requested, but also 
compensation for damage and restitution of unjustified enrichment.684  
Several country reports indicate that they have no information or that there is no 
relevant experience in this respect.685 One report states that this is a sensitive issue 
                                           
677 See more in detail: B. Keirsbilck, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial 
practices”, EJCL, 2013, p. 233 et seq. (see p.  271 and 273)  
678 Country report Austria. 
679 Country reports Bulgaria, Denmark. 
680 Country reports Belgium, Romania 
681 Country report Lithuania, Netherlands.  
682 Country report Hungary. 
683 Country reports Belgium, Cyprus, France, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia. 
684 Country report Czech Republic. 
685 Country reports Greece, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden. 
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and that the interplay with national law is highly complex.686 Other country reports 
mention opposition from business representatives against such remedies,687 from 
enforcement authorities concerning harmonisation in this respect at the European 
level,688 or simply that there is no need for such remedies.689 In the open public 
consultation conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check, a majority of individual 
businesses (45%), but only a minority of business associations (22%) either strongly 
agreed or tended to agree that business protection against unfair commercial practices 
should be strengthened by introducing a right to individual remedies (with 26% of 
businesses and 41% of business associations disagreeing). 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
It has already been mentioned that in some Member States the existing conditions for 
the lawfulness of comparative advertising are felt to be too restrictive and are seen as 
an obstacle for comparative advertising. The case law of the Court of Justice rather 
favours comparative advertising, especially with regard to retail prices, in the interests 
of consumers. However this generous case law can obviously not avoid self-restraint 
on the side of businesses. Apart from traditional views on advertising (and indeed a 
former tradition of prohibiting comparative advertising) self-restraint may be dictated 
by business interests in avoiding aggressive competition. Comparative advertising in 
the EU is notably – but not solely – present in the retail sector where some actors 
have chosen for discount pricing (and at the same time suppliers are increasingly 
complaining about pressure by large retail groups to obtain lower prices). 
Stakeholders interviewed during the country research often did not see the need to 
adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the MCAD. Some reports mention the 
need of small adaptations.690 One report stresses that there is only a need to clarify 
the interplay with the misleading advertising rules of the MCAD and the rules of the 
UCPD.691 In another Member State government officials opined that the law should 
incorporate the clarifications brought by the CJEU in several judgments.692  
A point that possibly needs to be clarified is the relationship between the rules on 
comparative advertising in the MCAD and the limitations on comparative advertising 
resulting from the CJEU’s case law on the protection of the reputation of trade marks 
(which has been reinforced by the recent Trademark Directive of 2015). 
                                           
686 Country report Austria. 
687 Country report Romania (adding that this should remain a matter of private law). 
688 Country report Italy. 
689 Country report Slovenia. 
690 Country report Austria: directory scams (but that does not seem to be a problem of comparative 
advertising) France already adopted rules on comparative websites.  
691 Country report Portugal. It is specifically reported that it is unclear whether certain practices (such as 
business directories) should be dealt with by the UCPD or by the MCAD. 
692 Country report Slovakia. 
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 Relevance for consumer-to-business transactions 6.4.1.2.
• The Study will analyse the need and potential for the application of the UCPD in 
consumer to-business (C2B) relations. This concerns situations where the consumer 
sells goods or provides services to a trader (e.g. where the consumer sells gold 
jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content to business against remuneration).  
According to the definition of Article 2(d) UCPD, “commercial practices” are only those 
“directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers”. The 
reverse situation, where traders (for example, car dealers, antique dealers and 
retailers of second-hand goods) purchase products from consumers, does not fall 
within the scope of the UCPD.  
However, in the UCPD Guidance document, the Commission notes that there are cases 
where a link can be established between the sale of a product by a consumer to a 
trader and the promotion, sale or supply of a (different) product to the consumer and, 
hence, where the UCPD applies. The Commission gives two examples. First, a car 
dealer purchases a used car from the consumer who in turn buys a new or second-
hand from the car dealer (“trade-in agreements”). Secondly, the Commission gives 
the example of the purchase and resale of gold where the trader offers consumers a 
professional evaluation for their gold before buying it.693 
According to the country research for this study cases involving consumer to-business 
(C2B) relations are not frequent. The above-mentioned examples appear to be the 
ones that are most relevant in practice. It is reported that over the past years there 
has been a rise and fall of e.g. businesses inviting consumers to sell their jewellery 
(especially in the 2010-11 period).694 It is also reported that businesses invite 
consumers to offer them their old electric appliance or car at a given price and buy a 
new one in the context of single transaction.695 Another example that was mentioned 
relates to consumers providing digital content to businesses (e.g. YouTube) for 
remuneration.696 A final example is where consumers owning solar panels or wind 
turbines sell energy to traders.697 
The country research confirms that situations where traders purchase goods from 
consumers (C2B relation) are in principle not covered by the UCPD, unless where a 
link can be established with the promotion, sale or supply of a (different) good or 
service to the consumer. Hence, it is recognised that, under certain circumstances, the 
UCPD can apply to C2B relations.698 In the UCPD Report, the Commission stated that 
Member States are indeed free to regulate the area concerned to address national 
specificities and needs.699 
As regards the need to explicitly extend scope of the UCPD so as to cover consumer 
to-business (C2B) relations, views diverge considerably. On the one hand, some 
stakeholders take the view that the UCPD should not be extended to all C2B 
                                           
693 UCPD Guidance document.  
694 Country reports Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal. 
695 Country reports Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal. 
696 Country report Lithuania. 
697 Country report Sweden. 
698 Country report Denmark. 
699 UCPD Report, 10-11. 
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situations. This would create confusion and raise unnecessary questions about the 
need of such protection.700 Moreover, this is considered not to be necessary in light of 
the fact that C2B situations are less frequent and pose smaller risks to consumers 
(usually their main interest is to receive the agreed remuneration).701 Finally, it is 
sometimes noted that this is not necessary because national provisions implementing 
the UCPD already apply to C2B transactions.702 
On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that there is a clear need to extend the 
protection of the UCPD to C2B situations, because consumers selling products to 
traders are in the weaker position and in need of protection.703 Without such an 
extension, the enforcement authorities are indeed forced to particularly extensive 
interpretations in order to cope with the lack of protection for consumers.704 In cases 
involving C2B relations, only general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable, thus 
failing to afford any kind of special or additional protection to the weaker party 
(natural person acting for non-professional purposes).705 Arguably, such an extension 
could be achieved by broadening the definition of “commercial practice” to all practices 
“directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to or from 
consumers”. As a result, commercial practices by traders who purchase goods from 
consumers (C2B relations) would be covered by the UCPD.  
See also recommendations in Section 8. 
6.4.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
 Relevance for business-to-business transactions  6.4.2.1.
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Earlier studies on unfair commercial practices (broadly defined as including the use of 
unfair contract terms) confirm the existence of a problem, also in B2B relationships. 
Thus, in a study carried out in 2012, 58 % of the more than 700 responding 
businesses declared to have been affected by unfair practices within the last two 
years. 66 % of the latter respondents declared to have had unfair terms imposed on 
them.706 In the same study, 70% of all respondents took the view that the legal 
certainty and predictability of their business would be enhanced if contractual terms 
were provided solely in a written form. Another 2009 survey with almost 700 
respondents reported that 96.4 % of the responding companies (suppliers) had been 
                                           
700 Country reports Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland (view of consumer associations) 
701 Country report Latvia. 
702 Country reports Estonia, Germany, Slovakia. 
703 Country report Austria (view of some stakeholders); France (most respondents), Lithuania, Portugal 
(enforcement authority), Romania (authorities and consumer associations) 
704 Country report Italy. 
705 See country reports Greece, the Netherlands (view of the Consumentenbond) 
706 Directorate-General for the internal market and services: Summary report of the responses received to 
the Commission’s consultation on unfair business to business commercial practices, 15 februari 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/consultations/2011/unfair_business/report_en.pdf, 14-15, nr. 30-32;  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  200 
exposed to unfair practices.707 48 % of the responding companies confirmed to have 
been imposed clearly one-sided contractual provisions.  
So far, the responses to the use of unfair commercial practices (including the use of 
unfair contract terms) in the Member States have been extremely diverse. Both 
competition law (through theories like ‘abuse of economic dependence’ or ‘abuse of 
relative dominance’)708 and unfair competition law, and specific B2B legislation has 
been adopted. Also, contract law is used in some Member States, in addition to self-
regulation. Contract law was found to be mainly used in relation to unfair practices 
relating to contract formation and execution and in particular in relation to payment 
terms and price related clauses, disclaimers, disproportionate penalty clauses.709 
This study confirms the disparity of the current approaches towards a strengthened 
protection of businesses. Quite a number of Member States already have some form of 
protection in place to protect businesses against unfair contract terms,710 often in their 
general contract law provisions. This may be a system similar to the system of the 
UCTD, that either predated the implementation of the UCTD, or in other countries, like 
e.g. Croatia, that finds its origin in an extension of the scope of application of the 
UCTD also to traders.  
The scope of the control of B2B unfair contract terms differs.711 The control of unfair 
contract terms may apply to all contracts;712 to all B2B contracts; or in certain 
countries only to certain categories of traders – whether only to traders acting for a 
purpose that is outside their regular business,713 or to all SMEs and micro-
enterprises.714  
In a number of countries, the protection against unfair terms in B2B contracts is 
ensured by mechanisms that differ from the system of the Directive. Thus e.g., in 
Lithuania, surprising conditions contained in a standard contract, i.e. such conditions 
                                           




708 See e.g. Bulgaria, 37a the Protection of Competition Act that prohibits the abuse of stronger position in 
negotiations (since 2015). 
709 A. RENDA, F. CAFAGGI, J. PELKMANS, P. IAMICELI, A. CORREIA DE BRITO, F. MUSTILI, L. BEBBER, S. CLAVEL, J. 
IGNACIO RUIZ PERIS en C. ESTEVAN, “Study on the legal framework covering business-to-business unfair 
trading practices in the retail supply chain”, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/retail/docs/140711-study-
utp-legal-framework_en.pdfu. 
710 I.a. Austria, Czech republic (situational protection), France, Lithuania (some protection in general 
contract law), Portugal, Germany, Denmark, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland (to a limited 
extent). 
711 See Annex IV of this report for a summary of extensions of the UCTD to B2B relations in the Member 
States. 
712 E.g. in France where the recently introduced Art. 1171 Code civil (law of obligations) entails a fairness-
test applicable to all not individually negotiated standard agreement forms (excluded are terms pertaining to 
the subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price). (Ordonnance du 10 février 2016 portant 
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations) ; and in Portugal. 
713 Article 1 of the Latvian Consumer Rights Protection Law; also in France the rules on UCT laid down in the 
Code de la consommation apply to the “non-professionnel”, a legal entity acting for purposes which are 
outside his commercial activity (cf. Art. L. 212-2 C.conso.). Note however that there are additional 
provisions protecting other traders.  
714 E.g. in the Netherlands. 
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that the other party could not reasonably expect to be included in the contract, are 
not effective.715 In addition, the Lithuanian Civil Code provides that a party may 
withdraw from the contract or the specific surprising condition if at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, the contract or its condition unjustifiably gave the other 
party an excessive advantage.716 An example of an alternative system is provided by 
the new Czech Civil Code that enshrines the protection of the weaker party as a 
general principle.717 The protection of the weaker party718 is strengthened in all B2B 
relationships, not just SMEs, but it only ensures a situational protection, i.e. protection 
of a party not dealing in the course of their own business in cases where the other 
party is dealing in the course of their own business.719  
The protection in B2B relationships is furthermore often not limited to mere control by 
way of general contract law provision but supplemented by additional provisions that 
are often sector specific. Thus, as one illustration of such a complementary and 
specific approach, France can be mentioned. Specific provisions in the French 
Commercial Code aim at securing well-balanced and fair trade relationships, 
irrespective of the size of the business.720 The provisions tackle power asymmetries, 
which often result from the structure of the market (e.g. suppliers to mass market 
retail chains are generally in a position of weakness, regardless of their size). More 
specifically, Art. L. 442-6(I)(2°) Code de commerce entails a control on unfair terms in 
B2B-contracts (including terms defining the contract’s object and the balance between 
price and performance). A court can hold a term unfair (and void) that causes a 
significance imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties provided that one 
party has subjected (or at least attempted to subject) the other party to this term.721 
Especially in the food sector, sector specific legislation has been enacted or is being 
considered in a number of Member States. Thus e.g. a special law in Slovakia 
regulates the relations between suppliers and purchasers of food enacted as the 
reaction to the frequent unfair practices in this branch of trade.722 The act covers only 
trade relations concerning foodstuffs. It does not contain a general clause. However, it 
identifies 44 specific types of unreasonable terms, and any contracting party who 
benefits from these terms may be sanctioned. In the Czech Republic, Act. 395/2009 
Sb. addresses the significant market power in the sale of agricultural and food 
products, and includes not just a general prohibition of abuse of significant market 
power, but also a black list of unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices. 
In Croatia, in 2016, the Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with the Competition 
Agency and the relevant stakeholders has initiated intensive activity in delivering an 
                                           
715 Article 6.186 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. 
716 Article 6.228 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. 
717 § 433 Czech Civil Code Act 89/2012 Sb., Havel in Melzer/Tégl a kol. Občanský zákoník, Velký komentář, 
2014-2017, Leges, § 433.   
718 Josef Bejček: Smluvní Svoboda a ochrana slabšího obchodníka, Acta Universitatis Brunensis, iuridica 
edition Scientia vol. 557, masarikova univerzita, Brno 2016, p 43 ff. 52 
719 § 433 Czech Civil Code “(1) A person who acts as an entrepreneur with respect to other persons in 
economic transactions may not abuse his expertise or economic position to create or take advantage of the 
dependence of the weaker party and to achieve a clear and unjustified imbalance in the mutual rights and 
duties of the parties. (2) It is presumed that the person who, in economic transactions, acts with respect to 
the entrepreneur in a manner unrelated to his own business activities is always the weaker party.” 
720 Book IV title IV Code of Commerce. 
721 Country report France. 
722 Act no. 362/2012 Coll. on unreasonable terms in trade relations objects of which are foodstuffs entered 
into force on January 1, 2013. 
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Act against unfair business terms in the food supply chain in order to establish 
protection against unfair business terms between all participants in the food chain.723  
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
On the basis of the country research, it can be concluded that the system of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive is generally considered appropriate for an extension to (at 
least certain) B2B contracts. The increased need to take into account individual 
circumstances in a B2B case was stressed in several country reports, as the existence 
of a weaker position of one of the parties cannot be presumed.724 The creation of 
several different standards to judge the unfairness of contract terms in certain 
Member States has attracted criticism725 and should be avoided at EU level. The open 
norm seems sufficiently flexible to take into account the specificities of a B2B context. 
However, there are differences of opinion as to the exact formulation an open norm 
should take in a B2B context726 and it should be noted that in prior proposals and 
attempts to introduce judicial control for B2B contracts, such as the DCFR and the 
CESL, slightly different open norms have been proposed (relying on the test of Article 
3 of the Late Payment Directive, recast 2011),727 a key goal being to place some 
restraints on the scope for judicial intervention.728  
The question of appropriateness of the UCTD’s test for use in B2B contracts if EU wide 
controls were to be applied to such contracts, is of course a different question from 
whether there is a need for such extension in the first place. In the countries that 
already have a system of control of unfair B2B contract clauses in place, it is logical 
that a need to extend the scope of the UCTD at European level was not considered 
strictly necessary by national stakeholders.729 In contrast, in a large majority of 
countries that do not have such system in place, a possible extension was seen as 
beneficial, especially for SMEs.730 Thus, e.g. the Estonian Chamber of Commerce 
                                           
723 See country reports of the mentioned countries. 
724 This point was also argued by some business associations in the position papers that they submitted to 
the online public consultation. For example, from EuroCommerce: “There will always be a stronger and a 
weaker party. We challenge the assumption that larger businesses are ipso facto the stronger in any 
relationship and that small sellers are automatically in a weaker position. There is no evidence that this is 
inevitably the case and there are examples of smaller suppliers providing ‘must have’ local brands who exert 
seller power on larger retailers.” 
725 Country report France. 
726 See e.g. T. Pfeiffer, “Unfaire Vertragsbestimmungen”, European Review of Private Law 2011 in favour of 
a slightly different norm in an B2B context. 
727 Directive 2011/7/EU. 
728 See article 86 CESL and Article II.-9:405 DCFR. 
729 E.g. Austria, Germany, France, Slovenia.  
730 Some support for an extension of the protection against unfair contract terms to SME’s was expressed in 
the following country reports: Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Spain, UK (see also 
the 2005 Law Commission Recommendation to extend the scope of application to small businesses). In 
Romania, companies have repeatedly brought the issue of the lack of protection to the Constitutional Court. 
The mentioned countries represent a majority of countries in which no protection currently exists for B2B 
unfair contract terms. In some countries, mixed views were reported (Bulgaria; Slovakia), and in a minority 
of countries in which no B2B protection exist, no need for or opposition to an extension of the protection 
was reported (Ireland, Latvia, Luxemburg). 
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answered that certain measures could definitely help benefit SMEs which sometimes 
have no other options than to succumb to the rules foreseen by the other contracting 
party; similarly Italian stakeholders were reported to be particularly in favour for the 
extension of the provisions of the UCTD at least to the Business-to-Microenterprises 
sector.731  
The position papers that were submitted in the open public consultation represent a 
different view. Of the papers submitted by business stakeholders that mentioned the 
UCTD (14),732 eight mentioned that the UCTD should not be extended to cover B2B 
relations. The principle of freedom of contract between businesses was often invoked 
as a justification. It should be noted, however, that the majority of position papers 
representing the business perspective were submitted by business associations. The 
quantitative results from the full survey in the online public consultation show that 
opinions on this issue are strongly divided between business associations and 
individual businesses: while only 24% of business associations agreed that business 
protection should be strengthened by extending the UCTD to cover B2B contracts, a 
majority (53%) of individual business respondents (companies) indicated that they 
would be in favour of such an extension. 
Various rationales have been invoked to justify judicial intervention in contracts. The 
approach adopted has an influence of the scope of application of judicial control of 
contract terms. The following possible reasons have been set out:733 
1. Protection of an individual contract party (‘the other party’): 
(a) Protection of the weaker party 
(b) Protection of the other party due to informational asymmetry upon 
conclusion of the contract. 
2. Protection of market functioning: 
(a) Judicial correction of market failure. 
(b) Enabling acceptance of (certain) contract terms without reading and 
negotiating. 
 
These reasons are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some authors see the 
protection of the weaker party as the main reason for judicial intervention, other 
authors focus on the protection of the market. Most authors see both the protection of 
the individual contract parties and of the market in general as a reason for judicial 
intervention.734 Control of unfair contract terms certainly enables necessary 
corrections: in B2B contracts, just like in B2C contracts, standard clauses may not be 
efficient because they are not really based on the choices of both parties. In addition 
standard clauses may be inefficient in that they can have unwanted redistribution 
effects. So, in a contractual chain, for example, where B2C protections prevent the 
retailer excluding or restricting responsibility to the consumer for defective goods, the 
retailer may be prevented from passing liability back up the chain to the party from 
                                           
731 In the same sense, ia also country report Malta. 
732 See report on the public consultation, Part 2 of this report. 
733 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015 [195–216]. 
734 KÖTZ, European Contract Law, vol. I (1997), p 137 ff.; BEALE, ‘Unfair Contracts in Britain and Europe’, 42. 
Current Legal Problems 1989, p (199) 204; English and Scottish Law Commissions, Unfair Terms in Contracts: A 
Joint Discussion Paper, 3 Jul. 2002 (The Law Commission  Consultation Paper No. 166; The Scottish Law 
Commission Discussion Paper No. 119, available at <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/unfair_terms.htm>), p 2.1 
ff. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  204 
whom the goods were purchased, if this party is free to exclude or restrict liability 
(because such terms are not subject to fairness controls).735  
Extension to non-negotiated terms in B2B contracts can in any event be justified on 
the basis of several of the above mentioned reasons. Protection of the market would 
allow an extension to all non-negotiated terms in all B2B contracts (there being no 
negotiation, there may not be an efficient allocation of risks); while if the rationale is 
the protection of the weaker party, there would be a justification for protecting at least 
those businesses that are most vulnerable to unfair terms.  
The case to apply control of unfair contract terms is therefore the least controversial 
for SMEs and micro-enterprises. This is even justified if one accepts that there is only 
a need for judicial intervention because of the weaker (bargaining) position of one of 
the parties. The similarity and negligible difference between small business (especially 
micro-enterprises) and consumers in terms of knowledge, experience and negotiating 
power has in any event been stressed in several country reports736 and studies. Also, 
certain consumer organisations report that micro-enterprises have turned to consumer 
associations in search of help and guidance.737  
To limit the scope of control to certain categories of businesses such as SMEs, of 
course entails the difficult task of providing a good and practicable criterion to 
distinguish SMEs from other businesses. An example of this approach is the 
Netherlands, where the equivalent of Art. 3 (1) UCTD738 is also applied to business-to-
consumer and business-to-SME (hereafter B2SME) contracts alike. The unfairness test 
does not apply to businesses that make use of the same set of standard terms, or that 
have 50 employees or more, or that are required to publish their annual financial 
statements including their balance sheet and the income statement and explanatory 
memorandum (large and medium-sized enterprises under European company law).739 
Such a distinction between different sizes of businesses is also not novel to EU law.740  
 
In the legal literature, an extension to all pre-formulated terms in all B2B contracts 
and not merely B2SME contracts has however also been pleaded for.741 It has been 
argued that the least controversial reason for intervention is that an efficient legal 
system should allow all parties, including businesses, to accept certain parts of pre-
formulated contracts presented to them without being required to check their content 
for fairness.742 Such reasoning pleads for an extension of judicial control to non-
negotiated terms for all B2B contracts, possibly with the exclusion of transactions 
                                           
735 T. Pfeiffer (2011), 842-843. 
736 E.g. country report Slovakia; country report Croatia; Petrić (2013), p. 34; this was also the 
recommendation of the UK Law Commission in 2005 - Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law 
Com. No 292 (2005)). 
737 Country report Croatia. 
738 Art. 6:233 sub (a) Dutch Civil Code. 
739 See Art. 6:235 (1) and (3) DCC. 
740 See Commission Recommendation 2003/361 of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises; OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36; and the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common 
European Sales Law. 
741 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015, (195), 207; T. Pfeiffer (2011) 843. 
742 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015, (195), 207. 
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above a certain (important) value.743 The idea behind excluding transactions of a large 
value, is that in these cases the contractual parties can be expected to seek legal 
advice and to carefully examine contract terms.744  
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price; Whether there are 
specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which could be regarded 
as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Based on the country research for this evaluation it can be concluded that the current 
limitations of the scope of application of the UCTD (exclusion of individually negotiated 
terms and core terms) appear to be appropriate for B2B contracts. Regulating these 
excluded terms is generally considered to be contrary to freedom of contract, 
especially in a B2B context, and an inappropriate intervention in the freedom to trade 
and conduct business. 745 
With regard to individually negotiated terms, it was argued that in a B2B context, it is 
much more difficult to justify intervention. A thorough justification is all the more 
necessary in a B2B context as an extension to negotiated terms play a much greater 
role in a B2B context than in a B2C context: whereas the number of B2C contracts in 
which there is genuine negotiation of the terms can be considered to be limited, this is 
not the case in a B2B context.  
Such justification is however lacking. In a B2B context, the transaction cost 
justification cannot be invoked for individually negotiated terms (there has, after all, 
been negotiation, so the resulting terms can be assumed to be efficient), and the 
weaker party justification does in any event not justify an extension to all negotiated 
B2B contracts either, as there is not necessarily a weaker party in every B2B contract.  
Some stakeholders in several Member States have however mentioned that, as in B2C 
contracts (albeit to a more limited extent), it may sometimes be that it is claimed that 
there has been negotiation when this is not really the case.746 In general, however, 
extension of controls to negotiated terms in B2B contracts is not pleaded for nor 
recommended by the stakeholders interviewed in the Member States.747  
The arguments raised against control of core contract terms in a B2C context are 
reiterated and generally considered even more relevant in a B2B context.748 Such an 
intervention would go contrary to freedom of contract749 or is considered an 
                                           
743 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015, (195), 213;  the English and Scottish Law Commission 
-  Unfair Terms in Contracts: Joint Report, February 2005 (http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc292.pdf), p 
5.24 and 5.54 - proposed a threshold of 500.000 GBP. 
744 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015, (195), 213. 
745 Country reports Bulgaria; Cyprus; Germany; Estonia; Croatia.  
746 Country reports the Netherlands, France. 
747 See also 2005 Law Commission Recommendation, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) 
at 5.68. 
748 E.g. country report Czech Republic. 
749 In this sense, e.g. country report Bulgaria.  
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inappropriate intervention in the freedom to trade.750 The argument was also raised 
that potential unfair consequences with regard to core terms could be averted by 
using “classical” contract rules such as those, e.g., on usurious contract.751 Also, it 
was argued that clear definitions are needed to distinguish core terms in order to 
avoid uncertainty and diverging court decisions. 752 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Support for a similar rule on transparency in B2B transactions as the one that applies 
in B2C contracts was reported from several countries.753 Such a rule was considered to 
have potential benefits in B2B transactions, as especially in certain specific sectors, 
very technical terminology is often used.754 
In general, there seems to be no convincing argument why the contractual 
transparency requirements should not equally apply to B2B transactions.755 
Businesses can equally be in need of protection from non-transparent terms.756 Such 
duty can also be justified as it enables a contractual party to assess the obligations 
and rights that arise from the contract without having to invoke legal or other 
assistance.757 
Some scholars reject this approach and argue that businesses can be expected to put 
more effort into understanding contract terms.758 The imposition of contractual 
transparency was also seen as a restriction upon private autonomy, it was argued that 
B2B transactions are usually much more complicated than consumer contracts and 
parties have freedom to choose the wording of their contract.759 It was also mentioned 
that much would depend on the standard to be applied in assessing those concepts 
and the consequences of non-compliance.760 It is clear that the question whether a 
                                           
750 In this sense, e.g. country report Cyprus. 
751 E.g. country report Slovenia. 
752 Langer “§ 879 para. 3 KSchG”, rec. 7 seq. in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
753 Country reports Czech Republic, Spain.  
754 Country report Bulgaria. 
755 Loos (2015), “Transparency of Standard Terms under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the 
Proposal for a Common European Sales Law”, 191; T. Pfeiffer, “Unfaire Vertragsbestimmungen”, European 
Review of Private Law 2011, 848. See also art. II.-9:402 DCFR. 
756 Leitner (2005), p. 130 seq. 
757 See C. Von Bar, E. Clive (eds.), Principles, definitions and model rules of European private law. Draft 
Common Frame of Reference, Full edition, Munchen, Sellier, 2009 (comment to Article II.-9:402 DCFR), p. 
629. 
758 Kath (2007), p. 226 seqq; against an analogous application of Sec. 6 para. 3 also 
Schurr “§ 6 para. 3 KSchG”, rec. 8 in: Fenyves/Kerschner/Vonkilch (2006). 
759 Country report Latvia. 
760 Country report UK. 
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term is transparent may be answered differently in a contract between businesses 
than in a consumer contract.761 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade; Whether the consequences of such an 
extension would have an effect on innovation by or market opportunities for SME 
providers/suppliers; Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-
business transactions would exceed the negative consequences of such an 
extension. 
In the country research, no compelling evidence was provided that the extension of 
the scope of the UCTD would create a hindrance to trade. On the contrary, in those 
countries which have already such protection in place, no specific barriers to trade 
stemming from such specific protective provisions were reported.762 In addition, such 
an extension would remedy the existing lack of uniformity as between national 
approaches to fairness in B2B contracts, and this was considered by a number of 
stakeholders to entail potential benefit to cross-border trade and to have the potential 
of strengthening the position of SMEs.763 It was however also mentioned that such 
effects are is difficult to quantify and might be limited.764 In general, the potential 
positive effects are considered to outweigh in the potential negative consequences. 
This evaluation therefore concludes that a majority of Member States already have 
some system of protection in place for unfair contract terms in B2B contracts. There is 
especially a case for control of such terms in contracts with SMEs. The system of the 
UCTD, based on the concept of good faith and significant imbalance between the 
rights and obligations of the parties, is generally considered appropriate for an 
extension to such contracts. This open norm leaves sufficient leeway to take into 
account the specificities of a business context. It is also considered appropriate in a 
B2B context to limit controls to clauses that are not individually negotiated and not to 
apply controls to the core contract terms. In case of an extension of the protection to 
B2B contracts, it appears logical to also extend the transparency requirement, as this 
can also benefit traders. 
 Relevance for consumer-to-business transactions 6.4.2.2.
• The Study will also analyse the need and potential for the application of the UCTD 
in consumer to-business (C2B) relations. This concerns situations where the 
consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader (e.g. where the consumer 
sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content to business against 
remuneration).  
The current unclear formulation of the scope of application of the UCTD leads to a 
discussion concerning its application to C2B contracts and to legal uncertainty in some 
Member States. According to Art. 1(1) the UCTD approximates unfair terms in 
contracts concluded ‘between a seller or supplier’ and a ‘consumer’ (in the English 
version; as a different terminology is used in other language versions). The 
formulation has posed problems i.e. concerning suretyship contracts (see above). It is 
                                           
761 Loos (2015), “Transparency of Standard Terms under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the 
Proposal for a Common European Sales Law”, 191. 
762 Country reports Austria, Germany. 
763 Country reports Bulgaria, Italy, Malta. 
764 Country report Latvia, UK. 
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also problematic in C2B contracts. Where the consumer sells the goods or supplies the 
service to a trader, the trader is not the ‘seller’ or ‘supplier’ and on a literal reading, 
the UCTD does not apply. Member States are of course allowed to extend the scope of 
application of the UCTD or to give a broad interpretation to that scope of application 
(given the minimum harmonisation character). It appears from the country research 
that different interpretations are indeed given to the scope of application. Whereas in 
some Member States, the UCTD is considered to cover these contracts, in other it is 
mentioned that this requires an extensive interpretation or an application by analogy, 
and in a third group of Member States, the UCTD is considered not to be applicable to 
C2B contracts. 
It is generally accepted that there can be problems with these contracts. The position 
of a consumer is, in terms of negotiating power, quite similar vis-à-vis both 
professional sellers and professional buyers.  
As has been discussed in the context of C2B unfair commercial practices (see above), 
the problems most often reported concern the sale of gold and jewellery by consumers 
to businesses.765 But problems and the absence of negotiating power were also 
reported in cases where a consumer provides digital content to a professional (e.g. 
YouTube) for remuneration;766 or where consumers occasionally sell their cars or 
motorcycles online to traders.767 The inequality may even be more significant than 
generally exists, because in these particular cases the consumers (especially in the 
gold selling cases) may be in need of ‘quick cash’ and may therefore take rash 
decisions.768 Traders can use this inferior position to the detriment of the consumers. 
Problems were furthermore reported in the energy market (e.g. when consumers sell 
solar or wind energy to traders).769 The Romanian National Consumer Protection 
Authority (NCPA), received complaints from consumers regarding the fairness of C2B-
lease contracts concerning land and buildings. In other countries however, the lack of 
protection in C2B contracts is considered to be less problematic or only seldom 
problematic.  
The problems with C2B contract are also (partially) linked to the rise of the 
collaborative economy. Transactions involving the use of collaborative platforms may 
not only lead to C2C contracts, but also to C2B contracts.770 However, the need to 
solve the lack of protection in C2C contracts in the sharing economy was perceived to 
be more urgent.771 
Different positions are taken in the Member States with regard to the need to apply 
control of unfair contract terms to C2B contracts/the need to extend the scope of 
                                           
765 E.g. in Greece, France, Portugal and Sweden. In the UK, the OFT e.g. launched an investigation into the 
gold buying industry, and found unfair contract terms contracts for the purchase of gold by post, this 




766 Country report Lithuania. 
767 Country report the Netherlands. 
768 Country reports Lithuania; the Netherlands. 
769 Country report Sweden. 
770 Commission Communication, A European agenda for the collaborative economy, COM(2016) 356 final, 
p.8. 
771 C2C relations are subject to a complementary study and are therefore not discussed here.  
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application on the UCTD. In some Member States it is either recognised that C2B 
contracts require the protection of the UCTD or it turns out that such contracts are 
already protected through specific or general national legislation. In contrast, in other 
Member States, some stakeholders do not find the extension of the UCTD to C2B-
relations necessary.  
Some countries have already established legislation protecting consumers in specific 
types of C2B transactions. For instance, the French legislator has recently adopted 
some specific legal provisions regarding the sale of precious metal and gold by a 
consumer.772 However, most French interviewees would prefer a general application of 
the UCTD to C2B-contracts. Other countries, like Italy, do not have regulation with 
regard to C2B-relations. Due to the lack of specific protection for consumers, the only 
possibility to provide protection to consumers in those relations is by interpreting 
existing legislation extensively.773 It was therefore claimed that it would be more 
efficient to extend the scope of application of the consumer law directives (at least 
UCPD and UCTD) to C2B-relations. A similar view was reported from the Irish 
enforcement agency and from Greece, where the extension of the scope of application 
to protect consumers in C2B relations received positive reactions.774 A gap currently 
exists, that can only be solved by an application of consumer law by analogy. 
A third category of Member States already applies their provisions on unfair contract 
terms to C2B contracts.775 Portugal, for instance, with its Decree-Law 446/85, has 
established some provisions that protect consumers against standard contract terms 
in C2B transactions. Indeed, a good number of countries have a broader control of 
standard contract terms that is not limited to contracts where the trader ‘supplies’ or 
‘sells’. Even within this third category of Member States, opinions differ on the need to 
extend the application of the UCTD itself to C2B-relations. The Dutch respondents, for 
instance, are in favor of the extension. Their legislation implementing the UCTD 
already applies to C2B-transactions, but only where the professional buyer introduces 
standard terms into the contract. The Dutch grey and black lists primarily assume that 
the consumer is the buyer or client instead of the seller or the service provider, and 
can therefore not protect consumers in the context of C2B-relations. Nevertheless, 
those C2B-contracts often contain terms that are ‘mirror versions’ of the ones 
mentioned on the lists. A consumer in such circumstances can only fall back on 
general contract law, from which the parties may derogate. In other countries, like 
Croatia or Cyprus, the abovementioned C2B problems would only seldom occur and as 
a result the need or potential for the application of the UCTD is not seen.  
Lastly, some stakeholders in certain countries had reservations concerning an 
extension of the UCTD to C2B-relations. An extension in the sense that traders would 
be protected in C2B relations is in any event not considered necessary or desirable.776  
                                           
772 Art. L. 224-96 ff, L. 242-34 ff and R. 224-4 C.conso 
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/dgccrf/documentation/fiches_pratiques/fiches/ra
chat-d-or-metaux-precieux.pdf 
773 Example given by Italy: “The classic example regards a non-professional who sells gold to a jewelry or a 
dedicated shop. In this concern, the actual provisions on consumer protection would not find application to 
such a case. Therefore the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato has configured this contractual 
scheme as that of a service contract, in whose framework the consumer pays for a service consisting in the 
assessment of the value of the goods proposed to the jewelry or the dedicated shop.” 
774 Country reports Ireland, Greece. 
775 I.a. Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Slovakia, also in the UK, the provisions on unfair contract terms 
were applied to consumers selling gold to traders. 
776 Country reports Luxembourg, Hungary, Greece. 
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Thus e.g., in Estonia or Poland, no need to extend the scope of the directives to C2B 
transactions was perceived. The Polish stakeholders representing traders consider the 
general contract rules that apply in such situation to provide sufficient protection. The 
point was furthermore raised that extension of the UCTD could complicate the 
understanding of traditional legal definitions as ‘consumer’. This problem is arguably 
however not caused as such by the application of consumer protection rules to C2B 
transactions. More generally, the changing roles of consumers and traders, especially 
in the collaborative economy, require a clearer delineation and clearer thresholds to 
establish who is a consumer.777  
In conclusion, there is no consensus on the need to extend the scope of application 
the UCTD to C2B transactions in the European Union as the scope of the problem is 
limited and an important number of countries already apply the UCTD to protect 
consumers in C2B contract either directly or by analogy.  
However, it is generally recognised that the position of the consumer in C2B contracts 
is similar to the position of the consumer in B2C contracts in which unfair standard 
terms are used and the application of unfair contract terms legislation in those 
countries where this already exists is not problematic. A clearer description of the 
scope of application of the UCTD to ensure its application to all consumer contracts 
would increase legal certainty and solve the problems that have been reported with 
C2B contracts, even if these problems may not be all that large in scope. It would also 
make specific legislation as has been adopted in some Member States superfluous, 
thus simplifying consumer law. 
6.4.3. Contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
In this Section, we analyse links between commercial practices used by traders and 
individual remedies of the consumer under the contract, in particular whether there is 
a need and potential to develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair 
commercial practices. 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Article 3(2) of the UCPD expressly provides that it “is without prejudice to contract law 
and, in particular, to the rules on the formation, validity, or effect of a contract”. 
Recital 9 provides that it “… is without prejudice to individual actions brought by those 
who have been harmed by an unfair commercial practice. It is also without prejudice 
to Community and national rules on contract law…” In essence, Article 3(2) of the 
UCPD functions as a kind of negative cross-reference to national contract law 
remedies778 that may be available for situations where an unfair, misleading or 
aggressive commercial practice has actually caused consumer detriment. Whether or 
not an unfair practice triggers effects relevant to the individual relationships and 
whether national courts are allowed to decide that the individual contract concluded as 
a result of that practice be invalid in its entirety and/or to award damages, is a matter 
of national contract law, and not of the UCPD, which is without prejudice to contract 
law and individual claims. 
                                           
777 Reflecting this point, 49% of respondents to the online public consultation, including 90% of consumer 
associations and 68% of public authorities, agreed that further criteria should be defined to allow for a 
clearer distinction between consumers and traders in the collaborative economy.  
778 That core of national contract law has never been harmonised by the EU legislator (except for the UCTD, 
based on minimum harmonisation). 
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Our country research shows a diverse patchwork of national arrangements as regards 
contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices before, during and after a 
commercial transaction. 
In all Member States, it seems in principle possible to rely on general contract law 
provisions to seek contractual consequences of an unfair commercial practice. Any 
consumer may claim that a misleading commercial practice constitutes a “mistake” or 
“fraud” that vitiated his or her consent; likewise, any consumer may claim that an 
aggressive commercial practice constitutes “violence”, “duress”, “threat” or “undue 
influence” that should lead to avoidance of the contract.779 In addition, doctrines of 
unlawfulness and unconscionability may be relevant in this regard.780 Likewise, 
doctrines on pre-contractual liability (culpa in contrahendo) may be relevant to claim 
damages.781 In relation to commercial practices after a commercial transaction, 
national contract law rules on performance (good faith) may be relevant to ask for 
performance or claim damages.  
However, it should be noted that there is no general principle that an unfair 
commercial practice (irrespective of whether before, during or after a commercial 
transaction) either automatically triggers the avoidance or termination of the contract 
and/or damages or automatically constitutes a breach of contract. These general 
doctrines are subject to certain limitations which may function as a barrier for 
consumers who want to get out of their contracts, etc., because of unfair commercial 
practices.782 It should be stressed that consumers often have no interest in the 
contract being labelled completely invalid as the consequence of a breach of the 
UCPD; consumers are often more interested in performance and damages.783 
In practice, in some Member States where national provisions on avoidance of 
contracts or damages could be used, a breach of the law transposing the UCPD is 
nonetheless generally not associated with any contractual consequences.784 In some of 
these Member States, the legislation implementing the UCPD even explicitly provides 
for a negative cross-reference to relevant national contract law doctrines. For 
example, Estonian law states that an unfair commercial practice does not result, in 
itself, in the nullity of the transaction.785 
Unfair commercial practices can also be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
contract.786 Unfair commercial practices connected with the conclusion of a contract 
are to be qualified as “circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract” which, according to Article 4 of the UCTD, are relevant for the assessment of 
                                           
779 Country reports Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Slovakia, Spain. 
780 Country reports Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Luxembourg. 
781 Country reports Austria, Germany. 
782 Country report Austria, Germany. 
783 Country report Austria. See, for example, judgment of the Landgericht Hildesheim of 17 January 2017, 
imposing mutual restitution obligations on the consumer and the Volkswagen group (sale of a Skoda car 
with “Dieselgate” engine from the Volkswagen group), on the basis of Section 826 of the BGB, according to 
which a person who, in a manner contrary to public policy, intentionally inflicts damage on another person is 
liable to the other person to make compensation for the damage. 
784 Country report Cyprus. 
785 Country report Estonia. 
786 Country reports Denmark, Italy. 
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the unfair nature of the contractual terms and of the transparency of such terms, as 
required by Article 5 UCTD.787 Unfair commercial practices can also trigger rights 
against the seller regarding lack of conformity under the legislation implementing the 
Consumer Sales Directive.788 However, these rights only concern goods during the 2-
year guarantee period (some Member States however have longer liability periods for 
sellers). 
Taking the example of a consumer buying a car following false statements by the 
manufacturer and/or car dealer, during the 2-year guarantee period, the consumer 
could rely on the legal guarantee of the Consumer Sales Directive against the seller, 
“taking into account any public statements on the specific characteristics of the goods 
made about them by the seller, the producer or his representative, particularly in 
advertising or on labelling” (Article 2(2), sub (d) CSD). After that period, the 
consumer can rely on national contract law doctrines as touched upon above. As 
mentioned, these doctrines are subject to certain limitations which may function as a 
barrier for consumers who want to get out of their contracts, etc., because of unfair 
commercial practices. These rights and remedies are not harmonised, so the legal 
situation of the consumer in a specific case will depend very much on the applicable 
national law. 
As indicated above, Article 3(2) UCPD does not prevent the introduction of specific 
national provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches of the 
UCPD. In a number of Member States, the legislation implementing the UCPD contains 
a positive cross-reference to relevant national contract law doctrines. For example,  
• In Bulgaria, the implementing legislation states that the consumer has the right 
to terminate the contract with the trader concluded as a result of an unfair 
commercial practice (through an out-of-court unilateral notice) and to claim 
damages under the general procedure;789 
• In France, the legislation states that, if an aggressive commercial practice leads 
to the conclusion of a contract, this contract is deemed null and void;790  
• In Luxemburg, Article L.122-8 of the Code de la consommation has a specific 
legal provision providing the nullity of a clause or a combination of clauses of a 
contract concluded in violation of the legal national legal provisions on unfair 
commercial practices. It is a relative cancellation, i.e. the consumer is the only 
admissible party to the contract to invoke its nullity. It is important to 
emphasise that cancellation involves retroactive destruction of the contract, or 
at least of the clause or the combination of clauses of the contract which is 
based on the unfair commercial practice; 
• In the Netherlands, the legislation implementing the UCPD offers the possibility 
to avoid any transaction concluded under the influence of an unfair practice 
(through an out-of-court unilateral notice);791 
• In Portugal, contracts concluded under the influence of an unfair commercial 
practice are voidable on the consumer’s initiative, in accordance with the rule 
                                           
787 Country reports Denmark, Italy. 
788 Country reports Austria, Germany. 
789 Country report Bulgaria. 
790 Country report France. 
791 Country report the Netherlands. 
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of the Civil Code. The consumer has one year to act and the decision that 
annuls the contract has retroactive effects;792 
• In Slovakia, a link is made with the category of good morals.793 
In a number of Member States, national law provisions provide for special contractual 
consequences in case of breaches of the UCPD:  
• In Belgium, Article VI.38 of the Code of Economic Law provides for a special 
type of invalidity of contracts concluded as a result of an unfair commercial 
practice: the court must (practices listed in para. 1) or may (practices listed in 
para. 2) order the reimbursement to the consumer of the amounts paid, 
without any obligation for them to return the product delivered. If the matter 
concerns an unfair commercial practice listed in para. 2, a judge has more 
discretion and can adapt the remedy, taking the concrete circumstances of the 
case into account, e.g. the gravity of the infringement, the degree to which the 
behaviour of the consumer was influenced, the financial implications and the 
proportionality of the remedy. For example, the judge could order a partial 
reimbursement of the sums paid. For practices listed in para. 1, the court has 
no margin of appreciation and must order the complete reimbursement;794 
• In Poland, consumers may claim avoidance of the contract concluded as a 
result of an unfair commercial practice, with an obligation of mutual restitution 
and the trader’s obligation to pay back consumer’s costs related to the 
purchase of the product, not quite compatible with other forms of avoiding the 
contract from the Polish Civil Code and comparable to putting consumers in the 
same position as if they were withdrawing from a contract.795 
• In the United Kingdom, consumers have specific private rights of redress in 
relation to the CPUTR 2008: the remedies are the unwinding of a contract, a 
discount and damages.796 These remedies can be invoked where the 
“prohibited practice” (for these purposes, a misleading action or aggressive 
practice) was a “significant factor” in the consumer entering the contract or 
making the relevant payment (“transaction”). Generally, and subject to rules 
on double recovery, these remedies operate in addition to existing possibilities 
for private redress under the general law.797 
                                           
792 Country report Portugal. 
793 Country report Slovakia. 
794 Country report Belgium. One much-debated question concerns the causality requirement: to what extent 
must the consumer prove that the unfair practices caused them to conclude the contract?  According to 
some authors, a decisive defect of consent (vice du consentement) is required, since the purpose of the 
legislator was to create a kind of extrajudicial nullity. In this regard, a contract is only null and void (with 
the consequence that reimbursement must be ordered) if the consumer would not have concluded the 
contract as such in the absence of the unfair commercial practice. Other authors state that no causal link 
needs to be established and that the only requirement is that the consumer took a transactional decision 
that they would not have taken otherwise, and therefore under other conditions. Legal certainty, equality of 
consumers and the consistent application of the remedy would benefit from a clarification of the causality 
requirement by the Belgian legislator. 
795 Country report Poland. 
796 Initially, the CPUTR 2008 did not give consumers specific rights of private redress; a position buttressed 
by the original version of Regulation 28 which provided that “[a]n agreement shall not be void or 
unenforceable by reason only of a breach of these Regulations.” Instead a consumer wanting private redress 
from an unfair commercial practice had to fashion a remedy from pre-existing doctrines. Yet such an 
exercise was not always straightforward. 
797 Country report United Kingdom. 
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Finally, in some Member States, enforcement authorities can obtain a commitment 
from the trader responsible for the infringement, or order that trader, to compensate 
consumers that have suffered harm as a consequence of the infringement including, 
among others, monetary compensation, offering consumers the option to terminate 
the contract or other measures ensuring redress to consumers who have been harmed 
as a result of the infringement.798 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
According to the country research there is not much case law on the application of 
traditional contract law doctrines in relation to unfair commercial practices. As 
mentioned, these general doctrines are subject to certain limitations which may 
function as a barrier for consumers who want to get out of their contracts, etc. It also 
seems that the above mentioned positive cross-references to relevant national 
contract law doctrines in the legislation implementing the UCPD in Member States 
such as Bulgaria, France, Portugal and the Netherlands do not have a very significant 
practical impact. These provisions are not applied very often.799 The Dutch provision, 
however, has been applied several times.800 A first case in which the special sanction 
of Article VI.38 of the Belgian Code of Economic Law was applied, was published 
recently.801 
 
• The relationship with Article 6 (1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
In contrast to the UCPD, breaches of the UCTD have contractual consequences: under 
Article 6(1), unfair terms used in a contract with a consumer must “not be binding on 
the consumer”. In relation to the UCPD, Article 3(2) of the UCPD seeks to ensure that 
undesirable overlapping of the UCPD and UCTD does not occur at the level of legal 
consequences. In the Pereničová and Perenič case,802 which concerned a credit 
agreement where the annual percentage rate of charge indicated was lower than the 
actual rate, the CJEU concluded that such erroneous information provided in the 
contract terms is ‘misleading’ within the meaning of the UCPD if it causes, or is likely 
to cause, the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not 
have taken otherwise. Finding that such a commercial practice is unfair is one factor 
that can be cited when assessing the unfairness of contractual terms under the UCTD. 
Such a finding, however, has no direct effect on whether the contract is valid under 
Article 6(1) of that Directive.803  
 
                                           
798 Country reports Latvia, Poland, Romania. 
799 Country reports Bulgaria, France. 
800 Country report the Netherlands. 
801 Antwerp Court of Appeal, 17 November 2014, Rechtskundig Weekblad 2016-17, nr. 23, 4 February 2017, 
912. 
802 Case C-453/10 Pereničová and Perenič, 15 March 2012   
803 Case C-453/10 Pereničová and Perenič, paragraph 46.   
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• Whether there is a need and potential to develop contractual consequences linked 
to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
The country research indicates that the question whether or not there is a need to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair practices is highly 
controversial. Especially consumer organisations as well as certain enforcement 
authorities advocate the introduction of specific contractual remedies for breaches of 
the UCPD at the EU level (or at the least at the national level). It is submitted that the 
law should provide a specific clause giving the consumer a direct possibility to avoid 
any transaction concluded under the influence of unfair commercial practices.804 
Examples given for relevant problems include e.g. subscription traps and misleading 
car evaluation services.805  
Most other stakeholders (especially business organisations) advocated against such 
contractual remedies.806 Business organisations fear that the introduction of 
contractual sanctions could create a wave of claims against businesses that could 
often be unfounded.807 A similar picture is provided by the results of the open public 
consultation conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check: 95% of consumer 
associations either strongly agree or tend to agree that consumer protection against 
unfair commercial practices should be strengthened by introducing a right to individual 
remedies. A significant number of consumer respondents and public authorities (both 
75%) also agree with this statement. In contrast, only 10% of business associations 
agree, while 64% either tend to disagree or strongly disagree in this respect.808 
Interestingly, responding business respondents (individual companies) are split in this 
respect, with 45% agreeing, and 37% disagreeing. 
Based on the country research the following options at the EU level with respect to 
contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices could be 
identified: 
• A first option would be to continue the legislative status quo. It can be 
expected that the case law of the CJEU on the interaction between the UCPD 
and UCTD will develop in the years to come. As mentioned above, the CJEU 
already ruled that the finding that the use of (not individually negotiated) 
contract terms constitutes an (unfair) commercial practice is one factor that 
can be cited when assessing the unfairness of contractual terms under the 
UCTD.809 Of course the case law on the interaction between the UCPD and the 
(individual contractual remedies set out in the) UCTD does not provide for 
                                           
804 Country reports Austria, Croatia, Cyprus (almost all interviewed stakeholders), Denmark, Latvia (all 
stakeholders), Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland. 
805 Country report Sweden. 
806 Country reports Cyprus (business association, regulatory authority, relevant ministry), Denmark (other 
stakeholders than the Danish Consumer Council), Estonia (government officials and consumer associations), 
Poland (stakeholders representing traders), Slovenia, Spain (ministry of justice). 
807 Country report Greece. 
808 See Part 2 of this report. 
809 See also Case C-388/13 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v UPC Magyarország kft, Judgement of 16 
April 2015, where the CJEU ruled that the UCPD must be interpreted as meaning that the communication, 
by a professional to a consumer, of (erroneous) information, must be classified as a (misleading) 
commercial practice, even though that information concerned only one single consumer. In light of this 
judgment, it would seem that any isolated act or omission on the part of a professional during individual 
negotiations on contract terms with one single consumer would also constitute a commercial practice within 
the meaning of the UCPD.  
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contractual consequences in case of unfair commercial practices other than the 
use of contract terms.  
• A second option could be to replace the current negative cross-reference in 
Article 3(2) and Recital 9 UCPD with a positive cross-reference to national 
“contract law” and “individual actions”; for example through the introduction of 
a provision according to which “Member States shall ensure that national laws 
provide for adequate and effective contract law remedies for consumers who 
have been harmed by an unfair commercial practice”. Under this option, the 
UCPD would oblige the Member States to establish contract law remedies, but 
Member States would be free to shape these remedies taking into account 
national legal cultures. This could be combined with further clarifications and 
examples in an updated UCPD Guidance document, drawing on best practices 
in Member States. 
• A third option would be for the UCPD to provide for a harmonised set of 
remedies that are available to consumers who have been harmed by an unfair 
commercial practice. The primary aim would have to be to restore the victims 
to the position they were in before the unfair practice and the resulting harmful 
transactional decision took place. However, drafting a sound set of UCPD 
remedies might be quite a challenge and this option has a number of potential 
drawbacks, as it would entail a full harmonisation of core parts of national 
contract law. Moreover, there may be a risk that contractual consequences 
could create a wave of claims made against businesses that could often be 
unfounded.810 
For a detailed discussion of the options, please refer to Section 8, conclusions and 
recommendations. 
6.4.4. Injunctions 
• Relevance of the injunction procedure across the EU under the Injunctions Directive 
and other directives.  
The Injunctions Directive does not create consumer rights or traders’ obligations but is 
merely an enforcement instrument. More precisely, in the absence of binding rules on 
collective redress, it is the classic enforcement instrument of EU consumer law. As has 
been emphasised in many documents of the European Commission and also at the 
Consumer Summit 2016, enforcement is essential for the practical effect of EU 
consumer law in the Member States, and it is in the interest of the EU to ensure its 
functioning if Member States do not safeguard the effectiveness of injunction 
procedures sufficiently; which this evaluation confirms, as well as the previous reports 
by the Commission have demonstrated. 
The Injunctions Directive is complemented by singular and partly overlapping 
provisions in other directives that require Member States to introduce injunction 
procedures at the domestic level. Relevant EU legislation currently in force includes 
the UCTD (Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Art. 7(2) and 
(3)), the UCPD (Directive 2005/29/EC on business-to-consumer unfair commercial 
practices, Art. 11 (1) and (2)) and the CRD (Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer 
rights, Art. 23 (1) and (2)). 
The Injunctions Directive applies both to domestic and cross-border infringements. 
These two dimensions need to be considered separately with regard to the relevance 
of the injunction procedure. 
                                           
810 Country report Greece (views of business associations). 
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In this context, is must be noted that B2C cross-border transactions within the EU 
have increased considerably since the adoption of the Injunctions Directive in 1998. 
Between 2003 and 2006 alone, the average proportion of survey respondents in the 
EU reporting at least one cross-border purchase in the previous year more than 
doubled, from 12% to 26%.811 The analysis of key trends provided in Annex VIII of 
this report also shows growth in cross-border shopping over the internet, which has 
also more than doubled since 2006, due in part to technological progress and the 
mainstreaming of internet shopping in general. In 2014, 16% of all Eurobarometer 
respondents reported that they made an online purchase from another EU country, 
compared to only 6% in 2006. 
This by itself implies an increase in the numbers of cross-border infringements of 
consumer law, which is indeed evidenced by an increase of complaints related to 
cross-border purchases,812 and a need to provide for instruments to address them. 
Moreover, a further increase of cross-border B2C e-commerce can be expected, and is 
also considered desirable in an EU perspective, to increase competition between 
traders and also the quality of goods and services offered to consumers in the internal 
market. This requires consumers to feel confident purchasing online from another EU 
country, which again implies relevant substantive rights and an enforcement system 
that also covers cross-border infringements of consumer law. It is notable that the 
available data in this respect indicates that while there was a dramatic increase in 
confidence between 2003 and 2006, after 2008 confidence appears to have stagnated 
at a relatively high level. The following figure provides more details in this respect: in 
2003, only 10% of consumers felt that they had a high level of protection buying 
something on the internet from another Member State. By 2006, however, nearly one 
third reported that they felt at least “as confident” shopping online in another Member 
State compared to their own. Between 2008 and 2014, the proportion of consumers 
indicating that they feel confident shopping online in other Member States has 
fluctuated around an EU average of 38%.  
                                           
811 The Eurobarometer definition of a cross-border purchase for this question includes distance purchasing 
and purchasing as a result of physical travel (e.g. shopping while on holiday). However, in the case of 
physical travel, it does not include purchases linked to the trip itself (transportation, accommodation, meals, 
leisure activities, etc.). 
812 Evidence for this increase is mostly available through the statistics of the networks of European 
Consumer Centres (ECC-Net). In 2014, ECCs addressed 37 609 complaints, an increase by 67% compared 
to 2005 (22 549 complaints). Note that complaint statistics have to be interpreted with caution, because 
other factors may contribute to increased complaint numbers (e.g. a better visibility of the network etc). 
Figures quoted from European Commission, The European Consumer Centres Network, Anniversary Report 
2005-2015. 
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Figure 8: Percentage of consumers feeling confident purchasing online from 
another EU country, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometers 193, 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 299, 332, 358 and 397. Question: 2003: Do 
you think that, as a consumer, you have a high level of protection or not when you buy something on the Internet from 
a seller/company located in another country of the European Union? 2006-2011: Would you be more confident, as 
confident or less confident purchasing goods or services via the Internet from providers located in other European 
Union countries compared to purchases from providers located in (OUR COUNTRY)? [Displayed are the combined 
responses for ‘as confident’ and ‘more confident’]. 2012-2014: How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements. ‘You feel confident purchasing goods or services via the Internet from retailers or service 
providers in another EU country.’ Note: EU% comprises the EU 15 in 2003, EU25 in 2006, EU27 from 2008 to 2012 and 
EU28 thereafter. 
Note, however, that the survey questions in the Eurobarometer which address 
consumer confidence making cross-border purchases online has significantly changed 
twice, between 2003-2006 and between 2011-2012 (see figure caption). As question 
wording has an influence on consumer response, this trend should therefore be 
interpreted with care. 
These figures indicate a continued need for cross-border enforcement of consumer 
rights. At the same time, the responses of stakeholders and the number of injunction 
procedures in those Member States where the injunction procedure is the primary 
enforcement instrument demonstrate the continuous need of that instrument also at 
the domestic level.813  
As far as the domestic level is concerned, stakeholders have confirmed the relevance 
of EU legislation in this regard in the Member States, where injunction procedures 
have been introduced for the first time or where they have been improved by way of 
implementation of or as a reaction to the adoption of the Injunctions Directive and the 
specific provisions as mentioned above. Even though a few Member States, including 
Austria, France and Germany, had already established injunction procedures in sector-
specific legislation such as unfair commercial practices law or unfair contract terms 
law, that legislation did not extend to all the areas of consumer law that are listed in 
Annex I of the Injunctions Directive or even to consumer law in general (as the scope 
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of application has been extended in a number of Member States). The country reports 
on Denmark, Finland and Sweden suggest that the Injunctions Directive has not added 
anything to the pre-existing system. 
The survey of qualified entities and the country research conducted for this evaluation 
has, however, also shown that the injunction procedure is not used at all, or rarely 
used, in Member States where qualified entities have public law mechanisms such as 
injunction orders available that are faster, cheaper or more effective to use. In fact, 
there has been a recent development towards increasing the public law powers of 
consumer protection authorities and public regulators, for example, in the 
Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Still, that development does 
not cast doubts on the relevance of the injunction procedure as a tool that is available 
EU wide, as firstly, there are Member States where public law barely plays a role at all 
in the enforcement of consumer law, such as Austria and Germany, and secondly, 
there are Member States where consumer protection authorities and regulators have 
to use the injunction procedure so as to enforce consumer law. Finally, even where 
public law instruments exist, and public consumer protection authorities are the main 
actors in the enforcement of consumer law, there is still a need for complementary 
rights of private actors, in particular consumer organisations, in cases where the 
public body decides, for whatever reasons, not to take action. 
With regard to cross-border injunction procedures, the relevance of EU law is obvious 
from the problems that existed before its adoption, namely, that Member States 
denied legal standing to consumer organisations from other Member States, thereby 
rendering protection of consumers through collective action against cross-border 
infringements practically impossible. The low numbers of injunction actions taken in 
other Member States under the system of Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive (see 
Section 6.1.3 above) in spite of an increasing number of cross-border complaints 
indicate, however, that current needs are not sufficiently addressed by that system, 
and that existing obstacles to the use of the injunction procedure in a cross-border 
perspective diminish its relevance in practice.  
At the same time, this study shows a significant number of domestic injunction 
procedures relating to cross-border infringements. For the last five years, 213 
injunction procedures concerning cross-border infringements were reported, as 
compared to around 70 in the 2012 Commission report. Thus, through the cross-
border enforcement of injunction orders of national courts, the national injunction 
procedure as called for by the Injunctions Directive produces effects for the internal 
market; which could, however, be improved if the cross-border enforcement of 
injunction orders and of sanctions for non-compliance with an injunction order was 
facilitated. 
 
• Benefits of further harmonisation of the injunction procedure across the EU under 
the Injunctions Directive. In particular, the following issues from the perspective of 
the possible further harmonisation at EU level should be analysed: (i) scope of the 
Injunctions Directive; (ii) provisions ensuring exemption of qualified entities from 
legal costs within injunction procedure; (iii) mandatory summary procedure; (iv) 
mandatory publication of the injunction decision; (v) common rules on the burden 
of proof; (vi) sanctions for the infringements defined by the Injunctions Directive, 
taking into account provisions of the Directives listed in the Annex I to the 
Injunctions Directive as transposed into internal legal orders of the Member States; 
(vii) more precise sanctions in case of the non-compliance with the injunction 
order; (viii) the cross-border effect of the injunction order within the EU; 
This evaluation has identified several types of problems with injunction procedures 
that only EU law would seem to be able to resolve: obstacles to the effectiveness of 
injunction procedures, and the lack of legal certainty in general. Thus, in a forward 
looking perspective, significant benefits of further harmonisation of the injunction 
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procedure across the EU under the Injunctions Directive can be expected. For a 
detailed analysis of related problems, the underlying needs and the options for further 
harmonisation (and related benefits) regarding scope, legal costs, summary 
procedure, publication of the decision, rules on the burden of proof, sanctions and the 
cross-border effect of the injunction order within the EU, see Section 6.1 on 
effectiveness above and the recommendations below (Section 8). 
It should be emphasised that this also applies to the fight against cross-border 
infringements since qualified entities can take action against foreign traders in the 
qualified entities’ domestic courts. If the problem of cross-border enforcement of 
injunction orders and sanctions for non-compliance with injunction orders can be 
solved, this type of injunction procedures against foreign traders could be used to 
enhance consumer protection but also to create a level playing field between domestic 
traders and foreign traders, thereby fostering competition in the internal market. 
 
• Benefits of any further non-legislative or legislative measures increasing the use of 
injunction procedures by consumer organisations and strengthening the cooperation 
between consumer organisations from different MS. Analysis of: (i) the need and 
practical usefulness of the awareness raising activities, for example on the "e-
justice" portal; (ii) the need and practical usefulness of further measures such as 
CoJEF II addressed to the qualified entities which are consumer organisations, so 
that they coordinate their injunction actions regarding infringements, as defined by 
the Injunctions Directive, having cross-border dimension (the advantages and the 
disadvantages of simultaneous actions taken by consumer organisations in different 
MS regarding the same/similar infringement should be covered by the analysis); 
(iii) the potential of out-of-court settlements aiming at stopping infringements as 
defined by the Directive to improve the enforcement of EU legislation protecting the 
collective interests of consumers as well as whether there are possible measures to 
encourage such settlements. 
According to the country research for this evaluation, qualified entities, in particular 
from smaller Member States,814 have limited financial and human resources. It can 
therefore be expected that such qualified entities, in particular, could benefit from the 
know-how and experience as well as from information on current activities of qualified 
entities in other Member States. 
Co-operation and exchange of information between qualified entities have proven to 
be a useful ‘third way’ in addressing cross-border infringements, although only in a 
very limited number of cases. The majority of responding qualified entities have not 
cooperated on specific injunction actions with qualified entities from other EU 
countries. Specifically, 81% of responding qualified entities have not cooperated with 
consumer organisations in other EU countries on injunction actions, while 82% of 
participants have not cooperated with independent public bodies in other EU countries 
on such actions. Additionally, the majority (64%) of responding qualified entities have 
not informed qualified entities from other countries if an infringement affected 
consumers from their country since June 2011. Of the 27% of entities who have done 
so, one consumer organisation stated that they do so frequently within the framework 
of the CLEF and COJEF I and II projects. 
Non-legislative measures by the EU Commission, in particular the financing of 
education measures, have been helpful but have not reached all qualified entities yet. 
Under half of all respondents to the survey of qualified entities (40%) have 
                                           
814 This was reported in the country reports for Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Malta 
and Slovakia. 
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participated in forums like the Consumer Justice Enforcement Forum and the 
Consumer Law Enforcement Forum. In terms of the effectiveness of these measures 
(which can be seen as a proxy for their practical usefulness), 36% of responding 
qualified entities viewed them to be ‘very effective’, stating, for example, that these 
forums facilitate the exchange of best practices and relevant information, which is 
particularly helpful for smaller consumer organisations.  
6.5. EU added value  
• What is the additional value resulting from the EU intervention, compared to what 
could be achieved by Member States at national and/or regional levels?  
The four consumer protection directives subject to this study aim at contributing to a 
high level of consumer protection, and to remove obstacles to the Internal Market (the 
MCAD is the only directive scrutinised containing provisions that that relate to B2B 
relations, and aims at protecting businesses against misleading advertising and 
creating a harmonised basis for comparative advertising). 
In principle, a high level of consumer protection can be ensured by a purely national 
legal framework, as is illustrated by the small number of Member States in which a 
comprehensive legislative framework against unfair commercial practices and unfair 
contract terms was already in place before implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD. 
This being said, it is clear that these two key consumer directives have significantly 
increased the level of consumer protection in the large majority of Member States in 
which a less comprehensive or even no such framework existed prior to their 
transposition. In more than two thirds of the Member States the UCPD has 
significantly increased both the comprehensiveness of the legislative framework 
concerning unfair commercial practices and the level of protection against unfair 
commercial practices from the perspective of consumers.  
In the case of the UCTD the situation was more complex: The UCTD did not make 
much difference in countries such as Denmark, Germany or the Netherlands, which 
already had fairly advanced control regimes. In the case of the civil law countries, 
there was usually already a general clause of some kind that could, in theory, be used 
against unfair terms in consumer contracts. However, the UCTD has also brought the 
indicative list of terms which may be regarded as unfair, which provide a clearer focus 
as to the targeted terms, and also specific enforcement tools designed for unfair terms 
in consumer contracts which may not have existed before (e.g. Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
France, Malta, Romania, Slovakia). Also, the codification of the transparency rule was 
considered to be an improvement in terms of consumer protection (e.g. in Austria, the 
Netherlands). In common law countries such as the UK and Ireland, the systems have 
been improved not only in these ways, but also by the coverage of terms imposing 
unfair obligations and liabilities on consumers, as in these countries, controls tended 
to be limited to terms excluding or restricting the liabilities of the trader. Finally, in a 
number of countries like Croatia, Estonia, and Italy, comparable legislation to control 
unfair contract terms was absent prior to the implementation of the UCTD, and the 
UCTD therefore definitely contributed to the protection of consumers. In Italy, it was 
even reported to have influenced the adoption of legislation to control unfair terms 
outside the B2C context.  
In conclusion, the increase in the level of consumer protection resulting from the EU 
intervention depended very much on the pre-existing situation, and in most Member 
States the directives provided a clear added value. This is also, but less so, the case 
regarding the MCAD, which seems to have improved the protection of businesses in 
some countries, but not in others.  
For the Injunctions Directive, the main added value seems to have resulted for those 
countries that make significantly use of the injunctions procedure, and mainly in a 
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national context, as cross-border injunction procedures are very rare. The Injunctions 
Directive is an important enforcement instrument, and it has contributed much to the 
enforcement of EU consumer law at the national level, even though this evaluation 
confirms that more needs to be done to ensure that consumer law is enforced 
effectively in the Member States. The level of consumer protection would be lower in a 
number of Member States if the EU had not imposed the duty on Member States to 
implement effective remedies and sanctions and to provide for the collective 
enforcement of consumer law by qualified entities. 
Effective enforcement of consumer law is by itself an essential ingredient of the 
consumers’ trust in the legal system. This includes trust in the fact that consumers are 
also protected when it comes to transactions with foreign traders. In that respect, the 
Injunctions Directive is not the only instrument, but it forms a necessary part of a 
bundle of instruments that improve the consumer’s position vis-à-vis foreign traders, 
including also the CPC Network, the Rome I Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation. 
At the same time, the Injunctions Directive does not negatively affect honest traders 
as it merely applies to infringements of consumer laws established by other directives 
and regulations. Thus, whilst it is not creating obstacles to honest traders, it has 
increased their potential to act on the markets of other Member States as consumers 
feel more confident to enter into transactions with them. 
The second objective of the EU consumer and marketing law framework, removing 
obstacles to the Internal Market, cannot be reached by national legal frameworks 
alone. All Directives subject to this study are considered to have contributed to 
reaching this objective. While obstacles to the Internal Market remain, there is no 
doubt that both the maximum harmonised rules and the minimum harmonised rules, 
in conjunction with the harmonising effect of CJEU case law, have reduced these 
obstacles (at least to some extent), while also reducing the resulting costs for 
businesses to adjust to legislative diversity when offering their products and services 
cross-border.  
In the interviews conducted for this study with key stakeholder organisations in all 
Member States, they often considered that these directives have had a positive impact 
on cross-border trade. The general view was that it has become easier for consumers 
to directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries over the 
past years, which is also confirmed by the increasing number of consumers purchasing 
online from traders in other Member States. The last decade saw a significant increase 
in business-to-consumer (B2C) cross-border shopping in the EU. Cross-border 
shopping over the internet has more than doubled since 2006, due in part to 
technological progress and the mainstreaming of internet shopping in general. In 
2014, 16% of all Eurobarometer respondents reported that they made an online 
purchase from another EU country, compared to only 6% in 2006. However, it is also 
reported from some Member States that the percentage of cross-border purchases 
and the level of consumer confidence remains low (especially taking into account 
“geo-blocking”).815 As regards businesses, it is often reported that is has become 
easier for them to directly trade cross-border to consumers located in other EU 
countries over the past years. It is also frequently noted that the decision by both 
businesses and consumers regarding whether they will engage in cross-border 
transactions is also influenced by factors outside the legal environment.816  
This view was confirmed by the panel data analysis conducted in the framework of the 
study, which analysed the impact of the UCPD on consumer trust and online cross-
border shopping. While one of the regression models applied found significant effects 
                                           
815 Country reports Croatia, Estonia, Malta. 
816 Country reports France, Germany. 
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of the UCPD being in place on consumer trust and on cross-border online purchases, in 
other regression models the UCPD was not determined to have any significant causal 
effects in this respect.817 These results therefore have to be interpreted with care, and 
are not unequivocal proof of a causal effect from the UCPD being transposed in the 
Member States. In contrast, the percentage of households with internet access at 
home in Member States was found to have a positive and highly statistically significant 
effect on consumer trust and online cross-border purchases. The robustness of this 
effect is striking in comparison with all other variables that were used in the analysis. 
The increasing access to information online which can contribute to better and more 
informed choices of products and services seems to be a major factor for increasing 
levels of consumer trust and market integration in the EU, in addition to any effects 
that could be attributed to the legal framework.  
 
• To what extent do the issues addressed by the intervention continue to require 
action at EU level? 
Consumer research through market studies and Eurobarometers, complaints data, and 
the responses of qualified entities to the survey conducted for this study consistently 
show that consumer law infringements are a continuing problem, including unfair 
commercial practices, unfair contract terms and intransparent/misleading pricing (see 
problem analysis, Section 7). While in theory national interventions could address 
these problems, there is a significant added value of a common and effective EU legal 
framework for safeguarding a high level of consumer protection, especially as retail 
strategies and product and service sales more and more cross EU (and international) 
borders. As indicated above, removing obstacles to the Internal Market is only possible 
through action at EU level. Continued EU intervention has the potential to increase 
effectiveness of measures (as e.g. new unfair commercial practices can be more 
quickly detected and cross-border violations better addressed), as well as their 
efficiency, as further harmonisation (e.g. through an updated black list of unfair 
commercial practices and a possible new black list of unfair contract terms) is 
expected to simplify enforcement and to create a more transparent framework for 
consumers and traders.    
Regarding collective enforcement (e.g. through injunctions), the requirement of action 
at EU level has increased since the adoption of the Injunctions Directive and the 
specific provisions on injunctions in specific legislation. As indicated before, B2C cross-
border trade, in particular via e-commerce, has increased significantly, and so have 
consumer complaints regarding cross-border transactions to the ECC network.818 The 
responses of qualified entities to our survey suggest that more needs to be done at EU 
level to strengthen the position of qualified entities and, indirectly, of consumers 
through more effective collective procedures for enforcement of consumer law. 
                                           
817 The fixed-effects logistical model applied found a significant effect of the UCPD 
being in place on consumer trust, both with the full data set covering all Member 
States and a restricted data set excluding the seven Member States that already had a 
comprehensive legislative framework concerning unfair commercial practices in place 
before the UCPD was transposed. It also found a significant effect of the UCPD being 
in place on cross-border online purchases (with the restricted data set only). However, 
in the other panel regression models considered – the fixed effects, LSDV, and random 
effects models – the UCPD was not determined to have any significant causal effect on 
the overall level of consumer trust or cross-border online purchases. For 
methodological details, see Part 4 of this report. 
818 See problem analysis, Section 7. 
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• What would be the most likely consequences of stopping or withdrawing the 
existing EU intervention? 
Withdrawing the existing consumer and marketing law framework (of which the five 
directives scrutinised in this study are an important element) would very likely result 
in an increase of regulatory diversity that would raise barriers to the Internal Market. 
Whether the level of consumer protection would be affected depends, of course, on 
the actions of national legislators that one would assume under such a scenario. But it 
could be expected that at least in some countries the currently developed consumer 
law framework would not be maintained, therefore reducing the level of consumer 
protection in these countries. 
Also, stopping or withdrawing the existing EU intervention regarding the availability of 
injunction procedures at the national level would most likely have a negative impact 
on consumer protection in some Member States. In particular, the frequent 
intervention of the CJEU in injunction procedures concerning unfair contract terms 
shows that there is a significant risk that enforcement of consumer protection law at 
the national level would be weakened. 
With regard to cross-border injunctions, where the effect of the Injunctions Directive 
has been very modest in the past (if at all), stopping or withdrawing the existing EU 
intervention would still be likely to have a negative effect as the possibility of cross-
border enforcement under the current framework possibly acts to some degree as a 
deterrent to traders. More importantly, a reform of the existing legislation in line with 
the recommendations made in this study (see below) could increase the effectiveness 
of injunctions significantly. Withdrawing EU intervention in this area would therefore 
be likely to increase consumer detriment in B2C cross-border trade, which could be 
considerable as the frequency of cross-border transactions is increasing. 
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7. Problem definition 
In this section we provide a description of the problems identified regarding unfair 
commercial practices and marketing, contract conclusion and performance, and 
injunctions. The subsequent sub-sections discuss drivers of the problems identified, 
the EU dimensions of these problems, and expected future trends and baseline 
scenario. 
7.1. Problems identified regarding unfair commercial practices and marketing 
• What are the issues or problems that may require action? What is the size of the 
problem? Why are they a problem? 
7.1.1. Information requirements 
The existence of marketing/pre-contractual information requirements for B2C 
transactions currently included in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD), 
Price Indication Directive (PID) and Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) creates 
problems of application and enforcement due to overlaps and conflicting approaches 
(such as positive information duties vs. a prohibition of misleading omissions). 
Especially the overlap between Article 7(4) UCPD and the more comprehensive Article 
5/6 CRD creates confusion. In addition, there are relevant rules and requirements not 
only in the UCPD, PID, and CRD, but also in the Services Directive and E-Commerce 
Directive as well as in sector-specific rules concerning unfair commercial practices and 
information obligations regarding advertising. All in all, this creates a complicated legal 
framework which is difficult to apply for businesses and enforcement authorities, likely 
leading to additional costs due to its complexity, both for businesses and enforcement 
authorities. At the same time the multitude of requirements contributes to the 
problem of “information overload” for consumers. Behavioural research indicates that 
for an informed and unbiased decision process consumers need the right information 
at the right point in time. However, these needs of consumers are currently not 
addressed, and there seems to be a lack of a clear logic about which type of 
information is required at which stage of the marketing and contracting process. 
7.1.2. Price indication 
While by and large consumers appear to be effectively informed and aware about the 
unit selling price and from most countries no major problems in this respect were 
reported, investigations at the national level (in the UK and Germany) indicate that a 
considerable level of infringements of price indication rules occurs in practice. The 
country research also identified a number of current problems related to price 
indication, which often are outside the scope of the PID and are mostly considered to 
fall within the UCPD framework. These include: 
• Small letter size of unit price indication; 
• Differences between the price indicated on the shelves of the shop and the 
price charged at checkout;  
• Erroneous or misleading price indication on websites (e.g. hidden surcharges);  
• Indication of a price that will only apply if a certain method of payment is used, 
or discount that is applied only when the consumer is paying by a particular 
payment method, e.g. by cash; 
• Prices are indicated not clearly enough during sales or discounts. For example, 
a discount is only applicable to the holders of a loyalty card and for others a 
higher price will apply;  
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• Price obfuscation, price partitioning and other practices which may confuse 
consumers and which may interfere with their ability to assess the full price.  
These practices are particularly difficult to address since they operate on the fringes of 
what is allowed under the UCPD. Practices which are not within the PID scope also 
concern dynamic pricing. Since the UCPD does not oblige traders to offer their 
products at identical prices to different customers, traders can offer different prices 
depending on variables such as the time of day of the purchase (depending on 
different elasticities of demand by consumers at different times, e.g. higher gasoline 
prices during the morning rush hour), which can lead to a lack of transparency for 
consumers and may contribute to what has been called 'confuseopoly', i.e. marketing 
approaches where businesses evade competition with other market participants via 
intentional obfuscation. This is particularly the case for high frequency price changes, 
which are common in the online environment and can easily be applied in an offline 
environment where electronic price labels or billboards are used.   
This evaluation concludes that the costs of (unit) price indication do not seem to imply 
disproportionate burdens on businesses. There is also no evidence that the 
divergences between national laws due to the minimum harmonisation character and 
the use of regulatory options under the Price Indication Directive have a significant 
effect on cross-border trade. However, it has been argued by some stakeholders that 
the PID should in general be made more consistent across the EU with respect to 
derogations and units, as in their view different national rules have made it confusing 
and difficult to apply them in practice, especially for retailers that sell online cross-
border.  
As indicated above, there is some overlap between several consumer law directives 
which concern information requirements, including the PID. The recent Citroën 
Commerce judgment of the CJEU has also shown that the borderline between the 
UCPD and the PID is unclear and that the scope of application of the PID is unclear as 
well. 
7.1.3. Principle based approach of the UCPD 
As indicated before, this evaluation confirms that the UCPD's principle-based rules (in 
combination with the black list) are widely considered to provide an effective 
framework for achieving a high level of consumer protection regarding unfair 
commercial practices. However, there are some concerns about legal uncertainty for 
consumers and businesses. To some extent, the principle-based approach is 
considered to have contributed to enforcement difficulties. The openness of the 
clauses is reported to encourage traders to enter time-consuming discussions on the 
fairness of a practice and the outcome of an action is considered to be uncertain, 
which may discourage enforcement bodies from taking action on the basis of the 
general clause. Consumer organisations also consider that the principle-based 
approach does not prevent certain practices that border on unfairness but fall just 
outside the scope of what constitutes an unfair commercial practice. Especially during 
the first years of implementation some enforcement authorities and courts had 
difficulties to “circumstantiate” the principle-based rules of the UCPD to the concrete 
case. In the meantime, however, they have gained more expertise and practical 
experience to handle the principle-based approach. Stakeholders have also noted 
during the country research that the European Commission’s Guidance document 
facilitates more effective application of the implementing national legislation.  
7.1.4. UCPD black list 
The UCPD black list is generally considered to generate practical and significant 
benefits. For practices on the list, there is no need to apply the transactional decision 
test in order to take action, which facilitates enforcement and may avoid costly and 
time-consuming litigation. This assessment is confirmed through the country research 
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for this evaluation. Stakeholders often assess the idea of a black list as positive, as it 
provides certainty and offers some clarity, predictability and examples and illustrations 
for what is prohibited behaviour of traders. However, there are certain limitations in 
the application of the blacklist due to the peculiar character or little practical relevance 
of some of the blacklisted practices, the vague/open-ended and/or too detailed/narrow 
conditions of the commercial practices included and the need of an assessment in 
concreto of the unfairness of the behaviour of the traders for some practices. The 
country research for the evaluation also identified several commercial practices 
currently not covered by the black list that are considered to be problematic by some 
stakeholders who proposed them as potential candidates for an extended black list, 
including:819  
• Practices related to promotion, marketing, and contract conclusion; 
• Practices related specifically to price transparency; 
• Practices related to contract performance/extension; 
• Other practices. 
This indicates that there is a need to review the practices on the UCPD black list 
and/or include new practices. It is notable that the current Directive does not provide 
for a simple mechanism to adapt blacklisted practices in light of new market 
developments or to include new unfair commercial practices that are leading to 
significant consumer detriment.  
7.1.5. Average consumer benchmark and protection of vulnerable consumers 
This evaluation concludes that the use of the “average consumer” benchmark allows 
authorities and courts in Member States to render a flexible decision, specifying the 
content of this concept in a manner that is appropriate for the specific case. This is an 
obvious advantage given to the authorities and courts that are not bound by 
formalistic and overly rigorous rules, when evaluating the nature of the supposedly 
unfair practice, which can be clearly to the benefit of consumer. In practice, the 
assessment whether a commercial practice is unfair vis-à-vis the “average consumer”, 
as defined in CJEU case law, is very often at the heart of the dispute. However, it 
appears that while in a number of countries the “average consumer” benchmark is 
considered to work in practice and no major problems are reported (at least in the 
perspective of consumer protection authorities), in other countries authorities and 
courts are unfamiliar with the concept, and overall stakeholders are divided in their 
general assessment of the appropriateness of the benchmark.820  
In the interviews conducted as part of the country research, consumer organisations in 
several Member States elaborated their concerns. For example, it was noted that the 
average consumer in real life is not reasonably well informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect – and is usually acting under time constraints. It was also 
argued that the many consumer protection rules primarily benefit “stronger” 
consumers and not more vulnerable consumers who really need the protection, 
suggesting that a lower standard for the average consumer should be applied. Position 
papers submitted by some consumer organisations in the framework of the open 
public consultation further elaborated: They put into question whether the "‘average 
consumer-model’ is adequate to serve as a standard of consumer protection", and 
                                           
819 For more details, see Section 6.1.1 above. 
820 While in the open public consultation conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check most business 
organisations (70%) either 'tended to disagree' or 'strongly disagreed' with the statement that "the notion 
of “average consumer” should be reviewed/updated", most public authorities (68%) and consumer 
associations (70%) either 'strongly agreed' or 'tended to agree' that there is need for a review. 
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proposed to "modernise the UCPD in line with the way that consumers behave in the 
real world".  
The discussion concerning the appropriateness of the "average consumer" benchmark 
is also led in academic literature, with a number of authors voicing concerns that this 
benchmark does not provide sufficient protection to consumers that are less capable 
and more careless than the average. In addition, results of behavioural research – to 
which some of the consumer organisations refer – have significantly put into question 
the model of consumers as rational decision-makers. Consumers' behavioural biases 
are widely documented in the academic literature and have been confirmed by a wide 
range of behavioural experiments, including those commissioned by the European 
Commission in its recent study on consumer vulnerability. They are also acknowledged 
in the UCPD guidance document, which refers to the relevance of behavioural biases 
such as consumer overconfidence when considering self-reported assessments of 
"well-informed", "observant" and "circumspect" as indicators for establishing the 
characteristics of the average consumer.  
To further explore this issue, an online workshop with experts for behavioural 
economics and psychology was conducted in the framework of the evaluation to 
consider the evidence and assess whether these concepts continue to be valid and fit 
for the purpose in light of results of behavioural research. The workshop concluded 
that there is indeed a need to further develop the concepts of "average consumer" and 
"vulnerable consumer" in light of the results of behavioural research. 
7.1.6. Unfair practices in consumer-to-business relations 
According to the definition of Article 2(d) UCPD, “commercial practices” are only those 
“directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers”. The 
reverse situation, where traders (for example, gold traders, car dealers, antique 
dealers and retailers of second-hand goods) purchase products from consumers, does 
not fall within the scope of the UCPD unless they are linked to a B2C practice. 
According to the country research for this study cases involving consumer-to-business 
(C2B) relations are not frequent. In spite of this limited relevance in terms of numbers 
of cases, it has been argued that there is a need to extend the protection of the UCPD 
to C2B situations, because consumers selling products to traders are in the weaker 
position and in need of protection. In cases involving C2B relations, typically only 
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable, thus failing to afford any kind of 
special or additional protection to the weaker party (natural person acting for non-
professional purposes).  
7.1.7. Contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices 
Whether or not an unfair practice triggers effects relevant to the individual 
relationships and whether national courts are allowed to decide that the individual 
contract concluded as a result of that practice be invalid in its entirety and/or to award 
damages, is a matter of national contract law, and not of the UCPD, which is without 
prejudice to contract law and individual claims. The country research for this 
evaluation shows a diverse patchwork of national arrangements as regards contractual 
consequences of unfair commercial practices before, during and after a commercial 
transaction. In all Member States, it seems in principle possible to rely on general 
contract law provisions to seek contractual consequences of an unfair commercial 
practice. Any consumer may claim that a misleading commercial practice constitutes a 
“mistake” or “fraud” that vitiated his or her consent; likewise, any consumer may 
claim that an aggressive commercial practice constitutes “violence”, “duress” or 
“undue influence” that should lead to avoidance of the contract. In addition, doctrines 
of unlawfulness and unconscionability may be relevant in this regard. Likewise, 
doctrines on pre-contractual liability may be relevant to claim damages. In relation to 
commercial practices after a commercial transaction, national contract law rules on 
performance (good faith) may be relevant to ask for performance or claim damages. 
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However, it should be noted that there is no general principle that an unfair 
commercial practice (irrespective of whether before, during or after a commercial 
transaction) either automatically triggers the avoidance or termination of the contract 
and/or damages or automatically constitutes a breach of contract. These general 
doctrines are subject to certain limitations which may function as a barrier for 
consumers who want to get out of their contracts, etc., because of unfair commercial 
practices.  
In a number of Member States, the legislation implementing the UCPD contains a 
positive cross-reference to relevant national contract law doctrines. In other Member 
States, national law provisions provide for special contractual consequences in case of 
breaches of the UCPD. Finally, in some Member States, enforcement authorities can 
obtain a commitment from the trader responsible for the infringement, or order that 
trader, to compensate consumers that have suffered harm as a consequence of the 
infringement including, among others, monetary compensation, offering consumers 
the option to terminate the contract or other measures ensuring redress to consumers 
who have been harmed as a result of the infringement. In the absence of EU contract 
law sanctions in case of violations of the UCPD (and similarly with respect to B2B 
practices in the MCAD) it therefore depends on the Member State if and to which 
extent there are contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices. National law 
copes with this in different manners, commensurate with national law sensitivities. 
According to the country research there is not much national case law on the 
application of traditional contract law doctrines in relation to unfair commercial 
practices. It also seems that the above mentioned positive cross-references to 
relevant national contract law doctrines in the legislation implementing the UCPD in 
Member States such as Bulgaria, France, Portugal and the Netherlands do not have a 
very significant practical impact. These provisions are not applied very often.821 
7.1.8. Misleading practices in B2B relations 
As described in Section 6.1.1.4 above, the scope of the Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive (MCAD) is limited to “advertising”, because this was the Union 
legislature’s approach in 1984 (the original Misleading Advertising Directive in which 
the comparative advertising provisions were inserted in 1997). Although the notion of 
“advertising” in Union law (including in the MCAD) is rather broad, it is nevertheless 
narrower than that of “commercial practices” in the UCPD. The MCAD prohibits 
misleading advertising in a generic way. No examples are given, only features to be 
taken into account to determine whether an advertisement is misleading (Article 3). 
Unfair practices between businesses that are regularly referred to include misleading 
payment forms, offers to extend internet domain names or protection of trademarks, 
or misleading directory companies, which often have a cross-border dimension. While 
this evaluation concludes that the MCAD provides a rather solid framework for a 
considerable part of the B2B advertising market, it also confirms that in particular 
small enterprises are affected by misleading advertisements, and need further 
protection, as is evidenced by legislative action in some Member States. The 
evaluation has also confirmed that there is no functioning cross-border enforcement 
framework concerning misleading practices in B2B relations. 
                                           
821 The Dutch provision, however, has been applied several times, see country report Netherlands. 
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7.2. Problems identified regarding contract conclusion and performance 
7.2.1. Scope of the Directive 
Subject to specific exclusions having no relevance to consumer protection,822 the 
UCTD applies to all trade sectors. Art 1 (1) refers simply to ‘contracts concluded 
between a seller or supplier and a consumer’. This catches sale and supply of goods 
and services; and the sale, lease and mortgaging of land. This brings significant 
benefits which can be seen by considering the huge range of sectors in which national 
regulatory bodies have been able to carry out work to remove unfair terms. Although 
the Directive is effective in that it is basically applicable to all types of contracts, there 
is some uncertainty as to the scope of application of the UCTD. So, the use of the 
terms “seller and supplier” and “goods and services” has led to confusion and 
differences of approach in national case law, e.g. raising the question as to whether 
the UCTD covers C2B contracts, where the ‘‘consumer’’ supplies goods or services, 
e.g. consumers selling gold to traders. 
Further, there has been a degree of uncertainty as whether it is necessary for the 
application of the UCTD that the consumer pays a price in the form of money, 
although it has recently been stated in the Tarcău case that this is not necessary (a 
consumer acting as a guarantor for another’s debt was held to be covered by the 
UTCD).823 This question is particularly relevant in the case of online services, as there 
is often no monetary consideration, but ‘only’ personal data in return for a service. 
This is however irrelevant for the application of this directive.824 This principle has 
already been applied in several national cases.825 Nevertheless, the issue still causes 
disputes and uncertainty.  
Finally, the UCTD refers to ‘contract’ terms, thus triggering the discussion of whether 
terms in unilateral acts and any other terms/notices that do not have contractual 
status are subject to review. In some countries, the scope of the review was widened 
to cover such unilateral acts and other non-contractual terms and notices,826 in other 
countries, a broad interpretation in case law has ensured the same effect.827 
Individually Negotiated Terms 
The test of unfairness in Art. 3 of the UCTD does not apply to individually negotiated 
terms. However, in reliance on the minimum clause, several Member States do 
provide for control of individually negotiated terms. Essentially the overall conclusions 
                                           
822 Contracts relating to employment, succession rights, rights under family law and the incorporation and 
organisation of companies or partnership agreements Preamble, recital 10). 
823 CJEU 19 Nov. 2015, Tarcău, ECLI:EU:C:2015:772, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-
74/15; Recital 10 Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
824 E. TERRYN, “‘Consumers, by Definition, Include Us All’ … But Not for Every Transaction”, ERPL 2016, n 2, 
271; M. LOOS & J. LUZAK, ‘Wanted: A Bigger Stick. On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’, Journal of 
Consumer Policy 2015. 
825 See e.g. several national courts already applied national provisions implementing the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive to ‘free’ internet services (e.g., Landgericht Berlin 6 Mar. 2012, Az 16 O 551/10; 
Kammergericht Berlin 24 Jan. 2014, 5 U 42/12 
826 Thus, in the UK, the Consumer Rights Act extends the scope of the review to a notice ‘to the extent that 
it (a) relates to rights or obligations as between a trader and a consumer, or (b) purports to exclude or 
restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer.’ (s. 61 (4) Consumer Rights Act). 
827 E.g. in Belgium. 
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here, based on the country research,828 are that the exclusion causes problems of 
uncertainty and also compromises effective protection; and that there have been no 
significant problems in countries where the exclusion does not apply.  
The exclusion of individually negotiated terms can be argued to be problematic for the 
following reasons: 
• It causes a protection gap in the sense that even if there is negotiation 
consumers will still be in a weaker position in terms of bargaining skill and 
expertise, so that the resulting terms may still be unfair to consumers.  
• There are uncertainties as to precisely when a term can be said to be 
individually negotiated. This may cause inefficiencies, but also one particularly 
problematic consequence is that these uncertainties may be exploited by 
traders to persuade consumers that there have been negotiations, when none 
have in reality occurred.  
Price and Main Subject Matter Terms  
The test of unfairness in Art. 3 of the UCTD does not apply to price and main subject 
matter terms.829 In several Member States, these exclusions from the test of 
unfairness do not apply, so the test of unfairness applies or should be applied to price 
and main subject matter terms.830 In relation to countries where it applies, the 
exclusion of price and main subject matter terms causes again uncertainties.  
The CJEU has already begun to develop what is required to satisfy the plain and 
intelligible language requirement, in fact taking it beyond plain and intelligible 
language to a fuller version of transparency. In Árpád Kásler831 and Van Hove,832 the 
Court said that the terms and their real consequences should be economically 
understandable to the consumer, i.e. that the consumer should be put in a position as 
to be able to “evaluate, on the basis of clear [precise], intelligible criteria, the 
economic consequences for him which derive from [the term].’’833  
However, it is not necessarily sufficient simply for these criteria to be contained in the 
case law if it is to be clear to all stakeholders precisely what is required. There is also 
a degree of uncertainty as to whether price and main subject matter terms (and the 
fact that they are exempt from review) must sometimes be specially highlighted within 
the contract. Finally, there is also uncertainty as to exactly what, in substance, can 
count as the price and main subject matter. It seems clear, but there remains a 
degree of uncertainty, that the ‘adequacy’ of the price refers to whether the price is 
too high, given what is received in return; this not covering other types of fairness 
                                           
828 E.g. Austria, Croatia, France Malta, UK. 
829 Art 4 (2) 
830 E.g. in Denmark, Spain, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal. 
831 Case C-26/13 Árpád Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt [2014]. 
832 Case C-96/14 Jean-Claude Van Hove v CNP Assurances SA [2015]. 
833 Citations from both cases identical in this respect, except for the one adjective: ’clear’ (Árpád Kásler) or 
’precise’ (Van Hove). 
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assessment, e.g. as to time or mode of payment, the right to vary the price etc;834 
and that the ‘price’ does not include charges imposed for consumer default.835 
7.2.2. Scope of the transparency requirement 
In general, it can be said that the transparency requirement of the directive has 
contributed to achieving a high level of consumer protection. The exact role of the 
transparency requirement in achieving this goal, however, differs in the Member 
States. In several Member States, a large number of cases are reported to be based 
on this provision.836 In addition unfair and intransparent agreements are reported to 
have disappeared from the market.837 It is only in a minority of Member States that 
the principle is seldom applied by the courts.838 Notwithstanding the fact that the 
transparency principle is in general considered to be effective, continuing problems 
with transparency are reported, especially in specific sectors, including digital 
products, energy, and telecommunications. 
It also appears from the country reports that there is a degree of uncertainty as to the 
scope of the transparency concept, which may undermine consumer protection, and 
also lead to differences in national approaches. For example, there is uncertainty as to 
what elements exactly are required for terms to be transparent. While there is CJEU 
guidance on transparency, in particular from CJEU cases such as RWE and Kasler and 
also rather detailed guidance in national case law, uncertainty still remains, and the 
issue is important as empirical research has shown that simpler and shorter terms 
contribute to readership, comprehension of the terms and to consumer trust.839 
7.2.3. Lack of clarity as to the legal consequences associated with the issue of 
transparency  
The results of the country research indicate that there is significant uncertainty as to 
the legal consequences of a lack of transparency. This is in line with the conclusions 
that were reached in earlier studies. For example, the same conclusion was reached in 
the Consumer Law Compendium.840 In particular, there is uncertainty as to whether a 
lack of transparency can, in itself, lead to a term being found to be unfair.  
The lack of clarity on the sanction for terms that are not transparent also affects the 
collective means of enforcement. Article 7 requires adequate and effective means 
(including collective means) to combat ‘unfair’ terms. As it is not clear whether terms 
that are not transparent are automatically unfair, it is also not clear whether 
                                           
834 Willett, ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of EU Consumer Law’; this reading is certainly 
accepted in at least some Member States (e.g. UK-Law Commissions (2012) Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts: Advice to the Dept of Business, Innovation and Skills).  
835 Otherwise, there would be no point in para 1(e) on the indicative list, which treats as indicatively unfair a 
term ‘..requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation.’ 
836 E.g. Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal. 
837 E.g. Czech Republic (hidden arbitration agreements, hidden fines); Denmark (subscription traps); Estonia 
(insurance contracts); Poland (sector regulators report improvements);  
838 E.g. Cyprus, Slovenia. 
839 M. Elshouts, M. Elsen, J. Leenheer, M. Loos, J. Luzak, Study on Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Terms 
Conditions (T&Cs) Final Report, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847546. 
840 Consumer law compendium, p. 421. 
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enforcement bodies/consumer organisations should be able to start actions for 
injunctions against terms that are merely not transparent. This is possible in some 
Member States,841 whereas it is excluded in other Member States.842  
 
There is also uncertainty as to the implications when terms are actually transparent. 
The key issue here is whether the existence of transparency can legitimise a term that 
is very substantively unfair. It seems likely from the Aziz case that transparency does 
not necessarily have this effect, i.e. that if a term is sufficiently unfair in substance, 
then there is a violation of good faith (because it will not be one that, according to the 
Aziz ‘agreement’ test, the consumer would have agreed to in individual negotiations), 
irrespective of whether the term is transparent. However, the issue remains unclear. 
Further, some Member States have not included the good faith element in their 
implementing legislation,843 and there is uncertainty as to what implications this may 
have in terms of the above questions as to whether a lack of transparency can lead to 
a term being found to be unfair, and whether the existence of transparency can 
legitimise a term that is very substantively unfair. 
7.2.4. The general test of unfairness 
The UCTD controls contract terms which were not individually negotiated. It 
establishes a general norm that considers a contract term unfair if it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer, contrary to the requirement of good faith (Art. 3 
(1)). In the analysis of effectiveness of the UCTD (see Section 6.1.2 above) it was 
concluded that this open-ended fairness test, which enables a range of (EU and 
national) fairness criteria to be applied to any given term, is broadly effective in 
contributing to a high level of consumer protection. Notwithstanding the benefits of 
the open-ended test of unfairness, it however also causes some uncertainty, and 
differing interpretations in various Member States. In addition, it does not take into 
account changes in circumstances after the conclusion of the contract that could affect 
the fairness of terms.  
7.2.5. Indicative list of terms which may be regarded as unfair 
In addition to the general test, the UCTD contains an indicative list of terms which 
may be regarded as unfair (Annex, Art. 3 (3)). Based on the country research it can 
be concluded that the current indicative list is considered to have significant practical 
benefits in terms of consumer protection and legal certainty; but that the grey and 
black lists used in a number of countries may provide even greater protection and 
certainty. The practical relevance of a list of unfair terms in concretising the principle-
based approach, i.e. in ‘fleshing out’ the broad test of unfairness by providing 
examples for consumers, businesses, courts and regulators of many of the most 
important types of potentially unfair terms, has been stressed by stakeholders 
throughout the country research. Lists add legal certainty and several national 
enforcers have stressed that lists with concrete examples of open norms make it 
easier to enforce compliance than mere open norms. However, the merely indicative 
list has often not been considered to be sufficient in terms of protection and certainty. 
In France e.g., it was not considered very effective844 as it leaves the burden of proof 
                                           
841 Thus e.g. in Italy, see e.g. Court of Appeal of Rome, 24 September 2002, in Foro italiano, 2003, I, 332 
ff. 
842 Thus e.g. in Slovenia. 
843 E.g. Belgium. 
844 Piédelièvre, nr. 459 a). 
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on the consumer-compared, e.g. to a black list where terms are automatically unfair 
or a grey list where there is at least a presumption that the terms are unfair. In 
France, the indicative list, which was attached as an Annex to the Code de la 
consommation, was reported to have had only a limited impact on the application of 
the general clause in the period before the introduction of the domestic grey and black 
lists. These grey and black lists are to a large extent based on the European list.845 
The terms listed in the similarly indicative recommendations by the Commission des 
clauses abusives (CCA) in France have had more impact in practical cases.846 In other 
country reports, the lesser legal certainty and clarity of an indicative list was also 
emphasised.847 In Sweden, for example, few traders were reported to look at the 
indicative list. In the Netherlands, both business associations and consumer 
organisations saw limited added value in the indicative list. The largest Dutch 
organisation blamed this on the abstract formulation of the terms in the indicative list. 
This formulation leads to the need for interpretation, which requires legal-technical 
knowledge that ordinary consumers do not possess. According to the country research 
it was also concluded that black lists (of terms considered unfair in all circumstances) 
and grey lists (of terms which may be presumed unfair) are considered more effective 
than indicative lists. However, in order to be effective, such lists – whether indicative, 
grey or black – need to be updated regularly, as was stressed several times in the 
country reports. 
7.2.6. Role of the national courts  
National courts must take up an active role in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 
UCTD. This is clear from the case law of the CJEU. Such an active role is however not 
taken up by courts in all Member States and uncertainty as to the exact role of 
national courts further impairs the full effectiveness of the UCTD. In particular, there is 
uncertainty as to precisely how to interpret the CJEU case law that requires ex officio 
assessments whether a contract term is actually unfair, just what changes this 
requires on national procedural law: these are particularly important questions to deal 
with, in view of the deeply rooted rules in some jurisdictions that judges are bound by 
the arguments that are invoked by the parties. 
7.2.7. Uncertainty as to the precise effects of terms being found to be unfair 
The Directive requires that the contract must remain binding upon the parties insofar 
as the contract is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term (Art. 6 
(1)). While certain issues surrounding this are now clearer than they were before, 
there are remaining uncertainties. The CJEU has made clear that national courts may 
not revise an unfair term.848 Such a power might eliminate the dissuasive effect on 
sellers, who would remain tempted to use those terms in the knowledge that, even if 
they were declared invalid, they could nevertheless be modified by the national court 
in such a way as to safeguard the interest of those sellers or suppliers.849 The 
                                           
845 10 of those terms on the French black list, and 8 on the French grey list also figure on the European 
indicative list. 
846 Piédelièvre, nr. 463. 
847 Country report Latvia. 
848 CJEU  14 June 2012, C‑618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino ; CJEU 30 May 
2013, C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse, para. 29. 
849 CJEU  14 June 2012, C‑618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino, para. 69.  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  235 
rejection of such a possibility to revise has generally been welcomed.850 The exact 
scope of the prohibition to revise a clause is however subject to discussion and the 
issue is interpreted differently in different Member States, in legal literature and by 
different national courts. The above line of case law excludes the possibility to reduce 
the unfair contract term to its legally permitted core. Nevertheless, it still seems 
possible to only declare parts of clauses unfair and non-binding, when such parts can 
be eliminated without changing the content of the remaining part (the so-called blue 
pencil test).851 This is however disputed in the literature and the need for a 
clarification by the CJEU has been expressed.852 Even more controversial is the 
interpretation of the contract by a court according to the hypothetical will of the 
parties, more specifically in cases where the nullity of an unfair clause would lead to 
unacceptable economic consequences. This CJEU case law seems to exclude the 
application of this theory853 but the views on this issue differ.854 Also, different 
opinions have been expressed as to whether supplementary provisions could be 
invoked where the deletion of the terms does not lead to the annulment of the 
contract. This indicates a need for further clarification and guidance at EU level. 
7.3. Problems identified regarding injunctions 
The findings of the evaluation differ, at least gradually, between cross-border cases 
and domestic cases. These types of cases are distinguished in the following. 
7.3.1. Problems concerning domestic cases  
In domestic cases, the injunction procedure has proved to be an important tool for the 
enforcement of consumer protection rules, and in particular in those Member States 
where no other tools are available or where injunctions are the most used tool, in 
particular in Austria, France, Germany and Greece. The study has, however, revealed 
a number of problems that limit the effectiveness of this tool and which could be 
reduced with a reform of the Injunctions Directive. This is also the view of consumer 
organisations and consumer authorities, as expressed in the open public consultation 
for this Fitness Check.855 
Insufficient coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
Qualified entities have criticised the limited scope of application of the Injunctions 
Directive and suggested to adjust it to the scope of application of the CPC Regulation 
or to extend it to consumer law in general.856 In particular, it was recommended to 
                                           
850 E. Hondius, “Unfair contract terms and the consumer: ECJ case law, Foreign Literature, and Their Impact 
on Dutch Law”, ERPL (2016), 3 & 4, 467.  
851 MüKoBGB/Basedow BGB § 306 Rn. 17-19. 
852 MüKoBGB/Basedow BGB § 306 Rn. 4-6c. 
853 R. Steennot, 601; H. Micklitz, N. Reich, “ The Court and the Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)”, CMLRev 2014, 795-796. 
854 See MüKoBGB/Basedow BGB § 306 Rn. 4-6c. The BGH is of the opinion that this theory is in conformity 
with the UCTD - BGH NJW 2013, 991 Rn. 24 ff. 
855 See Part 2 of this report. 
856 See country report Slovenia; position paper BEUC, at p. 12; position paper vzbv, at p. 23. Naturally, in 
those Member States where the injunction procedure has not been used by now, there is no perceived need 
for an extension of its coverage. The same is true where Member States have already extended the scope of 
application to consumer law in general. 
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include data protection law,857 the latest EU legislation in the area of financial 
services858 and consumer protection in regulated services such as telecommunications 
services and energy supply.859 Experience from Member States that have 
autonomously extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
demonstrates that there is a need for this extension. 
Incoherence between injunction procedures 
The Injunctions Directive is complemented by singular provisions in other directives 
that require Member States to introduce injunction procedures at the domestic level. 
Relevant EU legislation currently in force includes the UCTD (Art. 7(2) and (3)), the 
UCPD (Art. 11 (1) and (2)) and the CRD (Art. 23 (1) and (2)).The various injunction 
procedures required under EU law do not follow identical rules. Of course, this only 
poses a problem in Member States where the injunction procedure is actually used, or 
where it would be used if it was easier to handle. Member States such as Germany 
have resolved the problem autonomously by adopting the same rules for all injunction 
procedures. In those Member States where this is not the case, for example Cyprus, 
stakeholders have reported confusion, which impacts on legal certainty and on the use 
of the procedure by qualified entities in general, given the litigation risk that is 
normally involved in an injunction procedure. 
Legal uncertainty 
Legal uncertainty always has a chilling effect on consumers, and it has a chilling effect 
on consumer organisations as well, in particular if they bear the litigation risk. 
Numerous comments in this study relate to uncertainty about the correct 
interpretation of national legislation and to the discretion of courts or authority that 
reduce the predictability of the outcome of litigation. 
The problem of legal uncertainty also relates to undertakings that the current 
Injunctions Directive does not regulate at all. Some Member States have introduced 
specific rules on undertakings in which traders promise to discontinue an infringement 
in order to avoid litigation.860 In other Member States, courts have developed case law 
on the requirements that such undertakings must meet so as to defeat an injunction 
claim.861 Where no clear rules exist, this may lead to legal uncertainty.862 
Litigation costs 
Litigation costs, or rather the risk of having to pay litigation costs under the loser pays 
principle, was reported to be the most important obstacle, in particular, to qualified 
entities that are not funded through the state budget. Consumer associations from a 
number of Member States have indicated that they would be more inclined to use the 
injunction procedure if they were relieved from court fees and did not have to bear the 
risk of having to pay the defendant’s expenses.863 
                                           
857 See country report France; position paper vzbv, at p. 23. 
858 See country reports Greece, Malta, Slovakia; position paper vzbv, at p. 23. 
859 See country report Malta; position paper vzbv, at p. 23. 
860 UK. 
861 Germany. 
862 See country report Austria. 
863 E.g. country reports Czech Republic, Slovenia. 
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In some Member States, legislators have resorted to damage claims of consumer 
organisations that they can use to finance their activities. Thus, in France, the 
consumer organisation can claim damages but these damages are not proportionate to 
the harm caused to consumers, and they have no deterrent effect. Likewise, in 
Greece, the consumer organisation can obtain moral damages. Part of such damages 
is, however, awarded to the state for the education and protection of the consumer. 
Limitation to effect inter partes 
The primary effect of an injunction order is that the trader is prohibited to continue 
the infringement. In most Member States, that decision has only effect inter partes 
(between the parties). Thus, it does not have direct impact on other traders that use 
the same term. This poses problems for the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
procedure in two ways. 
First, the inter partes nature of the injunction requires individual consumers who bring 
claims based on the same infringement of consumer law by the same trader to 
substantiate and prove those claims anew, which increases their litigation risk and 
also causes costs to the court system as such. Accordingly, the consumer organisation 
stakeholders and one of the consumer authorities who have responded to the public 
consultation have noted that the inter partes nature of injunction decisions in most 
countries made it difficult for a consumer to rely on a decision to receive 
compensation.864 
The prohibition to rely, vis-à-vis a consumer, on a term that was declared unfair in 
collective proceedings would already seem to be required under EU law, according to 
the decision of the CJEU in Invitel.865 Some Member States, including Austria, 
Germany and Slovenia, provide accordingly in their national laws but most do not. The 
problem of course extends to infringements of consumer law other than by way of 
unfair contract terms. 
Second, the inter partes principle requires qualified entities to bring separate claims 
against all traders that engage in the same unlawful practice, which may exceed their 
human and financial resources and is also a burden on the court system. Evidence for 
the necessity to soften that strict inter partes effect can be seen, for example, in 
Germany where traders of the same industry often continue to use and to defend their 
standard terms after identical terms have been declared unfair in injunction 
proceedings against their competitors.866 Some Member States, including Greeceand 
Spain, have therefore introduced an erga omnes effect by law or have given that 
competence to the courts. 
Insufficiently effective and deterrent remedy 
A frequent critique by qualified entities of the remedy of injunction is that it is not 
sufficiently effective and deterrent as it only produces effects for the future but does 
not cover the compensation of the victims of the infringement; which leads to a 
situation where dishonest traders can often keep their unlawfully gained profits, to the 
                                           
864 See Part 2 of this report. 
865 CJEU, judgment of 26 April 2012, Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési 
Zrt, ECLI:EU:C:2012:242. See also H.-W. Micklitz, in: N. Reich, H.-W. Micklitz, P. Rott and K. Tonner, 
European Consumer Law, 2nd ed. 2014, at para 3.22b; position paper vzbv, at p. 21. 
866 See the position paper submitted to the online public consultation by vzbv: “[I]t often happens that 
competitors do not abide by injunctions either. Especially in the case of financial services, it is problematic 
that banks often do not allow judgments against other banks to be enforced against themselves. Similar 
problems also arise in other sectors.” 
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detriment of consumers.867 In the survey of qualified entities, this issue of additional 
remedies ranked highest on the list of future harmonisation measures that would be 
most beneficial.868 
There is abundant evidence in academic research on the fact that in many cases 
individual consumers will, for a variety of reasons, not bring a claim even if there is a 
remedy available in principle. The reasons include the lack of financial resources, the 
litigation risk and the unattractiveness of litigation in a cost/benefit perspective.869 
The necessity of additional remedies has led to recent developments in Member States 
some of which have introduced such additional remedies with the express intention to 
cure the hitherto insufficient effectiveness of the injunction procedure. For example, in 
Austrian and Polish unfair commercial practices law, there is a rule, according to which 
the injunction claim includes the claim to remove the consequences of the breach. A 
similar rule exists in Slovakia. In Germany, that claim has long existed in unfair 
commercial practices law, although it was only codified in that area in 2004, and it 
was extended in 2016 to the Injunctions Act, with an exception for unfair contract 
terms. In Poland, the trader can be ordered to inform consumers about the unfairness 
of a standard term. In France, the trader is obliged to inform consumers by all 
appropriate means about the unfairness of contract terms. This has also been ordered, 
at the request of consumer organisations, in recent decisions of German instance 
courts. In Bulgaria, Spain and the UK, the trader can be ordered to make a corrective 
statement publicly. These measures aim at making the individual victim of a consumer 
law infringement aware of that infringement so that he or she can take follow-up 
action.  
In Spain, it is possible to bring injunctions together with claims for absolute and 
relative nullity, termination, restitution of profits and damages. These secondary 
actions will be solved by judges responsible for the injunction claim. In Germany and 
Slovakia, there is an on-going academic debate about whether the obligation to 
remove the consequences of the breach could also cover the reimbursement of 
unlawfully obtained money.870 Whilst this possibility was rejected by a Slovakian court, 
the German district court of Leipzig has awarded the claim in a case where a bank had 
unlawfully charged consumers 30 Euros each against long established case law of the 
Federal Supreme Court, arguing, amongst others, that the individual consumers 
concerned would be highly unlikely to bring individual claims against the bank.871 
The most advanced add-on to the injunction procedure is reported from the UK, where 
the legislator has introduced, with the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the so-called 
“Enhanced Consumer Measures”. Their aim is to provide greater flexibility for public 
enforcers and the civil courts in relation to the contents of enforcement orders and 
undertakings made under the injunction procedure. If they are deemed suitable for a 
particular case, public enforcers and the civil courts will be able to attach (where they 
consider it just and reasonable) enhanced consumer measures to enforcement orders 
and undertakings. The enhanced consumer measures will need to fall into at least one 
of three specified categories (referred to as the redress, compliance and choice 
                                           
867 See also Part 2 of this report. 
868 See Part 4 of this report. 
869 See, for example, Wagner, in: Casper u. a. (eds), Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Sammelklage?, 
41, at 51 ff. See also Civic Consulting, Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress 
mechanisms in the European Union, 2008. 
870 Country report Slovakia. 
871 See Landgericht Leipzig.  
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categories). Measures in the redress category will offer compensation or other redress 
to consumers who have suffered loss as a result of the breach of consumer law. 
Compliance measures are intended to increase business compliance with the law and 
to reduce the likelihood of further breaches. Measures in the choice category will help 
consumers obtain relevant market information to enable them to make better 
purchasing decisions. 
Other obstacles 
It has sometimes been argued that the application of “normal” civil procedural law 
does not reflect the fact that consumer organisations or consumer authorities that 
bring injunction claims act in the collective interest of consumers, or in the public 
interest;872 a claim that has also been made in academic writing.873 Problems may, in 
particular, relate to the burden of proof that is often on the qualified entity bringing 
the claim.874 
In this context, it is worth noting that the problem of the burden of proof also extends 
to compensation orders if the qualified entity has to provide for a precise calculation of 
the loss suffered by consumers.875 In the UK, the problem is alleviated in that way 
that the court or the FCA can award compensation that it deems ‘just and fair’. In 
Belgian anti-discrimination law, the claimant may opt for a flat-rate compensation 
(fixed in the legislation), which may not be exact, but relatively speedy. 
Insufficient awareness of courts of consumer law, due to lack of specialisation, has 
also been mentioned as an obstacle to the enforcement of consumer law by way of 
injunction procedures. 
7.3.2. Problems concerning cross-border cases  
In cross-border cases, qualified entities face such severe obstacles that they generally 
do not use the system of the Injunctions Directive but resort to other mechanisms (if 
any), in particular the CPC Network (if they have access to that instrument) or law-
suits in their domestic courts against foreign traders.876 
Litigation in the foreign court is the type of action envisaged by the current Injunctions 
Directive. It has advantages at the enforcement stage because the qualified entity 
would obtain a judgment from a court of the Member State where the trader is 
domiciled but is very difficult to handle for most qualified entities, due to the staff and 
financial resources needed for legal research into the foreign procedural law, 
translation, travel, etc. 
Cross-border litigation in domestic courts is the currently preferred strategy of 
consumer organisations since they are more familiar with their domestic procedural 
law. They may, however, still have to argue foreign substantive law even in their 
domestic courts, as the determination of the applicable law is governed by the Rome I 
and Rome II Regulations. Problems also arise with the enforcement of the decision, 
                                           
872 See, for example, the position paper of Which? (on costs). 
873 See H.-W. Micklitz, in: Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozeßordnung, § 5 UKlaG margin note. 
874 See, e.g. country reports Austria and Hungary concerning the burden to prove an infringement of the 
“collective interest” of consumers.  
875 See the country reports Bulgaria and Hungary concerning the burden to prove the damage suffered by 
consumers in compensatory actions. 
876 See supra. 
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and in particular, of sanctions imposed on the trader, in a foreign country. The reason 
is that the Brussels I Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 does not apply to decisions of 
consumer authorities under public law, and also not to sanctions that bear a public law 
or criminal law character. 
7.3.3. Protection of collective business interests 
Collective business interests are protected in the unfair commercial practices 
legislation of some Member States. Where the national law only allows for action in 
the collective interest of consumers, there is, of course, still the indirect effect of 
protection of honest traders. The question is, however, whether or not business 
organisations need to have legal standing to protect the collective interests of 
businesses. In the country research, some business associations have proposed to 
introduce protection of the collective interests of small businesses or to businesses in 
general. Most country reports,877 however, show no need to extend the scope of 
application of the Injunctions Directive to the protection of collective business 
interests.878  
7.4. Drivers of the problems identified  
• What are the main drivers? Who is affected by the problem (s), in what ways, and 
to what extent? 
In this study, the term 'drivers' is understood as denoting the main underlying causes 
of the problems identified, in line with the definition set out in the Better Regulation 
Toolbox.879 Drivers for the problems identified in the previous sub-sections can be 
divided into two broad categories: drivers related to trends in markets and society and 
drivers related to the legal framework for EU consumer and marketing law itself. 
Drivers related to markets and society include the following: 
• Increasing levels of e-commerce and online B2C cross-border shopping; 
• Innovation in technology, commercial practices and contract terms; 
• Increasing potential to target vulnerable groups of consumers; 
• Stagnant levels of awareness of EU consumer and marketing legislation. 
Drivers related to the legal framework include the following: 
• Incremental development of EU consumer and marketing law; 
• Different implementation of EU consumer and marketing law across Member 
States; 
• Legal uncertainty resulting from the open-textured nature of the general 
clauses in the absence of up-to-date black lists; 
• Lack of incentive for individual enforcement. 
                                           
877 For a possible exception, see Country report UK. 
878 Furthermore, in the online public consultation, just one-quarter of respondents agreed that the scope of 
the Injunctions Directive should be enlarged to cover the protection of collective interests of businesses. 
However, a difference of opinion could be observed between business associations (20% in favour) and 
individual businesses (33% in favour).  
879 European Commission 2015, Better Regulation Toolbox.  
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The following sub-sections describe these drivers in detail. 
7.4.1. Drivers related to markets and society 
Increasing levels of e-commerce and online B2C cross-border shopping 
An increasing proportion of consumers shop online: between 2004 and 2016, the 
proportion of individuals in the EU reporting at least one purchase of a good or service 
over the internet within the last 12 months more than doubled, from 20% to 55%. 
The proportion of households with home internet access also doubled over the same 
period, from 41% to 85%.880 While this increase in e-commerce creates new 
opportunities for consumers to benefit from cheaper prices and increased choice, it 
also drives problems in consumer protection, e.g. through innovative (online) unfair 
practices (see also next driver). 
In parallel to the general increase in B2C e-commerce, and driven by increasing 
internet access at home,881 more and more consumers purchase cross border within 
the EU, and more and more traders offer products to consumers in other Member 
States. Already between 2003 and 2006, the average proportion of survey 
respondents in the EU reporting at least one cross-border purchase (including in 
person) in the previous year more than doubled, from 12% to 26%. Cross-border 
shopping over the internet has more than doubled since 2006, due in part to 
technological progress and the mainstreaming of internet shopping in general. In 
2014, 16% of all Eurobarometer respondents reported that they made an online 
purchase from another EU country, compared to only 6% in 2006 (see figure 
below).882 
                                           
880 Eurostat data series tin00096 and Eurostat data series isoc_ci_in_h. 
881 See results of the panel data analysis in Part 4 of this report. 
882 See Annex VIII on the analysis of awareness and trends for more detail. 
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Figure 9: Percentage of consumers who made at least one (online) cross-
border purchase in the EU within the last 12 months, EU%. 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 57.2, Special Eurobarometers 128, 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 299, 332, 358 
and 397. Questions for general cross-border purchase: 2001-2003: Over the last 12 months, have you bought or 
ordered products or services for private use from shops or sellers located in another EU country, or not? 2006-2008: 
Please tell me if you have purchased any goods or services in the last 12 months, in (OUR COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any 
of the following ways? [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another EU country]. Questions for online cross-border 
purchase: 2001-2003: [If the respondent indicated a cross-border purchase] How did you buy or order them? [On the 
internet] 2006-2008: Please tell me if you have purchased any goods or services in the last 12 months, in (OUR 
COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any of the following ways? ‘Via the Internet.’ [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another 
EU country] 2009-2011: In the past 12 months, have you purchased any goods or services, by internet, phone or post in 
(OUR COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any of the following ways? [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another EU country] 
2012-2014: In the past 12 months, have you purchased any goods or services via the internet (website, email etc. …) in 
(OUR COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any of the following ways? [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another EU country]. 
Note: EU% comprises the EU15 up to 2004, the EU25 from 2004 to 2007, EU27 from 2007 to 2013, and EU28 thereafter. 
An increase in cross-border commerce could be expected to also lead to an increase in 
cross-border infringements, which indeed is notable in the complaint statistics of the 
network of European Consumer Centres (ECC-Net). In 2014, ECCs addressed 37 609 
complaints, an increase by 67% compared to 2005 (22 549 complaints).883 This trend 
is expected to continue (see below, baseline scenario). 
Innovation in technology, commercial practices and contract terms 
The online environment along with its new business models, contract terms and 
marketing practices (including new unfair practices) leads to new challenges for 
consumers that have to be addressed by consumer organisations, enforcement bodies 
and courts. Examples include fake product reviews or possibly misleading practices of 
price comparison websites. Also new pricing practices, such as dynamic pricing and 
high frequency price changes, are concerns which are common in the online 
environment and can easily be applied in an offline environment using technology such 
as electronic price labels or billboards. The online environment has also seen 
                                           
883 Note that complaint statistics have to be interpreted with caution, because other factors than an 
increased number of problems may contribute to increased complaint numbers (e.g. a better visibility of the 
network etc). Figures quoted from European Commission, The European Consumer Centres Network, 
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innovation in standard contract terms. For example, there has been a degree of 
uncertainty as to whether it is necessary for the application of the UCTD that the 
consumer pays a price in the form of money, which is particularly relevant in the case 
of online services, as there is often no monetary consideration, but ‘only’ personal 
data in return for a service.884  
Increasing potential to target vulnerable groups of consumers 
The workshop with experts in behavioural economics and psychology conducted for 
this study on the implications of behavioural research for key aspects of the consumer 
protection legislative framework emphasised the rapid advances made in the 
understanding of behavioural biases in consumer decision making. While these 
research results may help enforcement bodies, courts and legislators to better protect 
consumers, relevant consumer biases are also exploited (and may be exploited with 
increasing sophistication) by new marketing techniques and products. 
In particular, advances in behavioural research combined with innovation in 
technology and marketing practices (for example, in online behavioural advertising)885 
create opportunities to target certain groups of consumers, and vulnerable consumer 
groups may be particularly at risk to be targeted by unfair practices. An example is 
the targeting of children with hidden advertisements in online games, which was also 
the subject of a recent study by the European Commission.886 The increasing potential 
both to target particular groups at a very granular level and to exploit the cognitive 
biases of consumers through technological innovation and behavioural insights 
therefore may exacerbate the problems associated with consumer vulnerability. 
Stagnant levels of awareness of EU consumer and marketing law 
Consumer awareness of EU consumer and marketing law as measured by the 
Eurobarometer has generally remained stable since 2010. As an example, the 
following figure shows the proportion of consumers who were able to correctly answer 
a knowledge question from the Eurobarometer about an unfair commercial practice 
between 2010 and 2014:887  
                                           
884 Although CJEU case law stated in the Tarcău case that this is not necessary, the issue still causes 
disputes and uncertainty. See section 7.2.1. 
885 Behavioural advertising uses data collected on  an  individual's  web-browsing  behaviour,  such  as  the  
pages  they  have  visited  or  the  searches they have made, to select which advertisements to display to 
that individual.  
886 2016 Study on the impact of marketing through social media, online games and mobile applications on 
children's behaviour 
887 See the analysis of awareness and trends in Annex VIII for additional examples and information on 
consumer and trader awareness of EU consumer and marketing law. 
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Figure 10: Percentage of consumers who correctly answered a knowledge 
question about an unfair commercial practice (receiving unsolicited goods), 
EU%. 
  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 342, Flash Eurobarometers 332, 358 and 397. Question: Imagine you receive two 
educational DVDs by post that you have not ordered, together with a EUR 20 [in 2010: EUR 50] invoice for the goods. 
Are you obliged to pay the invoice? [Correct answer: No, and you are not obliged to return the DVDs]. Note: EU% 
comprises the EU27 until 2012, and the EU28 in 2014. 
Although these levels of awareness are not themselves trending in a particular 
direction, they remain an important driver of the identified problems in connection 
with the drivers discussed above. Unchanging levels of awareness have the potential 
to put consumers at risk as consumers’ experiences become increasingly more 
complex in the face of the rapid innovation in technology, practices and contract terms 
as discussed above. 
In contrast, traders’ awareness of the unfairness of certain misleading advertising 
practices (i.e. describing a product as “free” when it actually entails substantial costs 
and including a fake invoice or other document seeking payment in marketing 
material) has slightly increased between 2009 and 2014, from 62% to 66% (for 
falsely describing a product as “free”) and from 48% to 55% (for fake invoices).888 It 
is unclear to which extent this trend will continue and lead to a reduction of related 
problems. However, the link between trader awareness and the number of problems 
consumers experience is not always direct, as consumer problems may be gravest 
with rogue traders, for which legality is not a major concern.    
Another key driver in this regard is the reported deficits in awareness of the specifics 
of EU consumer and marketing law within national court systems. For example, 
interviewed stakeholders in several countries have noted a lack of education and 
training of judges with respect to EU consumer law.889 If consumers and businesses 
are not aware of their rights and obligations and courts are uncertain as to the specific 
legal basis, this causes inefficiencies in rule application and dispute resolution. 
                                           
888 See analysis of awareness and trends in Annex VIII. 
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7.4.2. Drivers related to the legislative framework 
Incremental development of EU consumer and marketing law 
The incremental approach in creating the current legislative framework at the EU level 
has been a driver for the problems with coherence discussed. Gaps and overlaps have 
emerged in the framework as new legislation is introduced and as new best practices 
evolve. For example, the abundance of marketing/pre-contractual information 
requirements currently included in various directives (UCPD, CRD, PID) is largely a 
result of this incremental approach, with many of the interviewed stakeholders noting 
that the resulting “information overload” is challenging for both consumers and traders 
to navigate.890 Also in the context of injunctions, the various injunction procedures 
required under EU law do not follow identical rules, leading to confusion in some 
Member States with impacts on legal certainty and the use of the procedure by 
qualified entities. 
Different implementation of EU consumer and marketing law across Member States 
Differences in the implementation of EU consumer and marketing law across Member 
States through the use of minimum harmonisation clauses, extensions, regulatory 
derogations and different national interpretations of open-textured clauses may 
contribute to additional costs and legal uncertainty for traders in cross-border 
commerce, and may also contribute to differences in the level of enforcement. On the 
other hand, harmonisation may generate some sacrifices in terms of appropriate 
matching of the level of the legal standard in consumer law with the local preferences 
of consumers in a given country. Thus, when consumers may have different 
preferences concerning their willingness to pay for their rights as consumers, some 
flexibility and variety may improve welfare. An efficient implementation of EU 
consumer and marketing law across Member States therefore requires striking a 
balance between the gains from flexibility and the costs arising from the failure to 
realise the full potential gains from trade across the borders of Member States. 
In this context it is notable that the case law of the CJEU has had a harmonising 
influence, and tends to align the interpretation of the legal framework in Member 
States over time. However, this harmonising effect is slow, as the CJEU provides 
clarification only on specific issues, once a related case is brought before the court. It 
may also take considerable time to be reflected at a Member State level, as can be 
seen, for example, in the case of the requirement for national courts to conduct ex 
officio assessments regarding the unfairness of a contract term. In this sense, while 
CJEU jurisprudence has contributed to clarify a number of specific issues and improve 
consistency in the implementation of EU consumer law, many of the problems 
associated with differences in implementation across Member States remain. 
Legal uncertainty resulting from the open-textured nature of the general clauses in the 
absence of up-to-date black lists  
Although this evaluation has confirmed that the principle-based approaches of the 
UCPD, UCTD and MCAD are widely considered to provide an effective framework for a 
high level of protection of consumers (and protection of businesses in the case of the 
MCAD), a degree of legal uncertainty resulting from the open-textured nature of the 
general clauses continues to drive problems for consumers, traders and enforcement 
bodies. With the UCPD black list (which is easier to enforce) not being up-to-date and 
the absence of such a list in the MCAD and the UCTD (where only an indicative list of 
terms is annexed to the Directive), the openness of the general clauses is reported to 
encourage traders to enter time-consuming discussions on the fairness of a practice or 
                                           
890 See section 6.3.1. 
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contract term, and the outcome of an action is often considered to be uncertain, which 
may discourage enforcement bodies from taking action on the basis of the general 
clauses. Consumer organisations also consider that the principle-based approach does 
not prevent certain practices or contract terms that border on unfairness but fall just 
outside the scope of what constitutes an unfair commercial practice or unfair contract 
term. 
Lack of incentive for individual enforcement 
In case of infringements of consumer law, consumers may rationally decide to forego 
legal actions and the ensuing remedies, as has been analysed above (see Efficiency, 
Section 6.2). The reason would lie in the expected negative balance of costs and 
benefits of such legal action, compared with remaining passive, and letting bygones be 
bygones. The individual loss incurred by the consumer considering legal action may be 
reduced in case of a successful outcome – but this is something that the individual 
consumer will rationally not include in the calculation prior to deciding to pursue legal 
action. The reason is that this private benefit of initiating legal proceedings against the 
potentially liable trader (i.e. the damages awarded by court) is not certain, but 
probabilistic. It needs to be discounted by the probability that the trader, in the end, is 
not found liable, due to factual or legal reasons. On the cost side, however, there are 
the fixed costs of litigation, both monetary and not (time and inconvenience) 
associated with the redress activity. Individual consumers therefore have an incentive 
not to pursue enforcement. This is problematic, as legal action does not only provide 
private benefits, in the form of a damage payment, or the interruption of an action or 
activity detrimental to the individual consumer who decides to pursue legal claims. 
Legal action also serves to produce two types of benefits for society: the action, if 
successful, creates a beneficial precedent favouring parties in similar circumstances, 
and also serves to enforce the substantive rules of consumer law. Legal actions 
initiated by suitable organisations or other representative bodies may therefore help 
alleviate the enforcement shortcomings from decentralised consumer redress. These 
collective actions allow for the exploitation of the significant economies of scale in the 
process of preparing and litigating cases, and provide a mechanism, at least in theory, 
to reduce the coordination and transaction costs of bringing together different affected 
consumers. However, so far no effective mechanism for collective action to 
compensate for the lack of incentive for individual enforcement is available at EU level, 
as certain obstacles (discussed above) limit the effectiveness of the ID, especially in 
cross-border situations. 
7.5. EU dimension of the problems identified  
• What is the EU dimension of the problem(s)? 
Most of the problems described above have an EU dimension as they directly relate to 
shortcomings in the EU legal framework, such as inconsistencies, gaps and overlaps, 
which e.g. contribute to legal uncertainty and information overload, as well as 
increased compliance and enforcement costs. Regarding injunctions, the EU dimension 
is that EU consumer law is not sufficiently enforced if this instrument does not work in 
practice, affecting both domestic and cross-border cases. 
Some of the described problems also relate to shortcomings or use of policy options in 
the implementation and application of these EU instruments at the Member State 
level. So, there may sometimes be a lack of resources, competence or will for 
enforcement. Equally, there may be deep-rooted national traditions that make it 
difficult to achieve what is provided for in the EU legislation, such as national 
procedural traditions that are resistant to courts exercising ex officio control over 
contract terms (the national tradition being that courts can only proceed on the basis 
of arguments raised by lawyers). Nevertheless, in many of these cases there is an EU 
dimension to the solution, i.e. to spell out ever more clearly what is required and to 
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provide guidance and training that is nuanced to the particularities of Member State 
legal frameworks. 
The problems identified often affect Member States to a different degree, especially 
where minimum harmonisation has given them leeway to provide additional 
clarification or protection. Therefore, further harmonisation of relevant consumer 
protection rules based on best practices identified in the country research for this 
study would likely be beneficial for consumers and businesses and at the same time 
contribute to reducing obstacles to the internal market. This is especially obvious 
regarding injunctions. As far as the domestic level is concerned, there is a significant 
risk that consumer law is currently enforced unequally in the Member States, with the 
result of de facto different levels of consumer protection, which is likely to distort 
competition for businesses located in different Member States. In cross-border 
situations, lack of enforcement of consumer law may impact consumer confidence in 
purchasing goods or services from a trader in another Member State, limiting the 
potential of the internal market for consumers. 
7.6. Expected future trends and baseline scenario 
• How would the problem(s) evolve, all things being equal (i.e. no change to the 
existing rules)? 
Predictions with respect to the evolution of the identified problems are difficult and will 
also depend on the future progress with EU integration. Nevertheless, considering the 
trends in the problem drivers allows for the construction of a plausible baseline 
scenario in which there is no change to the existing rules. The rest of this section 
discusses a likely baseline scenario for each of the eight identified drivers in turn. 
Levels of e-commerce and online B2C cross-border shopping have been steadily 
increasing since the early 2000s and this trend can be expected to continue, 
particularly in conjunction with the European Commission’s Digital Single Market 
strategy, which foresees 100% of European households having access to a broadband 
connection of 30Mbps or greater by 2020.891 Additionally, the results of the panel data 
analysis conducted for this study show that an increase in internet penetration is also 
likely to lead to a rise in the level of cross-border online shopping.892 As the number of 
cross-border online transactions is expected to increase, so too is the number of 
cross-border infringements, a trend which can be already identified in the above 
quoted complaints data of the European Consumer Centres. In the absence of 
intervention, these trends would be expected to put consumers at greater risk of 
online cross-border infringements. 
Innovation in technology, commercial practices and contract terms can be expected to 
continue as new technologies (e.g. electronic price labelling) are adopted by traders, 
as more transactions take place online, and as new business models such as online 
platforms continue to evolve. Further innovation can be expected to also lead to new 
challenges for consumer protection; see, for example, the emerging problems and 
concerns expressed by consumers and consumer organisations regarding consumer 
                                           
891 See Pillar IV of the Europe 2020 strategy. More information available from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/our-goals  
892 See the results of the panel data analysis in Part 4 of this report. 
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rights in response to the online public consultation for the European Commission’s 
2016 Study on online platforms.893  
It can also be expected that new behavioural psychology insights will continue to 
inform methods for protecting consumers, but also methods for exploiting consumers’ 
cognitive biases and vulnerabilities through more sophisticated marketing techniques 
and products. The increasing importance of online transactions and the availability of 
large databases with data on preferences and past purchasing behaviour of individual 
consumers will allow increasingly sophisticated targeting of specific consumer groups 
and individuals, to address their specific needs, demands and biases.894 These 
practices are likely to specifically affect vulnerable consumer groups but also 
consumers that could be considered to be a closer match to the concept of an 
"average consumer". 
Levels of awareness of EU consumer and marketing legislation have generally 
remained stagnant among consumers since 2010. In the absence of intervention, 
these levels of awareness are not likely to increase of their own accord. Stagnant 
levels of awareness among consumers faced with growing complexity and innovation 
in transactions with traders, particularly as an increasing number of these transactions 
take place online or across borders, can be expected to exacerbate consumer 
problems and drive further difficulties in enforcement where consumers are unaware 
of their rights and thus fail to exercise them. 
By definition, with no change to the existing rules, the drivers related to the existing 
legislative framework will remain unaddressed. Although case law from the CJEU will 
continue to clarify many aspects of the existing rules and provide a harmonising 
influence with respect to the interpretation of EU consumer marketing law, the 
identified problems are likely to remain: For example, the overlaps and gaps that have 
emerged as a result of the incremental development of EU consumer and marketing 
law will likely persist. It is also likely that the relevance of the UCPD black list and the 
UCTD indicative list will decrease in absence of a mechanism for updating, as 
innovation in technology, commercial practices, and contract terms continues. This will 
increase reliance on the general clauses with the related greater legal uncertainty and 
thus a greater reluctance to enforce, as the outcome of enforcement actions will be 
more uncertain (and therefore carry a greater cost risk for individual consumers or 
enforcement bodies). 
The lack of incentive for consumers to pursue individual enforcement actions will 
remain without changes to the possibilities for individual remedies or collective 
redress. Although individual Member States may introduce national legislation in this 
regard, consumers will still face problems with enforcement in the cross-border 
context. Consumer problems with individual enforcement in the cross-border context 
are in fact very likely to increase, given the increasing level of cross-border shopping 
and the extra cost and uncertainty involved in cross-border enforcement.  
It is therefore considered likely that without changes to the existing rules, the 
consequences of the current shortcomings of the consumer and marketing law 
framework will become more pronounced in the future. 
 
                                           
893 2016 Study on Online Platforms - Contrasting perceptions of European stakeholders: A qualitative 
analysis of the European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms. 
See: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/online-platforms-digital-single-market  
894 See, for example, the European Commission’s Impact Assessment carried out for the General Data 
Protection Regulation: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_ 
72_en.pdf  
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8. Conclusions and recommendations 
In this section we first present overall findings of the evaluation, before elaborating on 
specific recommendations regarding unfair commercial practices and marketing, 
contract conclusion and performance, and injunctions. We then provide suggestions 
for improvements to the concepts of "average consumer" and "vulnerable consumer", 
as well as for codification of the current rules.   
8.1. Overall findings of the evaluation 
8.1.1. Overview 
This evaluation study was conducted in the framework of the Fitness Check of EU 
consumer law and assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU 
added value of the following five EU consumer and marketing law directives in line 
with market and technology developments:  
• Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, UCPD). 
• Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of 
products offered to consumers (Price Indication Directive, PID); 
• Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising 
(Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive, MCAD); 
• Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, UCTD). 
• Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests 
(Injunctions Directive, ID). 
Also considered is the interplay with the most recent instrument of the EU horizontal 
consumer legislation, the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU, and existing sector-
specific consumer protection rules in passenger transport, electronic communications, 
energy and consumer financial services, as well as with the relevant rules in the 
E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC and Services Directive 2006/123/EC. 
The study was conducted by Civic Consulting in cooperation with KU Leuven CCM. It is 
based on country analyses by legal experts in all 28 Member States (including a 
review of academic literature and evaluation of case law); a broad scale interview 
process at EU and Member State level, consisting of a total of 255 interviews with key 
stakeholder organisations (mostly ministries, enforcement bodies, consumer 
organisations, business associations) and an additional 282 business interviews in all 
28 Member States; an open public consultation with a total of 436 responses; a survey 
of qualified entities under the Injunctions Directive which received 29 answers from 21 
Member States; and a comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits of the legislation 
covered. The fieldwork and the analysis for the study were concluded in February 
2017. Detailed results are presented in the preceding sections of Part 1 of this report, 
as well as in Part 2 (results of the open public consultation), Part 3 (country reports) 
and Part 4 (additional evidence collected). 
The study concludes that the legislative framework subject to this evaluation is 
considered to be broadly fit for purpose. The UCPD and the UCTD, most notably with 
the principle-based approach regarding unfair commercial practices and unfair 
contract terms (in combination with the black list of the UCPD and the indicative list of 
the UCTD), have been successful in creating a comprehensive EU legislative 
framework in their respective areas providing a well-working 'safety net' to address 
new commercial practices, contract terms and market developments in general. These 
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two key consumer directives have significantly increased the level of consumer 
protection in those Member States (the large majority) in which a less comprehensive 
or even no such framework existed before. For most Member States therefore the 
directives provided a clear added value. Stakeholders in a significant number of 
Member States confirm that overall the principle-based approach of the MCAD is also 
effective for protection of businesses, with only a limited number of B2B misleading 
practices reportedly being cause for concern. The PID is considered to be by and large 
effective and to provide added value in terms of better (unit) price information. 
Finally, the Injunctions Directive is an important enforcement instrument, and has 
contributed much to the enforcement of EU consumer law at the national level, even 
though this evaluation confirms that more needs to be done to ensure that consumer 
law is enforced effectively in the Member States. In light of technological innovations 
in the online environment, and the increase of EU cross-border B2C trade, the 
relevance and the added value of EU action in this area has even become more 
pronounced. 
During the last decade, consumer trust has increased across the EU, in spite of the 
financial crisis. In Eurobarometer surveys between 2006 and 2014, the proportion of 
consumers who agree with the statement that in general, retailers and service 
providers respect the rules and regulations of consumer law increased by 9 percentage 
points from 62% to 71%. This overall rise in confidence was driven mostly by the 
EU12/13 (the accession countries), which saw an average increase of 15 percentage 
points (from 52% to 67%) compared to 7 percentage points in the EU15 (67% to 
74%). The gap in consumer trust between the EU15 and the EU12/13 decreased in 
size by almost half between 2006 and 2014, from 15 to 7 percentage points. It is 
notable that this increase in trust correspondents to the significant benefits in terms of 
improved levels of consumer protection that the directives have brought to the 
EU12/13 (but not only to them), as perceived by stakeholders in our country 
interviews.  
The last decade also saw a significant increase in business-to-consumer (B2C) cross-
border shopping in the EU. Cross-border shopping over the internet has more than 
doubled since 2006, due in part to technological progress and the mainstreaming of 
internet shopping in general. In 2014, 16% of all Eurobarometer respondents reported 
that they made an online purchase from another EU country, compared to only 6% in 
2006. In the interviews conducted for this study with key stakeholder organisations in 
all Member States, they often expressed the view that the directives have had a 
positive impact on cross-border trade. The general view was that it has become easier 
for consumers to directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU 
countries over the past years. However, it is also reported from some Member States 
that the percentage of cross-border purchases remains low (partly due to “geo-
blocking”). As regards businesses, it is often reported that is has become easier for 
them to directly trade cross-border to consumers located in other EU countries over 
the past years. However, it is also frequently noted that the decision by both 
businesses and consumers as to whether they will engage in cross-border transactions 
is also influenced by factors outside the legal environment. This view was confirmed 
by the panel data analysis conducted in the framework of the study, which analysed 
the impact of the UCPD on consumer trust and online cross-border shopping.895 While 
one of the regression models applied found significant effects of the UCPD being in 
place on consumer trust and on cross-border online purchases, in other regression 
models the UCPD was not determined to have any significant effects in this respect. 
These results have therefore to be interpreted with care, and are not unequivocal 
proof of a causal effect from the UCPD being transposed in the Member States. In 
contrast, the percentage of households with internet access at home in Member States 
was found to have a positive and highly statistically significant effect on consumer 
                                           
895 For details, see Added value, Section 6.5, and Part 4 of this report. 
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trust and online cross-border purchases. The robustness of this effect is striking in 
comparison with all other variables that were used in the analysis. The increasing 
access to information online which can contribute to better and more informed choices 
of products and services seems to be a major factor for increasing levels of consumer 
trust and market integration in the EU, in addition to any effects that could be 
attributed to the legal framework. These results also confirm the importance of 
effectively addressing unfair practices in the online environment which could materially 
distort economic behaviour of consumers, such as fake product reviews or possibly 
misleading practices of price comparison websites.  
Consumer research through market studies and Eurobarometers, complaints data, and 
the responses of qualified entities to the survey conducted for this study consistently 
show that consumer law infringements are a continuing problem. In other words, the 
legal framework subject to this evaluation has not translated into a significantly lower 
prevalence of unfair commercial practices and unfair contract terms. New 
intransparent and potentially misleading pricing practices are a matter of concern. This 
lack of improvement is likely due to insufficient enforcement but also several factors 
related to the development of markets and society, with innovation in technologies 
and practices not only bringing benefits to consumers, but also creating new 
vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by unscrupulous traders. However, other 
factors also appear to be relevant, including stagnant levels of awareness of 
consumers regarding their rights, insufficient enforcement of consumer and marketing 
law, and deficiencies of the legal framework itself. For example, while costs of 
businesses for complying with the directives under review seem to be proportionate, 
this evaluation has concluded that there are certain problems regarding coherence 
(and, as a result, regarding efficiency) in terms of overlaps and inconsistencies 
between rules.  
These and other key findings of this study regarding the 99 specific evaluation 
questions are presented in more detail in the following sub-sections, structured 
according to the five evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, 
relevance and EU added value. 
8.1.2. Effectiveness 
 Unfair commercial practices and marketing 8.1.2.1.
Key evaluation questions regarding the effectiveness of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive focus on the effectiveness of the principle-based approach under 
this Directive and of the black list of unfair commercial practices. They also address 
the practical benefits for consumers arising from: the minimum harmonisation clauses 
for financial services and immovable property; the "average consumer" as the 
reference point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially 
distort economic behaviour; and the specific protection of "vulnerable consumers" 
introduced by the directive. Finally, the related evaluation questions concern how self-
and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have been effective in 
addressing unfair commercial practices. Findings include: 
 The reasoning behind the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive's principle-
based approach is focused on the inability of rigorous rules to regulate 
adequately each and every case. It allows for the combating of unfair practices 
that do not fall under any of the black listed items, and is ‘future-proof’ in that 
it allows national authorities and courts to adapt their assessments to the rapid 
evolution of new products, services and selling methods. In practice, decisions 
of enforcement authorities and courts often involve an application of the 
principle-based approach of the Directive. The Directive’s principle-based rules 
(in combination with the black list) are widely considered to provide an 
effective framework for achieving a high level of consumer protection regarding 
unfair commercial practices. In more than two thirds of the Member States, the 
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UCPD has significantly increased both the comprehensiveness of the legislative 
framework concerning unfair commercial practices and the level of protection 
against unfair commercial practices from the perspective of consumers. Only in 
a minority of Member States is it reported that the principle-based approach of 
the UCPD actually leads to divergent application of the same principles and that 
this divergent application actually has a negative impact on cross-border trade. 
From other Member States it is reported that the principle-based approach 
actually leads to divergent application of the same principles, but that no major 
problems due to a resulting negative impact on cross-border trade are reported 
or experienced. It would seem that so far CJEU jurisprudence, the recently 
updated UCPD Guidance document and the exchange of ideas amongst national 
enforcement authorities within the CPC Network contribute to a common 
understanding of the principle-based UCPD across the EU, limiting disparities in 
its application and related impacts.  
 The black list of the UCPD is generally considered to generate practical and 
significant benefits. For practices on the list, there is no need to apply the 
transactional decision test896 in order to take action, which facilitates 
enforcement and may avoid costly and time-consuming litigation. Country 
reports emphasise that the black list has important practical benefits for 
authorities, as well as for consumers and traders. There are however 
limitations in the application of the black list, namely, some of the blacklisted 
practices are considered to be irrelevant or incidental in practice; in several 
countries it is reported that many blacklisted practices are difficult to apply; 
and some of the provisions of the black list are formulated in a way which still 
requires an assessment in concreto of the unfairness of the behaviour of the 
traders. The country research also identified a call from various stakeholders to 
add a number of commercial practices that are considered to be problematic to 
an extended black list. From a theoretical perspective, the black list is more 
likely to remove barriers to the internal market, because the rule-based 
approach provides more legal certainty and uniformity than the principle-based 
approach. This assessment is confirmed through our country research. 
Stakeholders often assess the black list as positive in this respect. By reducing 
uncertainty and diversity in the application of the UCPD, the uniform black list 
is a helpful tool for fostering cross-border trade, complementing the Directive’s 
general clauses. 
 This study has not identified significant problems in countries that make use of 
the minimum harmonisation clause for financial services or immovable property 
(according to Article 3(9) of the UCPD) with respect to barriers to cross-border 
trade, although interviewed stakeholders in several countries could not report 
on practical experience on this issue. 
 The benchmark of the average consumer is considered to allow in practice a 
significant degree of flexibility in its application. The use of the "average 
consumer" benchmark allows authorities and courts to render a flexible 
decision, specifying the content of this concept in a manner that is best suited 
for the specific case. This is an obvious advantage given to the authorities and 
courts that are not bound by formalistic and overly rigorous rules, when 
evaluating the nature of the supposedly unfair practice, which can be clearly to 
the benefit of consumers. In contrast, the vulnerable consumer benchmark is 
considered to be of limited relevance in practice, and there is no evidence that 
                                           
896 Under the general clause of the UCPD, in order to qualify as misleading, aggressive or contrary to the 
requirements of professional diligence, a commercial practice must cause or be likely to cause an average 
consumer to take a transactional decision that he/she would not have taken otherwise. This is to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis by the competent national bodies.  
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this provision has benefitted consumers. National courts and enforcement 
authorities tend to apply the modulated average consumer benchmark,897 
instead of the “vulnerable consumer” benchmark of Article 5(3) UCPD. There is 
also little indication that new categories of vulnerable consumers not listed in 
the UCPD (such as poor/indebted) have been recognised by administrative 
practice or case law within the scope of the UCPD.  
 In those Member States where there is long-standing tradition of self- and co-
regulation, this approach seems to work fairly well in addressing unfair 
commercial practices. In contrast, in Member States where there is no such 
tradition, codes of conduct appear to be often of limited practical relevance – 
with notable exceptions such as the advertising self-regulatory organisations 
and self-regulatory organisations that promote the enforcement of unfair 
competition law by pursuing unfair commercial practices. 
Key evaluation questions regarding the effectiveness of the Price Indication 
Directive mainly focus on the extent to which consumers are effectively informed 
about the unit selling price and related problems. Findings include: 
 The available evidence indicates that by and large consumers appear to be 
effectively informed aware about the unit selling price or at least stakeholders 
consider that there are no major problems in this respect. While stakeholder 
mostly considered price indication rules to be effective and from most countries 
no major problems in this respect were reported, investigations by consumer 
organisations and authorities at the national level indicate that a considerable 
level of infringements of price indication rules occurs in practice. 
 The research conducted for this evaluation did not provide evidence that the 
divergences between national laws due to the minimum harmonisation 
character and the use of regulatory options under the Price Indication Directive 
have a significant effect on cross-border trade. 
Regarding the effectiveness of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive evaluation questions focus on whether its scope limited to the notion of 
'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses, the overall effectiveness of 
the principle-based approach of the Directive, but also concern the effectiveness of the 
comparative advertising rules, and of the current rules on enforcement. Findings 
include:  
 The country research corroborates the finding that the Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive provides a solid framework for a 
considerable part of the B2B advertising market. The limitation to “advertising”, 
as it is broadly defined in the MCAD, does not seem to reduce significantly the 
MCAD’s effectiveness as compared to a situation where its provisions would 
apply to e.g. “commercial practices” as in the UCPD. Stakeholders in a 
significant number of Member States confirm that overall the principle-based 
approach of the MCAD is effective. However, several country reports stress the 
absence of experience with the application of the MCAD, due to lack of 
administrative enforcement, or lack of case law or settlements, whilst others 
emphasise that in particular small enterprises are affected by misleading 
advertisements. 
                                           
897 Where commercial practices are directed to a particular target group (e.g. advertising towards children), 
the modulated average consumer benchmark applies, i.e. the benchmark of the average member of that 
target group (as set out in Article 5(2)(b) UCPD). 
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 Apparently, and notwithstanding the full harmonisation character of EU 
provisions on comparative advertising, there are important differences between 
Member States in the occurrence of comparative advertising. The available 
evidence suggests that overall the existing comparative advertising rules are 
either not very relevant in countries where this practice is rare, or provide an 
effective legal framework to the extent that major problems have not been 
reported in those countries where comparative advertising is more often used. 
 There appear to be only limited practical experiences in cross-border 
enforcement in B2B relations. Where experience exists, practical problems 
seem to be considerable; for example, an enforcement authority reported that 
they receive several complaints concerning cross-border infringements but that 
they are not able to react adequately, because of the lack of adequate 
instruments concerning cross-border cooperation. 
 While in theory disparities in the application of the principle-based approach of 
the MCAD and the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on 
misleading advertising could have negative effects on cross-border trade, the 
country research for this study identified no significant problems in this 
respect. According to the country research the fully harmonised provisions on 
comparative advertising are considered to provide an appropriate legal 
framework, but it also has to be noted that relevant experience of stakeholders 
seems often to be limited, due to the limited use of comparative advertising in 
some Member States, and/or the limited experience with cross-border trade in 
this respect.  
 Contract conclusion and performance 8.1.2.2.
Key evaluation questions regarding the effectiveness of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive focus on the effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this 
Directive and of the indicative list of unfair contract terms. They also address the 
benefits for consumers of the “black” or “grey” lists adopted in some Member States; 
the effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of a term to the 
individual relationship between the specific trader and consumer (the inter partes 
effect); the effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements; and the 
benefits for consumers of the extensions in certain Member States to cover negotiated 
terms or terms on the adequacy of the price and main subject-matter. Finally, the 
evaluation questions concern the effectiveness of the sanction foreseen for unfair 
contract terms (i.e. that the term is not binding). Findings include: 
 There is a principle-based approach of the UCTD in two broad senses (the 
range of sectors and terms covered and the open-ended fairness test), and in 
both these senses this principle-based approach is broadly effective in 
contributing to a high level of consumer protection. There is a principle-based 
approach in that the UCTD applies to all trade sectors and that all contracts not 
positively excluded are covered. This broad scope of application has certainly 
contributed to the effectiveness of the Directive. The test of unfairness is 
sufficiently open ended to enable a range of EU and national fairness criteria to 
be applied to any given term. It is arguable that the foundations are there for a 
general approach under which it can be taken that a term will often cause 
significant imbalance and violate the good faith requirement where it 
significantly deviates from any default position that would otherwise apply.  
The CJEU has unpacked the potential of the principle-based approach in 
developing new substantive fairness norms and thereby safeguarded the 
effectiveness of the principle-based approach in contributing to a high level of 
consumer protection. Furthermore, decisions of enforcement authorities and 
courts often involve an application of the UCTD illustrating the effectiveness of 
the Directive's principle-based approach in practice. In summary, the principle 
based approach appears to be working well. 
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 The indicative list of terms which may be regarded as unfair is considered to 
have significant practical benefits in terms of consumer protection and legal 
certainty. The indicative list of the Directive has been transposed in various 
ways in the different Member States, the Directive being a minimum 
harmonisation instrument. Most countries have some form of black 
(automatically unfair) or grey (presumed unfair) list, in some cases even both 
(e.g. Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK). The 
black or grey lists were reported to provide more legal certainty than a mere 
indicative list. Specifically, they facilitate the judicial task, provide foreseeability 
as to the result of the procedure, and have thus helped to eradicate certain 
unfair terms considered particularly dangerous for consumers (e.g. arbitration 
clauses). It can be concluded that black and grey lists are considered more 
effective than indicative lists. However, in order to be effective, such lists 
(whether indicative, grey or black) need to be updated regularly. 
 While the transparency principle of the UCTD is considered an important 
precondition for a high level of consumer protection, its full effectiveness is 
currently not reached due to a lack of clarity regarding the consequences of a 
breach of the principle.  
 The extension of the application of Directive to individually negotiated terms in 
several Member States has been advantageous for consumers. It addresses 
existing problems as to complexity; and also as to sham negotiations, and the 
imbalance between businesses and consumers, which are likely to mean that 
there is a high risk of a significant imbalance even with ‘negotiated’ terms. At 
the same time, there is no evidence from the country reports, that extension of 
the Directive to individually negotiated terms, causes problems in application or 
leads to unintended effects. In the small number of countries where the 
Directive has been extended to price and main subject matter terms, the 
evidence suggests that this provides important consumer protection benefits, 
especially where these terms are not subjected to market discipline, and where 
other important policies of social cohesion are at stake. Further, there is no 
evidence that extension of the Directive to price and main subject matter 
terms, causes problems in application or leads to unintended effects. 
 The sanction that a term is non-binding has contributed to achieving a high 
level of consumer protection. Especially the interpretation by the CJEU that the 
Directive requires this sanction to be invoked ex officio by the national courts 
has contributed to its effectiveness. The sanction has however not reached its 
full potential in all Member States, due to a lack of awareness of the effects of 
this sanction and a lack of compliance with this duty by national courts in some 
Member States. A need for increased awareness (in the form of legal training) 
and for guidance and codification of the exact scope of the obligations of the 
national courts was expressed by numerous stakeholders in the country 
research. 
 Court or administrative decisions in the context of collective proceedings are in 
the vast majority of Member States only binding on the businesses who are 
party to the case. This limited effect of judgments and decisions declaring a 
term unfair limits the effectiveness of the Directive. Exceptions to this principle 
do however exist in some Member States. The absence of an erga omnes effect 
of individual and / or collective proceedings does however not mean that 
individual court decisions do not have influence, as decisions of especially the 
highest courts are followed even in countries in which there is no binding 
precedent.  
 Injunctions 8.1.2.3.
Key evaluation questions regarding the effectiveness of the Injunctions Directive 
focus on the extent to which Member States have extended the scope of the injunction 
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procedure beyond the legislation listed in Annex I of the ID. They also address the use 
of the injunction procedure across the EU; the number of injunctions initiated in each 
Member States since June 2011 and trends in the use of the procedure; and the 
advantages of specific national measures taken by Member States; the obstacles to 
the effective use of the procedure. Finally, the questions concern the impact of the ID 
on consumers in terms of reduction in consumer law infringements and consumer 
detriment. Findings of the evaluation include: 
 Based on the country research for this evaluation, four groups of Member 
States can be differentiated regarding the scope of application of the 
Injunctions Directive. The first group of Member States has implemented the 
scope of application for both national and cross-border infringements as in 
Annex I of the Injunctions Directive; the second group of Member States has 
added specific, enumerated pieces of legislation for both national and cross-
border infringements; the third group has different approaches for national and 
for cross-border infringements; and the fourth group has extended the scope of 
both domestic and cross-border injunction procedures to consumer law in 
general. 
 In the five year period since June 2011, qualified entities responding to our 
survey initiated a total of 5 763 injunction actions. While in most countries the 
number of reported injunction actions is a few hundred or less, the notable 
exceptions are qualified entities in Germany which reported the highest number 
of injunction actions (4 579) of all Member States, and Latvia (794). 
 The number of injunction actions that concerned national infringements 
appears to have been relatively stable since 2008, while the number of cross-
border injunction actions had been insignificant from the outset, and has 
remained low. The most affected sectors are the sectors that had also been 
mentioned in the 2012 report of the European Commission. The 
telecommunications sector still features on top of the ranking and other sectors 
such as banking and investments, tourism and package travel also continue to 
remain relevant. Misleading and aggressive practices and unfair contract terms 
have remained prominent types of infringements since the 2008 report of the 
European Commission. 
 All available evidence confirms that while the injunction procedure is by and 
large considered being effective in several countries where their use is common 
(and stakeholders in the consultation agree that the procedure is beneficial for 
consumers), the impact of the Injunctions Directive in terms of its aim to 
facilitate cross-border injunction procedures can still be considered as being 
minimal. The complexity of cross-border injunction procedures mainly stems 
from the application of foreign law. This clearly has a limiting effect on cross-
border injunction litigation. 
 Court fees and lawyers’ fees for injunction procedures brought by consumer 
organisations and even by public authorities have been named by stakeholders 
as key obstacles to the effectiveness of the injunction procedure generally, 
including domestically. The loser-pays-principle in particular has a significantly 
chilling effect on the consumer organisations’ activities. 
 The length of court procedures has been criticised by stakeholders. A lengthy 
procedure may reduce the effectiveness of an injunction order that only stops 
infringements from a later point in time onwards. Overall, however, while the 
availability of speedy procedures can be considered a necessary ingredient of 
effective injunction procedures, given the need to stop infringements of the 
collective interest of consumers as fast as possible, it seems clear that not all 
infringements of consumer law are clear-cut, and that in some instances 
complex legal issues need to be resolved. 
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 A system where individual claims are prescribed before a final decision in the 
collective action is made appears to be ineffective in protecting the consumers’ 
interests. While injunctions as such can be considered an effective remedy to 
stop infringements for the future, as evidenced in the country research for this 
study, only some Member States have introduced broader effects of injunction 
orders. Additionally, from the country research it appears that publication of 
the decision and, where applicable, of a corrective statement is an effective 
remedy. 
 Generally speaking, close to all Member States foresee sanctions for non-
compliance. It has, however, sometimes been doubted that they are 
sufficiently deterrent to discourage continued infringements. Sanctions for the 
breach of an injunction order are however a necessary element under the 
principle of effectiveness as established by the CJEU. In some Member States, 
public authorities also use the prior consultation of the trader to negotiate a 
settlement that may even involve repayment of unduly collected fees. 
8.1.3. Efficiency 
The evaluation questions regarding efficiency concern both the costs and benefits of 
the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules for businesses and 
consumers, focusing on the rules regarding commercial practices, standard contract 
terms and injunction proceedings. To put these costs and benefits in perspective, we 
first outline the related benefits for society. 
The benefits for society of having a consumer and marketing law framework in place 
are as follows: 
 Unfair commercial practices and marketing: From an economic perspective, the 
behaviour of traders towards consumers with respect to communication, 
advertising, and marketing in general is likely to have a large impact on the 
functioning of consumer markets, since the influence on consumers’ 
information and decision-making in such markets is very significant. Consumer 
policy has therefore the potential to positively interact with market forces in 
order to foster competition and improve both allocative and productive 
efficiency. This efficiency-enhancing function is partly performed at the EU 
level, for the following reasons: First, because within the EU, the size and 
intensity of cross-border trade are high enough (in fact, higher than in any 
other large trading area in the world) to make such economic activity in the 
Single Market vulnerable to inconsistent policy choices by Member States or 
even mere diversity between those choices. Second, traders’ behaviour in 
communicating with consumers and in pre-contracting activity is not bound by 
Member States' borders; thus, it directly impacts cross-border trade. The trade 
dimension is fundamental, given that intra-EU28 trade in goods reached 
EUR 3 070 billion in 2015.898 For businesses, cross-border trade can reduce 
input costs and increase the potential customer base. For consumers, access to 
goods cross-border can lower prices and increase choice.899  
                                           
898 Eurostat, Intra-EU28 trade (exports), by Member State, total product, Code: tet00047, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tet00047&language=
en, accessed on 20.1.2017  
899 This is especially obvious in the area of e-commerce. A 2011 study concluded that total welfare gains for 
EU consumers resulting from lower online prices and increased online choice under a hypothetical situation 
of a 15% share of internet retailing (then at 3.5%) and a Single EU consumer Market in the e-commerce of 
goods amount to 204.5 billion Euro per year (equivalent to 1.7% of EU GDP). This was estimated to be four 
times higher compared to a situation where, with a similar share of internet retailing, the (still rather) 
fragmented national consumer markets of the Member States would continue to exist. See: Civic Consulting 
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 Contract conclusion and performance: Transaction costs are real costs, and 
thus, reducing the costs of preparing the terms of contracts with the help of 
standard contract terms is, ceteris paribus, a socially desirable endeavour. 
These cost savings are not only privately beneficial for the trader, but are also 
true reductions in social costs, which are likely to benefit consumers. However, 
if there is no individual negotiation, the drafter will possess an informational 
advantage over the content that may add onto a previously existing advantage 
as a trader. The uses and abuses of standard terms in contracts with 
consumers thus involve asymmetries of information between contracting 
parties. Additionally, it is rational for the consumer to remain ignorant of 
standard clauses as they anyhow cannot be changed, a strategy that can be 
anticipated by the drafter, who can then select the level of quality most 
beneficial to themselves. The contracting process involving standard terms 
therefore does not by itself result in the level of quality in the bundle of rights 
and obligations of the parties that will be desirable in a societal perspective, i.e. 
there is a market failure as to the content of standard terms. This market 
failure can be addressed by mandating certain minimum levels of quality (in 
terms of consumer rights) in non-negotiated terms, or the ban of certain terms 
that are deemed unfair given their impact on the situation of the consumer, an 
approach many countries have taken. Legislators in the EU with the UCTD (as 
implemented in the Member States) and third countries with their national 
legislation have therefore introduced minimum standards of quality in standard 
terms, through several means: black lists of prohibited terms that are always 
considered being below the minimum acceptable level of consumer rights, grey 
lists of presumptively prohibited terms, general notions and tests of unfairness. 
 Injunctions: It is well-known from an economic perspective that decentralised, 
disperse, individual action for enforcing consumer protection legislation often 
results in significant under-deterrence of infringements. First, infringement of a 
given rule may not be detected by the affected consumers; second, consumers 
may rationally decide to forego legal actions and the ensuing remedies, 
considering the potentially negative balance of costs and benefits of such legal 
action; third, the classical collective action problem will induce individual 
consumers to choose a level of legal action that is sub-optimal in a societal 
perspective. This is problematic, as legal action does not only provide private 
benefits, in the form of a damage payment, or the interruption of an action or 
activity detrimental to the individual consumer who decides to pursue legal 
claims. Legal action also serves to produce two types of benefits for society: 
the action, if successful, creates a beneficial precedent favouring parties in 
similar circumstances, and also serves to enforce the substantive rules of 
consumer law. Legal actions initiated by suitable organisations or other 
representative bodies may therefore help alleviate the enforcement 
shortcomings from decentralised consumer redress. These collective actions 
allow for the exploitation of the significant economies of scale in the process of 
preparing and litigating cases, and provide a mechanism, at least in theory, to 
reduce the coordination and transaction costs of bringing together different 
affected consumers. 
In line with these societal benefits, benefits for consumers of having a consumer 
and marketing law framework in place are as follows: 
 The benefits for consumers from the protection against unfair commercial 
practices through the UCPD mainly derive from an improved functioning of the 
market in terms of outcomes for consumers, by deterring harmful practices and 
                                                                                                                               
2011, Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and internet marketing and selling 
techniques in the retail of goods. 
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increasing transparency and reducing influences that potentially distort 
economic decision making, thereby increasing consumer welfare. Consumers 
may also benefit from a passing on of the reduction of traders’ costs due to 
reductions in compliance costs linked to legal disparity between Member 
States. 
 The benefits that consumers may derive from the protection against unfair 
contract terms are very large, covering a wide range of circumstances and 
economic transactions. Very few consumer policy measures have the potential 
to influence the economic welfare of consumers to such an extent and with 
such a wide scope of application as the UCTD. An illustration of this large 
potential impact can be found in the Spanish experience from mortgage 
contracts. Foreclosure proceedings, penalty interest, and floor clauses in 
adjustable interest rate mortgages have been strongly affected by UCTD and 
its interpretation by the CJEU and Spanish courts. The UCTD therefore plays an 
essential role in the economic welfare of Spanish borrowing consumers, as has 
been illustrated again through a recent judgement by the CJEU which will lead 
to large paybacks of Spanish banks to consumers due to an unfair term in their 
mortgage loan agreements.900 It can be concluded that the benefits of the 
UCTD for consumers mainly derive from preventing and stopping abuses of 
standard terms in contracts, which involve asymmetries of information between 
contracting parties leading to market failure. The obligations of the UCTD for 
traders concerning transparency and fairness of standard contract terms and 
the possibility to declare the nullity of an unfair contract term address this 
market failure and thereby increase consumer welfare. 
 The actual benefits for consumers from the consumer and marketing law 
framework depend on the combination of the adequacy of the substantive rules 
with the level of enforcement. The most obvious and relevant benefit for 
consumers from the Injunction Directive refers to enhanced enforcement of 
consumer law: if individual action by dispersed consumers leads to insufficient 
levels of deterrence, then collective actions, including injunctions, are very 
likely to improve this situation. Collective actions for injunctions according to 
the ID also allow society (and therefore consumers) to attain a given degree of 
enforcement at lower costs, both to the parties involved and to the public. 
However, the deficiencies of the ID, which limit its effectiveness especially in a 
cross-border context, reduce these potential benefits to a significant degree. 
Consumers may also incur costs related to the consumer and marketing law 
framework in place. Three different kinds of consumers’ costs can arise: 
 Traders may pass on their costs of compliance with the consumer and 
marketing law framework in the form of higher prices. The passing-on of the 
costs created or raised by this legislation would depend on their impact on 
price elasticities and on supply and demand functions. The degree to which 
costs are actually passed on will also depend on other factors such as the 
pricing policy of traders and competitive pressure they face, which will likely 
differ by sector and Member State. It is therefore not possible to assess the 
extent to which the mentioned costs of the legislative framework concerning 
unfair commercial practices and marketing in B2C transactions are passed on 
                                           
900 Judgement in Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15 (Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco, 
Palacios Martínez v. BBVA and Banco Popular Español v. Irles López). In its judgement, the CJEU 
"overruled" national case law that limited the temporal effects of the declaration of nullity of an unfair term 
(in this case 'floor clauses' in mortgage loan agreements establishing a minimum rate below which the 
variable rate of interest cannot fall). According to an estimate published by El País, banks will have to pay 
back an estimated amount of EUR 3 to 5 billion, see: http://economia.elpais.com/economia/ 
2016/12/21/actualidad/1482306332_458117.html.   
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to consumers. Even if they would be fully passed on, the effect on prices would 
likely be minor, considering that regular costs for businesses in this respect 
were estimated at approximately 0.024 percent of turnover for the five sectors 
in which business interviews were conducted (see below). 
 In addition, costs accrue through unfair commercial practices or unfair contract 
terms of traders which are not prevented by the legal framework, e.g. because 
of insufficient enforcement of rules, or where consumers cannot obtain 
adequate redress regarding infringements of this legislation. 
 Finally, the variety of terms in standard contracts may be reduced due to the 
legislative framework. Elimination of certain contract terms due to an unfair 
term assessment made with respect to one type of borrower may inefficiently 
reduce term variety for other borrowers, and such a reduction of the variety of 
standard contract terms is not necessarily welfare-enhancing for all groups of 
consumers. However, the reduction in variety is likely to be socially beneficial 
in many other cases, especially regarding terms that can be considered as 
unfair under all possible circumstances.  
Regarding the benefits for traders related to the consumer and marketing law 
framework in place, the study concludes as follows: 
 Traders operating cross-border reap the most tangible benefits related to a 
consumer and marketing law framework which is to a significant extent 
harmonised across Member States, since their costs are likely to decrease as a 
result of a reduction in the level of legal fragmentation across Member States. 
In our business interviews across all potential benefits that were listed in a 
respective question, between 63% and 46% of the businesses that sell their 
products/services in other EU countries indicated that they benefited at least 
slightly from the EU legislative framework subject to the Fitness Check. In 
particular, these businesses indicated that they benefited most from the 
harmonised legislation that facilitates selling cross-border to consumers in 
other EU countries, followed by the level playing field that was created across 
the EU for businesses regarding contracts with consumers by safeguarding that 
standard contract terms are fair. 
 However, even traders who do not operate cross-border may experience 
benefits from a more stable and consistent legal framework as a result of it 
being Europeanised, as this reduces the need for and cost of regular 
compliance checking and adjustment.  
 Specific benefits for traders also arise from the legal framework regarding 
standard contract terms, because standardised contracts terms reduce 
transaction costs for traders. When a trader faces a multitude of contract 
negotiation and drafting processes with different contracting parties, there are 
substantial economies of scale to be achieved if the contracting process 
becomes standardised and not tailor-made. Traders active in cross-border 
transactions may benefit in two additional ways from the UCTD: First, it allows 
additional economies of scale in the investments made by traders on contract 
drafting and communication, and on compliance with legal requirements, by 
making the set of legal requirements more homogeneous (although not entirely 
so) across European markets. This makes such investments more productive, 
and thus improves the return traders obtain from them. Second, it may help to 
restrict contract terms which impose high switching costs on consumers (i.e., 
clauses and terms that reduce the ability of new entrants to lure existing 
consumers from an established trader) by a finding of unfairness with respect 
to those terms. With this, entry and competition may become more vigorous. 
This effect may be particularly attractive both for new traders and for traders 
entering new markets in other EU Member States. 
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 A source of potential benefits for traders from concentrated litigation under 
injunctive action proceedings is the avoidance of possibly contradictory 
outcomes under individual enforcement actions,901 and thus, enhanced legal 
certainty for traders. It could also be argued that the per-case litigation cost for 
the trader under a collective action for injunction would be lower than having to 
face a multitude of individual cases. This in turn, however, depends on the 
number of consumers that would actually sue the trader on an individual basis. 
As the consistent and long-standing opposition against collective redress 
mechanisms by business associations illustrates,902 businesses themselves do 
not seem to consider these theoretical benefits as being relevant in practice. 
Finally, the costs of traders related to the consumer and marketing law framework in 
place are assessed as follows: 
 To explore the costs for traders in detail, the above mentioned business 
interviews covering all Member States were conducted in five sectors.903 On 
basis of the data collected, the annual costs incurred by businesses in the EU28 
for checking that their advertising/marketing and standard contract terms still 
comply with national legislation and adjusting business practices if needed 
were estimated to amount to EUR 278 million in the five sectors reviewed (best 
estimate).904 Of these costs, the largest share of 46% is caused by compliance 
checks and adjusting business practices related to advertising and marketing 
targeted at consumers and 16% is related to advertising and marketing 
targeted at businesses, with the remaining share of 39% of costs being related 
to standard contract terms in consumer contracts. This is similar to the pattern 
observed at company level regarding the one-off costs when entering another 
EU country’s market. These costs appear very proportionate when compared to 
the approximate annual turnover of EUR 1 180 billion in these five sectors, 
especially when taking into account the importance of these rules for the 
functioning of consumer markets. The estimated overall costs of regular 
compliance checks amount to approximately 0.024 percent of turnover. These 
estimates refer to the overall compliance costs for businesses related to the 
national legal framework on marketing and standard contract terms, and 
therefore are caused by the combined effects of EU and Member States 
legislation in this area, including relevant sector-specific legislation. 
 Costs for (unit) price indication were separately assessed and are not included 
in the previous estimate. Median costs of interviewed businesses that indicate 
unit prices in the pre-packaged food and detergents sector905 are EUR 2 178 
per business per year (e.g. staff costs to prepare and change price labels and 
other costs such as electronic price labels), of which 30% are specifically 
related to unit price indication. Costs related to unit price indication therefore 
also do not seem to imply disproportionate burdens on businesses, although 
data limitations do not allow a final conclusion in this respect. In line with the 
                                           
901 Assuming that the collective action and individual actions are linked. 
902 See also the results of the open public consultation in Part 2 of this report. 
903 Large household appliances, electronic and ICT products, gas and electricity services, telecommunication 
services, and pre-packaged food and detergents. For detailed results, see Section 6.2 (Efficiency) and Part 4 
of this report. 
904 For an estimated number of 962 261 businesses in the five selected sectors. Note however that the total 
costs at the EU level are calculated based on costs per business by size class, which vary greatly as shown 
in the previous table, and on the number of businesses per sector and size class, which has a strong 
influence on the results; for more details see Part 4 of this report. 
905 In this sector unit pricing is most relevant. 
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size distribution of companies in the food retail sector, the business interviews 
focused mostly on SMEs. Large companies in the sector that were interviewed 
had difficulties providing estimates regarding the cost of price indication. Other 
possible reasons for the relatively low estimate include that price information is 
often provided automatically either on websites or in some cases on electronic 
labels, using special software, which reduces related costs. 
 The proportionate character of the costs of consumer protection legislation, of 
which the scrutinised directives are essential elements, has been recognised by 
businesses. In a 2014 survey (the only year that such a question was asked in 
the Eurobarometer) a large majority of traders agreed that in their own country 
compliance with consumer legislation is easy (72%) and that the costs of 
compliance are reasonable (67%), although traders selling in other EU 
countries were less likely to agree that this applied when selling cross-border. 
Only a slight majority of traders operating cross-border agreed that compliance 
in other EU countries was easy (57%) and that the related costs were 
reasonable (52%). These results illustrate that compliance with the rules in 
other EU countries is considered to be more burdensome, which reflects the 
fact that in addition to costs for regular compliance checks, businesses incur 
one-off costs for entering a new market, as they need to assess whether their 
existing practices comply with the rules in the new market (see detailed 
analysis in Section 6.2, Efficiency). 
8.1.4. Coherence 
 Unfair commercial practices and marketing 8.1.4.1.
Key evaluation questions regarding the coherence of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive and Price Indication Directive with other horizontal 
legislation focus on the level of awareness of traders regarding information 
requirements at different stages of the transaction and whether there were any costs 
arising from the multiplicity of information obligations. They also concern consumer 
benefits of receiving information under the PID; and the effect on cross-border trade 
of divergences between national laws arising from the minimum harmonisation 
character of the PID. Findings include: 
 Article 7(4) UCPD establishes an indirect duty to disclose information in the 
specific context of “invitations to purchase”, subject to the well-known 
transactional decision test. Article 5/6 CRD imposes a positive obligation on 
traders to provide the consumer, before he or she enters into an on-premises 
contract (i.e. at the precontractual stage), with certain pieces of information, in 
a clear and comprehensible manner, unless if already apparent from the 
context. In a large number of Member States the level of awareness of traders 
as regards Article 7(4) UCPD is generally considered to be fairly high, while the 
level of awareness of traders as regards the more recent Article 5/6 CRD seems 
to be equally high if not higher. One of the reasons might be that positive 
information duties are much more effective than a prohibition of misleading 
omissions.  
Stakeholders in the country research and in the open public consultation 
emphasised that the amount of information that must be provided to 
consumers under Article 7(4) UCPD and/or Article 5/6 CRD is creating 
“information overload” and confusion amongst consumers and also creating 
(unnecessary) costs for businesses.  
 The information requirements in Article 22 of the Services Directive apply in 
addition to the information required for invitations to purchase under Article 
7(4) UCPD. The E-Commerce Directive applies to information society services, 
which can include the services provided by operators of websites and online 
platforms which allow consumers to buy a good or service. In several Member 
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States the view of stakeholders is that the scopes of the various information 
requirements in UCPD, Services Directive and E-Commerce Directive do not 
overlap (significantly) or at least that there have not been practical problems 
reported in this respect, and that, hence, no related costs are incurred by 
businesses or by public authorities. In other countries, it is admitted that costs 
can arise for businesses, as the fragmentation in advertising law requires resort 
to and review of multiple laws and regulations. Overall, it would seem that 
there is a clear need for information requirements under the different directives 
to be streamlined. Taking into account the insights of behavioural research, 
there is also a need for a critical analysis of what type of information with what 
kind of specificity should be given at what stage of the marketing and 
contracting process. For example, it was suggested that all information does 
not necessarily have to be included in an “invitation to purchase”; it should be 
enough that information is provided before the actual purchase. 
Key evaluation questions regarding the coherence of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive with respect to EU sector-specific legislation first address 
the awareness of UCPD requirements by businesses, consumers and enforcement 
bodies in the relevant sectors. They then consider the question which authorities are 
responsible for the enforcement of horizontal and sector-specific rules in the relevant 
sectors; the extent to which the combination of horizontal and sector-specific rules 
provide for a clear and coherent legal framework; the benefits of the complementary 
application of the UCPD in the relevant sectors; and finally the need for any 
clarification of the interplay between the horizontal and sector-specific rules. Findings 
of the evaluation include: 
 As regards the interplay of the UCPD with sector-specific legislation (in 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer 
financial services), the awareness of consumers that the rules of the UCPD are 
also applicable in the regulated sectors is generally considered insufficient, 
whereas the general awareness of the UCPD requirements seems to be higher. 
Businesses are considered to be quite well aware of the application of the UCPD 
in the regulated sectors. Enforcement authorities are also considered to have a 
fairly good knowledge of the interaction between the UCPD and sector-specific 
legislation. 
 In the vast majority of the Member States, different authorities are responsible 
for the enforcement of the horizontal consumer law and the sector-specific 
rules. The institutional arrangements for enforcement sometimes affect the use 
of the UCPD in the regulated sectors. 
 In the majority of Member States the interplay between the horizontal UCPD 
and the sector-specific rules is generally considered to provide for a clear and 
coherent legal framework concerning unfair commercial practices and 
information obligations regarding advertising. While the combination of the 
UCPD and the sector-specific rules seems to work fairly well in practice, the 
country research indicates that there is also room for reducing overlaps in 
information requirements in this respect, and that there may be a need for 
some further clarification of the interplay between the UCPD and the sector-
specific rules. 
 Contract conclusion and performance 8.1.4.2.
Key evaluation questions regarding the coherence of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive with respect to EU sector-specific legislation address the awareness of 
UCTD requirements by businesses, consumers and enforcement bodies in the relevant 
sectors. They also concern the extent to which the combination of horizontal and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework; the benefits of 
the complementary application of the UCTD in the relevant sectors; and the need for 
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any clarification of the interplay between the horizontal and sector-specific rules. 
Findings include: 
 Most stakeholders consider the legal framework as provided by the UCTD and 
sectoral EU legislation to be rather clear and coherent. In a number of Member 
States however it was emphasised that the different sets of regulation overlap 
regularly. Businesses and enforcement bodies are considered to be generally 
aware of the combined application of the two sets of rules in the regulated 
sectors, in contrast to the reported lack of awareness of consumers concerning 
the requirements of the UCTD, both in the regulated sectors and in general. 
The institutional arrangements for enforcement however sometimes affect the 
use of the UCTD in the regulated sectors.  
 Injunctions 8.1.4.3.
Key evaluation questions regarding the coherence of the Injunctions Directive 
address the interplay with other enforcement instruments of EU consumer law, with a 
focus on the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Regulation 2006/2004. Findings 
include: 
 The Injunctions Directive and the CPC Regulation differ in their respective 
scopes of application in relation to those who can use them and to the types of 
consumer law infringements that they cover. First, only public authorities can 
make use of the CPC Regulation, whereas consumer organisations can only 
take cross-border action by way of the Injunctions Directive or by using none 
of the two instruments, namely by suing the foreign trader in their domestic 
courts, or by way of informal co-operation with a befriended consumer 
organisation in the Member State where the trader is domiciled. Second, from 
the legal instruments that are within the scope of application of the Injunctions 
Directive, only the Services Directive 2006/123/EC is missing in the CPC 
Regulation. In contrast, the CPC Regulation covers a number of instruments 
that are not listed in the Annex of the Injunctions Directive, namely the Price 
Indication Directive 98/6/EC, the Data Protection Directive 2002/58/EC, the Air 
Passengers Rights Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004, the Boat Passengers Rights 
Regulation (EC) No. 1177/2010, the Railways Passengers Rights Regulation 
(EC) No. 1177/2010, the Bus Passengers Rights Regulation (EU) No. 181/2011 
and finally the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive 
2006/114/EEC. Thus, there are a number of cases where the qualified entity 
that wants to take action does not have a choice in the first place, because the 
problem at hand is only covered by the one or the other enforcement system. 
If they have a choice, consumer authorities prefer to use the CPC Network 
when it comes to cross-border infringements. Qualified entities have criticised 
the limited scope of application of the Injunctions Directive and suggested to 
adjust it to the scope of application of the CPC Regulation or to extend it to 
consumer law in general. 
 The Injunctions Directive is complemented by singular provisions in other 
directives that require Member States to introduce injunction procedures at the 
domestic level. Relevant EU legislation currently in force includes the UCTD 
(Art. 7(2) and (3)), the UCPD (Art. 11 (1) and (2)) and the CRD (Art. 23 (1) 
and (2)).The various injunction procedures required under EU law do not follow 
identical rules, and the differences between the directives do not seem to be 
based on any clear rationale. 
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8.1.5. Relevance 
 Unfair commercial practices and marketing 8.1.5.1.
Key evaluation questions regarding the relevance of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive and Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive 
address a possible extension of the UCPD for B2B transactions or revision/extension of 
the MCAD. They also consider whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes 
for B2B and C2B in the area of commercial practices; and whether there is a need to 
develop contractual consequences linked to breaches of the MCAD or adapt the rules 
on comparative advertising. Finally, the evaluation questions address the need and 
potential for the application of the UCPD to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. 
Findings of the evaluation include: 
 A number of Member States currently apply the UCPD also to B2B relations. 
From several countries it is reported that, from a theoretical perspective, an 
extension of the UCPD to B2B transactions or a revision/extension of the MCAD 
could bring benefits for cross-border trade. However, the general perception 
among the interviewed stakeholders in Member States is that there is no need 
for a fully-fledged extension of the UCPD to B2B transactions whilst a 
revision/extension of the MCAD with a view to ensuring more extensive 
protection for traders and competitors could be considered. It is generally 
considered not appropriate that businesses and consumers should be equally 
protected across the board.  
 Stakeholders interviewed in the Member States often did not see the need to 
adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the MCAD. Some government 
officials opined that the law should incorporate the clarifications brought by the 
CJEU in several judgments. A point that possibly needs to be clarified is the 
relationship between the rules on comparative advertising in the MCAD and the 
limitations on comparative advertising resulting from the CJEU’s case law on 
the protection of the reputation of trade marks. 
 According to the country research for this study cases involving consumer to-
business (C2B) relations are not frequent. The country research confirms that 
situations where traders purchase goods from consumers (C2B relation) are in 
principle not covered by the UCPD, unless a link can be established with the 
promotion, sale or supply of a (different) good or service to the consumer. As 
regards the need to explicitly extend scope of the UCPD so as to cover 
consumer to-business (C2B) relations, views diverge considerably. Arguably, 
such an extension could be achieved by broadening the definition of 
“commercial practice” to all practices “directly connected with the promotion, 
sale or supply of a product to or from consumers”. 
 Contract conclusion and performance 8.1.5.2.
Key evaluation questions regarding the relevance of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive consider whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of 
businesses, particularly SMEs. They address the appropriateness of the UCTD’s system 
of protection for B2B transactions; the appropriate scope of B2B protection against 
unfair contract terms; and the need and potential for the application of the UCTD to 
consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. Findings include: 
 A number of Member States already have some form of protection in place to 
protect businesses against unfair contract terms, often in their general contract 
law provisions. Protection in B2B relationships is furthermore often not limited 
to mere control by way of general contract law provision but supplemented by 
additional provisions that are often sector specific. Various rationales have 
been invoked to justify judicial intervention in contracts, namely protection of 
an individual contract party and protection of market functioning. 
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 The case to apply control of unfair contract terms is the least controversial for 
SMEs and micro-enterprises. The similarity and negligible difference between 
small business (especially micro-enterprises) and consumers in terms of 
knowledge, experience and negotiating power has been stressed in several 
country reports and studies. 
 There is no consensus on the need to extend the scope of application the UCTD 
to C2B transactions in the European Union as the scope of the problem is 
limited and an important number of countries already apply the UCTD to 
protect consumers in C2B contract either directly or by analogy. However, it is 
generally recognised that the position of the consumer in C2B contracts is 
similar to the position of the consumer in B2C contracts in which unfair 
standard terms are used and the application of unfair contract terms legislation 
in those countries where this already exists is not problematic. 
 Contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices 8.1.5.3.
Key evaluation questions regarding contractual consequences of unfair 
commercial practices address national law provisions providing contractual 
consequences in case of breaches to the UCPD, and whether there is a need and 
potential to develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial 
practices. Findings include: 
 In all Member States, it seems in principle possible to rely on general contract 
law provisions to seek remedies in case of an unfair commercial practice. In 
practice, in Member States where national provisions on avoidance of contracts 
or damages could be used, a breach of the law transposing the UCPD is 
nonetheless generally not associated with any contractual consequences. In 
some of these Member States, the legislation implementing the UCPD even 
explicitly provides for a negative cross-reference to relevant national contract 
law doctrines. In other Member States, in contrast, the legislation 
implementing the UCPD contains a positive cross-reference to relevant national 
contract law doctrines. Furthermore, in some Member States, national law 
provisions do provide for special contractual consequences in case of breaches 
of the UCPD.  
 The country research indicates that the question of whether or not there is a 
need to develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair practices 
is highly controversial, and stakeholders are divided in their opinion in this 
respect. 
 Injunctions 8.1.5.4.
Key evaluation questions regarding the relevance of the Injunctions Directive 
focus on the benefits of further harmonisation of the injunction procedure across the 
EU and of any further non-legislative or legislative measures to increase the use of 
injunction procedures by consumer organisations and strengthen the cooperation 
between consumer organisations from different Member States. Findings include: 
 The Injunctions Directive applies both to domestic and cross-border 
infringements. These two dimensions need to be considered separately with 
regard to the relevance of the injunction procedure.  
 At the domestic level, stakeholders have confirmed the relevance of EU 
legislation in this regard in the Member States where injunction procedures 
have for the first time introduced or where they have been improved by way of 
implementation of or as a reaction to the adoption of the Injunctions Directive 
and the specific provisions as mentioned above. The survey of qualified entities 
and the country research conducted for this evaluation has, however, also 
shown that the injunction procedure is not used at all, or rarely used, in 
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Member States where qualified entities have public law mechanisms available 
that are faster, cheaper or more effective to use. 
 With regard to cross-border injunction procedures, the relevance of EU law is 
obvious from the problems that existed before its adoption, namely, that 
Member States denied legal standing to consumer organisations from other 
Member States, thereby rendering protection of consumers through collective 
action against cross-border infringements practically impossible. The low 
numbers of cross-border injunctions in spite of an increasing number of cross-
border complaints indicate, however, that current needs are not sufficiently 
addressed, and that existing obstacles to the use of the injunction procedure in 
a cross-border perspective diminish its relevance in practice. At the same time, 
this study shows a significant number of domestic injunction procedures 
relating to cross-border infringements. 
 Co-operation and exchange of information between qualified entities have 
proven to be a useful ‘third way’ in addressing cross-border infringements, 
although only in a very limited number of cases. Non-legislative measures by 
the EU Commission, in particular the financing of education measures, have 
been helpful but have not reached all qualified entities yet.  
8.1.6. EU added value 
Key evaluation questions concern the additional value resulting from the EU 
intervention, compared to what could be achieved by Member States themselves. 
Findings in this respect include: 
 The UCPD and the UCTD have significantly increased the level of consumer 
protection in the large majority of Member States in which less comprehensive 
or even no such framework existed. This is also, but less so, the case regarding 
the MCAD, which seems to have improved the protection of businesses in some 
countries, but not in others.  
 Effective enforcement of consumer law is by itself an essential ingredient of the 
consumers’ trust in the legal system. This includes trust in the fact that 
consumers are also protected when it comes to transactions with foreign 
traders. In that respect, the Injunctions Directive is not the only instrument but 
it forms a necessary part of a bundle of instruments that improve the 
consumer’s position vis-à-vis foreign traders, including also the CPC Network, 
the Rome I Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation. At the same time, the 
Injunctions Directive does not negatively affect honest traders as it merely 
applies to infringements of consumer laws established by other directives and 
regulations. Thus, whilst it is not creating obstacles to honest traders, it has 
increased their potential to act on the markets of other Member States as 
consumers feel more confident to enter into transactions with them. 
 All directives subject to this study are considered to have contributed to 
removing obstacles to the Internal Market. While obstacles to the Internal 
Market remain, there is no doubt that both the maximum harmonised rules and 
the minimum harmonised rules, in conjunction with the harmonising effect of 
CJEU case law, have reduced these obstacles at least to some extent, also 
reducing the resulting costs for businesses to adjust to legislative diversity 
when offering their products and services cross-border. 
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8.2. Recommendations 
8.2.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing 
 Regroup and streamline information requirements 8.2.1.1.
Based on the results of this evaluation it is recommended to regroup and streamline 
the marketing/pre-contractual information requirements currently included in different 
directives. The number of requirements in Art. 7(4) UCPD could be reduced, in light of 
the overlap with Art. 5/6 CRD regulating the pre-contractual stage.  
The information requirements under the UCPD, CRD, Services Directive and 
E-Commerce Directive should be coordinated and the interplay between the UCPD and 
the sector-specific rules concerning unfair commercial practices and information 
obligations regarding advertising be clarified. To tackle the problem of information 
overload for consumers it is suggested to draw on the results of behavioural research 
in determining the information required at each stage of the transaction, with a focus 
on essential information in advertising and the provision of more detailed information 
before the contract is concluded. Where possible, concise information on key product 
or service characteristics should be provided in a standardised manner, to facilitate an 
informed consumer choice. 
 Integrate unit price indication requirements in other instrument 8.2.1.2.
The results of this evaluation indicate that the scope of the PID is somewhat unclear 
and that therefore a review of the Directive is recommended, preferably as part of a 
broader review of consumer information requirements. The integration of the PID into 
the CRD would lead to one instrument containing pre-contractual information duties; 
another option could be the integration of price integration requirements into both the 
CRD and the UCPD. Finally, a broader option for codification could be considered (see 
below). 
As indicated before, special attention should be paid to information overload, while the 
principle of indication of the selling price and unit pricing should be maintained. It is 
notable that the country research indicated the existence of a number of current 
problems related to price indication, which often are outside the scope of the PID and 
are mostly considered to fall within the UCPD framework, reaching from small letter 
size of unit price indication to intransparent discount schemes, price obfuscation, and 
other practices. It is therefore recommended to monitor new pricing technologies and 
practices carefully. It will be essential to make price indication requirements 'future 
proof', i.e. to allow for effective and rapid measures should new pricing technologies 
impair an informed and unbiased consumer choice. 
 Distribute UCPD guidance document and update in regular intervals  8.2.1.3.
While the UCPD's principle-based rules are an essential element of an effective 
framework for achieving a high level of consumer protection regarding unfair 
commercial practices, there are some concerns about the resulting legal uncertainty 
for consumers and businesses. Case law, but also the European Commission’s 
Guidance document has facilitated more effective application of the implementing 
national legislation. It is therefore recommended to distribute the UCPD Guidance 
document widely to business associations and enforcement authorities, and to update 
it in regular intervals in light of new case law and market developments.  
 Review practices on UCPD black list and introduce mechanism for updating  8.2.1.4.
The evaluation has also identified a call from some stakeholders to review the 
practices of the UCPD blacklist and/or to include new practices. The country research 
identified several commercial practices currently not covered by the black list that 
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some stakeholders considered to be problematic and proposed as potential candidates 
for an extended black list (see above and Section 6.1 on effectiveness). A key 
challenge for any revision or extension of the black list will be to avoid to the extent 
possible the use of terms which: need to be interpreted, or are otherwise vague and 
open-ended, while on the other hand not being too narrow or specific; or need an 
assessment of the unfairness of the behaviour of the specific trader in question.906 In 
light of the consequences of inclusion of specific practices into a revised black list it is 
recommended to conduct an open, transparent and inclusive consultation process on 
possible additions. Finally, it is recommended to include a mechanism in a recast 
UCPD for updating the black list (e.g. delegated/implementing acts).907 One black list 
for all Member States poses an inherent challenge, as there is a vast diversity in 
traditions and marketing cultures in various Member States (e.g. in relation to the 
regulation of sales). It is therefore recommended that a notification requirement be 
introduced whereby the Commission and other MS are duly notified of the emergence 
of any new unfair practices. This would have the benefit of alerting all MS of new 
practices considered as unfair which may possibly also impact other MS, and could 
feed into an updating of the UCPD black list in regular intervals.908 
 Extend the protection of the UCPD to consumers selling products 8.2.1.5.
It could be considered to extend the protection of the UCPD to consumers selling 
products to traders, even if the number of cases in this respect seems to be limited, as 
consumers are typically in the weaker position in these transactions. This could be 
achieved by broadening the definition of “commercial practice” to all practices “directly 
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to or from consumers”. As a 
result, commercial practices by traders who purchase goods from consumers would be 
covered by the UCPD; yet, the “practices” by those consumers vis-à-vis these traders 
would not be subject to the UCPD control (even in C2B situations, traders remain the 
stronger party and are not in need of protection against any “practices” by 
consumers).  
 Address needs regarding contractual consequences of unfair practices 8.2.1.6.
The country research for this evaluation indicates that the question of whether or not 
there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair 
practices remains highly controversial, although a significant number of Member 
States have already introduced a specific contractual sanction (but case law seems to 
be limited in this respect). Consumer organisations in particular as well as certain 
enforcement authorities would prefer the introduction of specific contractual remedies 
for breaches of the UCPD at the EU level (or at the least at the national level). In 
contrast, business organisations in particular advocate against such contractual 
remedies. On the basis of the results of this evaluation the following options at the EU 
level with respect to contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial 
practices could be identified: 
• A first option would be to continue the legislative status quo. It can be 
expected that the case law of the CJEU on the interaction between the UCPD 
and Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) will develop in the years to come. 
As mentioned in Section 6.1, the CJEU already ruled that the finding that the 
                                           
906 See also the list of criteria proposed for the inclusion of terms in a possible black list of unfair contract 
terms. 
907 Similar to the use of delegated and implementing acts of the Commission in Article 9(3) Food 
Information Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011). 
908 A similar mechanism could be envisaged for possible black lists that are recommend to be included in the 
recast UCTD and MCAD. 
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use of (not individually negotiated) contract terms constitutes an unfair 
commercial practice is one factor that can be cited when assessing the 
unfairness of contractual terms under the UCTD. Of course the case law on the 
interaction between the UCPD and the (individual contractual remedies set out 
in the) UCTD does not provide for contractual consequences in case of unfair 
commercial practices other than the use of contract terms. It should be noted 
that, as far as public enforcement is concerned, the Commission is now 
proposing to amend the CPC Regulation as to require new minimum 
enforcement powers for authorities, including the power to obtain a 
commitment from the trader responsible for the infringement, or to order that 
trader to compensate consumers that have suffered harm as a consequence of 
the infringement including, among others, monetary compensation, offering 
consumers the option to terminate the contract or other measures ensuring 
redress to consumers who have been harmed as a result of the infringement. 
But of course this is only relevant for those cases where the enforcement 
authority decides to take action. 
• A second option could be to replace the current negative cross-reference in 
Article 3(2) and Recital 9 UCPD with a positive cross-reference to national 
“contract law” and “individual actions”; for example through the introduction of 
a provision according to which “Member States shall ensure that national laws 
provide for adequate and effective contract law remedies for consumers who 
have been harmed by an unfair commercial practice”. Under this option, the 
UCPD would oblige the Member States to establish contract law remedies, but 
Member States would be free to shape these remedies taking into account 
national legal cultures. This could be combined with further clarifications and 
examples in an updated UCPD Guidance document, drawing on best practices 
in Member States. 
• A third option would be for the UCPD to provide for a harmonised set of 
remedies that are available to consumers who have been harmed by an unfair 
commercial practice. Private law remedies are not a complete novelty to EU 
(consumer) law.909 The primary aim of a UCPD set of remedies would have to 
be to restore the victims to the position they were in before the unfair practice 
and the resulting harmful transactional decision took place. However, drafting a 
sound set of UCPD remedies might be quite a challenge. Admittedly, one of 
these remedies might be designed through a cross-reference to the existing EU 
contractual sanction in Article 6(1) UCTD as interpreted by the CJEU, i.e. that 
the harmful contract or contract term is “not binding on the consumer”; other 
remedies could include a discount, damages, etc. Important choices would 
have to be made as regards to the criteria for determining whether the 
resulting contract is invalid in its entirety or only partially (one or more contract 
terms), the criteria for quantification of the discount or damages, the optional 
or automatic nature of these remedies, whether there should be a hierarchy 
between the remedies, the definition of the “causality” criterion (actual or 
potential (substantial) impact on the consumer decision making process), the 
applicable consumer benchmark (average consumer or the individual consumer 
at issue) etc. Even where these challenges may well be surmountable this 
option has a number of potential drawbacks. First, this option could entail full 
harmonisation of core parts of national contract law. In this respect, it should 
be noted that the UCTD and the CSD, that are properly regarded as the first EU 
                                           
909 See e.g. the (extension) of the right of withdrawal (CRD), the absence of liability for diminished value of 
goods in case of non-respect of certain information duties (CRD); the reimbursement of payment by the 
consumer in case of default options (CRD); the termination of the sales contract for non-delivery (CRD); the 
fact that a consumer is not bound by the contract or order in case the trader did not mention ‘order with 
obligation to pay’ or similar (CRD); the right to reimbursement in case of inertia selling (CRD); the non-
binding character of unfair terms (UCTD); the right to claim repair or replacement of the product or a price 
reduction or the termination of the contract in case of non-conformity (CSD). 
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incursions into the heartland of national contract law, are based on minimum 
harmonisation only and that earlier attempts by the European Commission to 
shift to full harmonisation in this sensitive field have faced rocky reception. This 
could be avoided by a minimum harmonisation approach with regard to 
sanctions, or by explicitly determining that the UCPD remedies do not affect 
national private law remedies. Second, this option may create incoherencies at 
the national level. As the (fully) harmonised of set of remedies included in the 
UCPD would naturally apply only to B2C contracts that result from an unfair 
commercial practice, these new UCPD remedies would differ from the existing 
national contract remedies that would remain available for other situations.910 
Moreover, there may be a risk that contractual consequences could create a 
wave of claims made against businesses that could often be unfounded.911 
It appears that replacing the current negative cross-reference to national contract law 
in Article 3(2) and Recital 9 UCPD with a positive cross-reference to national “contract 
law” and “individual actions” (i.e. the second option) could be one way to address 
current needs regarding contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair 
practices, while respecting the differences in national contract law. However, the 
evaluation could only identify limited data concerning the extent of the underlying 
problems and the effectiveness and practical relevance of the different approaches in 
the Member States. Also, the impact on national contract law of a harmonisation in 
this respect would need to be considered in detail. It is therefore recommended to 
review all three options in the context of the subsequent impact assessment.   
 Improve protection against misleading practices in B2B relation 8.2.1.7.
Before the adoption of the UCPD in 2005, the MCAD’s general prohibition of misleading 
advertising applied to any advertising, whether addressed to consumers or businesses 
(integrated approach). It is only since 2005 that EU law takes a dualistic approach in 
the field of unfair practices, with the UCPD covering (unfair) B2C practices and the 
MCAD covering (misleading) B2B advertising. However, mass (misleading) advertising 
is often directed at both consumers and businesses. In private enforcement cases the 
dualistic approach can cause a problem in that the judge might be called to apply to 
different sets of rules to the same facts. Based on the research conducted for the 
study, several options for further aligning the legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and for increasing the protection for 
small businesses could be identified:  
• The UCPD’s general prohibition of unfair practices could be extended to B2B 
relations or a general prohibition of unfair B2B practices in the MCAD could be 
introduced. The main argument for both options would lie in the mentioned 
more unified approach and the expected lower compliance costs for businesses 
that advertise to both businesses and consumers (only for the first option, an 
extension of the UCPD to B2B, see above). Along these lines, these options 
could be complemented with an extension of the UCPD’s general prohibitions of 
misleading B2C practices to B2B relations or the alignment of the general 
prohibition of misleading B2B practices in the MCAD with the UCPD. However, it 
                                           
910 See in this regard the work of Walter van Gerven, including “The Case-law of the European Court of 
Justice as a Contribution to the European Court of Justice and National Courts as a Contribution to the 
Europeanisation of Private Law’, ERPL 1995, 367–377; “Comparative Law in a Texture of Communitarisation 
of National laws and Europeanization of Community law’, in D. O’KEEFF and A. BAVASSO (eds.), Judicial 
review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum Lord Slynn of Hadley, 1, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, 433–445. In this scenario, the only option to maintain coherence in national contract 
law as a whole would be to generalise the UCPD remedies so that they apply to all contracts. Yet, such 
“spontaneous harmonization” might take years; moreover, these UCPD remedies might not be fit for such 
“spill-over effect”).  
911 Country report Greece (views of business associations). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  272 
is unclear to which extent these benefits would be relevant at a practical level, 
as no major problems with the current situation in terms of cross-border 
advertising/marketing targeted at businesses are reported. Also, most 
stakeholders do not see a need in this respect. 
• A B2B blacklist of unfair practices could be introduced. It is acknowledged in at 
least some Member States that SMEs may need additional protection because 
they have a level of competence or bargaining power similar to that of 
consumers. As mentioned, Italy has extended the UCPD to relations between 
businesses and “micro-enterprises”. Also, previous studies and the country 
research demonstrate that businesses (especially SMEs) face a number of 
common and harmful B2B marketing practices. The introduction of a black list 
of commercial practices would increase legal certainty and complement a 
principle-based approach with a list of practices prohibited under all 
circumstances, building on the positive experiences with the UCPD in this 
respect.  
• B2C and B2B rules on misleading practices could be aligned. For this purpose, 
the MCAD’s general prohibition of misleading B2B advertising could be aligned 
with the UCPD’s general prohibitions of misleading B2C practices. This would be 
in line with the view that B2B relationships should be covered by their own set 
of rules (such as is now the case with the MCAD). For the sake of uniformity 
both regimes could use similar terminology and similar categories, but 
thresholds used within each category could differ for B2B transactions. In 
particular, the UCPD’s general prohibition of misleading actions could be 
introduced into the MCAD. In addition, a general prohibition of misleading B2B 
omissions could be included in the MCAD, though it is likely much more difficult 
to prove a misleading omission in the B2B regime than in the B2C regime. An 
alignment of B2C and B2B rules on misleading practices would reintroduce an 
integrated approach in this area, which could be expected to generate benefits 
from an enforcement point of view. This option would be a partial alignment 
only, if it were not to include the introduction of a general prohibition of unfair 
practices in B2B transactions. 
The results of this evaluation relating to the minimum character of the harmonisation 
and the limitation to advertising of the MCAD do not suggest that there is an urgent 
need for a fully-fledged extension of the UCPD to B2B relations or for a major revision 
of the MCAD. According to the majority of country reports stakeholders are not aware 
of many complaints, and the limitation of the scope of the MCAD to “advertising”, i.e. 
not extending to commercial practices, is not reported to cause major problems. 
However, certain gaps in protection for small businesses remain, and it is therefore 
recommended to at least align the MCAD’s general prohibition of misleading 
advertising with the UCPD’s general prohibitions of misleading practices, and to 
complement the recast MCAD with a short list of common and harmful misleading 
practices in B2B relations (e.g. fake invoices, misleading directory companies), in line 
with the identified needs. 
The results of the evaluation do not indicate an urgent need for a revision of the 
provisions on comparative advertising, which are subject to a developing case law of 
the CJEU. Relevant issues identified are that conditions for the legality of comparative 
advertising are felt to be too restrictive by certain stakeholders, and that the 
application of the Trade Mark Directive limits the possibilities of comparative 
advertising with goods bearing a trade mark and hence potentially jeopardises the 
attainment of the objective of consumer information of the provisions on comparative 
advertising. It could therefore be considered to clarify the relationship between the 
provisions on comparative advertising and the provisions of the Trade Mark Directive, 
and to describe the implications of the CJEU case law in a Commission Guidance 
document. 
As regards the lack of effective enforcement framework in B2B relations, especially in 
the context of cross-border transactions, various solutions are possible, ranging from 
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creating a network of public enforcement authorities in the field of business protection 
to encouraging/strengthening voluntary enforcement mechanisms at the national 
and/or EU level.  
8.2.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
 Clarify the scope of application of the UCTD  8.2.2.1.
This evaluation concluded that there is uncertainty as to the scope of application of the 
UCTD. The use of the terms “seller and supplier” (in the English version) and “goods 
and services” has led to some confusion and diverging national case law. One 
particular aspect of this problem was shown to be the issue as to whether the 
Directive covers C2B contracts, e.g. consumers selling gold to traders. 
It was already suggested in the Consumer Law Compendium that a more neutral and 
uniform wording would avoid these discussions as to the “seller and supplier” issue. 
Instead of the terms “seller/supplier”, a uniform term could be used for all consumer 
protection directives, to denote the contractual partner of the consumer, e.g. 
“business” or “professional” or “trader". So, following this approach, although the 
existing CJEU case law has largely clarified most of the interpretation issues regarding 
the UCTD identified in this study, textual amendment could avoid confusion and make 
it clear that the UCTD applies to all contracts between “traders” and “consumers”. The 
application of the UCTD to all contracts between consumers and traders would 
obviously imply its application to C2B contracts but this might also be stated 
expressly. 
It was also concluded that there remains a degree of uncertainty as to whether the 
UCTD covers contracts where the consumer has not paid a price: an issue of particular 
significance in online services, as there is often no monetary consideration, but ‘only’ 
personal data in return for a service. Although it now follows from Tarçau that such 
contracts are covered, the issue still causes disputes and uncertainty. It is therefore 
recommended that it be clarified through textual amendment that the UCTD does 
cover contracts where the consumer has not paid a price. 
Finally, because the UCTD refers to ‘contract’ terms it was also concluded above that 
there is uncertainty as to whether it covers terms in unilateral acts and any other 
terms/notices that do not have contractual status, but that affect the rights/ 
obligations of the consumer. It is therefore recommended that textual amendment or 
guidance could clarify that terms in unilateral acts and terms and notices affecting the 
rights/obligations of the consumer, are indeed subject to control by the Directive. 
In relation to individually negotiated terms, there have been no express calls in 
country reports to remove the exclusion of these terms from the test of unfairness 
under UCTD. Nevertheless, the reports do suggest that the exclusion of individually 
negotiated terms can cause problems of uncertainty and also compromises effective 
protection; and there have been no significant problems in countries where the 
exclusion does not apply. Based on this it is recommended that the exclusion of 
individually negotiated term be removed: one important reason being the 
uncertainties surrounding its application, and related to this, how this may be 
exploited by traders to persuade consumers that there have been negotiations, when 
none have in reality occurred.  
As with individually negotiated terms, there have been no express calls in country 
reports to remove the exclusion of price and main subject matter terms from the test 
of unfairness under UCTD. Nevertheless, it does appear from consideration of case law 
that there are various uncertainties in relation to the price and main subject matter 
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exclusions and specific stakeholders (mainly consumer organisations) have pleaded for 
the removal of the exclusion.912 While it is in principle possible to remove the 
exclusion altogether, this would likely be considered to be a significant encroachment 
on freedom of contract. It is therefore recommended that guidance should be provided 
on the scope of the exclusion of price and main subject matter: developing the 
transparency condition, and both clarifying and placing substantive limits on what can 
count as ‘price’ and ‘main subject matter’. The desirability of such approach was 
confirmed in the country research for this evaluation. Specifically the following is 
recommended: 
• The CJEU has already begun to develop what is required to satisfy the plain 
and intelligible language requirement, in fact taking it beyond plain and 
intelligible language to a fuller version of transparency. In Árpád Kásler913 and 
Van Hove,914 the Court said that the terms and their real consequences should 
be economically understandable to the consumer, i.e. that the consumer should 
be put in a position as to be able to “evaluate, on the basis of clear [precise], 
intelligible criteria, the economic consequences for him which derive from [the 
term].’’915 These criteria should be spelt out in textual amendment of the 
Directive or guidance – the fundamental principle being that the term should be 
sufficiently transparent and explained, to enable the consumer to understand 
its real practical economic consequences.  
• The redraft or guidance could improve the level of transparency further by 
specifying that price and main subject matter terms (and the fact that they are 
exempt from review) must be specially highlighted within the contract.916 This 
might involve the explanation of these terms being separated out from the 
other terms, possibly in a separate document or communication; in a manner 
that very clearly indicates to the consumer both that these are the core and 
most important terms of the contract, and that special consideration should be 
given to them as they cannot be challenged under the unfairness test. It could 
further be provided that this separate part of the contract (or separate 
document) must be separately assented to by consumers.  
• As for clarifying and placing substantive limits on what can count as the price 
and main subject matter, first it could be made clear that the ‘adequacy’ of the 
price refers to whether the price is too high, given what is received in return; 
this not covering other types of fairness assessment, e.g. as to time or mode of 
payment, the right to vary the price etc;917 and that the ‘price’ does not include 
charges imposed for consumer default.918 Further, it could be clarified whether, 
                                           
912 See e.g. position paper Which?. 
913 Case C-26/13 Árpád Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt [2014]. 
914 Case C-96/14 Jean-Claude Van Hove v CNP Assurances SA [2015]. 
915 Citations from both cases identical in this respect, except for the one adjective: ’clear’ (Árpád Kásler) or 
’precise’ (Van Hove). 
916 Compare with the additional requirement of ‘prominence’ in the UK Consumer Rights Act to benefit from 
the core term exemption; see for a similar proposal in the US to only allow enforcement of unexpected, 
unfavourable terms if they have been discloses in a warning box: I. Ayres, A.Schwartz, “The No-Reading 
Problem in Consumer Contract Law”,  Stanford Law Review, vol. 66:545.  
917 Willett, ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of EU Consumer Law’; this reading is certainly 
accepted in at least some Member States (e.g. UK-Law Commissions (2012) Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts: Advice to the Dept of Business, Innovation and Skills).  
918 Otherwise, there would be no point in para 1(e) on the indicative list, which treats as indicatively unfair a 
term ‘…requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation.’ 
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when goods or services are supplied in exchange for a charge, the CJEU 
intended to leave it open to national courts to include (as the price) any charge 
that is in exchange for goods or services, and (as the main subject matter) any 
trader obligation provided in exchange for a charge. In sum, it should be 
indicated whether any charge can be the price, so long as a service is provided 
in exchange for it, and any trader obligation can be the main subject matter, so 
long as it is provided in exchange for a charge; or whether charges and trader 
obligations can only be price and main subject matter terms if they can be 
considered to be main or essential provisions of the overall main contract. 
• It could also be clarified, following the Kasler guidance, that ‘main subject 
matter’ in particular, is to be construed narrowly, and that if there are no goods 
or services supplied in exchange, then the charge in question cannot be the 
price, and any obligation of the trader cannot be the main subject matter.  
The above recommendations focus on rather broad clarifications as to whether only 
essential elements of the contract can be the price and main subject matter, and 
generally how narrowly these exclusions should be construed. Another (slightly 
narrower) possibility, is to refuse to treat as main subject matter/price, any trader 
obligation/charge to the consumer, that does not arise as standard on entering the 
main contract, but rather is contingent on some later consumer action or omission-
usually something that is inadvertent, and not a real choice by the consumer (the 
charges for exceeding overdraft limits or airline baggage limits, forgetting to check in 
on time etc.).919 
 Extend the control of unfair terms to small businesses 8.2.2.2.
While respondents to the public online consultation were divided as to whether aspects 
of the consumer law framework should be extended to B2B relations, it appears from 
the evidence in the country reports that the application of the control of unfair 
contract terms also to SMEs, in particular micro-enterprises could be considered. The 
similarity and negligible difference between small businesses (especially micro-
enterprises) and consumers in terms of knowledge, experience and negotiating power 
was stressed in several country reports and studies. Moreover, it has been argued that 
an efficient legal system should allow all parties, including businesses, to accept 
certain parts of pre-formulated contracts presented to them without being required to 
check their content for fairness.920  
An extension to B2SME contracts would require a workable criterion to distinguish 
SMEs from other businesses. Such distinctions are however already in use both at 
national and at European level.921 An alternative, which would be easier to apply, 
would be the exclusion of transactions of a large value from control.922 In these cases 
                                           
919 With non-main/essential terms, and even more so with contingent charges, the argument for these not 
to be treated as main subject matter/price, is that, no matter how transparent these are, consumers may 
not be able to make market comparisons-there is a limit to how many terms consumers can consider, and it 
will be very hard to estimate the risk of the contingent events occurring. This means the terms will not be 
subjected to competitive discipline-sweeping away what is arguably the whole justification for them being 
exempt from the test: Willett, ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of EU Consumer Law’. 
920 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015, (195), 207. 
921 See e.g. the Netherlands: Art. 6:233 sub (a) Dutch Civil Code and Art. 6:235 (1) and (3) DCC and for 
the EU: Commission Recommendation 2003/361 of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises; OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36; and the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common 
European Sales Law. 
922 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015, (195), 213;  the English and Scottish Law Commission 
-  Unfair Terms in Contracts: Joint Report, February 2005 (http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc292.pdf), p 
5.24 and 5.54 - proposed a threshold of 500.000 GBP. 
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the contractual parties can be expected to seek legal advice and to carefully examine 
contract terms.923  
 Provide guidance on transparency 8.2.2.3.
It appears from the country research that there is a degree of uncertainty as to the 
transparency concept, which may undermine a high level of consumer protection, and 
also lead to differences in national approaches. To address these problems, guidance 
or textual amendment could set out CJEU case law on transparency, in particular from 
CJEU cases such as RWE and Kasler.924 A textual amendment of the text of the 
directive could clarify that transparency includes the need for an actual opportunity for 
the consumer to examine all the terms (now only included in Recital 20). A definition 
of ‘plain and intelligible language’ could furthermore make the transparency 
requirement more concrete and could help to combat complex and long contract 
terms, a problem increasingly occurring in the online world. Empirical research has 
shown that simpler and shorter terms contribute to readership, comprehension of the 
terms and to consumer trust.925 Such a definition can either be either numerical or 
formula based (length of sentences, paragraphs, words, font, etc.); elements based 
(structure, design, content, vocabulary) or outcome focused; or a combination of 
these approaches.926 
In addition, this evaluation has established the need to clarify the legal consequences 
of a lack of transparency. This is in line with the conclusions that were reached in 
earlier studies, such as in the Consumer Law Compendium.927 It should therefore be 
made clear in the UCTD that a lack of transparency can lead to the unfairness of a 
term. Guidance could therefore specify that transparency is always fundamental to 
good faith,928 meaning that a lack of transparency can therefore lead to the unfairness 
of a term and make the term non-binding.  
Lack of clarity as to the sanction for terms that are not transparent also affects the 
collective means of enforcement. Article 7 requires adequate and effective means 
(including collective means) to combat ‘unfair’ terms. As it is not clear whether terms 
that are not transparent are automatically unfair, it is also not clear whether 
enforcement bodies / consumer organisations should be able to start actions for 
injunction against terms that are merely not transparent. This is possible in some 
Member States.929 A clarification that enforcement bodies can act against terms that 
                                           
923 H. Schulte Nölke, “No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B 
Contracts”, European Review of Private Law 2-2015, (195), 213. 
924 This guidance could be possibly along the lines of the UK First National Bank case, and the UK Law 
Commission guidance, see above. 
925 M. Elshouts, M. Elsen, J. Leenheer, M. Loos, J. Luzak, Study on Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Terms 
Conditions (T&Cs) Final Report, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847546. 
926 A useful outcome based definition is the following: “A communication is in plain language if it meets the 
needs of its audience – by using language, structure and design so clearly and effectively that the audience 
has the best possible chance of readily finding what they need, understanding it, and using it”. A. Cheek, 
Defining plain language, Clarity, 2010, Journal of the international association promoting plain legal 
languagehttp://clarity-international.net/journals/64.pdf. 
927 Consumer law compendium, p. 421. 
928 In relation to those Member States that do not reproduce good faith in their implementing tests, see 
below.  
929 Thus e.g. in Italy, see e.g. Tribunale di Roma, 21 February 2000, in Foro italiano 2000, I, 2046 ff.; Court 
of Appeal of Rome, 24 September 2002, in Foro italiano, 2003, I, p. 332 ff. 
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are not transparent could improve the effectiveness of the Directive and its 
requirement of transparency. 
We have seen that there is also still some doubt as to whether transparency can 
legitimise a term that is very substantively unfair. So, in the interests of guaranteeing 
a high level of consumer protection and improving consistency in national approaches, 
there is a case for indicating that if a term is sufficiently substantively unfair, it can 
still violate the good faith requirement even if it is transparent.930 Some Member 
States have not included the good faith element in their implementing legislation.931 
This avoids any risk of transparency being taken to satisfy good faith, and therefore to 
legitimise substantive unfairness (see above). However, it would also mean that, even 
if the Directive were to be amended to clarify that transparency is a basic requirement 
to satisfy the good faith requirement, the sanction for a lack of transparency would 
remain unclear in the case of those countries with no good faith requirement. So, 
countries with no good faith requirement would either need to be required to introduce 
such a requirement, or they would need to be required to introduce a separate rule 
specifying that lack of transparency can make a term unfair. 
 Clarify the general test of unfairness 8.2.2.4.
The country research for this evaluation concluded that the general test of unfairness 
(the ‘open norm’) generates a degree of uncertainty and is interpreted differently in 
different Member States. The following could increase legal certainty and consistency 
in application of the Directive: 
• The Aziz932 ‘agreement’ test determines compliance with good faith by 
reference to whether a consumer would have agreed to the term in individual 
negotiations. It could be clarified that this is not satisfied simply on the basis 
that consumers have agreed to the term in the past, and certainly not where in 
such past cases there have been no individual negotiations. It could also be 
clarified that for the purposes of this agreement test, the benchmark is a 
consumer who would only agree to a term if it would be possible to make a 
rigorous, evidence based case to the effect that the term in question is 
proportionate to protect the interests of the trader or other relevant interests.  
• The Aziz approach, which defines potential unfairness in terms of deviation 
from national default rules, should be developed into guidance, giving further 
explanation and examples as to types of default rules and how terms might 
deviate from them to the detriment of the consumer. In addition to referring to 
deviation from default rules, there could be further guidance on forms of 
unfairness in substance that are likely to potentially cause significant imbalance 
contrary to good faith. So, guidance could provide that a term potentially 
causes a significant imbalance, contrary to good faith, where it allows for 
deviation from the ‘reasonable or legitimate expectations’ of the consumer.933 
• This would cover terms that do not deviate as such from a national default rule, 
but give discretion to the trader in the way the trader performs his/her own 
                                           
930 An alternative would be to remove the good faith requirement, but this is probably not desirable because 
of how deeply rooted it is in the way of thinking about fairness generally in some countries, e.g. Germany  
931 E.g. Belgium. 
932 Case-415/11 
933 Early drafts of the UCTD provided that one way in which a term could be considered unfair would be if it 
‘causes the performance of the contract to be significantly different from what the consumer could 
legitimately expect’: Re-examined proposal for a Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
COM (93) 11, at 6, alternative text of Art. 3. 
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obligations, or in the scope of the obligations that can be imposed on 
consumers. The link to reasonable or legitimate expectations is that the 
consumer has an impression (a reasonable or legitimate expectation) as to 
what will be received and how much it will cost, an impression generated by 
the basic agreement and the background marketing. However, the formal 
terms allow the trader the scope to vary things, i.e. to offer something 
substantially different from what was reasonably expected. Some such terms 
are contained in the UCTD Annex of indicatively unfair terms, e.g. paras (j), (k) 
and (l), dealing with discretionary rights to alter terms, product and service 
characteristics and price; and explicit reference to the reasonable/legitimate 
expectations concept would provide a solid theoretical basis for these Annex 
terms, for treating other discretion giving terms as potentially unfair, and for 
handling other types of (existing or emerging) terms that do not deviate from 
any particular default rule. It would also fit well within the CJEU’s ‘agreement’ 
test, with consumers being unlikely to wish to agree to terms that do not 
reflect what they would reasonably expect.934 Also, legitimate or reasonable 
expectations are already present in EU private law thinking: at a concrete level, 
forming the core of the ‘defectiveness’ concept, in the Product Liability 
Directive;935 and at a more abstract (broader organising principle) level as 
suggested in academic literature.936   
• Under Art. 4(1) the assessment of unfairness involves referring ‘at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of 
the contract’. So, no account can be taken of the fact that, although the term 
may have been a fair one to include at the time of conclusion of the contract, it 
has subsequently become unfair to rely on the term, due to changing 
circumstances. This is allowed in Nordic law, where the focus is on assessing 
the fairness of the consequences of applying a term: it not mattering whether 
the unfair consequences are related to the circumstances prevailing when the 
contract was made or to later changes in circumstances.937 This may be 
especially important given the very many modern contracts that involve long 
term relationships (e.g. financial services, tenancy etc) and where the scope 
for detrimental changes is very significant.938 A modern principle-based 
approach should be flexible enough to take such changes into account. So it is 
recommended that there be an extension of the test of unfairness, allowing 
consideration as to whether it has become unfair to rely on the term due to 
serious changes: either changes in the personal circumstances of the 
consumer, such as illness, unemployment etc., or in the socio-economic 
circumstances, e.g. significant changes in costs, or the advent of some other 
significant consumer detriment associated with the service (i.e. ‘social force 
majeure’).939 
                                           
934 In support of this connection, see T. Wilhelmsson (2016), ‘Unfair Terms’, in G. Howells and T. 
Wilhelmsson, EU Consumer Law, forthcoming.  
935 85/347/EEC, art 6 (1), and also in support of this link, T. Wilhelmsson (2016), ibid.  
936 Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Principles of Justice in Private Law within the European Union’ in Esa Paasivirta and 
Kirsti Rissanen (eds), Principles of Justice and the Law of the European Union (Helsinki University Institute 
of International Economic Law, 1995) 284, Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law 
(Ashgate 1997) 320, and Thomas Wilhelmsson (2016) ibid.  
937 See Nordic Contracts Act, s. 36. 
938 T. Wilhelmsson (2016), ‘Unfair Terms’, above. 
939 Willett (2007), Fairness in Consumer Contracts. 
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 Introduce a limited, non-exclusive black list of unfair terms  8.2.2.5.
According to the country research for this evaluation, the indicative list of terms which 
may be regarded as unfair (provided as Annex to the UCTD) has not had the same 
impact in all countries – potentially contributing to different levels of consumer 
protection across Member States. In some cases the problem is that (unlike a grey 
list) it leaves the burden of proof on the consumer; another problem is the open-
ended nature of many of the paragraphs in the Annex, producing the need for 
interpretation, which requires legal-technical knowledge that ordinary consumers do 
not possess.  
It is therefore recommended to provide at the EU level for a either a grey list, whereby 
the listed terms are presumed to be unfair, or preferably a black list of terms that are 
considered to be unfair under all circumstances, or for a combination of a black list 
and a grey list. Both lists obviously increasing the degree of certainty compared to the 
current situation where the terms are merely ‘indicative’ of unfairness. The country 
research provided numerous examples of terms that are blacklisted at the country 
level with a view to providing a high degree of certainty and effectiveness (see 
examples below from the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and the UK). It is 
recommended to have a limited list at EU level, to be complemented by national lists. 
Such a limited (black) list at EU level would both contribute to a high level of 
consumer protection across Member States, and increase predictability for traders. 
Some terms could be blacklisted on the basis of CJEU case law.  
As indicated, the country research provided examples of blacklisted terms at national 
level. Further factors in determining whether terms should be blacklisted is to consider 
whether:  
• The term is highly unbalanced (offering no benefit to consumers); 
• The interest of the trader in using the term is manifestly and significantly lower 
than the interests of the consumer in it not being used (drawing on the ’abus 
de droit’ principle); and 
• The description of the term is sufficiently determinate that the assessment as 
to whether a term reflects this description, is appreciably simpler than would be 
the application of the full test there. Therefore a clear practical advantage in 
blacklisting must exist.  
Based on these criteria, and drawing on the country reports of this evaluation, 
examples of terms which could be blacklisted at EU level are provided in the following 
box.  
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Examples of terms which could be blacklisted at EU level 
Paragraph 1(a) of the UCTD Annex is concerned with terms excluding or limiting liability for death 
or personal injury.940 Here, there is a case for general blacklisting, given the fundamental consumer 
interest in safety, the lack of any justification for escaping responsibility (traders can insure), and the 
determinate nature of the description (exclusions/restrictions cover death or injury, or they do not). 
 Paragraph 1 (b) describes terms having the object or effect of “inappropriately excluding or 
limiting the legal rights of the consumer … in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance.” This covers a much broader range of exclusion/limitation clauses than 
para 1 (a), and it would not be justifiable to impose a blanket ban on all the many terms that could 
fall under para 1 (b). The key is to decide on specific types of exclusion clause that are always wholly 
unbalanced, and not justifiable in terms of legitimate trader interests. The case for blacklisting might 
be strongest in the case of: (i) terms excluding/restricting very important rights and remedies (e.g. in 
relation to quality etc. in digital contents contracts, and reasonable care in services contracts – it 
arguably being unacceptable to derogate in any way from such important rights and remedies –
reflecting the approach of the Sales Directive, which allows no derogation from the key conformity 
standards and remedies in sales contacts);941 (ii) most terms wholly excluding all liabilities flowing 
from any given breach (it is usually not justifiable to wipe out all responsibilities that would 
otherwise exist – unless a case can be made that there is such justification, in the case of specific 
terms).942  
Paragraph 1 (c) and (d) describe respectively, terms "making an agreement binding on the 
consumer whereas provision of services by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose 
realisation depends on his own will alone", and "permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid 
by the consumer where the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without 
providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or 
supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract". These are blacklisted in some 
countries,943 as they are very one sided, with no consumer benefit. It is hard to see what legitimate 
interest a trader could have for using them, and there are no open textured elements (so the 
assessment as to whether a term reflects the description in the paras, is appreciably simpler than 
would be application of the full test-so there is a clear practical advantage in blacklisting).  
Paragraph 1 (f) (part2) describes a term "permitting the seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for 
services not yet supplied by him where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract". 
There seems a case for blacklisting, as there is no obvious consumer benefit, or trader legitimate 
interest, and no open textured elements (so the assessment as to whether a term reflects the 
description in the para, is appreciably simpler than would be application of the full test).  
Following the same general logic, paras 1 (m), (n), (o), (p) and (q) do not depend on open textured 
criteria, and it is hard to see a consumer benefit or a legitimate trader interest in ever using them, so 
blacklisting may be justifiable. 
 
                                           
940 Blacklisted e.g. in the UK (Consumer Rights Act 2015, s. 65 (1). 
941 Sales Directive, art 7 (1); and see UK, Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss. 47 & 57 banning certain exclusions 
in digital contract and services contracts. 
942 E.g. Netherlands. 
943 E.g. Slovakia 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  281 
There are also some examples of terms which are blacklisted in some Member States, 
but which are not recommended to be included in a possible black list at EU level. The 
reason for this is that specific terms need to be interpreted in the specific case, so 
blacklisting does not make assessment easier in practice. Relevant examples are 
provided in the following box. 
Examples of terms which are not recommended to be blacklisted at EU level 
Paragraph 1 (e) describes a term "requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in compensation". This is often blacklisted,944 but there is no real 
practical point in blacklisting here, as the ‘disproportionality’ of the sum needs to be assessed 
(probably the main task to be performed under the general unfairness test as well).  
Paragraph 1 (f) (part 1) describes a term "authorising the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract 
on a discretionary basis where the same facility is not granted to the consumer". This is often 
blacklisted,945 but it may not be wise to do so in the UCTD, as it may sometimes be justifiable to 
allow wholly discretionary cancellation, and perhaps a ‘mirror image’ consumer right may not always 
be useful.  
Following the same general logic, there is no practical case for blacklisting in the case of paragraphs 
1 (g) (open textured concepts ‘serious grounds’, ‘reasonable notice’), 1 (h) (‘unreasonably early’), 1 (i) 
(‘no real opportunity’), 1 (j) & (k) (‘valid reason’), 1 (l) (‘final price is too high’). 
 
 Provide guidance with commentary and examples  8.2.2.6.
A recurring theme in the country research was that it would improve the effectiveness 
of the UCTD indicative list, if there was additional guidance containing commentary 
and examples in relation to each paragraph (at least for specific sectors). This would 
allow consumers and traders alike to better assess the potential unfairness of 
contractual terms. Such guidance could build, of course, on the CJEU jurisprudence, as 
well as national best practices.946  
 Clarify the role of national courts 8.2.2.7.
National courts must take up an active role in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 
UCTD. This is clear from the case law of the CJEU. However, the country research for 
this evaluation has established that such an active role is not taken up by the courts in 
all Member States, and that uncertainty as to the exact role of national courts further 
impairs the effectiveness of the UCTD. Initiatives taken e.g. in the Netherlands and 
other countries lead to the following recommendations:  
• There is a need for codification at EU level of the task of the national courts. 
Such codification could either be incorporated in the UCTD or in a horizontal EU 
                                           
944 E.g. Poland, Slovakia 
945 E.g. Slovakia 
946  See e.g. for the UK, OFT, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Guidance’ (OFT311 (2008)) at [18] later adopted by 
the CMA https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unfair-contract-terms-guidance--2; see also country 
report Latvia. A useful resource providing generic descriptions of typical types of terms that might fall under 
each para is the work of the English and Scottish Law Commissions, Unfair Terms in Contacts (2005). See 
also the guidance on the application of the Belgian black list by the Belgian Commission on Unfair Contract 
Terms (Country report Belgium).  
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instrument.947 Codification in a directive would make national implementation 
rules necessary and would in certain countries require an amendment of 
national procedural law. Clear legislation on the role of the courts will raise 
awareness and could increase effectiveness, especially in view of deeply rooted 
rules in some jurisdictions that judges are bound by the arguments that are 
invoked by the parties. In absence of a codification, it is recommended to 
provide at least guidance on the exact role of the national courts and the 
principles that can be inferred from the CJEU’s case law, to avoid divergent or 
incorrect interpretations of CJEU case law.  
• Further education and training of judges is necessary.948 This has been 
confirmed and was stressed by stakeholders in several countries. Recent CJEU 
case law (Milena Tomášová)949 underlines the need for such training. The Court 
confirmed in this case that not invoking the unfairness of a term ex officio can 
constitute a sufficiently qualified breach of EU law, leading to Member State 
liability. This is in any event the case since 4 June 2009, the date of the 
Pannon decision.950  
 Clarify consequences for the contract term and for the contract as a whole 8.2.2.8.
The UCTD requires that the contract must remain binding upon the parties insofar the 
contract is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term (Art. 6 (1)). A 
number of issues in this respect have been clarified by the case law of the CJEU. For 
example, it is now clear that the assessment whether the contract is capable of 
continuing in existence without the unfair terms is an objective assessment: the 
situation of one of the parties to the contract, in this case the consumer, can therefore 
not be regarded as the decisive criterion determining the fate of the contract. The 
court cannot base its decision solely on a possible advantage for the consumer of the 
annulment of the contract as a whole.951 It is also clear that courts may not revise an 
unfair term to make it ‘fair’,952 and that this also means that courts may not reduce 
the unfair contract term to its legally permitted core. In relation to these issues that 
are now clear, it is recommended that extra certainty be provided by these points of 
principle being reiterated in textual amendment or guidance.  
In addition, a number of issues remain unclear. It is therefore recommended that 
guidance or textual amendment be provided in relation to the following:  
• Whether it is possible to only declare parts of clauses unfair and non-binding, 
when such parts can be eliminated without changing the content of the 
remaining part (the so-called blue pencil test). As indicated above, this is 
disputed in the literature and the need for a clarification by the CJEU has been 
expressed.953 
                                           
947 Country reports Cyprus, Romania (some stakeholders), see also Law Commission UK. 
948 C. Pavillon, “Het LOVCK-rapport ambtshalve toetsing II kritisch getoetst”, TvC 2015-3, 128. 
949 C‑168/15, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0168&from=EN 
950 C-243/08, EU:C:2009:350. 
951 CJEU 15 March 2012, C_453/10, Perenicova, para. 32-33. 
952 CJEU  14 June 2012, C‑618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino ; CJEU 30 May 
2013, C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse, para. 29. 
953 MüKoBGB/Basedow BGB § 306 Rn. 4-6c. 
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• Whether it is possible to apply the theory of ‘ergänzende Vertragsauslegung’ as 
applied by the German Supreme Court (BGH, Bundesgerichtshof). This method 
interprets the contract according to the hypothetical will of the parties, more 
specifically in cases where the nullity of an unfair clause would lead to 
unacceptable economic consequences. As seen above, the CJEU case law 
seems to exclude the application of this theory954 but the views on this issue 
differ.955  
• Precisely when it is possible to invoke default rules of national law once an 
unfair contract term as been declared void. As we saw above, the Court has 
accepted this possibility, but only in very specific circumstances. In Kásler, the 
CJEU held it should be possible for a national court to replace an unfair term 
with a supplementary provision, if the court would otherwise have to annul the 
contract in its entirety, thus potentially exposing the consumer to particularly 
unfavourable consequences.956 The difficulty is that, as we have seen above, 
different opinions have been expressed as to whether supplementary provisions 
could be invoked where the deletion of the terms does not lead to the 
annulment of the contract. Clarification and guidance on this issue therefore 
seems necessary.  
 Include summary T&Cs in consumer contracts 8.2.2.9.
Evidence showing that in electronic transactions and in other forms of contracting 
which rely on standard terms governing the transaction, consumers do not commonly 
read the contract terms before entering into the contract because they do not have 
the capacity, or the willingness, to read and understand the implications of standard 
contract terms, they do not value the opportunity to read the terms prior to contract 
nor do they typically value the more advantageous contract terms that they may 
hypothetically be able to find if they read standard contract terms in advance and 
shop around for more favourable ones.957 A recent consumer market study 
commissioned by the European Commission concluded that shortening and simplifying 
terms and conditions has positive effects, including improvements in the proportion of 
consumers who read the terms and conditions.958 The results of the behavioural 
experiments on consumers’ responses towards unfair contract terms conducted in the 
Consumer market study to support the Fitness Check also suggest that summarising 
the T&Cs is effective.959 In the experiment, standard (long) T&Cs were read less 
thoroughly by participants than summarised T&Cs, and participants read a higher 
proportion of the text of the summarised T&Cs. In addition, results showed that 
participants were better able to distinguish between fair and unfair T&Cs in their 
                                           
954 R. Steennot, 601; H. Micklitz, N. Reich, “ The Court and the Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)”, CMLRev 2014, 795-796. 
955 See MüKoBGB/Basedow BGB § 306 Rn. 4-6c. The BGH is of the opinion that this theory is in conformity 
with the UCTD - BGH NJW 2013, 991 Rn. 24 ff. 
956 CJEU 30 April 2014, C‑26/13, Árpád Kásler, para. 83. 
957 See, Rachlinski (2002); Rachlinski (2007); Ben-Shahar (2008). 
958 For example, in the online experiments conducted in the framework of the study, when terms and 
conditions were extremely short and simple 26.5% of consumers report to have read the full terms and 
conditions compared to only 10.5% when the T&Cs were long and complex (the study was conducted in 12 
Member States with 1000 respondents in each Member State). See European Commission 2016, Study on 
consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions (T&Cs), Final report. 
959 The experiment aimed to answer the following research question: Can consumers distinguish unfair from 
fair T&Cs and can they do so more easily if the T&Cs are presented in a clearer (summarised) manner? It 
tested consumers’ reactions to fair and unfair terms in two sectors: consumer credit and internet access 
provision, and their subsequent economic behaviour. 
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comprehension of the legal fairness of terms, in fairness perceptions and in intentions 
to buy from the seller, when presented with summarised T&Cs. In contrast, results 
showed that adding icons to the summary T&Cs seems to have no additional beneficial 
effects. 
It is therefore recommended that “key terms” be required to be presented separately 
and clearly, e.g. in a short summary on the first page of the T&Cs following a structure 
that is similar for all contracts of this product or service category. As shown by the 
quoted study results, this would likely lead to increasing proportions of consumers 
reading the terms and conditions and it would make them better able to identify unfair 
terms as well as compare terms offered by different traders in a given market. As 
detailed in the section on efficiency, this targeted transparency could thus be expected 
to improve consumer welfare as well as the efficiency of the consumer law framework.  
8.2.3. Injunctions 
 Improve coherence of the various injunction procedures 8.2.3.1.
Injunctions are an important tool for consumer protection but this evaluation has 
identified a need to strengthen and refine procedural aspects, while at the same time 
safeguarding that the system is as clear and transparent as possible. Thus, it is 
recommended to create a coherent system for domestic and cross-border injunctions 
at the proposed higher level of protection. More concretely, the specific provisions of 
other consumer law directives should be abolished or integrated into the Injunctions 
Directive. This would be in line with the approach in several Member States to have 
the same system for all types of injunctions. Where cross-border injunctions require 
specific rules, they could be regulated in a separate chapter within the Injunctions 
Directive. The special rules concerning legal standing of business organisations of the 
UCPD could be maintained. 
 Extend the scope of application of the Injunctions Directive 8.2.3.2.
Qualified entities have criticised the limited scope of application of the Injunctions 
Directive and suggested to adjust it to the scope of application of the CPC Regulation 
or to extend it to consumer law in general.960 In particular, it was recommended to 
include data protection law,961 the latest EU legislation in the area of financial 
services962 and consumer protection in regulated services such as telecommunications 
services and energy supply.963 Member States have also explicitly included 
passengers’ rights legislation in their national legislation on injunctions.964 In this 
context, it should be noted that the activities of airlines and other passengers 
transport sectors already come under the Injunctions Directive if they come in the 
form of standard terms or unfair commercial practices. The latter argument was also 
                                           
960 See the report on the open public consultation, at 6.6.2.; position paper BEUC, at p. 12; position paper 
vzbv, at p. 23. See also country report Slovenia. 
961 Country report France; position paper vzbv, at p. 23. 
962 Country reports Greece, Malta, Slovakia; position paper vzbv, at p. 23. 
963 Country report Malta; position paper vzbv, at p. 23. 
964 Croatia has included Regulation (EU) no. 181/2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach 
transport. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  285 
made in the context of data protection law when the German legislator included data 
protection law within the scope of the German Injunctions Act.965 
Indeed, there seems to be no reason for a limitation of the scope of application of the 
Injunctions Directive to specific pieces of legislation. Experience in Member States with 
a broader scope of application, such as Austria, Germany or Lithuania, demonstrates a 
practical need for such extension. The preferable solution would seem to be a coherent 
scope of application of both the Injunctions Directive and the CPC Regulation. Both 
instruments should cover consumer law in general and could include a non-exclusive 
list of pieces of legislation that fall into that category. 
 Remove obstacles that limit use and effectiveness of injunction procedures 8.2.3.3.
With regard to the substance of a possible reform of the Injunctions Directive, there 
seems to be four crucial topics that limit the use and the effectiveness of injunction 
procedures in general. In addition to that, in order to increase the effectiveness of 
cross-border injunctions, additional measures would need to be taken to overcome, or 
reduce, the specific obstacles to these procedures. The two areas are dealt with 
separately hereinafter. The four general obstacles are 1) litigation costs, 2) the 
limitation of the effect in the future rather than remedial effects, 3) the limitation of 
decisions and 4) lack of legal certainty. 
Abolition or modification of the loser-pays principle 
Clearly, the risk of having to bear the costs of a lost injunction claim has been the 
most crucial obstacle to many qualified entities, and in particular of underfunded 
consumer organisations. Hereby, relief from court fees is useful but insufficient, as in 
most Member States, court fees are low in comparison to the defendant lawyers’ fees 
that a losing qualified entity would also have to refund. Qualified entities have 
therefore ranked exemption from legal costs second of the measures where they 
regard further harmonisation as beneficial.966 
The loser-pays-principle does not reflect the public interest role that qualified entities 
(i.e. the designated public authorities and consumer organisations) play in defending 
the collective interest of consumers. Notably, the Court of Justice has qualified 
consumer law provisions as being part of the public order (ordre public) of the EU. 
Therefore, the most consequent measure would be to include a cost rule into the 
Injunctions Directive, according to which a) qualified entities do not have to pay court 
fees and b) qualified entities are not liable towards the defendant’s lawyers’ fees. 
Furthermore, it would be consequent if qualified entities did not have to pay for expert 
opinions etc that are necessary to decide on the merits of the claim.967  
Another option that would also provide for predictable costs would be a system of 
limiting the litigation risk, as is in place in Germany; a system that has clearly worked 
in the area of injunction procedures.968 
                                           
965 See the explanations of the German government in its bill, Printed Matters of the Parliament 
(Bundestags-Drucksache) 18/4631, 1 f. 
966 See survey of qualified entities, Part 4. 
967 An exception could of course be made for frivolous claims. However, this evaluation has not identified 
any evidence for frivolous claims brought by qualified entities. See also, for example the German experience 
where frivolous claims are excluded but that exclusion has never been applied to an action by a consumer 
organisation, see Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung – Micklitz, 4th ed. 2013, § 2 UKlaG margin 
note 53 f. Also note that consumer organisations have to be accepted as a qualified entity. Consumer 
organisations would risk their status if they bring frivolous claims. 
968 See above, Section 6.1.3. 
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Effects beyond the omission of future infringements 
The effectiveness of the injunction procedure in terms of reducing consumer detriment 
as well as in terms of its preventive, deterrent effect is limited if the only legal 
consequence is the prohibition to continue the infringement. If traders are not worried 
about their reputation, they can easily gain unlawful profits without fear of having to 
return them. Therefore, a recent trend in the Member States towards the introduction 
of further remedies that are meant to remove the consequences of the infringement 
could be taken up with a reform of the Injunctions Directive. This is supported by the 
survey of qualified entities conducted for this evaluation that have ranked the 
possibility to claim monetary compensation within the injunction procedure highest 
amongst possible measures that would be beneficial969 or, conversely, have mentioned 
the unavailability of additional remedies, in particular, of monetary compensation as 
very negative.970 
Two types of measures could be included, depending on whether the infringement 
already caused harm: 
• Firstly, if the infringement consisted in, for example, an unfair term on the 
basis of which the trader has collected, or withheld money, the adequate effect 
would be the obligation to refund the money to the consumers concerned 
(compensation). This remedy would seem to be typical for infringements of 
consumer contract law. 
• Secondly, where the risk has not materialised yet or where the victims of an 
infringement of consumer law cannot be identified, the adequate measure 
would seem to be an obligation to inform all consumers concerned about the 
unfairness of the term, or the misleading character of a statement, and also 
about the true contractual situation (excluding the unfair term). 
Both measures are not disproportionate because the trader drafting the term that is 
later being declared unfair is often aware of the borderline character of the term. The 
same applies to advertisement. Therefore, there is no reason to protect the trader if 
the risk materialises. This is also the position of the Court of Justice when it comes to 
balancing consumer protection and legal certainty on part of the trader, as evidenced, 
for example, in the case of Heininger.971  
Rather, the effect of having to refund the consumers concerned (and of having to 
identify the relevant consumers in the first place) may also serve as a deterrent 
against the use of potentially unfair terms. Protection of traders can be achieved by 
including a defence under which the trader has to demonstrate that he had no reason 
to suspect that he might commit an infringement. 
As an additional measure, one would have to ensure that someone is able to monitor 
the fulfilment of the compensation or restitution duty. In principle, this could be the 
qualified entity that has obtained the compensation or restitution order. Alternatively, 
one could think of a collective claims settler to be appointed by the court, as it is 
foreseen in the new Belgian collective redress system.972 
                                           
969 See Results of the survey of qualified entities, Part 4 of this report. 
970 See the Survey of qualified entities, Part 4 of this report. Business stakeholders, in contrast, generally 
regard the injunction procedure as sufficient and reject the idea of additional remedies, see Part 2 of this 
report. 
971 ECJ, case C-481/99, Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:684. 
972 For details, see S. Voet, Consumer Collective Redress in Belgium: Class Actions to the Rescue?, European 
Business Organization Law Review 2015, 121 ff.  
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The introduction of the restitution of unlawful profits, in particular, would trigger some 
additional need for regulation. In particular, one would need to clarify the beneficiary 
of the claim and its relationship with potential subsequent individual claims. 
As to the beneficiary of the claim, the German legislator has determined, in the 
context of the restitution action under § 10 of the German Unfair Commercial Practices 
Act, that the unlawful profits have to be paid to the public purse; which has been 
criticised for its missing link to consumer protection. In Greece, in the context of the 
consumer organisations’ action on “moral damages”, one part of the “moral damages” 
is also to be paid to the State budget, where it is, however, used for the purposes of 
consumer protection. In the UK, if under the new “Enhanced Consumer Measures”, 
compensation of the victims is not possible, the court can order “measures intended to 
be in the collective interests of consumers”; which would include payment of the 
unlawful profits into a fund dedicated to promote consumer protection. 
As to the relationship between the payment of unlawful profit into the state budget or 
some consumer protection fund and compensation of individual consumers for the 
same infringement, double payment would need to be avoided. Thus, where individual 
consumers have been compensated already, the profit is reduced by the relevant 
amounts anyway. For subsequent compensation of individual consumers, German law 
concerning the action under § 10 of the German Unfair Commercial Practices Act 
provides for a claim of the trader against the State for reimbursement of amounts that 
were paid out to consumers after the restitution of the unlawful profits. 
An opt-in or opt-out issue, which was and still is hotly debated with regard to 
collective redress mechanisms such as group actions, is not at stake, since individual 
consumers are not party to the injunction procedure, and they would not be party to 
the secondary compensation order either. The idea that consumers might be awarded 
compensation that they do not want appears to be illusionary. If they are awarded 
less than they would have expected in individual litigation, they would not be barred 
from suing for the difference in individual litigation; which is rather unlikely to happen. 
An extension of the remedies of the injunction procedure towards restitution of 
unlawful profits would also be in line with equivalent powers that have recently been 
given to consumer protection authorities.973 The most far-reaching powers have been 
given to the UK Financial Conduct Authority and some UK regulators. In Estonia, the 
Consumer Protection Board is entitled to order airlines to compensate passengers for 
cancelled or delayed flights, under the Air Passengers Rights Regulation (EC) 
261/2004. In Spain, it is possible to bring injunctions together with claims for absolute 
and relative nullity, termination, restitution of profits and damages. These secondary 
actions will be solved by judges responsible for the injunction claim. In Hungary, the 
law provides for the possibility of combining the injunction order with a restitution 
order, that is an order to restore the situation as it was prior to the infringement. In 
Slovenia, draft legislation, according to which qualified entities shall obtain the right to 
claim compensation for consumers is currently in the legislative process. In Germany, 
there has been a judgment from a first instance court, according to which the 
reimbursement of unlawfully obtained money was owed as removal of the 
consequences of the breach. 
Effects beyond the parties of the injunction procedure 
The injunction procedure is a procedure in the collective interest of consumers. It 
should therefore have effects for the collective interest, which means that the effects 
                                           
973 See, for example, C. Hodges, Mass Collective Redress: Consumer ADR and Regulatory Techniques, 
European Review of Private Law 20ga15, 829; P. Rott, Behördliche Rechtsdurchsetzung in Großbritannien, 
den Niederlanden und der USA, in: H. Schulte-Nölke (ed.), Neue Wege zur Durchsetzung des 
Verbraucherrechts, 2016, forthcoming. 
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of the decision should go beyond the parties of the injunction procedure. Again, this is 
a trend in Member States that have acquired experience with injunction procedures, 
such as Spain. It has two aspects both of which are recommended to be addressed: 
• Effects for individual consumers in relation to the trader. As the decision of the 
Court of Justice in Invitel indicates, the result of collective injunction 
procedures should be binding in a following individual law-suit, and in line with 
the established case law of the Court of Justice that considers the weakness of 
the consumer in his relations with the trader, the national courts should be 
obliged to consider the result of collective injunction procedures ex officio. 
Moreover, and this would be in line with the decision of the Court of Justice in 
the case of Cofidis974 (according to which an unfair term cannot become fair 
due to prescription), the EU legislator could make sure that individual claims 
cannot be lost by way of prescription while collective procedures are pending 
that are relevant for those claims. 
• Effects on other traders engaging in the same infringement. The reform of the 
Injunctions Directive could also take up the trend in Member States to extend 
the effects of a decision to other traders. This is particularly useful in the area 
of unfair contract terms that are often used identically by a whole industry (for 
example, because they have been recommended by a business association). In 
contrast, it would be highly ineffective and inefficient if a e.g. consumer 
organisation had to sue each trader that uses the same term individually. 
Therefore, the EU legislator could include a provision in the Injunctions 
Directive that determines, under which circumstance traders are bound by the 
decision in collective proceedings. Taking account of the decision of the Court 
of Justice in the case of Partner, such a rule would have to be accompanied by 
procedural rights of other traders to show that they have not engaged in the 
same infringement, so as to guarantee their right to be heard. 
Both effects mentioned above would need to be supported by a register where the 
decided law-suits as well as the pending law-suits are made publicly accessible. 
Legal certainty 
Legal uncertainty always has a chilling effect on consumers, and it also has a chilling 
effect on consumer organisations (in particular if they bear the litigation risk). During 
the country research for this evaluation stakeholders provided numerous comments 
that relate to uncertainty about the correct interpretation of national legislation and 
also to the discretion of courts or authority that reduce the predictability of the 
outcome of litigation. These problems could be resolved by introducing clear 
mandatory rules at the level of the Injunctions Directive. Such rules should relate to 
the publication of the decision and of corrective statements as well as the way in 
which sanctions are imposed in the case of the continuation of an infringement after a 
related decision of a court or administrative body, amongst others: 
• Publication of the decision has become much easier due to the internet. First of 
all, qualified entities could have the express right to publish a decision on their 
websites (as much as traders will have that right if they win the case). 
Secondly, the trader could also be obliged to publish the decision on the 
website and/or in the shop. The related reputational damage would act as a 
deterrent in the first place, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the sanction. 
Certainly, the obligation to publish the decision should not be in the discretion 
of the court, since such discretion creates legal uncertainty and acts as a 
deterrent, in particular, if a negative decision of the court triggers litigation 
costs. 
                                           
974 ECJ, case C-473/00, Cofidis SA v. Jean-Louis Fredout, ECLI:EU:C:2002:705. 
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• As mentioned above, corrective statements may already be one form of 
removal of the consequences of an infringement. This is, however, not always 
the case but only where statements were made to specific persons, for 
example, to all contracting partners. Qualified entities have ranked the 
publication of the decision and corrective statements highest as to the 
effectiveness of measures taken in the national implementation of the 
Injunctions Directive.975 Therefore, the publication of the decision and of 
corrective statements, where applicable, could both complement the injunction. 
• As all Member States foresee sanctions for the breach of the judgment, there is 
no additional burden involved in making this mandatory but this would increase 
legal certainty. Moreover, the Injunctions Directive could provide that sanctions 
should be provided for in the decision on the judgment so as to avoid a second 
procedure. It could be considered that sanctions are paid to the qualified 
entity; which would create an incentive to actually monitor the post-decision 
behaviour of the trader. 
• Prior consultation appears to be a useful tool when it comes to dealings with a 
trader who is principally willing to comply with the law. It is an instrument that 
avoids litigation (or administrative procedures). Thus, it could be recommended 
that, normally, the qualified entity has to consult the trader prior to initiating 
formal proceedings but that there may be exceptions where the previous 
behaviour of the trader suggests that this is unlikely to lead to results. If prior 
consultation was made mandatory, qualified entities should be entitled to 
compensation for the prior consultation, which in itself causes costs.976 
• The Injunctions Directive could also clarify the role of undertakings with which 
traders can avoid formal procedures. As a complement to the sanctions of the 
breach of a judgment, undertakings could have to include the promise of a 
penalty in case of continued infringement, and they could be published, as it is 
the case in some Member States, such as Latvia and the UK. 
• Summary procedures should be available in all Member States but complex 
cases should not necessarily be decided in summary procedures. Negative 
consequences that may arise from the not-so-short duration of the procedure 
should be remedied through an extended remedial system, in particular 
through removal of the consequences of the infringement. 
 Introduce modifications to “normal” civil procedural law 8.2.3.4.
Where injunction procedures are dealt with by civil courts, the procedural rules should 
reflect the public interest character of such proceedings. This could, in particular, 
relate to the burden of proof. For example, in Slovakia, the court may introduce 
evidence other than one proposed by the parties of the law-suit if the introduction is 
necessary for the decision.977 
Some Member States have provided for a certain specialisation of courts in injunction 
procedures, aiming at the uniform application of the law and greater legal certainty. 
For example, in Poland only the District Court in Warsaw – Court Protecting 
Competition and Consumers is competent to hear appeals against injunction orders 
from the Polish consumer protection authority. In Slovakia, the three regional courts 
are the first instance courts in collective proceedings about abstract control in 
                                           
975 See Results of the survey of qualified entities, Part 4 of this report. 
976 For example, under German law, consumer organisations can claim around EUR 250 for a justified 
reminder to comply with the law. 
977 Country report Slovakia. 
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consumer affairs, and the Supreme Court is the appeal court. Best practices in this 
respect could be identified and provided in guidance to Member States. 
 Improve the use of injunctions cross-border 8.2.3.5.
The original idea of the Injunctions Directive was that qualified entities should have 
legal standing in foreign courts. In the meantime, two alternative strategies have 
evolved: litigation against foreign traders in domestic courts, and co-operation with 
foreign qualified entities. All three strategies are valid, but all three strategies face 
obstacles that could be removed or reduced. 
It should be noted at the outset that forum shopping concerning the applicable law is 
impossible since, in accordance with the decision of the Court of Justice in VKI v. 
Amazon, all relevant courts have to apply Article 6(2) of the Rome II Regulation and 
therefore have to apply the law of the Member State where the collective interest of 
consumers is harmed, or may be harmed. 
At the same time, the Court has clarified that the law that is applicable to the alleged 
breach is to be determined separately. Thus, the Rome I Regulation applies where the 
breach of a contract is at stake, whereas the Rome II Regulation applies in the case of 
a non-contractual infringement. In that latter case, the country-of-origin principle may 
also play a role where the alleged non-contractual infringement is committed by an 
information service provider in the terms of the E-Commerce Directive. 
Litigation in foreign courts 
The only possible facilitation of litigation in foreign courts seems to be in a 
standardisation of the procedure, e.g. with standardised application forms, and 
possibly with designation of only one competent court or authority to deal with 
injunction claims that are brought by foreign qualified entities, similar to, for example, 
the system of the Order for Payment Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006. Otherwise, 
qualified entities may always be expected to resort to cross-border litigation in 
domestic courts. 
Cross-border litigation in domestic courts 
Cross-border litigation in domestic courts is the currently preferred strategy of 
consumer organisations since they are more familiar with their domestic procedural 
law. Problems can arise with the enforcement of the decision, and in particular, of 
sanctions imposed on the trader, in a foreign country. The reason is that the Brussels 
I Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 does not apply to decisions of consumer authorities 
under public law, and also not to sanctions that bear a public law or criminal law 
character. Therefore, separate rules on the cross-border enforcement of such 
sanctions could be included in the Injunctions Directive. 
Co-operation between qualified entities 
Measures addressed to qualified entities, which are consumer organisations, so that 
they coordinate their injunction actions regarding infringements having a cross-border 
dimension, rank highest amongst “other measures” in the opinion of qualified entities. 
Co-operation between qualified entities requires, first of all, the readiness of qualified 
entities to take action in favour of foreign consumers; which may not be easily 
justifiable where e.g. consumer organisations are financed through membership fees. 
Even if they are ready to take action, however, one problem may be their legal 
standing, as they do not represent their own members, or consumers of their own 
Member State. A solution would be to clarify in the Injunctions Directive that qualified 
entities do have legal standing for the defence of the collective interest of consumers 
from other Member States. 
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Changes to private international law? 
One problem is common to all three strategies: the problem of the applicable law. In 
the first strategy (litigation in the foreign court) the foreign court may have to apply 
the law of the Member State of the qualified entity if that is the Member State where 
the collective interest of consumers is harmed. This is likely to delay the injunction 
procedure significantly. Vice versa, if the trader uses a (valid) choice of law clause, the 
law of the trader’s Member State, or even the law of a third country, may apply; which 
the qualified entity of the Member State where the collective interest of consumers is 
harmed is not familiar with. This was the result the Court of Justice found in the case 
of VKI v. Amazon. The result is clearly a chilling effect on the qualified entity’s 
readiness to initiate an injunction procedure. 
The solution to that problem would of course seem to be full harmonisation of relevant 
provisions. For example, with the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 
the problem of different data protection laws that formed the background of the case 
of VKI v. Amazon should disappear. Under the current system of the Rome I 
Regulation, where ‘passive’ consumers are at least protected by the mandatory 
provisions of the law of the Member State in which they are domiciled, consumer 
organisations could at least litigate safely for the observance of those mandatory 
rules. Gaps arise where Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation does not apply, according to 
Article 6(4) Rome I Regulation. One such area is passenger transport, and indeed, 
some of the most challenging injunctions proceedings pursued by German consumer 
organisations were against airlines such as Air Baltic (Latvia)978 and easyjet (UK),979 
where the consumer organisation had to demonstrate a breach of Latvian or English 
law. Here, one could consider introducing a special conflict rule for injunction 
proceedings. 
 Continue non-legislative measures 8.2.3.6.
Co-operation and exchange of information between qualified entities have proven to 
be useful in addressing cross-border infringements. Non-legislative measures by the 
EU Commission, in particular the financing of education measures, have been helpful 
in this but have not reached all qualified entities yet. Thus, it is recommended to 
continue and expand the training measures to a larger number of qualified entities, 
especially in case the Injunctions Directive would be recast and the application of the 
rules for cross-border injunctions be streamlined, so that effective cross-border 
enforcement of infringements to EU consumer law becomes more feasible. 
8.2.4. Concepts of "average consumers" and "vulnerable consumer" 
 Clarify the "average consumer" concept 8.2.4.1.
There is a fairly general acceptance that the "average consumer" benchmark, as 
interpreted by the CJEU in some cases relating to misleading practices and food 
labelling does not reflect the behaviour of a real life consumer. It is regarded as a 
normative abstraction that does not correspond to actual consumer behaviour as 
understood by behavioural science. This was moreover demonstrated in behavioural 
experiments, e.g. with regard to the Mars case of the CJEU.980 It has also been argued 
that such interpretation is problematic in terms of achieving the objectives of the 
                                           
978 BGH, 9/7/2009, NJW 2009, 3371. 
979 LG Berlin, 19/5/2015, VuR 2016, 311. 
980 For more information on CJEU case law and the results of behavioural research, see the Workshop 
Document, prepared for the workshop with behavioural experts, Part 4 of this report. 
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relevant directives and that a realistic interpretation of the consumer benchmark is all 
the more important as a number of consumer directives now provide for full 
harmonisation, leaving limited scope for further reaching protection at Member State 
level. 
Yet, the current definition of the "average consumer", as a consumer that is 
"reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, taking into 
account social, cultural and linguistic factors" (Recital 18 UCPD) as such does not 
preclude the use of evidence from behavioural sciences. As a matter of fact, insights 
from behavioural sciences could more specifically be used to determine what is 
‘reasonably’ circumspect and ‘reasonably’ observant. Some of the latest case law of 
the CJEU (Teekanne, Canal Digital Denmark) seems to move in that direction and – 
without however referring to insights from behavioural research – seems e.g. to 
accept that the effect of more prominent anchors (packaging, prominent price 
indication) will not always be undone by additional information (list of ingredients, less 
prominent price indication). 
It is therefore not strictly necessary to define the average consumer differently981 to 
take a more realistic view of the capacities of the average consumer and to concede 
that "reasonably observant and circumspect" does e.g. not imply reading a list of 
ingredients (cf. Darbo) nor that a consumer always realises that there no link between 
the size of publicity markings relating to an increase and the size of that increase (cf 
Mars).  
Some amendments (in the recitals) seem nevertheless necessary in order to assure a 
more realistic interpretation of the capacities of the average consumer. It is therefore 
recommended that the reference to the average consumer in Recital 18 of the UCPD is 
amended to clarify that in the interpretation of the benchmark of the average 
consumer, insights from behavioural studies and available empirical data on the actual 
behaviour of an average consumer can be taken into account. It could also be 
emphasised that as insights from behavioural studies are quickly and constantly 
developing, the benchmark of the average consumer has to be a dynamic benchmark, 
reflecting new insights from behavioural sciences.  
In order to make clear that insights from (available) empirical data and behavioural 
studies can be taken into account, the sentence in Recital 18 UCPD that "The average 
consumer test is not a statistical test" should be deleted. Although it can be made 
clear that there is no obligation to commission an expert's report or a consumer 
research poll, there should be no prohibition either if the "average" consumer is meant 
to reflect a real life consumer. Empirical insights (which are often derived from 
research results that are evaluated with the help of statistical methods) may thus feed 
into what ultimately remains a normative decision making process by courts and 
enforcement authorities. 
It is also recommended that when reviewing and updating the UCPD black list (see 
Section 6.1.1 above) also practices are included that are known – on the basis of 
behavioural research – to cause material distortion of economic behaviour, in order to 
better protect consumers against such practices and to make it easier for traders to 
understand and apply the UCPD and thus increase predictability. Such amendments of 
the black list of the UCPD can also be used to prohibit specific practices that were 
shown by research to cause material distortion of economic behaviour of specific, 
                                           
981 See e.g. in Canada, where a different definition was used in recent Supreme Court case law, describing 
the average consumer as a consumer “who is credulous and inexperienced and takes no more than ordinary 
care to observe that which is staring him or her in the face upon first entering into contact with an entire 
advertisement” (Richard v. Time Inc. 2012 SCC 8 in ECCG 2013) 
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vulnerable groups of consumers (such as embedded advertising in games, that was 
shown to affect children’s behaviour).982  
As indicated before, the legislative process to amend the black list may however not 
be sufficiently flexible and swift to quickly respond to new unfair marketing practices 
and new evidence, and it is therefore recommended to use for this purpose 
delegated/implementing acts of the Commission, taking into account evidence of 
consumer behaviour, as has e.g. been done in Article 9(3) Food Information 
Regulation (see also Section 8.2.1 above).983  
As for the UCTD there is currently no reference in the directive to the "average" 
consumer and no clear need to define the "average consumer" has become apparent. 
In the context of the UCTD, this concept has mainly played a role in the framework of 
the transparency requirement. In Kasler, the benchmark of the "average" consumer 
was also introduced in the interpretation of the UCTD and more specifically of the 
transparency criterion: in order to be transparent, terms should not merely be 
grammatically intelligible, but they should enable the (average) consumer to foresee, 
on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, which economic consequences derive for him 
[or her] from the term.984 This reference to the "average" consumer that is considered 
to be a stricter benchmark than referred to in other UCTD case law has been criticised 
in the academic literature as difficult to reconcile with the general idea of the UCTD, 
that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the trader, both in terms of 
bargaining position and level of knowledge.985 This is also reflected in cases like 
Océano, Pannon on the duty of national courts to invoke unfairness ex officio, where 
no "reasonable circumspect" consumer seems to be required.986 It was also recognised 
by the CJEU that the level of attention of the average consumer may vary according to 
the category of goods or services in question. The case of Van Hove, that concerned a 
loan with a linked insurance contract, illustrates this. The Court there found that the 
average consumer cannot be required […] to have the same vigilance concerning the 
insurance element of the transaction as he would if he had entered into it 
separately.987  
Whether there is an actual conflict with the consumer benchmark in the various UCTD 
cases in any event depends on what is expected from a "reasonably circumspect" 
consumer. If insights from behavioural sciences are taken into account, also in the 
interpretation of the transparency requirement in the UCTD, the "average" consumer 
benchmark should not conflict with the general idea of the directive.  
If the UCPD and the UCTD are kept in separate legislative instruments (see, however, 
recommendation in the next sub-section), a reference in the recitals of both 
instruments to the possibility to take into account insights from behavioural sciences 
when assessing the capacities of the average consumer is recommended. 
                                           
982 Cf. European Commission’s study on online marketing to children (Guidance on the 
implementation/application of Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices. 
983 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011. 
984 CJEU 30 April 2014, C-26/16, Kásler, para. 73-74. 
985 M. Loos,”Transparency of Standard Terms under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the Proposal for 
a Common European Sales Law”, ERLPL 2-2015, 188. 
986 V. Mak, “Standards of Protection: In Search of the 'Average Consumer' of EU Law in the Proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive,” (TISCO), Working Paper Series No.04/2010, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1626115, p. 7. 
987 CJEU C-96/14, Jean-Claude Van Hove, para. 48. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report  
Civic Consulting  294 
 Streamline the "vulnerable consumer" concept 8.2.4.2.
As for the "vulnerable consumer" and the reference to this category of consumers in 
Article 5(3) UCPD, the evidence in the country reports illustrates that the specific 
article is seldom used. Courts and enforcement authorities rather apply the 
‘modulated’ average consumer benchmark, i.e. the average consumer of the target 
group. Moreover, the exact delineation between Art. 5(2) and 5(3) UCPD is not clear. 
It is therefore recommended to delete Art. 5(3) UCPD and include it in article 5(2) 
UCPD in order to ensure adequate protection of vulnerable consumers. Certain 
practices may reach a larger group of consumers, but are actually directed to a 
specific group of consumers, that may be vulnerable consumers. Such practices should 
be assessed from the perspective of the average member of that group of consumers. 
As it may be difficult to prove that a practice is ‘directed’ to a specific group, it should 
be added as an alternative criterion that a practice is likely to affect a specific group of 
consumers. An alternative Art. 5(2), with an amended last sentence could therefore 
read:  
Article 5(2) UCPD (amended) 
A commercial practice shall be unfair if:  
(a) it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and 
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with 
regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is 
addressed, ‘or of the average member of the group when a commercial practice is 
directed to a particular group of consumers or is likely to materially distort the 
economic behaviour only of a particular group of consumers, who may be particularly 
vulnerable’.  
 
The current ‘foreseeability criterion’ in Art. 5(3) is no longer included in the amended 
Article as it merely complicates the provision and seems included in the criterion that 
the practice should be ‘likely’ to materially distort the behaviour only of a particular 
group of consumers.  
The current description of factors that can make consumers vulnerable and therefore 
more susceptible to certain marketing practices,988 must furthermore be adapted as 
the discrepancy between the (seemingly) exhaustive enumeration in Article 5(3) UCPD 
and the non-exhaustive list in Recital 19 UCPD is confusing. It should be made clear in 
an amended recital that vulnerability can not only be caused by internal or 
endogenous factors (such as, but not limited to age, mental or physical infirmity, 
credulity) but also by external factors (such as but not limited to unemployment, 
overindebtedness, market environment) and that vulnerability may be temporary. It is 
not considered feasible or desirable to use a static definition of vulnerability or to work 
with a limited number of relevant factors, as this does not sufficiently take into 
account that vulnerability may be situational and insights on factors that determine 
consumer vulnerability are still developing. 
As for the UCTD, there is currently no reference to the ‘vulnerable’ consumer. From 
the country reports, no clear need to define the concept in the framework of this 
directive has become apparent. The principle based approach of the directive and the 
open norm, that allows to take into account ‘all the circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract’ in assessing the unfairness of a term, was mentioned to 
                                           
988 See European Commission, Study on consumer vulnerability in key markets across the European Union. 
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also allow protection of vulnerable consumers. The open norm allows to particularly 
protect those whose circumstances make them vulnerable to exploitation of pressure 
at the time they sign or otherwise agree to a contract.989  
As is the case with the UCPD, the UCTD furthermore allows courts to have regard to a 
‘modulated’ average consumer benchmark, taking the average consumer of the target 
group as a standard, thereby also taking into account specific characteristics or 
circumstances that may make targeted consumers vulnerable.990 Van Hove in any 
event confirms that the level of attention required from consumers may differ 
depending on the type of contract or good or services involved.991  
As mentioned, in the context of the UCTD, a reference to a consumer benchmark has 
mainly played a role in the framework of the transparency requirement. This 
transparency assessment is particularly important for core contract terms, as they are 
only excluded from control on condition that they are transparent. It is the ‘average’ 
consumer that was referred to by the CJEU as a standard to assess the transparency 
of contract terms. As mentioned, such reference does however not exclude the use of 
the ‘modulated’ average consumer benchmark, that allows taking into account the 
capacities of vulnerable consumers where such consumers are targeted and ensures 
that core terms are only excluded from control when the economic consequences were 
clear for the average member of the group.  
Though even the ‘modulated’ average consumer standard will not ensure that all 
(vulnerable) consumers will always fully understand all contract terms, no clear call for 
a stricter general standard in the UCTD in order to better protect vulnerable 
consumers was made. The general protection provided by the UCTD does however not 
exclude stricter protection in specific sectors where this may be justified for various 
reasons, including the complexity of the goods or services at stake or the interests 
involved.992 
8.2.5.  Codification 
 Gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies in the current legal framework 8.2.5.1.
Although this evaluation did not include a detailed review of the Sales and Guarantees 
Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive, the analysis of the other directives 
nevertheless allows to draw some conclusions on the possible need for and added 
value of a single horizontal EU instrument. There are gaps in the current EU legal 
framework for consumer protection, there are overlaps and there are inconsistencies. 
They have been described in detail before, and include:  
                                           
989 See CMA, “Unfair contract terms guidance. Guidance on the unfair terms provisions in the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015”, 2.35, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main
_Guidance.pdf. 
990 See eg OFT v Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services Ltd and others, para. 155. The case 
concerned unfair terms in gym contracts. The average consumer was interpreted as ‘a member of the public 
interested in using a gym which is not a high end facility and who may be attracted by the relatively low 
monthly subscriptions’. 
991 CJEU 23 April 2015, C-96/14, Van Hove. 
992 See e.g. the stricter standards for package leaflets for medicine, Directive 2011/83/EC on medicine for 
human consumption and the Guideline On The Readability Of The Labelling And Package Leaflet Of Medicinal 
Products For Human Use, ENTR/F/2/SF/jr (2009)D/869, 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/files/eudralex/vol-
2/c/2009_01_12_readability_guideline_final_en.pdf.  
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• There is an abundance of marketing/pre-contractual information requirements 
that is currently included in four different directives (UCPD, CRD, PID, MCAD). 
This was identified to create problems of implementation and application 
(overlap and conflicts).  
• The recent Citroën Commerce judgment of the ECJ has shown that the 
borderline between the UCPD and the PID is unclear and that the scope of 
application of the PID is unclear as well. As a possible solution, the 
incorporation of the PID in the UCPD or CRD has been suggested. 
• There is an abundance of rules and requirements not only in the UCPD, CRD, 
PID and MCAD, but also in the Services Directive and E-Commerce Directive as 
well as in sector-specific rules concerning unfair commercial practices and 
information obligations regarding advertising. As indicated above, this 
contributes to the problem of “information overload” and there seems to be a 
lack of a clear logic about which type of information is required at which stage 
of the marketing and contracting process. 
• Despite this extensive information requirements, gaps in the provision of 
information were also identified, as the rules on the prior communication of 
contract terms and in the incorporation of contract terms were considered to be 
insufficiently clear and effective. 
• Inconsistencies were furthermore identified in the application and interpretation 
of key concepts, such as the "average consumer" and the "vulnerable 
consumer" (see previous section).  
• Furthermore, problems with a lack of effective enforcement were identified that 
are not limited to specific directives.  
This evaluation therefore concludes that there is a need to address the identified gaps, 
overlaps and inconsistencies in the current legal framework.  
 Options for codification 8.2.5.2.
A codification of several directives in a comprehensive single legal instrument is one 
possibility to solve the mentioned problems. The results of the open public 
consultation show that at least half of all respondent categories (with the exception of 
business associations) strongly agree or tend to agree that EU consumer and 
marketing rules should be simplified by bringing them into a single horizontal EU 
instrument. For example, 63% of businesses, 55% of consumer associations, and 53% 
of public authorities strongly agree or tend to agree that EU consumer and marketing 
rules should be simplified by bringing them into a single horizontal EU instrument.993 
Codification can take different forms, ranging from a codification à droit constant – 
regrouping but not substantially amending the existing directives – to a codification 
involving a substantive review of the existing instruments. Possible options and their 
advantages and disadvantages include: 
• Maintaining existing directives. A first option would be to maintain the existing 
directives, to keep them separate and merely to delete overlapping provisions 
and to align definitions. This does imply that the directives continue to lead 
their separate lives; it also implies addressing similar changes in different 
legislative procedures. The simplifying effect of a horizontal instrument then 
remains absent. Assuring lasting consistency, also in the interpretation of 
different instruments and in the national implementation of aligned definitions 
and rules, is more difficult and complex than in a horizontal approach. 
                                           
993 While 32% of business associations agree, a plurality of 42% disagrees. See Part 2 of this report. 
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• ‘Minimal’ horizontal instrument. A minimal codification exercise could be limited 
to extracting a number of common elements, mainly definitions from the 
separate directives in a common instrument. Although such an approach would 
provide guarantees for a common interpretation of fundamental notions as e.g. 
consumer and trader, the simplifying effect would remain limited. Cross-
references to definitions used in the common instrument would remain 
necessary. Overlapping substantial rules (e.g. information requirements) would 
still need to be addressed in the separated legal instrument and thus through 
separate legal procedures. 
• Comprehensive horizontal B2C instrument. A comprehensive horizontal B2C 
instrument has the potential to not only address inconsistencies and overlaps in 
the current consumer protection directives, but also to deal with identified gaps 
in consumer protection. A first attempt for such a codification exercise already 
exists in the form of the CRD. The scope of that directive has however 
remained limited and it is not well aligned with inter alia the information 
requirements from other directives, including the UCPD. Codifying different 
directives into a single instrument that deals with various stages of consumer 
transactions (both the marketing, pre-contractual, contractual and post-
contractual stage) necessarily involves an exercise of simplification and 
harmonisation as not only different definitions but also substantive rules need 
to be aligned.  
Dealing both with marketing rules and contract rules in one instrument would 
allow for a clearer distinction to be made between the information that needs 
to be provided in marketing and information that needs to be provided prior to 
the conclusion of a contract, thus avoiding an information overload. This would 
also clarify the link between marketing (commercial practices) rules and 
contract rules at a European level and allow for determination as to whether 
unfair commercial practices have an effect on the validity on contracts 
concluded as a consequence of such practices (see discussion of related options 
above).  
A comprehensive horizontal instrument also allows for gaps in the current EU 
legal framework for consumer protection to be dealt with. EU consumer law 
currently does not cover all steps in a transactional process. Incorporation of 
standard terms is e.g. currently not clearly covered by the (transparency) rules 
of the UCTD. Also, as mentioned, the effect of unfair commercial practices on 
the validity of a contract is not clear. Neither, when assessing the fairness of 
contract terms, is there provision to take into account the effect of 
circumstances occurring after the conclusion of the contract. Gaps can of 
course also be dealt with in separate instruments, but incorporation in one 
horizontal instrument has at the very least as an advantage that it forces the 
legislator to pay attention to and address the interaction of the different 
instruments.  
Furthermore, any interpretation by the CJEU of common definitions in such a 
horizontal instrument will automatically have a further-reaching harmonising 
effect as there will be no doubt that it applies to all provisions in the horizontal 
instrument.  
Such a horizontal instrument would also make it easier to enhance the 
effectiveness of enforcement. A general section on sanctions could ensure that 
both private and public law sanctions are available for infringement of the 
rights guaranteed in the directive. Such a horizontal instrument would also 
allow to clearly define the tasks of the national courts in the application of EU 
consumer law. These principles are now necessarily developed by the court in 
the framework of one specific directive. That leaves it unclear whether these 
principles can be transposed to other (consumer protection) directives. That 
uncertainty can only be solved through new preliminary references, but that 
leads to a haphazard development of the law. Finally, a codification can further 
make legal provisions more easily accessible to traders and consumers and 
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may increase awareness. Of course, the latter benefit will mainly occur if the 
rules are then also implemented into one instrument at the national level. It 
must indeed be kept in mind that a codification (and simplification) in a broad 
horizontal EU instrument does not prevent national implementation in separate 
and scattered legislation; simpler EU legislation does not fully guarantee easily 
accessible national legislation. However, simple EU legislation is in any event a 
prerequisite for simple and accessible national legislation.  
• Comprehensive horizontal B2C and B2B instrument. A fourth option would be 
to also include specific aspects of B2B protection into a horizontal instrument, 
both against unfair contract terms and against unfair commercial practices. As 
for unfair contract terms, there is especially a case for control of such terms in 
contracts with SMEs. The system of the UCTD, based on the concept of good 
faith and significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of the 
parties, is generally considered appropriate for an extension to B2B contracts. 
This open norm leaves sufficient leeway to take into account the specificities of 
a business context. Such a system already exists in a number of Member 
States where it is considered to provide an appropriate protection also for 
businesses. In the countries that do not have such systems in place, it appears 
from the country research that a possible extension would often be seen as 
beneficial by stakeholders, especially for SMEs. As for unfair commercial 
practices, this mostly makes sense in case of a maximum convergence of UCPD 
and MCAD, including an extension of the general prohibition of unfair practices 
to B2B relations. However, as mentioned above, on the basis of the country 
research, no urgent need for a fully-fledged extension could be established and 
a limited alignment of the B2C and B2B rules (outside a horizontal B2C 
instrument) was recommended: alignment of the MCAD’s general prohibition of 
misleading advertising with the UCPD’s general prohibitions of misleading 
practices, and the addition of a short list of common and harmful misleading 
practices in B2B relations (e.g. fake invoices, misleading directory companies).  
The benefits in terms of substantive consumer protection of a codification exercise will 
of course depend on the scope, content and level of harmonisation of such an 
instrument.  
 Scope and level of harmonisation 8.2.5.3.
The consumer protection directives within the scope of the Fitness Check are capable 
of inclusion in such a horizontal instrument. The incorporation of (parts of) other 
directives could be envisaged (e.g. the E-Commerce Directive or the future provisions 
on digital content). However, such a horizontal instrument will necessarily need to be 
complemented by a vertical approach as it cannot replace sector specific instruments. 
However, it is recommended to keep a revised Injunctions Directive as a separate 
instrument. The scope of the latter directive is indeed much broader and should be 
adjusted to the scope of application of the CPC Regulation or extended to consumer 
law in general, thus including sector specific legislation in the areas of data protection 
law and financial services as well as consumer protection in regulated services such as 
telecommunications services and energy supply. It is not considered feasible or 
desirable to include such sector specific instruments in the mentioned horizontal 
instrument.  
An important choice to be made when adopting a comprehensive horizontal 
instrument will be the degree of harmonisation. Such a horizontal instrument does not 
necessarily imply that all provisions must use the same method of harmonisation. As 
in other instruments, a main form of harmonisation can be chosen, with exceptions for 
specific provisions. Both targeted full harmonisation or targeted minimum 
harmonisation could be envisaged.  
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It appears from the country research for this evaluation, and from earlier consultations 
and studies, that stakeholders continue to disagree on the desired level of 
harmonisation. Especially for the provisions on unfair contract terms, the link with 
national contract law underlines the need to maintain minimum harmonisation in this 
area. 
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Country Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
EU level European eCommerce and Omni-
Channel Trade Association (EMOTA) 
Business association 03 May 2016 
EU level BusinessEurope Business association 09 May 2016 
EU level Eurelectric Business association 10 May 2016 
EU level EuroCommerce Business association 10 May 2016 
EU level European Association of Craft, Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(UEAPME) 
Business association 11 May 2016 
EU level E-Commerce Europe Business association 24 May 2016 
EU level European Direct Selling Association 
(Seldia) 
Business association 25 May 2016 
EU level Independent Retail Europe Business association 04 July 2016 
EU level Advertising Information Group Business association 02 August 2016 
EU level European Advertising Standards 
Alliance 
Business association 03 August 2016 
EU level Federation of European Direct and 
Interactive Marketing (FEDMA) 
Business association 3 June 2016 and 6 
September 2016 
EU level BEUC Consumer organisation 04 May 2016 
AT Federal Ministry of Science, Research 
and Economy 
Ministry 22 July 2016 
AT Federal Ministry of Justice Ministry 25 July 2016 
AT Federal Ministry of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Consumer Protection 
Ministry 26 July 2016 
AT Federal Labour Chamber National authority 26 July 2016 
AT Austrian Regulatory Authority for 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications 
National authority 22 July 2016 
AT Financial Market Authority National authority 25 July 2016 
BE SPF Economie, P.M.E., Classes 
moyennes et Energie 
National authority 4 August 2016 
BE Court National authority 11 August 2016 
BE Court National authority 17 August 2016 
BE Court National authority 9 November 2016 
BG Ministry of Economy Ministry 10 June 2016 
BG The Commission for Consumer 
Protection 
National authority 20 June 2016 and 21 
June 2016 
BG State Energy and Water Regulatory 
Commission 
National authority 16 June 2016 
BG The Ministry of Transport, Information 
Technology and Communication, The 
Directorate General "Civil Aviation 
Administration"  
National authority 21 June 2016 
BG Executive Agency "Car Administration" National authority 29 June 2016 
CY Central Bank of Cyprus National authority 29 July 2016 
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CY Department of Civil Aviation of the 
Ministry of Transport, 
Communications and Works 
Ministry 27 July 2016 
CY Department of Road Transport of the 
Ministry of Transport, 
Communications and Works 
Ministry 26 August 2016 
CY The Energy Service of the Ministry of 
Energy, Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism 
Ministry 26 August 2016 
CY Competition and Consumer Protection 
Service of the Ministry of Energy, 
Commerce, Industry and Tourism 
Ministry/Regulator 23 June 2016 
CY Department of Merchant Shipping National authority 12 June 2016 
CY Office of the Commissioner of 
Electronic Communications and Postal 
Regulation 
National authority 22 June 2016 
CY The Financial Ombudsman of the 
Republic of Cyprus 
National authority 18 July 2016 
CZ Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry 08 June 2016 
CZ Ministry of Finance Ministry 10 June 2016 
CZ Czech Trade Inspection Authority National authority 03 June 2016 
CZ Financial Arbitrator National authority 14 June 2016 
CZ Czech Telecommunication Authority  National authority 07 June 2016 
CZ Czech National Bank National authority 15 June 2016 
DE Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy (BMWi) 
Ministry 06 July 2016 
DE Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection(BMJV) 
Ministry 14 July 2016 
DE Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection (BMJV) 
Ministry 28 July 2016 
DE Federal Network Agency for 
Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, 
Post and Railway (Bundesnetzagentur) 
National authority 10 August 2016 
DE Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin) 
National authority 10 August 2016 
DK Danish Competition and Consumer 
Authority  
Ministry 23 June 2016 
DK Ministry of Justice Ministry 01 July 2016 
DK Danish Consumer Ombudsman  National authority 17 June 2016 
DK Danish Energy Agency  National authority 16 June 2016 
EE Ministry of Justice Ministry 16 June 2016 
EE Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications 
Ministry 20 June 2016 
EE Consumer Protection Board National authority 16 June 2016 
EE Financial Supervision Authority National authority 29 June 2016 
EL General Secretariat for Consumer 
Protection 
Ministry 28 July 2016 and 29 
July 2016 
EL RAE National authority 26 July 2016 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
Civic Consulting  348 
EL ESR National authority 29 August 2016 
EL EETT National authority 30 August 2016 
ES Ministry of Justice Ministry 29 July 2016 
ES AECOSAN (Spanish Agency for 
Consumer Affairs, Food Safety and 
Nutrition)  
Ministry 02 September 2016 
ES Catalan Consumer Agency – Catalan 
Government 
Ministry 14 October 2016 
FI Competition and Consumer Authority National authority 06 September 2016 
FI Energy Authority National authority 07 September 2016 
FI Financial Supervisory Authority National authority 10 August 2016 
FI Consumer Ombudsman National authority 05 September 2016 
FI Ministry of Justice Ministry 05 September 2016 
FI Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment 
Ministry 23 October 2016 
FR Institut national de la Consommation 
(INC)/Commission des clauses 
abusives (CCA) 
National authority 04 June 2016 
FR Autorité des Marchés financiers (AMF) National authority 24 June 2016 
FR Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel (ACP) National authority 06 July 2016 
FR Direction générale de la concurrence, 
de la consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes (DGCCRF) (1) 
National authority 11 July 2016 and 19 
July 2016 
FR Direction générale de la concurrence, 
de la consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes (DGCCRF) (2) 
National authority 11 July 2016 and 19 
July 2016 
FR Autorité de régulation des 
communications électroniques et des 
postes (ARCEP) 
National authority 12 July 2016 
HR Ministry of Economy Ministry 22 July 2016 
HR Ministry of Justice  Ministry 01 July 2016 
HR Directorate for Economic Inspection 
(Market Inspectorate) 
National authority 22 July 2016 




National authority 08 July 2016 
HR Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency National authority 06 July 2016 
HU Ministry of National Developement  National authority 17 August 2016 
HU Ministry of Justice National authority 12 July 2016 
HU National Authority for Consumer 
Protection 
National authority 13 July 2016 
HU National Authority for Media and 
Infocommunication 
National authority 08 July 2016 
HU Hungarian Competition Authority National authority 13 July 2016 
IE Department of Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation 
Ministry 12 September and 
10 October 2016 
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IE Competition and Consumer Protection 
Commission 
National authority 06 September and 
19 October 2016 
IE Commission for Energy Regulation National authority 14 September and 
27 September 2016 
IT Ministry of Justice Ministry 28 July 2016 
IT Ministry of Economic Development Ministry 25 July 2016 
IT Authority for Competition and the 
Market (AGCM) 
National authority 01 August 2016 
IT Communications Authority (AGCOM) National authority 31 August 2016 
IT Banca d’Italia National authority 01 August 2016 
LT State Consumer Rights Protection 
Authority 
National authority 24 August 2016 
LT Competition Council of the Republic of 
Lithuania 
National authority 23 August 2016 
LT Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Lithuania 
Ministry 10 August 2016 
LT Ministry of Transport and 
Communications of the Republic of 
Lithuania 
Ministry 26 August 2016 
LT Lithuanian Consumer Organisation 
Alliance 
National authority 05 August 2016 
LT Bank of Lithuania National authority 20 July 2016 
LT National Commission for Energy 
Control and Prices 
National authority 17 August 2016 
LU Ministère de l'Economie et du 
Commerce extérieur – Direction du 
marché intérieur et de la 
consommation 
Ministry 13 September 2016 
LU Ministère de l'Economie et du 
Commerce extérieur – Direction 
générale PME et Entrepreneuriat 
Ministry 30 September 2016 
LU Commission de surveillance du secteur 
financier 
National authority 26 September 2016 
LV Ministry of Economics Ministry 21 July 2016 
LV Consumer Rights Protection Centre/ 
ECC Latvia 
National authority 28 June 2016 
LV Competition Council National authority 02 August 2016 
MT Malta Competition and Consumer 
Affairs Authority (MCCAA) 
National authority 24 June 2016 
MT Regulator for Energy and Water 
Services (‘REWS’) 
National authority 21 June 2016 
MT The Authority for Transport in Malta 
(‘Transport Malta’ or ‘TM’) 
National authority 13 June 2016 
MT Malta Communications Authority 
(‘MCA’)  
National authority 16 June 2016 
NL Ministry of Security and Justice Ministry 11 July 2016 
NL Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry 23 June 2016 
NL Authority Consumer and Markets 
(ACM) 
National authority 22 June 2016 
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NL Netherlands Authority for the 
Financial Markets (AFM) 
National authority 07 July 2016 
NL Complaints Board for the Advertising 
Industry (Reclame Code Commissie) 
National authority 30 June 2016 and 11 
July 2016 
PL Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection (UOKiK) 
National authority 27 July 2016 
PL Office of Electronic Communication 
(UKE) 
National authority 27 July 2016 
PL Office of Energy Regulation (URE) National authority 06 July 2016 
PT Directorate General for Consumers 
(DGC) 
National authority 30 June 2016 
PT Authority for Economic and Food 
Safety (ASAE) 
National authority 22 June 2016 
PT Directorate General for Consumers 
(DGC) 
National authority 20 July 2016 
PT National Communications Authority 
(ANACOM) 
National authority 01 July 2016 
PT Energy Services Regulatory Authority 
(ERSE) 
National authority 28 June 2016 
RO National Consumer Protection 
Authority 
National authority 29 June 2016 
RO National Authority for Management 
and Regulation in Communications  
National authority 28 June 2016 
RO Regulatory Authority for Energy National authority 30 June 2016 
SE Finansinspektionen Ministry 08 June 2016 
SE The Swedish Consumer Agency 
(Konsumentverket) 
National authority 21 June 2016 
SE Konkurrensverket National authority 28 June 2016 
SE Energimarknads-inspektionen National authority 13 June 2016 
SE Post och telestyrelsen National authority 21 June 2016 
SI Ministry of Economic Development 
and Technology, Consumer and 
Competition Protection Division 
Ministry, national regulatory 
authority 
26 July 2016 
SI Market Inspectorate National authority 19 July 2016 
SK Ministry of Economy of the Slovak 
Republic 
Ministry 15 July 2016 
SK Ministry of Justice Ministry 30 June 2016 
SK National Bank of Slovakia National authority 29 June 2016 
SK The Regulatory Office for Network 
Industries 
National authority 23 June 2016 
UK Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (formerly BIS) 
Ministry 11 August 2016 
AT Schutzverband gegen unlauteren 
Wettbewerb 
Business association 15 July 2016 
AT Austrian Economic Chamber Business association 09 August 2016 
BE VBO/FEB Business association 29 July 2016 
BG Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Business association 13 June 2016 
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CY Cyprus Association of Retail Trade 
Enterprises 
Business association 17 June 2016 
CY Cyprus Advertising Regulation 
Organization 
Business association 07 July 2016 
CZ Union of Trade and Tourism Czech 
Republic  
Business association 14 June 2016 
DE German E-Commerce and Distance 
Selling Trade Association (BEVH) 
Business association 29 July 2016 
DE Association of German Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (DIHK) 
Business association 09 July 2016 
DE Centre for Protection against Unfair 
Competition (Wettbewerbszentrale) 
Self-regulatory institution 
for the enforcement of the 
Act against Unfair 
Competition 
09 July 2016 
DK Danish Financial Supervisory Authority  Business association 16 June 2016 
DK The Confederation of Danish 
Enterprise  
Business association 24 June 2016 
DK Creativity and Communication  Business association  29 June 2016 
EE Estonian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Business association 17 June 2016 
EL SEV Business association 27 July 2016 
EL ESEE Business association 04 July 2016 
FI Finland Chamber of Commerce Business association 07 September 2016 
FI Federation of Finnish Financial 
Services 
Business association 05 September 2016 
FR Fédération du Commerce et de la 
Distribution (FCD) 
Business association 27 June 2016 and 15 
June 2016 
FR Fédération des industries électriques, 
électroniques et de communication 
(FIEEC) 
Business association 18 July 2016 
HR Croatian Chamber of Economy Business association 13 July 2016 
HR Croatian Chamber of Trade and Crafts Business association 18 July 2016 
HU Hungarian Chamber of Trade and 
Industry 
Business association 07 July 2016 
HU National Trade Association Business association 06 July 2016 
IE RGDATA Business Association 09 November 2016 
IE IBEC/Retail Ireland Business Association 09 November 2016 
IT Assoelettrica Business association 27 July 2016 
IT Confcommercio Business association 15 July 2016 
LU Chambre des Métiers Business association 06 September 2016 
LU Confédération luxembourgeoise du 
commerce 
Business association 21 September 2016 
MT General Retailers & Traders Union 
(‘GRTU’) (represents SMEs in Malta) 
Business association 14 June 2016 
MT Malta Employers Association (MEA) Business association 23 June 2016 
MT Malta Chamber of Commerce, 
Enterprise and Industry (MCCEI) 
Business association 23 June 2016 
NL Raad Nederlandse Detailhandel Business association 20 June 2016 
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NL Detailhandel Nederland Business association 20 June 2016 
PL Conference of Polish Financial 
Businesses (KPF) 
Business association 05 July 2016 
PL Polish Chamber of Commerce (KIG) Business association 12 July 2016 
PT Portuguese Commerce and Services 
Confederation 
Business association 07 July 2016 
PT Portuguese Association of Distribution 
Companies 
Business association 08 July 2016 
RO Romanian Banking Association  Business association 30 June 2016 
RO Romanian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry  
Business association 28 June 2016 
SE  Svensk handel Business association 08 June 2016 
SE Energiföretagen Business association 20 June 2016 
SE Stockholms lokaltrafik Business association 15 June 2016 
SI Commercial Chamber of Slovenia Business association 26 July 2016 
SK Union of Transport, Posts and 
Telecommunications  
Business association 22 June 2016 
SK Association of Trade and Tourism of 
Slovak Republic 
Business association 06 July 2016 
SK Slovak Banking Association Business association 12 July 2016 
UK Federation of Small Business Business association 30 August 2016 
AT Association for Consumer Information Consumer organisation 26 July 2016 
AT European Consumer Centre Austria Consumer organisation 26 July 2016 
BE Test Achats Consumer organisation 17 January 2017 
BG Federation of Consumers in Bulgaria 
(FCB) 
Consumer organisation 14 June 2016 
BG Bulgarian National Association Active 
Consumers – BNAAC 
Consumer organisation 13 June 2016 
BG ECC Bulgaria European Consumer Centre 14 June 2016 
CY Cyprus Consumer Organization Consumer organisation 10 June 2016 
CY Cyprus Workers Confederation Consumer organisation 01 June 2016 
CY Cyprus Consumer Union and Quality of 
Life 
Consumer organisation 05 July 2016 
CY European Consumer Centre Cyprus European Consumer Centre 28 June 2016 
CZ SOS Consumers Protection Association Consumer organisation 03 June 2016 
CZ Czech Consumer Association DTEST Consumer organisation 06 June 2016 
CZ Czech European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 07 June 2016 
DE Federation of German Consumer 
Organisations (Vzbv) 
Consumer organisation 11 July 2016 




09 August 2016 
DK Danish Consumer Ombudsman Consumer organisation 26 May 2016 
DK Danish Consumer Council Consumer organisation 28 June 2016 
DK ECC Denmark  European Consumer Centre  16 June 2016 
EE Consumers Together  Consumer organisation 16 June 2016 
EE European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 26 July 2016 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
Civic Consulting  353 
EL EKPOIZO Consumer organisation 21 July 2016 and 28 
July 2016 
EL KEPKA Consumer organisation 22 July 2016 
EL INKA Consumer organisation 29 July 2016 
EL Consumer Ombudsman European Consumer Centre 25 July 2016 
ES CUS: Salut, Consum i Alimentació Consumer association 16 November 2016 
ES Federació Unió Cívica de Consumidors 
i Mestresses de Casa de Catalunya 
(UNAE) 
Consumer association 16 November 2016 
FI ECC Finland European Consumer Centre 26 August 2016 
FI Finnish Consumer Association Consumer organisation 06 September 2016 
FR Association Consommation, 
Logement, Cadre de Vie (CLCV) 
Consumer organisation 22 June 2016 
FR Union Française des Consommateurs - 
Que Choisir (UFC) 
Consumer organisation 29 June 2016 
FR EEC-France European Consumer Centre 20 June 2016 
HR Croatian Union of Consumer 
Protection Organisations 
Consumer organisation 04 July 2016 
HR Croatian Association for Consumer 
Protection 
Consumer organisation 19 July 2016 
HR European Consumer Centre ECC – 
Croatia 
European Consumer Centre 30 June 2016 
HU National Consumer Association Consumer organisation 13 July 2016 
HU National Federation of Consumer 
Association 
Consumer organisation 06 July 2016 
HU European Consumer Center  European Consumer Centre 13 October 2016 
IE ECC Ireland European Consumer Centre 27 September 27 
2016 
IE Bar Library Member Consumer Rights Advocate 21 October 2016 
IT Consumer Association 
(Federconsumatori) 
Consumer organisation 8 August 2016 and 
11 August 2016 
IT Adiconsum Consumer organisation 20 July 2016 
IT Altroconsumo Consumer organisation 05 August 2016 
IT European Consumer Centre Italy European Consumer Centre 20 July 2016 
LT Lithuanian bank customers association Consumer organisation 05 August 2016 
LU Union Luxembourgeoise des 
Consommateurs 
Consumer organisation 17 May 2016 
LU ECC Luxembourg European Consumer Centre 05 September 2016 
LV Latvian Consumers’ Association Consumer organisation 01 July 2016 
MT Association for Consumer Rights Consumer organisation 20 June 2016 
MT Ghaqda tal-Konsumaturi (Consumer 
Association – Malta) 
Consumer organisation  15 June 2016 
MT European Consumer Centre – Malta  European Consumer Centre 17 June 2016 
NL Consumentenbond Consumer organisation 2 June, 16 June and 
28 June 2016 
NL Vereniging ‘Consument en Geldzaken’ Consumer organisation 06 June 2016 
NL Europees Consumenten Centrum European Consumer Centre 24 June 2016 
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PL Consumer Federation Consumer organisation 18 July 2016 
PL European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 19 July 2016 
PT Arbitration Centre for Consumer 
Disputes of Lisbon 
Consumer arbitration centre 12 July 2016 
PT Portuguese Association for Consumer 
Protection (DECO) 
Consumer organisation 21 June 2016 
PT European Consumer Centre – Portugal European Consumer Centre 20 June 2016 
RO Association Pro Consumer Consumer organisation 29 June 2016 
RO Association of Romanian Users of 
Financial Services 
Consumer organisation 29 June, 2016 
RO European Consumer Centre  European Consumer Centre 29 June 2016 
SE ECC Sweden European Consumer Centre 03 June 2016 
SI Slovene Consumers’ Association Consumer organisation 25 July 2016 
SI Evropski potrošniški center European Consumer Centre 27 July 2016 
SK Association for Protection of 
Consumer Rights (OMBUDSPOT) 
Consumer organisation 20 July 2016 
SK Association of Slovak Consumer 
Entities 
Consumer organisation 03 July 2016 
SK European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 01 July 2016 
UK Which? Consumer organisation 28 August 2016 
UK Consumer Council of Northern Ireland Consumer organisation 31 August 2016 
UK European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 26 August 2016 
Source: Civic Consulting. Note: one additional interview is planned for January 2017 in Belgium. 
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Annex III Overview of rules in the national laws transposing 
the UCPD, MCAD and PID in the Member States 
Table 16: Overview of Member States rules in the national laws transposing 
the UCPD regarding financial services or immovable property going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements  
Country Provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
Regarding financial services Regarding immovable property 
Austria No No 
Belgium No No 
Bulgaria No No 
Croatia  No No 
Cyprus Yes No 
Czech Republic No No 
Denmark  Yes  Yes 
Estonia No No 
Finland No No 
France Yes Yes 
Germany No No 
Greece No No 
Hungary Yes Yes 
Ireland No Yes  
Italy No No 
Latvia No No 
Lithuania No No 
Luxembourg No No 
Malta Yes Yes 
Netherlands Yes No  
Poland No No 
Portugal Yes No information available 
Romania No No 
Slovakia No No 
Slovenia No No 
Spain Yes Yes 
Sweden No No 
United Kingdom Yes Yes 
Notes: According to country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law - UCPD 
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Table 17: Overview of Member States provisions regarding specific regulatory 
choices/derogations PID 
Country Provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
Extension of the 
application to other 
sectors  
Derogation for small 
businesses 
Use of other specific 
regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Austria No Yes, for small businesses 
with fewer than 9 full-time 
employees; businesses with 
fewer than 50 full-time 
employees where the 
product is not directly 
available to the consumer; a 
sales area smaller than 
250m2, where that the shop 
is not part of a chain with 
more than 10 locations; at 
temporary markets or 
mobile sales facilities 
Derogation for common 
price indications in Member 
States 
Belgium No Yes, for sellers whose 
commercial premises are 
smaller than 150m2 
Price per unit indication not 
mandatory for 6 types of 
food items: 1) pre-packaged 
food sold at a discount close 
to the best-before date; 2) 
food items offered for on-
premises consumption in 
restaurant, cafés, hotels, 
hospitals, cafeterias and 
similar establishments; 3) 
wine conditioned in 75 cl 
bottles; 5) pre-packaged 
sweets and snacks and ice 
cream offered for immediate 
consumption of the whole 
unit; 6) packs of products in 
special gift packaging 
Bulgaria No No No 
Croatia  No No No 
Cyprus No No No 
Czech 
Republic 
Act 526/1990 Sb. § 1 (3) 
Extension of the application 
to other sectors (general 
application for products, 
performances, works and 
services in every sector § 1 
(1), and also for transfer of 
right and of immovable 
property § 1 (3)) 
Yes, if the product was sold 
in person; if the product was 
sold by self-service in a shop 
smaller than 400m2; if the 
product was sold in a 
vending machine 
Derogation for antiquity, art, 
perishable goods etc. 
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Denmark  Yes: The requirement of 
price indications apply to 
electronic commerce to the 
extent it is possible to place 
an order. The rules apply to 
services as well.  
No Article 3(1) does not apply to 
sales by auction and sales of 
works of art and antiques (cf. 
Article 3(2). According to BEK 
10002 it is possible to 
announce price reduction for 
a shorter period (2 weeks) by 
use of signage. 
Estonia No No No need to indicate the unit 
price for goods sold in 
auction and sales of works of 
art and antiques, products 
supplied in the course of the 
provision of a service; also in 
case of certain other product 
categories. 
Finland No No No 
France Extension to service 
providers. 
No. However, breaches of 
the PID rules by non-self-
service retail outlets with a 
sales area not exceeding 120 
m2, have been considered 
with a certain degree of 
forbearance, in line with 
legislation prior to the PID. 
Art. 5(2) allowing MS in the 
case of non-food products, 
to establish a list of the 
products or product 
categories to which the 
obligation to indicate the 
unit price shall remain 
applicable. 
Art. 4(1) allowing MS to 
provide that the maximum 
number of prices to be 
indicated be limited: 
identical products sold at the 
same price and displayed 
together can bear a single 
indication of the selling and 
unit prices 
Germany The German PAngV that 
transposes the PID is 
basically applicable to 
anyone that commercially 
sells goods to a person, that 
finally consumes the good. 
Therefore the scope is not 
limited to consumers (in the 
sense of EU law), but to 
everyone that is the 
eventual purchaser, e.g. the 
PAngV also applies, if a car 
is sold to a businessmen. In 
contrast it is not applicable 
to purchases from 
wholesalers to retailers. 
Different to the PID the 
PAngV does not address 
specific sectors. 
Yes, the German legislature 
implemented the derogation 
for ‘small direct salesmen’ 
and ‘small retailers’. 
No specific information 
provided. 
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Greece No For traders with a sales floor 
not exceeding 50m2; for 
convenience stores, kiosks, 
and outdoor retail outlets. 
The derogation of art.3.2 PID 
for products supplied in the 
course of the provision of a 
service and sales by auction 
and sales of works of art and 
antiques has been used.(See 
art.3.3 (a) and (b) KYA Z1-
404). The waiver of art.5 PID 
has been used. Art.5 KYA Z1-
404 includes table I and table 
II of non-food products and 
foodstuff respectively that 
are exempt from the 
obligation to indicate the 
unit price of products.  
Hungary Yes: The rules are 
applicable to products, i.e. 
movable property (except 
money, securities and other 
financial instruments), and 
natural energy usable as a 
product (Section 2 
paragraph f) of Act CLV of 
1997) 
No The rules on price indication 
are not applicable for 
products sold at auction, 
provided the starting bid is 
determined in the auction 
documents.  
The unit price shall not be 
indicated when the product 
is: 
a)under 50g, 50 ml or 5 cm, 
b)Sold from an automated 
machine, 
c)Sold in bulk, 
d)Is gift wrapped 
e)A foodstuff sold in a 
package for preparation of a 
particular meal. 
Ireland No No Products supplied under 
provision of a service and 
auctions sales and sales of 
works of art and antiques 
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Italy No No The following products are 
excluded from the duty of 
indicating the unit price: 
a)Products which are sold 
without packaging; 
b)Products of different 
nature put in one single 
package; 
c)Products sold by means of 
vending machines; 
d)Products which are 
destined to be mixed with 
one another in order to 
create another product; 
e)Pre-packaged product 
which are exempted from 
the duty of indication of the 
net quantity; 
f)Pre-cooked products; pre-
prepared products; products 
which contain elements 
which are separately 
packaged in one single 
package and that need an 
activity of the consumer in 
order to come to the final 
product; 
g)‘Fantasy products’; 
h)Single-item ice creams; 
i)Non-food products which 
can be sold only per piece. 
Latvia Extension to service 
providers. 
The price per certain unit of 
measurement does not have 
to be indicated at small sales 
points where it is not 
possible to ensure the 
indication of the price per 
certain unit of measurement 
in the manner easily 
identifiable and clearly 
legible for a consumer 
(Article 12) 
The Regulations provided for 
the procedure of dual display 
of prices of products and 
services during the Latvia’s 
accession to euro zone. 
The Regulations states that 
the price does not have to be 
indicated, inter alia, for a 
product which is utilised in 
providing a service and 
which is part of the service 
and in auctions and in 
marketing of works of art 
and antiques (Article 12).  
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Lithuania No Waived the obligation to 
indicate the unit price for 
products sold not in bulk in a 
market, kiosk, or other 
temporary sales facility, or 
by small businesses 
Broadening the concepts of a 
consumer and a trader 
Waived the obligation to 
indicate the unit price if 
detergents are sold to the 
consumers and the price of 
one wash is indicated; 
Waived the obligation to 
indicate the unit price of 
some products; 
Additional measures 
indicating where the price is 
to be shown;  
Additional measures 
indicating how the price is to 
be shown (size etc); 
Article 4(2) of the PID was 
not transposed into 
Lithuanian law. 
Luxembourg Extension to services, 
except liberal professions, 
of the obligation to indicate 
unit price for every 
professional of all usual 
services proposed by the 
professional 
For businesses whose sale 
area is less than 400 m2 and 
itinerant traders 
Derogation for enumerated 
food products to indicate 
unit price; mandatory 
indication of the price unit 
for enumerated non-food 
products; derogation to 
indicate the unit price for 
products supplied in the 
course of the provision of a 
service 
Malta No Yes: At the discretion of the 
Director 
Reg. 6 of SL 378.09 lists the 
instances to which the said 
norms do not apply namely: 
goods supplied for the 
purpose of re-selling; goods 
sold in the course of the 
provision of a service; sales 
by auction or sales of works 
of art or antiques; 
advertisement for such 
goods unless the price is 
indicated in the 
advertisement. Furthermore 
the Director (Consumer 
Affairs) may exempt other 
goods if he considers that 
adherence would be 
‘excessively onerous’ subject 
to any conditions that he 
may impose. 
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Netherlands Yes 
 
Yes: In Annex I use is also 
made of the option under 
Art. 6 PID to exclude certain 
small businesses. Annex I 
under E excludes ‘products 
offered for sale on public 
markets by means of sales 
eloquence, where the sales 
price or unit price of the 
product are not settled in 
advance’  
In Annex I of the 2003 
Decree on Pricing of 
Products, the option under 
Art. 3 (2) PID to exclude 
works of art, services, 
auctions, and antiques is 
exercised.  
Poland No No The Act gave the authority to 
the Minister of Commerce to 
issue a regulation on 
publishing prices of products 
and services, which was 
published on December 9, 
2015 and started applying as 
of January 1, 2016. 
Portugal Yes: National legislation 
sets out a few specific rules 
for the indication of prices 
in services contracts. 
Decree-Law no. 138/90 
contained a provision that 
exempted itinerant trading 
from the obligation to 
indicate the unit price. 
However, this provision was 
repealed in 2002. 
PID is not applied to 
products supplied in the 
course of a provision of a 
service, to sales by auction 
or to sales of works of art 
and antiques, or where the 
unit price is not useful or 
may lead to confusion (e.g. 
products sold in quantities 
below certain limits or by the 
piece and different products 
sold in the same package). 
Romania No No No 
Slovakia No No  No  
Slovenia No Yes: For business with a sale 
area of less than 500m2 
No 
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Spain No No Use of this option with 
regard to products supplied 
in the course of the provision 
of a service; sales by auction; 
sales of works of art and 
antiques; stricter provisions 
on the display of the unit 
price; exclusions for 
products with a selling price 
identical to the unit price; 
products sold in quantities 
less than 50 g or ml, 
products of different nature 
sold in the same package; 
products sold by automatic 
vending machines; individual 
portions of ice cream; wines 
and alcoholic drinks with 
geographic nomination; 
fantasy food products; in 
Catalan Decree, jewellers 
and furriers are exempted 
for security reasons 
Sweden No No No 
United 
Kingdom 
No Yes: For small businesses 
under 280m2. 
Not applicable to products 
supplied in the course of a 
service (Regulation 3); not 
applicable to sales by 
auction and 
artwork/antiques 
(Regulation 3); not 
applicable to vending 
machines (Regulation 5(3)). 
Country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law - PID.. 
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Table 18: Overview of MS extension of protection to B2B relations 
Country Extension of provisions of the UCPD to B2B relations Other provisions going beyond the MCAD 
Answer Comments Answer Comments 
Austria Yes The UCPD’s provisions generally also apply to B2B transactions. No N/A 
Belgium Yes 
 
The following provisions of UCPD are extended to B2B practices: 
prohibition of three types of misleading advertisement; prohibition of 
one type of misleading omission; prohibition of three blacklisted 
practices: pyramid schemes, inertia selling, and the use of invoices or 
similar documents seeking payment  
Yes Additional specifics in the case of advertising for listing services in 
company guides in art. VI.107 CEL, addressing the illicit practices of 
the so-called advertising recruiters 
Bulgaria No Since 2015 however there has been a new rule aiming at protecting 
the weaker party in B2B transactions from unfair acts or omissions of 
the party with the stronger bargaining position.  
Some courts also extend the application of the rules about unfair 
commercial practices between trader and consumers also to contracts 
between traders, when one of the parties is a ‘one man company’, 
acting outside their professional field 
No N/A 
Croatia No N/A Yes A wide definition of the concept of “trader”. 
In accordance with the provision of Art 5(2) of the MCAD, a system of 
collective protection of traders was introduced, meaning that certain 
organizations are ex officio entitled to initiate proceedings before the 
Commercial court against any suspicious advertising. 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
 
Civic Consulting  364 
Cyprus No N/A Yes As for national rules going beyond the MCAD, the Trade Descriptions 
Law, Law 5/87 contains provisions (specifically, Section 5(2) and (3)), 
comparable to the ones on misleading omissions of the UCPD and to 
this extent, goes beyond the MCAD which does not touch upon 
misleading omissions. It should be noted however that the 
applicability of the Trade Descriptions Law, Law 5/87 to B2B relations 
is uncertain. 
Some of its provisions entail the term ‘consumer’ and are thus clearly 
not applicable to B2B relations. Other provisions however do not refer 
to the ‘consumer’ and it is in relation to those provisions that there is 
uncertainty with regards to their applicability to B2B 
Czech 
Republic 
Yes The Czech norms extend the scope of the UCPD in many areas also to 
B2B transactions. According to § 2976-2990 CzCC, in the cases of a) 
misleading advertising, b) misleading identification of goods and 
services, c) creating a likelihood of confusion, d) free-riding on the 
reputation of an enterprise, product or services of another competitor, 
e) bribery, f) disparaging a competitor, g) comparative advertising, 
unless allowed as admissible, h) breach of business secrets, i) 
unsolicited advertising, and j) threat to health and the environment, 
competitors and consumers can request the violator according to § 
2988 CzCC to refrain from competing unfairly or to return the injured 
party to the position they were in before the harm occurred. Not only 
can adequate satisfaction be requested but also compensation for 
damage and restitution of unjustified enrichment can be awarded. 
No N/A 
Denmark  No N/A  Yes Generally speaking, the Danish marketing practices act provides a 
common framework for traders’ marketing activities, including 
provisions on misleading and aggressive practices in order to protect 
the interests of consumers, businesses, and society. Hence, the 
regulation of B2B goes beyond the MCAD. 
Estonia No N/A No N/A 
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Finland No N/A Yes The MCAD was implemented through the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Act, which operates primarily on its general clause that 
prohibits activity ‘against good commercial practice’. Thus, redress is 
not limited to advertising or marketing, or the scope of the MCAD. 
France Yes Only partially: art. L. 121-5 C.conso. The misleading practices of art. 6 
UCPD and the black list of misleading practices from the UCPD (art. L. 
121-2 and L. 121-4 C.conso.) are directly applicable to B2B 
transactions (see art. L. 121-5 C.conso.). 
Yes  The scope of protection has been extended under French law to 
misleading practices. The misleading practices of art. 6 UCPD and the 
black list of misleading practices from the UCPD are directly 
applicable to B2B transactions.  
The misleading omission clause (art. 7 UCPD) does not apply to B2B 
relationships.  
Germany Yes The UWG is generally applicable to B2B transactions, since there is no 
specific provision that limits the scope to B2C transactions. Exceptions 
are Sec. 3 para 3 UWG with the Annex (Black List), Sec. 5a para. 3 
UWG. 
Yes Taking into account the minimum harmonisation approach of the 
MCAD, it is acknowledged that the transposing rule (Sec. 5 UWG) has 
to be interpreted differently regarding the advertisement’s 
addressee. As regards consumers, the interpretation needs to align 
with Art. 5 UCPD, whereas for businesses Art. 2 lit. b, Art. 3 and Art. 8 
para. 1 MCAD are decisive for the interpretation. In contrast to the 
UCPD itself, Sec. 5 para. 2 UWG, which transposes Art. 6 para. 2 lit. a 
UCPD, applies to B2B-relations as well under German law. As the 
requirements of Art. 6 para. 2 lit. a UCPD are stricter than those of 
the MCAD, this leads to a higher level of protection of companies in 
German law compared to the MCAD. 
Greece No N/A Yes Misleading advertising is also covered by the law of unfair 
competition on art.1, 3 of N.146/1914. Furthermore, the code of 
advertisers as enforced by SEE also covers misleading advertising 
with detailed provisions that go beyond what is prescribed in the 
MCAD. As the code does not distinguish amongst addressees of the 
advertisement it can also be applied in B2B relations. 
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Hungary No N/A Yes The MCAD is implemented in a way to provide similar rules to the 
UCPD applicable for B2C transactions. It applies to ‘business practice’ 
that allows an investigation of a wider range of issues than 
advertising. There is reference to the ‘average business’ standard. 
However, there are no black listed practices available for B2B 
transactions and no reversal of burden of proof in front of the 
competent public authority. 
Ireland No N/A No N/A 
Italy Yes To microenterprises Yes Additional measures regarding the definition of “advertising” and 
permitted forms of advertising; additional conditions under which 
advertising is considered to be misleading 
Latvia No N/A No N/A 
Lithuania No N/A Yes Lithuania provided in the national law a broader definition of 
“advertising “, in comparison with one provided in Article 2(a) of the 
MCAD; Lithuania deviated in the national law from the definition of 
“misleading advertising”, in comparison with one provided in Article 
2(b) of the MCAD; Lithuania did not transpose Article 2(e) of the 
MCAD; Lithuania deviated from Article 3 of the MCAD; Lithuania 
deviated from Articles 4(e) and 4(f) of the MCAD 
Luxem-
bourg 
No N/A Yes In Luxembourg, effective protection in B2B relations is also and 
mainly reached by the concept of unfair commercial practice defined 
in article 14 of the ‘Loi du 30 juillet 2002’, which allow to take into 
consideration other acts - and not only advertising - which are 
against the fair competition. 
With regard to the forthcoming entry into force of the new law(law of 
the 23th Decembre 2016), B2B relations will no longer be regulated 
by this article 14 but only by the rules implementing the MCAD, i.e. 
articles 3 to 7 of the new law. 
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Malta No N/A Yes The remedies available are of a civil nature where the injured trader 
may seek redress against the offending trader before the competent 
civil court.  
A trader who acts in breach of prohibitions relating to comparative or 
misleading advertising may be sued by the injured party for damages 
or else be subject to a penalty.  
Nether-
lands 
Yes In 2016, an important statutory extension of the UCPD regime was 
introduced in Art. 6:194 (2) – (4) DCC. The new statutory regime opens 
up the possibility for businesses to claim on the basis of the tort of 
misleading omission of essential information and the tort of not 
properly and timely disclosing the commercial purpose of the 
information. 
Yes The original position of the Dutch legislature was to implement the 
MCAD in a broad sense; not only advertising but any commercially 
relevant public announcements fall within the scope. In the past, 
courts have therefore used the MCAD to evaluate not only advertising 
but also annual business reports, investment documentation, flyers, 
folders, public statements on business results outlook etcetera. 
Therefore, because of the initial choice to go beyond the minimum 
harmonisation character of the 1984 Directive, the Netherlands had 
already introduced a wider scope, which was continued with the 
MCAD. 
Poland No Act on combating unfair competition (Ustawa o zwlaczaniu 
nieuczciwej konkurencji, 16 April 1993, Dz.U. 1993 Nr 47 poz. 211) 
applies a similar test for recognizing misleading and comparative 
advertising in B2B claims as for unfair commercial practices, though. 
Yes 
 
Penalisation of unfair competition acts, including misleading and 
comparative advertising 
Portugal Yes Some misleading practices (e.g. concerning the trader’s identity, the 
price or the object of the contract) are extended to B2B contracts. 
Yes Definition of misleading advertising going beyond minimum 
harmonisation (relies on UCPD definition), application of the regime 
on comparative advertising to consumers 
Romania No N/A Yes Designated entities may also notify the enforcement authority; Legal 
facilities may be directed jointly against a number of traders; Legal 
facilities may be directed against code owners; Voluntary control by 
self-regulatory bodies 
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Slovakia No N/A Yes The definition of misleading advertising has been implemented 
almost verbatim from Art. 2 b) of MCAD, only in the Slovak regulation 
it has already included assets involved (the advertising of goods, 
services, real estates, a business name, trademark or designation of 
product origin and other rights and obligations).  
A more important feature of Slovak regulation is the alternative 
prerequisite that can indicate the misleading nature of 
advertisement, i.e. the advertisement is misleading also in the cases 
where it may injure consumers. In this regard the Slovak 
implementation provides a higher level of protection as the 
consumers are also entitled to claim legal protection against unfair 
competition under sec 53-55 of CommC. 
Slovenia No N/A Yes The Consumer Protection Act contains some provisions, which also 
apply B2B and which go beyond the provisions of the MCAD on 
misleading advertising: a prohibition of indecent advertising, a 
demand that advertising messages must be written in a language 
easily understood by the consumers in Slovenia and a special rule that 
advertising may not contain any elements, which cause or may cause 
bodily, psychic or other harm to children, nor any elements exploiting 
or potentially exploiting their trustfulness or inexperience. 
Spain No N/A No N/A 
Sweden Yes Marketing Act, except 12 § Yes Provisions on misleading and comparative advertising are covered by 
the entire Marketing Act. It means that business operators enjoy the 
same legal protection as consumers. 
United 
Kingdom 
No N/A Yes The public enforcement regime is supplemented by the availability of 
various (common law based) private law actions. 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law and legal country expert clarifications. 
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Annex IV Overview of extensions of the application of the 
UCTD in the Member States 
Table 19: Overview of MS extension of the application of the UCTD 
Country Provisions going beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
Extensions of the application of 
Directive to individually negotiated 
terms 
Extensions of the application of 
Directive to terms on the adequacy 
of the price and the main subject-
matter 
Austria Yes 
The terms listed in Sec. 6 para. 1 KSchG are 
void, regardless whether they were 
individually negotiated or can be qualified 
as standard contract terms. Sec. 6 para. 2 
KSchG only applies to standard contract 
terms. 
No 
Belgium Yes: Belgium has extended the scope of the 
UCTD to individually negotiated terms. 
No 
Bulgaria No No 
Croatia No No  
Namely, according to Article 52 of the CPA it 
is not permitted to assess whether the 
contractual terms relating to subject matter 
of the contract and adequacy of the price are 
fair, provided they are clear, easy 
understandable and noticeable. 




The Civil Code has extended the application 
of the Directive regarding individually 
negotiated terms according to § 1813 CzCC 
No 
Denmark  Yes 
The General Clause applies to contracts in 
general, including B2C and B2B and all types 
of contract terms are within the scope. 
Yes 
The General Clause applies to contracts in 
general, including B2C and B2B and all types 
of contract terms are within the scope. 
Estonia No No 
Finland Yes 
National law has broadened the scope of 
the unfairness assessment to individually 
negotiated contractual terms 
Yes 
National law has broadened the scope of the 
unfairness assessment to the adequacy of the 
price or remuneration. 
France Yes: France has extended the application of 
the Directive (art. L 212-1 C.conso.) to 
individually negotiated terms 
No 
Germany No No 
Greece No No 
Hungary No No 
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Ireland No No 
Italy No No 
Latvia No No 
Lithuania No No 
Luxembourg Yes 
Luxembourg law provides the extension to 
individually negotiated terms. 
No 
Malta Yes 
Article 44(1). Law provides that it is 
unlawful in consumer contracts to use 
unfair terms. The law does not include any 
exceptions or qualifications in relation to 
terms that are individually negotiated. 
Hence protection is provided to all terms.  
No 
Netherlands No No 
Poland No No 
Portugal No Yes 
UCT national legislation was not amended to 
exclude these aspects. 
Romania No No 
Slovakia No No 
Slovenia No Yes 
Art. 4 (2) of the Directive - as regards the 
non-assessment of the adequacy of price – 
was not transposed. The possibility of the 
assessment therefore exists in Slovenian law. 
There is, however, no known case law of such 
assessment. 
Spain No 
Individually negotiated contract terms are 
excluded from the scope of application of 
both Act 7/1998 (Article 1 of this Act states 
that standard terms are pre-drafted clauses 
imposed in the agreement by one of the 
parties, without prejudice of their actual 
authority, their external appearance, their 
extension, and whatever other 
circumstances, having been drafted with 
the aim of being included within a plurality 
of agreements) and Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007 (Article 82 states that unfair terms 
shall be considered to be all clauses not 
individually negotiated and non-authorized 
practices against good faith principles, 
prejudicing consumers and users, by 
creating an imbalance between the rights 
and obligations of the parties under the 
agreement). 
Yes 
Article 4.2 of the Directive was not explicitly 
transposed. This led to contradictory 
opinions and case law regarding the control 
of the main subject matter of the contract 
and the adequacy of price. 
Sweden No No 
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The test of unfairness is not limited to, in 
effect, standard form contracts. The CMA, 
or other Regulator, is able to bring an 
application for an injunction (or interdict in 
Scotland) in relation to ‘the use, proposing 
or recommending’ of a relevant term or 
notice. This power also now extends to 
individually negotiated terms. 
No 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on transposition of directives in Member States' law - UCTD. 
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Table 20: Overview of MS extension of UCTD provisions to B2B relations 
Country Extensions of provisions of the UCTD to B2B relations 
Austria Yes. The Austrian Supreme Court affirmed the use of § 6 KSchG [the B2C black and grey 
lists] as an indicative list for B2B contracts under certain circumstance 
(“Ungleichgewichtslage”). Under general civil law all standard contract terms are scrutinised 
under Sec. 879 para. 3 ABGB. 
Belgium No general rules on unfair terms for B2B transactions.  
There is however a specific provision in the Act on Late Payment in Commercial 
Transactions, namely art. 7, that provides that a contractual term which deviates from 
certain provisions of the Act can be reviewed by a judge if it is grossly unfair to the creditor. 
Bulgaria Since 2015 there has been a new rule aiming at protecting the weaker party in B2B 
transactions from unfair acts or omissions of the party with the stronger bargaining position 
– Article 37a the Protection of Competition Act. Following a number of cases in which big 
retail chains put pressure on their suppliers to accept contract conditions and clauses 
favourable mainly for the retailer, this new provision has been enforced. 
Some Bulgarian courts already justify the extended application of consumer protection 
legislation to terms in contracts between businesses. When checking the fairness of 
standard T&Cs of a certain trader this control may affect all contracts concluded between 
this trader and its customers, both consumers and legal entities (including, other traders). 
When a term in T&Cs used by the trader is proclaimed as unfair and void, as per some 
courts decisions, it is impossible to limit this legal effect only to contracts under the T&Cs 
which the trader concluded with consumers and to exclude the ones concluded with other 
traders under the same standard conditions. 
Croatia In Croatia, due to the fact that provisions of the Obligation Act have been harmonized with 
consumer protection Directives (including the UCTD) the concept of good faith and the 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations as well as the concept of the 
endangering of the purpose of the contract are applied in order to establish if the terms of 




The new Czech Civil Code Act 89/2012 Sb. enshrines the protection of the weaker party as a 
general principle according to § 433. The protection of the weaker party is automatically 
strengthened in all B2B relationships, not just SMEs, but it only ensures a situational 
protection. The decisive factor is whether the entrepreneur’s act is unrelated to his 
business. Besides this general term, the new CzCC also covers special cases for protection of 
the weaker party against abuse, such as:  
- Usury (§ 1796); 
- Lesion, disproportionate shortening (§ 1793 et seq.); 
- Contracts of adhesion (§ 1798 et seq.); 
- Inability to negotiate a shorter or longer deadline to the detriment of weaker parties (§ 
630 paragraph. 2); 
- Limitation or exclusion of rights to compensation under § 2898. 
Denmark  The General Clause applies to contracts in general, including B2C and B2B and all types of 
contract terms are within the scope. 
Estonia Estonia has extended the applicability of the rules on unfairness control also to B2B 
relations. 
Finland No. B2B relations are governed by general contract law and a general clause.  
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France The rules on unfair contract terms of the Code de la consommation do not apply to B2B 
transactions. However, Book IV title IV of the Code de commerce contains many provisions 
aiming at securing well-balanced and fair trade relationships. More specifically, art. L. 442-
6(I)(2°) Code de commerce (which was introduced in 2008) entails a control on unfair terms 
in B2B-contracts (including terms defining the contract’s object and the balance between 
price and performance). A court can hold a term unfair (and void) if it causes a significance 
imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties, provided that one party has subjected 
(or at least attempted to subject) the other party to this term. 
What is more, the current revision of the Code civil (law of obligations) entails the 
introduction of a fairness-test applicable to all not individually negotiated standard 
agreement forms (excluded the terms pertaining to the subject-matter of the contract and 
the adequacy of the price). The newly drafted fairness-test of art. 1171 Code civil is based 
on the concept of the significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations. It does not 
refer to the principle of good faith. 
Germany Yes. Sec. 310 para. 1 BGB The law of unfair contract terms was initially developed to protect 
parties in B2B relations and that hence the regulation of this area of law in B2B contracts 
has a long history in Germany. 
Greece In Greek law, there is already a level of protection for SMEs from unfair contract terms. For 
unfair terms, the general definition of the consumer of art.1 par.4 (α) of N.2251/94 applies 
which includes legal persons and defines the consumer as the end user without requiring 
that they act outside their trade or profession. 
Hungary Key provisions of the UCTD are implemented without differentiating between B2B and B2C 
transactions. Although the key rules are extended to B2B contracts, the standard of 
protection is somewhat lower than in B2C contracts. The regulation of unfair terms in B2B 
contacts is limited to standard terms, and is not extended to individually not negotiated 
terms, the extension of which is only applicable for consumer contracts. While unfair terms 
in B2C contracts are null and void, unfair terms in B2B contracts are avoidable. The black 





Luxembourg All provisions of UCTD are extended to B2B. 
Malta No. 
Netherlands Under Dutch law, SMEs may invoke the open clause against unfair terms in standard terms 
used by their counterpart. The SME bears the burden of proof that a term is unfair. The 
conditions for the application of the unfairness test are the same as for B2C contracts. This 
implies that the protection against unfair terms is restricted to standard terms; core terms 
are excluded from the unfairness test unless they have not been drafted in plain and 
intelligible language. However, businesses that make use of the same set of standard terms, 
or that have 50 employees or more, or that are required to publish their annual financial 
statements including their balance sheet and the income statement and explanatory 
memorandum (large and medium-sized enterprises under European company law), are 
excluded from the protection of the unfairness test. Moreover, in cross-border B2B 
contracts the unfairness test does not apply, irrespective of a choice for Dutch law as the 
applicable law and irrespective whether the party relying on the standard terms is the 
Dutch or the foreign business. 
SMEs cannot invoke the protection of the black list or the grey list.  
Poland Polish law provides partially an extended protection against unfair contract terms, e.g. 
Article 805 of the Polish Civil Code in its paragraph 4 allows for such a control in case of 
insurance contracts concluded by any natural persons acting for purposes related to their 
trade or profession. 
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Portugal  Yes, the scope of application of the UCT national legislation does not draw a distinction 
between B2C and B2B contracts. 
The lists of unfair terms in articles 22 and 23 do not apply to B2B contracts. 
Romania No. 
Slovakia No. 
Slovenia In Slovenia, there are two different sources of unfair contractual terms law: the Consumer 
Protection Act, implementing the UCTD, and the Obligations Code (Art. 121-122) which is 
only applicable to B2B contracts. However, not so many B2B cases exist in practice. 
A possibility to invoke an unfair term in B2B contracts already exists in Slovenian law (Art. 
121-122 Obligations Code). Under the existing regulation, a contractual term is unfair if it is 
‘contrary the purpose of the contract or good commercial practices’, Art. 121 (1) Obligations 
Code. There is no mention of a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations. 
However, a reference, although indirect, to significant imbalance may be deduced from Art. 
121 (2) Obligations Code, which gives some examples of unfair clauses. 
Spain No. 
Sweden In Swedish law, there is already a law for combating unfair contract terms in B2B 
transactions, namely the law (1984:292) concerning contract terms between traders. The 
law is designed after the model of the law (1994:1512) on Consumer Contracts, which has 
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Annex V Overview tables on injunction procedures in the 
Member States  
Table 21: Overview of the Member States that have extended the scope of 
application of the injunction procedure 
MS Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to cover areas of consumer 
law that are not part of Annex I of the Directive, or consumer law in general? 
Answer Comment 
AT Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
Sec. 28a KSchG e.g. mentions also the general information duties 
of entrepreneurs and providers of services related to financial 
issues, and so-called “Heimverträge”. For an extensive list, see the 
answer to the first question on the ID. 
BE  Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
Belgian injunction procedure applies well beyond the scope of 
consumer law (e.g. competition and intellectual property, 
designation of experts and much more). Regarding consumer 
protection, the injunction procedure also applies to the protection 
of consumers of mobile telecommunication services.  
BG Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
Any “other legislation that protect the interests of consumers”  
HR Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
 
According to Art 106 (1) of the CpA injunction procedure is also 
provided against persons who act against provisions of Act for the 
application of the Regulation (EU) no. 181/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 concerning the 
rights of passengers in bus and coach transport and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, so additionaly rights of consumers 
as bus or coach passengers (as weaker parties to the transport 
contract) are covered. 
CY No  
CZ Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
DK  No  
EE Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
 
The Consumer Protection Board may require termination of or 
refraining from activities harmful to the collective interests of 
consumers and for that purpose either issue a precept or file a 
claim at the court (§ 64 (1) of the Consumer Protection Act) 
FI Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
FR Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
 
The national injunction procedure tied to civil actions carried out 
in the collective interest of consumers pertains to practices and 
clauses which are illicit under national law. It is not restricted to 
Annex I of the Directive. This type of civil action is however 
restricted to national organisations. 
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DE Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
GR Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
 
HU Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
The scope of application is very wide, including all disputes 
suitable for court procedure (based on Section 39 paragraph 1 of 
Act CLV of 1997). 
IE No  
IT Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
LV No  
LT No, qualified entities of other 
EU Member States are entitled 
to apply for injunctions only in 
the areas of consumer law that 
are part of Annex I of the 
Directive. 
Yes, national entities may apply 
with a claim to a court for an 
injunction if a consumer public 
interest was infringed. The law 
does not limit the scope of 
“consumer public interest”.  
Please note that Annex I of the Directive was not fully transposed 
to the Lithuanian law, as the Lithuanian list does not contain the 
last addition to the list - Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online 
dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on 
consumer ODR) 
LU Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive  
Code de la consommation, article L.320-1. Extension regarding 
price display  
MT Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive  
 
In the case of the Consumer Affairs Act – the injunctions 
procedure applies to Cap. 378 and any regulations made under 
that Act, and to any other laws relating to consumer protection as 
the Minister may designate (see art. 94(1)(c) of Cap. 378). 
Amongst the laws not relating to any of the Directives listed in the 
Annex in relation to which the injunctions procedure applies one 
can include the following:  
SL 379.10 ‘Home Loan Regulations’ 
SL 378.14 ‘Denied Boarding (Compensation and Assistance to Air 
Passengers) Regulations 
NL Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
For national cases the scope is broad: any claim for the benefit of 
the constituency of the organisation will be heard. For foreign 
qualified entities, the Annex I applies 
PL Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
Pursuant to Article 21 para 1 and 2 of the above-mentioned Act, 
any practice harming collective consumer interests is prohibited 
and examples from Annex I are only listed as indication of possible 
infringements of such collective interests 
PT Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
Article 2, no. 2 of Law 25/2004. The injunction procedure applies 
to any practice that violates consumers’ rights. 
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RO No  
SK Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
Under CPA as substantive statute (general procedural norms do 
not exist), special procedural norms exist only in cases of 
unfairness of contract terms and unfair commercial practice 
SI Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
Pursuant to Art. 74 (1) of the Consumer Protection Act the scope 
of application is extended, so that it covers all injunctions which 
are brought against companies which, in business with 
consumers, are using unfair contract terms, business practices or 
advertising activities contrary to the Consumer Protection Act and 
the act on the protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices, the act on consumer credit, the acts governing medicine 
and media, and, by doing so, are damaging the collective interests 
of consumers.  
ES Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
General application of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 and Act 
1/2000 
SE No  
UK Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
 
See s.211 (‘domestic infringements’). 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on the Injunctions Directive.  
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Table 22: Overview table of whether the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Directive is regulated separately from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law Directives in the Member States  
MS Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the Injunctions Directive 
regulated in your country separately (as a separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by other EU 
Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Answer Comments 
Austria Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
The UCTD’S procedural aspects are transposed in Sec. 28 
seqq. KSchG, whereas the ID’s transposition concerns both 
Sec. 28 seqq. KSchG and Sec. 14 UWG. Additionally, there has 
been an Act on Alternative Dispute Resolution, regulating 
aspects of Regulation (EU) 524/2013 and Directive 
2013/11/EU. 
Belgium Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
Rules on injunctions can be found in the Judicial Code - not in 
the Code of Economic Law (CEL) where EU Consumer 
directives are transposed. Belgian rules go beyond the ID, in 
that urgency (a necessary condition to apply for an injunction 
under Belgian law) is irrefutably presumed in all matters 
falling within the scope of the ID.  
Bulgaria No, single procedure  Extended list of provisions to which injunction procedure is 
applicable – to “any other legislation that protects the 
interests of consumers”  
Croatia  Yes, separate procedures in 
a single legal act 
 
The injunction procedure is regulated in Art 106 CpA et seq. 
as procedure for the collective protection of consumers. 
The procedure does not exclude the possibility of initiating 
individual procedure for declaring the contract null and void, 
consumer’s right to written complaints (Art 10 CpA), 
administrative procedure or traders misdemeanour 
responsibility(Art 138-140 CpA) 
Cyprus Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
The main difference is the prior consultation obligation that 
exists in the law transposing the ID but not in the laws 
transposing the individual Directives. Another is that the 
injunction procedure under the law transposing the UCTD 
allows for an injunction to be sought against trader 
associations while the law transposing the ID does not do so. 
There is no provision in any of the relevant laws that seeks to 
ensure coherence and this is problem identified in the 
report.   
Czech 
Republic 
No, single procedure  
 
The procedure do not go beyond measures foreseen by the 
ID 
Denmark  No, single procedure   
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There is a possibility of administrative procedure under § 64 
of the Consumer Protection Act (issuing a precept and if the 
trader is not complying with it, then applying a penalty 
payment) as well as a court procedure. Both procedures go 
beyond the ID as they are available for all forms of violations 
of collective consumer interests. 
As court procedure has been used only once (in an unfair 
terms case) then practical problems concerning the 
coherence between the procedures have not yet emerged. 
There have been discussions within the Consumer Protection 
Board whether using an unfair term could constitute an 
unfair commercial practice entitling the Consumer Protection 
Board to issue a precept (and possibly penalty payment) but 
there is no case law yet. 
Finland Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
The ID did not change the law in Finland, since injunctions 
were already available under the CPA and sector-specific 
legislation 
France  No, single procedure  
 
Art. L. 621-7 in combination with art. L. 621-8 C.conso. 
Germany Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
The general procedural rules are set out in the Civil 
Procedure Act (“Zivilprozessordnung”, ZPO). Additional 
provisions for the Injunction procedure are found in Sec. 5-
12a UKlaG. As leges speciales they supersede the general 
rules of the ZPO. However, pursuant to Sec. 5 UKlaG, the ZPO 
is applied complementarily for everything that is not 
particularly regulated by the UKlaG. As far as injunctions 
against unfair commercial practices are concerned, Secs. 8-
10 UWG contain the relevant provisions. 
Greece No, single procedure in a 
single legal act  
 
The collective action of art.10 par 16 of N.2251/94 can 
request not only an injunction but also for pecuniary 
compensation for moral damages, temporary injunction as 
well as the acknowledgement of the right of consumers to 
restore the damages they incurred from the illegal behaviour 
of the trader. It should be noted that only injunction and 
pecuniary compensation for moral damages are exercised 
under the voluntary jurisdiction procedure. 
Hungary Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
Injunctions procedures are regulated in various acts 
separately from the acts implementing the UCPD and the 
CRD.  
Note that the enforcement procedure of unfair contract 
terms is regulated in the Civil Code together with other 
provisions implementing the UCTD.  
Ireland Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
Drafted in compliance with Directive 2009/22/EC. 
Application is made by qualified entities to the Circuit Court.  
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Italy Yes, separate procedures in 
a single legal act 
 
 
Art. 139 and 140 of the Consumer Code entitle the consumer 
associations listed in Art. 137 of the Consumer Code the 
power to ask a court to putting an end to abusive conducts 
which harm consumers’ interests. In any case, relating to the 
implementing provisions of the mentioned directives, there 
is provided an additional protection system, which gives to 
the consumers’ associations the power to ask the 
administrative authority for an injunction (in particular: Art. 
27 Consumer Code concerning the violation of the 
implementing provisions of the UCPD; Art. 37 bis Consumer 
Code concerning the violation of the implementing 
provisions of the UCTD; Art. 66 Consumer Code concerning 
the violation of the implementing provisions of CRD).  
Latvia Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
Injunction procedure is foreseen in Article 15 of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Prohibition Law, Article 25 of 
Consumer Rights protection Law, Article 213 of the Electronic 
Mass Media and Article 37 of the Cabinet of Ministers’ 
Regulations No. 378 Procedures for Advertising Medicinal 
Products and Procedures by Which a Medicinal Product 
Manufacturer is Entitled to Give Free Samples of Medicinal 
Products to Physicians 
Lithuania Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
Luxembourg No, single procedure   
Malta Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
administered by different 
public authorities (see next 
column) 
The majority of the Directives listed in the annex to the ID 
are dealt by the equivalent of the injunction powers 
(described as ‘compliance orders’ under Maltese law) of the 
Director General Consumer Affairs within the MCCAA. The 
DG can issue compliance orders with regard to the national 
laws implementing the following directives:  
UCPD 
UCTD 
Consumer Rights Directive 
Consumer Credit Directive 
Services Directive (2006/123/EC).  
The power to issue injunctions in relation to the other 
Directives listed in the annex of the ID is exercised by 
different sector specific authorities as described earlier.  
The procedures adopted in the applicable national legislation 
reflects to principal requirements of the ID and there is no 
substantial difference other than in the case of the injunction 
powers of the DG and of the MFSA are to some extent more 
feasible in so far as these authorities in the issue of 
injunction orders may also require any person to take any 
such measures as may be specified in the order in order to 
ensure effective compliance.  
The other point to note is that injunction order can be 
contested before diverse appellate fora which vary according 
to the authority which is issuing the order. Hence in the case 
of the Director General contestation of an injunction order 
may be lodged before the Consumer and Competition 
Appeals Tribunal, whereas contestation of an order by the 
MCA has to be lodged before the Administrative Review 
Tribunal.   
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
Civic Consulting  381 
Netherlands Yes and no The general procedure of Art. 3:305a – c DCC apply to all 
procedures, apart from the specific collective action 
procedure for unfair terms, which is regulated in Art. 6:240-
243 DCC. The Supreme Court recently decided, however, that 
this specific procedure does not derogate from the general 
procedure, which implies that the general procedure is 
available to consumer organisations also in case of unfair 
terms (but only can serve to have the terms declared unfair 
without further consequences). 
Art. 3:305a – c DCC offers standing in court for any 
association or foundation incorporated with the aim to 
represent the interests of consumers in any consumer 
related case. 
Poland Yes, separate procedures in 
a single legal act 
 
 
Act on protection of competition and consumers provides 
the President of the UOKiK with an authority to protect 
collective consumer interests. The President may thus start 
injunctions proceedings, negotiate with traders cessation of 
unfair practices etc. Article 99a (and further) of this Act 
regulate injunction proceedings against traders using unfair 
contract terms (see described in the text of the study). Art 
100 (and further) of this Act regulate injunction proceedings 
when traders harm other collective consumer interests. 
One of the main differences in the procedures is that in case 
of injunctions related to the use of unfair contract terms only 
certain, specified categories of entities are entitled to notify 
the President of the UOKiK about this (Article 99a of the Act). 
In case of infringements of provisions on unfair commercial 
practices or implementing CRD – anyone may serve this 
notification (Article 100 of the Act). In case of procedure 
against infringement of UCPD- or CRD-based rules, the 
President of the UOKiK may also issue a temporary injunction 
for the trader to cease with such a practice, when 
continuation of this practice until a decision is issued could 
severely harm consumer interests (Article 101a of the Act). 
Portugal Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
  
Law no. 25/2004 (July 8) implemented into national law the 
ID.  
The injunction procedure is set out in separate legislation: 
a) Law no. 24/96 (Consumer Protection Act – CPA) applies to 
all cases not covered by specific legislation.  
b) Decree-Law no. 446/85 covers unfair commercial terms. 
Decree-Law no. 446/85 only applies when there is no specific 
provision on the CPA. 
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Romania Injunction was introduced 
by a separate legal act in 
Romania: Government 
Decision no. 1553/2004 
subsequently amended by 
Government Decision no 
1822/2004; Government 
Decision no. 957/2008 on 
modification of the Annex of 
Decision no.1822/2004; 
Government Decision no. 
404/2010, Government 
Decision no. 795/2011. 
However, no special 
procedure is provided for in 
the implementing act, thus 
the procedures under the 
laws enlisted in the annex to 
Government Decision 
1553/2004 will apply in case 
of an injunction that only 
provides a single procedural 
rule, the 20 day timeframe 
within which the authority 
must solve the complaints.  
The framework law does not go beyond the provisions of the 
ID.  
Injunction is not a separate procedure from the enforcement 
procedures of the implementing laws mentioned in the 
Annex of Government Decision no. 1553/2004 that enlists 13 
legal acts for which an injunction is allowed. This annex does 
not go beyond the Annex of the ID.  
 
 
Slovakia Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
There are 4 procedures in cases of breach of collective 
interests of consumers:  
1) Interim measure (summary proceeding) ordered by STI 
(under sec 21 CPA)  
2) Interim measure ordered (summary proceeding) by The 
National Bank of Slovakia (in sector of financial services)  
3) Interim measure (summary proceeding) ordered by court 
(without specific provision)  
4) Judgment ordered by court in review of unfairness of 
contract terms and unfairness of commercial practices 
(under sec 301-306 CDPC) 
Slovenia No, single procedure The scope of protection provided by an action for an 
injunction as regulated in the Consumer Protection Act is 
broader than the one foreseen by the Injunctions Directive. 
Art. 74 (1) of the Consumer Protection Act stipulates that an 
action for an injunction may be commenced in cases, where 
companies are using unfair terms, business practices or 
advertising activities contrary to this act and the act on the 
protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices, 
the act on consumer credit, the acts governing medicine and 
media, and by doing this are damaging the collective 
interests of consumers.  
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Spain Yes, separate procedures in 
a single legal act 
Act 3/1991 regulates (1) standing, (2) statute of limitations 
and (3) preliminary proceedings for actions against unfair 
commercial practices, including injunctions 
Act 7/1998 regulates collective actions against standard 
terms contrary to the law, including injunctions. It refers to 
(1) the possibility to submit the case to a previous 
conciliation; (2) standing and (3) statute of limitation 
Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 regulates injunctions 
specifically. It contains rules on national and cross-border 
injunctions as well as standing and statute of limitations.  
All these rules contain cross-references to external legal texts 
(usually, Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 and Act 1/2000).  
Act 1/2000 does not provide for tailor-made rules for 
injunctions (id est, a single procedure), but general rules on 
civil procedure. 
Sweden Yes, separate procedures in 
a single legal act 
The relevant procedure is regulated in a single legal act, as a 
single procedure and these procedure does not go beyond 
measures foreseen by the ID. 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
As noted above in the report, there is some scope from 
streamlining the procedures in the Enterprise Act 2002 with 
other enforcement provisions (e.g. under the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015). 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on the Injunctions Directive.  
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Table 23: Overview table of entities entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction in the Member States 
MS Answer Comments 
AT - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Competitors 
To the extent injunctions against unfair commercial practices 
(regardless whether misleading, aggressive commercial practices or 
comparative advertisement) are at issue, the following entities are 
entitled under Sec. 14 UWG: 
Business associations and government bodies, such as the Austrian 
Chamber of Commerce, the Federal Office of Competition, the Federal 
Labour Chamber, the Austrian Labour Union Association and the 
Chamber of Agriculture. 
To the extent unfair contract terms are at issue, the following entities 
are entitled under Sec. 29 KSchG: Austrian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Federal Labour Chamber, the Austrian Labour Union Association, the 
Austrian Farmworker Council and the Chamber of Agriculture, the 
“Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI)” and the “Seniorenrat”. 
Pursuant to Sec. 14 para. 2 UWG and Sec. 29 para. 2 KSchG, designated 
consumer organisations are entitled to seek an injunction for, 
infringements of both the UCPD and the UCTD. However, please note 
that even if there are entitled public bodies, Austria does not have a 
public enforcement system. The entitled bodies have to bring their 
claims before a civil law court. 
BE - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Individual consumers 
Persons who can apply for an injunction are listed in XVII.7 CEL.  
BG - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
 
HR - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Other  
1. Designated public bodies: Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Maritime, Ministry of Health and Agency for Electronic 
Media  
2. Croatian Union of Consumer Protection Organisations-Potrošač 
Union of Organizations for Protection of Croatian’s Consumers 
3. HAKOM as a regulatory authority is entitled to initiate proceedings 
CY - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
 
CZ - Authorized/registered 
consumer associations 
(6 organizations) 
1.Association of Czech Consumers, 2.dTest, 3. Consumer Defense 
Association – Syndicate, 4. Common defense, 5. Unicampus, 6. HELP - 
Cheated Consumers' Rights Association 
DK  - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Individual consumers 
- Other  
[the plaintiff must have a 
sufficient interest in the 
case] 
The ID is implemented in Act no. 1257 of 20 December 2000. It grants 
designated (foreign) authorities and organisation the right to to use the 
normal Danish procedure for injunctions. 
EE - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
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FI - Designated public bodies  
FR - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
The competence of the DGCCRF to bring an action seeking an injunction 
is based on Regulation 2006/2004, not on the ID. 
DE - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- business organisations 
Pursuant to Sec. 3 para. No 2 UKlaG also entitled are: Associations with 
legal personality for the promotion of commercial interests, insofar as 
their membership includes a considerable number of businesses 
marketing goods or commercial services of the same or a similar type 
on the same market, insofar as their staffing, material and financial 
resources enable them actually to perform the interest promotion 
functions laid down in their statutes. 
GR - Specified consumer 
associations (Ν.2251/94, 
art.10 par.16) 
Consumer associations that have at least 500 active members and are 
enrolled in the consumer organisation register for at least a year. 
It is possible for two or more consumer associations of less than 500 
active members to bring an action jointly, provided that the number of 
their combined members is 500 (Ν.2251/94, art.10 par.17) 
HU - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Individual consumers 
 
Note that Section 6:105 of the Civil Code empowers a number of 
enforcement agents to commence injunctions procedures, i.e. the public 
prosecutor; the minister, or the head of any autonomous government 
authority, government office or central office; the head of the Budapest 
and county government offices and professional chambers and 
organizations (but the Civil Code does not implement the ID). 
IE  Qualified entities are defined in the Directive for Member States other 
than Ireland. In Ireland The Competition and Consumer Protection 
Commission is the only body that can use the Directive as an 
enforcement mechanism.  
IT - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Other 
Consumers’ associations pursuant to Article 137, associations 
representing professionals, and Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Crafts 
and Agriculture 
LV - Designated public bodies 
 
Consumer Rights Protection  Centre can bring this action upon request 
of the responsible authorities and institution mentioned in list of 
Directive No.2009/22/EK, Article 4(3)  
Also Health Inspectorate (in accordance with Directive 2005/29 in area 
of medicine and Directive 2001/83/EC); Council of National  Electronic 
Media (Directive 89/552/EEC) 
LT - the SCRPA (a designated 
public body) 
- consumer associations, 
complying with statutory 
requirements. 
- in cases prescribed by 
laws: other state or 
municipal institutions and 
legal entities  
Individual consumers may also submit a claim to the court and seek an 
injunction, however such claims are regulated by general rules of civil 
procedure and are not subject to requirements of legal acts 
implementing the Injunctions Directive. 
LU - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations (see code de 
la consommation, articles 
L.313-& L.313-2) 
- Individual consumers 
- Other : professional 
organisation 
Individual consumers and professional organisation are entitled to bring 
an action seeking an injunction in UCPD and UCTD matters 
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MT In accordance with article 
2 of the Consumer Affairs 
Act , a ‘qualified entity’ – 
namely: 
A consumer association 
registered in accordance 
with Part IV of the 
Consumer Affairs Act (Cap. 
378). The Minister may 
furthermore include any 
other voluntary 
organisation under this 
heading after consulting 
with the Consumer Affairs 
Council,  
an independent public 
body which has a 
legitimate interest in 
ensuring the protection of 
the collective interests of 
consumer in Malta or any 
other Member State 
(‘MS’) where such bodies 
exist, 
a voluntary organisation in 
any other MS whose 
purpose is to protect the 
collective interests of 
consumers  
Any qualified entity from 
any other MS including in 
the list of qualified entities 
published in the Official 
Journal of the EU.    
As explained earlier the Injunctions Directive has been implemented in 
different laws depending on the subject matter. The majority of the 
Directives listed in the Annex to the Injunctions Directives are catered 
for in Cap. 378.  
 
In the other instances the approach taken in identifying which entities 
are entitled to make an action seeing an injunction is similar to that 
under article 2 of Cap. 378 (cited in the first column). See for example 
the definition of ‘qualified entity’ reg.2 of  Distance Selling (Retail 
Financial Services) Regulations (SL330.07).  
NL Foreign qualified entities 
(Art. 3:305c DCC) 
Other  
For national cases, any association or foundation with legal personality 
can bring claims (Art. 3:305c DCC.). For cross-border claims by foreign 
entities the requirement of qualified foreign entity listed in their country 
of origin  applies (Art. 3:305c DCC). 
 
PL - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Individual consumers 
- Other  
Under Article 100 of the above-mentioned Act – anyone may notify the 
President of the UOKiK, who then may seek an injunction. 
Under Article 99a of the above-mentioned Act – individual consumers, 
consumer ombudsmen, ombudsmen of the insured, consumer 
associations and foreign organisations entitled to start injunction 
proceedings may notify the President of the UOKiK, who then may seek 
an injunction. 
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PT National injunctions: 
- Designated public bodies 
(Prosecutor’s Office and 
Directorate-General for 
Consumers); 
- Consumer associations; 
- Trade associations; 
- Individual consumers. 
Cross-border injunctions: 
- Designated public bodies 
(Prosecutor’s Office and 
Directorate-General for 
Consumers); 
- Consumer associations 
included in a list notified 
to the European 
Commission. 
Article 13, CPA and article 26, no. 1, Decree-Law no. 446/85. 
Articles 3 to 5, Law no. 25/2004. 
RO Designated entities 
(consumer associations 
entitled by law to 
represent the collective 
interest of the consumers. 
 
SK - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
 
Under sec 302 CDPC qualified entities are consumer associations or 
supervisory authorities stated in special statutes (e. g. STI, The National 
Bank of Slovakia). Abstract control in consumer affairs under CDPC is 
limited to review only unfair contract terms and unfair commercial 
practice in consumer contracts. 
Under sec 21 CPA a qualified entity is a consumer association – an 
interim measure ordered by STI in cases of collective interests in 
consumer law in general. STI can initiate proceedings ex officio, too. 
Under 35e para 3 Act No 747/2004 Coll. National Bank of Slovakia can 
order interim measures ex officio in cases of breaches of collective 
interests of financial consumers 
SI - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Other  
Pursuant to Art. 75 of the Consumer Protection Act also a commercial 
association or chamber, in which the defendant is a member, are 
entitled to bring an action seeking an injunction.  
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ES - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Individual consumers 
- Other  
- Designated public bodies (National Institute of Consumer Affairs and 
its counterparts in the Regions and Local Governments, Chambers of 
Commerce): Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 53 of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
- Specified consumer associations: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 
7/1998, 11 of Act 1/2000, 53 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
- Consumers: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991 (individual consumers, natural or 
legal persons), 6 and 11 of Act 1/2000 (individual consumers, natural or 
legal persons; groups of consumers whose members are determined or 
easily determined); 
- Associations, professional corporations or representatives of economic 
interests: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998; 
- Organisations from other EU Member States that protect collective 
and the diffuse interests of consumers and users: Articles 32 of Act 
3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 53 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
-The Public Prosecutor: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 11 
of Act 1/2000, 53 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007. 
SE  
 
A public body or a consumer organisation, according to a special list 
organized by the European Union and published in Official Journal 
UK - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
See, in particular, ss.213 and 219C. See also Enterprise Act 2002 (Part 8) 
(Designation of the Consumers' Association) Order 2005/917. 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on the Injunctions Directive. 
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Table 24: Overview table of sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction 
order in the Member States  
MS Answer Comments 
AT Yes, a penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
Regarding Art. 2 (1) b: Publication of decisions is possible in some cases. 
Regarding Art. 2 (1) c: The EO foresees, for instance, fines as sanctions.  
Under both the EO and Sec. 220 ZPO, the federal government is the 
beneficiary of the fines. 
BE Yes, other sanction  
 
If the losing party does not comply with the injunction, the President of 
the commercial court may, at the request of the plaintiff, impose a 
penalty payment. The fine is paid to the public purse.   
BG Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
Article 226 the Consumer Protection Act – fine with an amount from 
5000 BGN up to 25,000 BGN. The penalty is paid to the state. 
HR Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
According to Art 116 (4) CpA a fine (money penalty) will be paid to the 
state treasury (the public purse) 
CY Yes, other sanction  Fine, imprisonment or confiscation of property.  Fine is paid to the 
public purse. This is according to Section 42, Law 14/60, which is 
adopted for the purposes of the injunction procedure by Section 6 of the 
law transposing the ID 
CZ Theoretically yes, § 351 (1) 
Act 99/1963 Sb. 994 
Max. 100.000 CZK (approx. EUR 3700) 
DK  Violation of an injunction 
may trigger penalty of a 
fine or imprisonment up 
to 4 months 
Fines are paid to the state. 
EE No, no sanction No specific sanction but the court may order a fine for non-compliance 
FI Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
 
FR Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
To the public purse (‘astreintes’) 




Under German law it is usually deemed necessary that the infringer sign 
a cease and desist declaration with a penalty clause due to the 
otherwise existing risk of repetition. This is paid to the claimant. 
Moreover, the claimant can ask for a fine (paid to the national budget) 
if the infringer violates this injunction, Sec. 890 para. 2 ZPO. 
GR Yes, other sanction  It is possible to request the temporary enforcement of the injunction 
order (N.2251/94, art.10 par.20). If granted, and the trader does not 
conform there is the threat of a penalty of up to 100.000€ and up 
imprisonment up to 1 year (ΚΠολΔ, art.947). The penalty would be paid 
to the plaintiff, the consumer organisation. 
HU No, no sanction  
                                           
994 While the possibility exists, no example of the application of this rule was found. 
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IE Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
 
The amount is to be specified in the Court Order and the payment is 
made to the Irish Exchequer (Central Fund). If payment is not made, the 
competent Minister may recover sum due as a simple contract debt.  
IT Yes, pecuniary sanction Art. 140, Para 7 Consumer Code provides for non-compliance with the 
injunction order a sanction of an amount between EUR 516 and 
EUR 1032 for each non fulfilment or day of delay. The aforementioned 
amounts have to be paid to the Italian State Budget. 
LV Yes, other sanction Sanctions are provided in the Latvian Administrative Violation Code. 
Article 1759 provides  In the case of the non-provision of information at 
the disposal of a person to an advertisement or consumer rights 
protection supervisory institution after a request therefrom within a 
specified time period and in the specified amount or of the provision of 
false information, as well as of the non-fulfilment of the lawful requests 
or decisions of the supervisory institution –a fine shall be imposed on 
natural persons in an amount up to EUR 700, but for legal persons – 
from EUR 70 up to EUR 14 000. Also Unfair Commercial Practices 
Prohibition Law provides for the sanctions. Article 15 states that 
supervising institution shall impose the fine for unfair commercial 
practice in amount of 10% of the annual turnover but not more than 
EUR 100 000 
LT Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
The legal acts transposing the Directive do not contain any specific 
provision. However, under general rules of Lithuanian civil procedure, in 
cases where the respondent does not complies with an injunction, the 
court may issue a fine of up to EUR 289 for each day of non-compliance. 
LU Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
Penalties should be paid to the plaintiff 
MT Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance and other 
sanction  
In the case of compliance orders und Cap. 378 the DG (Consumer 
Affairs) may impose both a one off administrative fine and /or a daily 
administrative fine (see art. 106A of Cap. 378).  
Administrative fines may also be imposed under the other sector 
specific laws implementing the injunctions directive – see for example 
reg. 13 of SL 409.17 and reg. 24 of SL 330.07. 
NL Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
To be paid to claimant 
PL Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
Pursuant to Article 107 of the Act, for every day of non-compliance the 
President of the UOKiK may fine a trader with a monetary fine of an 
equivalent of up to EUR 10 000 
PT Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance (periodic 
penalty payment) 
Article 10, no. 2, CPA. 
The fine is divided in equal parts between the State and the applicant. 
RO The competent authorities 
apply the sanctions 
provided in the specific 
legislation that has been 
infringed.  
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SK Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance and other 
sanction  
 
In a court procedure the dictum of the judgment in case of abstract 
control in consumer contracts is binding for everyone (sec 306 CDPC). It 
constitutes an enforcement order and the enforcement authority is 
entitled to impose fine up to EUR 30 000 to the trader for the violation 
of that judgment (sec 192 para 1 Enforcement Act). The fine is paid to 
state. The National Bank of Slovakia can cancel a license (permission) if 
a person in the sector of financial services violates the court decision 
In an administrative procedure –  
1. STI can impose a fine for breaches of consumer rights under CPA 
(including collective interests of consumer) up to EUR 66 400, in cases of 
repeated violations within twelve months up to EUR 166 000 (sec 24 
para 1 CPA).  
2. The National Bank of Slovakia can cancel a license (permission) for a 
person who is entitled to provide financial services. It can also impose 
fines, up to EUR 700 000, in cases of repeated violations up to 
EUR 1 400 000 (sec 35g para 1  and sec 35f para 1 and 2 Act No 
747/2004 Coll. Fines are paid to the state (Slovak Republic). STI can 
prohibit the trader from selling a product or providing services to 
consumers for up to three years in cases when the seller violates a 
previous decision within 12 months. 
SI Yes, sanctions in form of 
fine 
Art. 226 and 227 of the Claim Enforcement and Security Act provide the 
procedure for execution of claims in cases of omissions. Pursuant to 
these articles the court orders the debtor to stop his activity, together 
with penalty for the case of acting against the order, for natural persons 
up to 10.000 EUR and for legal entities and sole traders up to 500.000 
EUR, with regard to circumstances of every particular case; if the debtor 
acts against the order, the court executes the penalty (fine) and sets the 
next one higher. This can be repeated until the amount reaches 10 
times the first penalty. 
ES Yes, penalty of a fine for 
each day of non-
compliance 
 
According to Article 711 of Act 1/2000, a judgement upholding an 
injunction will impose a fine ranging from EUR 600 to EUR 60 000 of 
delay in the enforcement of the judgement within the time limit set 
forth therein. The amount of this fine will depend on the nature and 
relevance of the damage caused and the economic capacity of the party 
who has been condemned. Such fine shall be paid to the Public 
Treasury. 
SE No, no sanction  
UK Yes, other sanction A fine and potentially imprisonment (see s.220 and Phillimore v. Surrey 
County Council [2010] EWCA Civ 61). 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on the Injunctions Directive. 
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Table 25: Overview table of parties bearing the costs of an injunction 
procedure in the Member States  
MS Answer Comments 
AT The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
Regarding proceedings instituted by privately organised qualified 
entities, Sec. 40 seqq. ZPO establishes that each party has to first bear 
its costs itself unless the costs have been induced by both or by the 
court in the interest of both. In the case of the latter, both have to 
commonly bear the costs. The party which loses the case has to 
reimburse the opposite party’s legal costs. Where each party succeeds 
on some and fails on other aspect of the case, costs have to be shared 
proportionally.  
BE Costs are borne by the 
losing party 
The Judge may however take circumstances into account and exempt 
the losing party from paying part of the costs. 
BG The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
 
HR The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
 
CY The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
But by virtue of Section 43 of the Courts Law, Law 14/60, the court has 
full discretion to decide who (and to what extent) is to bear the costs of 
civil proceedings. 
CZ The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
 
DK  The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
 
EE The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
Certain deviations made by the court possible 
FI The qualified entities are 
exempted from costs  
 
FR The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
Art. 700 Code de procédure civile («condamnation aux dépens»). 
Not all the costs will however be covered. 
DE The costs are in general 
borne by the losing party 
 
This is the general rule in German civil procedure (Sec. 91 ZPO), which is 
applicable under Sec. 5 UKlaG. There is no exception for qualified 
entities. However, qualified entities which are expected to cope without 
a lawyer in average cases can only receive a lump sum fee if they win. 
This is, for example, currently set at 230 EUR for the 
Wettbewerbszentrale. Please note that qualified entities are to certain 
extent funded by the federal government and are therefore able to bear 
the risk of losing in court. 
GR The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
 
HU - The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
-The qualified entities are 
exempted from costs  
- Some administrative 
procedures in front of 
public authorities are free 
of charge. 
Consumer protection organizations are exempted from the costs of 
court procedure under Section 5 paragraph 1 subparagraph b) of Act 
XCIII of 1990 on Fees. 
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IE  S.I. No. 555 of 2010 specifies that ‘nothing in the regulations affects the 
Court’s power to make an order for costs’. However, as these 
Regulations have never been invoked in an Irish court, there is no 
answer possible to this question.  
IT The costs are normally 
borne by the unsuccessful 
party 
 
LV The qualified entities are 
exempted from costs  
Article 25(11) of the Consumers Rights Protection Centre: The Consumer 
Rights Protection Centre, in recovering expenses in respect of the 
laboratory or other type of expert-examination of goods purchased or 
services utilised by consumers, shall be released from the payment of 
court costs. 
LT The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
If the claim is submitted for the protection of a public interest, the 
claimants are exempt from stamp duty (Article 83(1)(5)). Thus, all 
entities filing a claim under the legal acts implementing the Injunctions 
Directive are exempt from stamp duty. However, if they lose the case, 
the costs (litigation expenses) of the opposing party will still be borne by 
the losing party. 
LU Each party bears its own 
costs, the court estimate is 
inequitable to let a part of 
the costs to a party 
 
MT - The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
- Each party bears its own 
costs 
-The qualified entities are 
exempted from costs  
Each party bears its own costs in relation to the procedures before the 
competent regulatory authority. If the decision of the regulatory 
authority in relation to the issue of the compliance order is contested 
before the competent appellate forum – provisionally each party will 
bear its own costs – however the competent adjudicative body may 
decide on the matter of costs in favour of one party or the other. 
There are no exemptions as to who bears the costs in such proceedings.  
NL The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
Cost shifting rules are operated on the basis of modest tariffs, not full 
cost orders 
PL - The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
-The qualified entities are 
exempted from costs  
Pursuant to Article 77 of the above-mentioned Act trader who was 
found infringing the provision of the Act is bound to pay the costs of an 
injunction procedure. Para 2 of this provision specified that in justified 
circumstances traders may be obliged to pay the costs only partially or 
not at all.  
Article 78 specifies that regardless of the outcome of the procedure, 
traders may be obliged to pay costs resulting from their obviously 
wrongful behaviour (e.g. hiding information). 
Pursuant to Article 58 para 2 of the above-mentioned Act, if one of the 
parties asks of an expert’s opinion they may be obliged to pay a deposit 
to cover some of the expert’s costs. If no practice harming collective 
consumer interests is found, these expert’s costs are covered by the 
State Treasury, Article 58 para 3.  
PT - Consumer associations 
and consumers:  The costs 
are as a rule borne by the 
losing party. 
- Designated public 
bodies: Exemption from 
court costs.  




Article 4, no. 1, pars. a) and g), Decree-Law no. 34/2008. This exemption 
does not apply to other costs (e.g. with attorneys). 
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RO This is established in the 
laws that fall under 
injunction. Most of these 




SK The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
 
SI The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party. 
 
ES - Costs are as a rule borne 
by the losing party: 
Articles 394.1 (first 
instance) and 398.1 
(appeal) of Act 1/2000 
- Each party bears its own 
costs and share common 
costs if cases are partially 
upheld or dismissed: 
Article 394.2 of Act 1/2000 
-The qualified entities are 
exempted from costs: 
Second Additional 
Provision of Act 1/1996 
The costs are as a rule borne by the losing party, unless the case poses 
serious de facto or de iure doubts. 
If the upholding or dismissal is partial in the first instance, each party 
shall pay the costs involved in his proceedings and the common costs 
shall be shared equally, unless there are reasons to impose the costs on 
one of these as she litigated recklessly. In appeal, none of the litigants 
shall be ordered to pay the costs of appeals. 
Consumer associations are exempted from costs without having to 
prove lack of sources to bring a claim (Second Additional Provision of 
Act 1/1996). A new Project of Law on Legal Aid  (Ministry of Justice, 
2014) intended to limit the application of this exemption to 
superregional consumer associations, legally established and registered 
in the State Registry of Consumer Associations. 
SE The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing party 
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UK Which? noted: ‘Court 
action in the UK is very 
expensive. Not only does 
the enforcer have to bear 
its own costs of bringing 
proceedings, if the 
enforcer loses the action 
then it also has to pay the 
trader’s legal costs, which 
could be very significant. 
This problem is often 
exacerbated by an 
inequality of arms as 
between a consumer 
organisation or public 
enforcer on the one hand, 
and a large corporation 
with a substantial 
litigation budget on the 
other…The Directive itself 
is silent on costs. For 
Which?, the cost of 
litigating, and our 
exposure to the risk of 
paying the trader’s costs, 
has inevitably been a key 
consideration when 
contemplating action. The 
same is true for Trading 
Standards, who tell us that 
pursuing civil cases is 
often too costly for them, 
and that adverse costs risk 
– particularly in the 
context of falling local 
authority budgets – is a 
significant factor in 
deterring actions. 
Importantly, Trading 
Standards do not have 
rights of audience in the 
civil courts (as opposed to 
the criminal courts, where 
they do) which means 
they have the additional 
cost of hiring counsel.’ 
 
 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on the Injunctions Directive. 
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Table 26: Overview table of whether effects of individual injunctions orders 
are extended to the future infringements and/or same or similar illegal 
practices (of other traders) in the Member States  
MS Answer Comments 
AT No According to Austrian law court decisions have effect only inter partes with 
regard to the subject matter in dispute, Sec. 411 ZPO, Sec. 12 ABGB.  
BE Yes Note: The President of the Commercial Court can issue an order even when 
the infringement has ceased ‘as long as the risk of repetition of the 
infringement cannot objectively be excluded’ (Case 1986-87, Court of 
cassation, 14 November 1986; Court of cassation, 29 May 2009.) 
BG No  
HR No Under Art 117(1) CpA the effects of the decision in which there is an 
individual injunctions order is also extended to the future infringements 
and/or same or similar illegal practices of the  trader against which the 
procedure was initiated  towards all consumers 
CY No  
CZ To the same illegal 
practice of the same 
traders to other 
consumers - 
Theoretically yes 
according § 159a (2) 
Act 99/1963 
No existence of practical experiences  
DK  Yes An identical illegal practice would be considered a failure to comply with the 
injunction. 
EE No  
FI Yes Injunction on pain of fine 
FR Yes 
 
The erga-omnes effect of injunctions against unfair terms is laid down in art. 
L. 524-1(2) and (3), L. 621-2(2), L. 621-8(2) C.conso. 
DE Yes Actually, a judgment in a civil law case binds only the parties themselves 
(“inter partes”). However Sec. 11 UKlaG deviates from this general rule 
stating that a trader cannot rely on a trading term that has been held unfair 
previously. 
GR Yes and no 
 
Art.10 par. 20 of 2251/93 states that ‘the legal consequences of the decision 
arising from this decision are valid for everyone, even if they have not been 
litigant parties.’ It is accepted that this provision should be interpreted 
contractively so as not to conflict with the Greek law on res judicata. This 
means that individual consumers can invoke the injunction order for the 
violation e.g. an unfair term but it is ultimately not binding for the court. 
However, it is possible to extend the res judicata to all traders via the 
mechanism of N.2251/94, art.10 par.21. According to that provision, the 
Minister of Development, invoking reasons of public welfare may issue a 
decision (which is a law of the state), extending the res judicata of an 
irrevocable injunction order to all traders. 
HU No  
IE No  
IT See comment Individual injunctions orders may have a role as precedents, even if in the 
Italian legal system the precedent is in itself not binding. 
LV No  
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LT No Injunctions only cover the actions indicated in the injunction and are only 
directed at a specific trade (respondent). 
LU No  
MT Debateable  The relevant provision of the law empowers the DG to require any person 
engaging or proposing to engage in any unfair commercial practice to 
discontinue or refrain or to take any measures as may be specified in the 
order. One may argue that such a provision can be applied to all persons who 
may be engaging in such a practice. To date however there has been no 
specific order in this regard and consequently there is no case law which may 
assist in interpreting this provision. (See art. 94(1) of Cap. 378).    
NL No No ex parte effects. However, the injunction claim can have informal res 
judicata effect on the points of law to benefit of others in similar cases 
PL - Yes 
- No 
The injunction order is extended to past and future practices of the same 
trader against other consumers, but not to practices of other traders. 
PT Yes (trader 
concerned) 
No (other traders) 
Injunction orders are limited to the same or similar unfair terms used by the 
trader concerned (article 32, no. 2, Decree-Law no 446/85). 
RO No  
SK Yes 
 
It is applied only in court procedure and is limited to unfairness of contract 
terms and commercial practices. Under sec 306 CDPC dictum of the judgment 
in abstract control of consumer contracts is binding for everyone. 
In individual cases, under 53a CC,  if the court determined some contractual 
condition in the consumer contract made in multiple cases, and it is usual 
that the consumer does not affect the content of the contract in a significant 
way, or in the general business conditions, to be invalid due to the 
unacceptability of such condition, or did not award the performance to the 
provider due to such condition, the provider shall refrain from using such 
condition or any condition with the same meaning in contracts with all 
consumers. The provider shall have the same obligation even if the court 
ordered the provider to render the consumer unjust enrichment, compensate 
for damages or pay adequate financial compensation on grounds of such 
condition. The legal successor of the provider shall have the same obligation. 
SI No  
ES No  
SE No  
UK Yes 
 
See s.217(6): ‘A person complies with this subsection if he—(a) does not 
continue or repeat the conduct; (b) does not engage in such conduct in the 
course of his business or another business; (c) does not consent to or connive 
in the carrying out of such conduct by a body corporate with which he has a 
special relationship (within the meaning of section 222(3)).’ 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on the Injunctions Directive. 
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Table 27: Overview of Member States that have taken specific measures 
regarding the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement  
MS Answer Comments 
AT Yes Sec. 25 UWG indicates that in certain cases it is possible (in other cases 
mandatory) to order the publication of the court’s decision at the expense of 
the convicted party. Via Sec. 30 KSchG this provision in the UWG also applies 
to injunctions against unfair contract terms and injunctions pursuant to Sec. 
28a KSchG. 
BE Yes At the request of the plaintiff, the President of the commercial Court may 
order the publication of his decision or a summary of it (Art.XVII.4 CEL). 
Publication may be ordered only where it contributes to the cessation of the 
infringement (Art.XVII.4 CEL §2) 
BG Yes According to Article. 187 item 1 CPA. When consider that a commercial 
practice or action constitutes a violation of acts listed in Article  186 (to which 
the injunction procedure is applied), the court may  oblige the manufacturer, 
importer, trader and supplier to announce publicly  the decision or part 
thereof and / or to make a public corrective statement to remove the effect 
of the infringement. 
HR Yes 
 
According to Art 115 the court may order the defendant to publish the 
decision at its own expense   
CY No No other than mentioning the power of the court to order such publication 
CZ Theoretically yes, but 
the claimant should 
ask in his petition for 
publication 
§ 155 (4) Act 99/1963 
but just regarding 
unfair competition 
cases (incl. Unfair 
business practices)  
A  publication provision of court decision in general is missing  
DK  No  
EE Yes 
 
The conclusion of a court judgment whereby the person recommending 
application of a standard term is obliged to terminate recommending and to 
withdraw the recommendation of the term shall, in addition, set out the 
requirement to communicate the court judgment in the same manner as the 
recommendation was communicated. The court may require that the user of 
the standard terms communicate the court judgment in the manner 
determined by the court or may determine an additional manner for 
communication of the judgment (§ 443 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
FI Yes All decisions are published on the websites of the Competition & Consumer 
Authority 
FR Yes L. 621-11 C.conso. 
DE Yes 
 
This is governed by Sec. 7 UKlaG or alternatively Sec. 12 para. 3 UWG. If the 
claimant succeeds, he can apply for the publication of the judgment in the 
“Bundesanzeiger” at the defendant’s expense or at his own expense in any 
other medium. However, the decision is left to the discretion of the court, 
which also rules on the details of the publication.  
GR No Law only states that suitable publication of the decision or corrective 
statement can be order with no further qualifications 
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HU Yes Under Section 38 paragraph 6 of Act CLV of 1997 the court may order the 
publication of a statement, upon the claimants’ request. The court will decide 
on the content of the statement and the method of publication. Publication is 
in particular possible in a daily newspaper with country-wide distribution and 
on the Internet. 
Section 16/E of Act CVIII of 2001 contains detailed rules on the publication of 
an administrative decision. 
IE Yes The Circuit Court makes provision for publicity when making the order.  
IT Yes The decisions of the judges or of the admnistrative authority may be 
published on national newspapers. The decisions of the administrative 
authority may be published also on the institutional website of the authority.  
LV Yes Article 25(8) of the Consumer Rights Protection Law states that If a violation 
of the consumer rights has been determined, which affects group consumer 
interests (collective interests of consumers) and it may cause losses or harm 
to consumers, as well as to a particular consumer, the Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre, having evaluated the nature and essence of the violation, 
as well as other aspects, is entitled to carry out one or several following 
activities: 
1) to propose that the manufacturer, trader or service provider makes a 
commitment in writing to rectify the violation within the specified time 
period. In accordance with Article 151 of the Unfair Commercial Practice 
Prohibition Law (1) A written commitment is a document, which upon 
proposal of the Supervisory Authority is signed by the performer of 
commercial practices, committing to eliminate the detected violation within 
a specified time period. A written commitment may include the commitment 
of the performer of commercial activities: 
1) not to perform specific activities; 
2) to perform specific activities, also to provide additional information 
necessary in order to ensure the conformity of commercial practices with the 
requirements of this Law, to publish a notification in a communication 
medium conforming to the respective commercial practices, in which unfair 
commercial practices are withdrawn; 
3) to reimburse the losses caused to consumers. 
(2) Upon signing a written commitment in which the violation, as well as the 
way and time period for elimination thereof is indicated, the performer of 
commercial practices acknowledges that he or she has committed the 
violation detected. The written commitment shall be deemed received (enter 
into effect) from the moment when the Supervisory Authority has approved 
its acceptance, certifying in writing to the performer of commercial activities 
that the relevant measures are sufficient for elimination of the violation and 
its impact. The Supervisory Authority shall notify acceptance of the written 
commitment in accordance with the procedures laid down in the Law On 
Notification. The time period for elimination of the violation shall not exceed 
the time period necessary for the performer of commercial practices to take 
the intended measures and to ensure the conformity with the interests of 
consumers, and usually may not be longer than three months, except  
LT Yes Consumer associations and other state or municipal institutions or other 
legal entities must: 
(i) no later than within 5 working days from the day the court accepts the 
claim as admissible, inform the SCRPA. The SCRPA will publish the 
information on their website. 
(ii) no later than within 5 working days from the day the court issues a 
decision, to provide a copy of the decision to the SCRPA. The Authority, after 
the decision enters into effect, will publish the decision on their website. 
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LU Yes Publications can be order in and/or out of the point(s) of sales of the infringer 
and/or in newspapers and/or any other manner 
MT Yes 
 
Yes in the case of compliance orders under Cap. 378 the DG may require ‘any 
person’ to publish the order in full or in part in such form as the DG ‘consider 
to be appropriate and adequate’  
The DG may moreover require the publication of a corrective statement as 
may be required in the order.  
Cap. 378 further states that publication must be made in at least two daily 
newspapers and if appropriate in any other medium of communication and 
this at the expense of the person against whom the order is issued.  
If publication is not made then the DG may proceed to effect publication 
themselves in which case they are empowered to recover any covers relating 
thereto from the person against whom the order was made.  (See art. 101 of 
Cap. 378). 
Similar though not identical measures exist under the other national (sector 
specific) laws which implement the ID (see for example: reg. 20 of SL 330.07).  
NL No General rules apply 
PL Yes Pursuant to Article 23b of the Act if the President of the UOKiK assesses a 
standard contract term as unfair, the President may oblige the trader to issue 
a corrective statement in a form and with content as stated in the decision. 
The President of the UOKiK may also decide to publish the decision, partially 
or in full, at the trader’s expense. Article 26 of the Act states the same for 
other injunction procedures. 
PT Yes The decision is published automatically (article 11, no. 3, CPA). 
RO No   
SK Yes Under sec 305 para 2 CDPC the plaintiff is entitled to ensure the publication 
of the judgment in abstract control in consumer contracts in appropriate 
form. 
SI Yes Pursuant to Art. 74 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act the plaintiff can 
demand the legal decision to be published on the defendant’s costs. The 
court may decide whether and to what extent the reasons for the decision 
are published. 
ES Yes Total or partial publication of the decision and publication of a corrective 
statement are foreseen by Articles 32 of Act 3/1991 and 221.2 of Act 1/2000 
SE No  
UK Yes See, for example, s.217(8). 
Source: Country reports' fact sheets on the Injunctions Directive. 
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Annex VI Intervention logic of the EU consumer law and 
marketing Directives 
The following figure presents the revised intervention logic and shows the 
interlinkages between the directives in terms of general and specific objectives, inputs, 
outputs and the intended results and impacts.  
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Figure 11: Refined intervention logic of the EU consumer and marketing law directives  
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Annex VII Analytical framework 
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− Extent to which the principle-based approach 
under this Directive has been effective overall;  
− What are the practical benefits for consumers of 
the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive?  
− Extent to which the "black" and/or "grey" lists of 
unfair contract terms adopted in certain Member 
States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection compared to the purely indicative list 
of the Directive;  
− What are the effects of limiting a court decision 
establishing the unfairness of an unfair term to 
the individual relationship between the specific 
trader and the consumer? 
− What would be the expected outcome of 
extending the effect of such court decision to all 
contracts concluded with a given trader, or to all 
contracts containing the same contract term? 
− Extent to which the contractual transparency 
requirements under the Directive have 
contributed to a high level of consumer 
protection; 
− Is there scope for strengthening the requirement 
for clear and intelligible contract terms, for 
example by attaching contractual consequences 
to unclear and unintelligible contract terms? 
− Have the extensions of the application of this 
Directive (to individually negotiated terms or to 
terms on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter) put in place in certain Member 
States provided an advantage for consumer 
protection? 
− Assessment of stakeholders concerning the 
effectiveness of the principle-based approach 
− Identification of practical benefits of the 
indicative list of unfair terms for consumers 
− Assessment of stakeholders and legal experts 
concerning the extent to which the black/grey 
lists have contributed to a high level of consumer 
protection in the MS that have adopted them 
− Identification of possible benefits of: a) extending 
the effect of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, or to all contracts 
containing the same contract term; b) 
strengthening the requirement for clear and 
intelligible contract terms 
−  Assessment of the extent to which the 
contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive have contributed to a high level of 
consumer protection 
− Assessment of stakeholders and legal experts 
concerning the benefits of extending the 
application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main subject-matter) for 
consumer protection 
Stakeholder interviews with : 
− National consumer enforcement 
authorities 
− Responsible ministries 
− Relevant national regulatory 
authorities 
− National consumer organisations 
and EU umbrella associations 
− Business associations and EU 
umbrella associations 
Online consultation 
Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− Report on the implementation of 
the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive 
− Report on the integration of 
Directive 93/13 into the national 
legal systems 
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− Extent to which the principle-based approach 
under this Directive has been effective overall;  
− What are the practical benefits for consumers of 
the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this directive, in particular its 
application in practical cases? 
− What are the practical benefits for consumers 
arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial 
services and immovable property?  
− To what extent does the application of the 
Directive's rules in a) tackling misleading 
environmental claims; b) addressing misleading 
practices in the energy market lead to a higher 
level of consumer protection and practical 
benefits for consumers?  
− Extent to which there are practical benefits for 
consumers of a) using the "average consumer" as 
the reference point for assessing whether a 
commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; b) the specific protection of 
"vulnerable consumers" introduced by the 
Directive;  
− Have self-and co-regulation actions in EU MS or 
at EU level have been effective in addressing 
unfair commercial practices? 
− Assessment of stakeholders concerning the 
effectiveness of the principle-based approach 
− Practical cases in which the black list of unfair 
commercial practices annexed to this directive 
has led to benefits for consumers 
− Identification of the benefits for consumers 
arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial 
services and immovable property 
− Identification of the benefits for consumers 
arising from the application of the Directive's 
rules in a) tackling misleading environmental 
claims; b) addressing misleading practices in the 
energy market 
− Identification of self-and co-regulation actions in 
EU MS or at EU level that have (not) been 




Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− Study on the application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in the EU 
(2011) 
− Study on consumer vulnerability 
across key markets in the 
European Union 
− Consumer Market Study on 






− Are consumers are effectively informed about 
the unit selling price? 
− What are the effects of the regulatory choices/ 
derogations (e.g. for small retail shops) allowed 
by the Directive and applied by Member States? 
− Assessment of stakeholders whether consumers 
are effectively informed about the unit selling 
price 
− Proportion of consumers that attach importance 
to the unit selling price 
− Assessment of effects of the regulatory choices/ 




Legal analysis in 28 EU MS 
Consumer survey  
1.1.1d 
Injunctions 
− Has the Injunctions Directive on EU consumers 
led to a reduction in the number of 
− Stakeholder assessment of the contribution of 
the Injunctions Directive to a) reducing the 
Stakeholder interviews with: 
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
Directive infringements to consumer protection rules? 
−  Has the Injunctions Directive on EU consumers 
led to a reduction in consumers' detriment? 
− How has the number of injunctions initiated in 
each MS evolved since June 2011? 
− Extent to which specific national measures 
regarding the injunction procedure have been 
effective if taken by MS 
− To what extent has progress been made in 
removing obstacles compared to periods 
covered by the two previous Commission 
reports?  
− What obstacles to the effective use of the 
injunctions procedure remain across the EU?  
 
number of infringements to consumer protection 
rules; b) reducing consumers’ detriment 
−  Identification of two effective injunctions cases 
per MS taking place after June 2011  
− Estimation of the number of injunctions initiated 
in each Member State since June 2011, 
identifying: a) economic sectors most affected by 
the injunction actions; b) allegedly unlawful 
practice most challenged by the injunction 
actions; c) the number of injunction actions for 
infringements related to Internet and digital 
technologies; d) the number of purely national 
injunction actions; e) the number of injunction 
actions related to intra-EU cross-border 
infringements; f) the number of injunction 
actions having an extra-EU element; g) the 
number of cases in which a settlement with the 
alleged perpetrator of the infringement was 
reached 
− Analysis of the trends in the use of the injunction 
procedures 
− Assessment of the effectiveness of national 
measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a corrective 
statement, the effects of the injunction order, the 
sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction 
order and the prior consultation, if taken in MS 
− Assessment of obstacles to the effective use of 
the injunctions procedure, regarding a) the cost 
and the associated financial risks of injunction 
procedure; b) the real and perceived complexity 
of the injunction procedure in another MS; c) the 
length of actions sought by qualified entities in 
their own jurisdictions and in another MS; d) the 
effects of the injunction orders, including the 
cross-border effects; e) the effectiveness of the 
− National consumer enforcement 
authorities 
− Responsible ministries 
− Relevant national regulatory 
authorities 
− National consumer organisations 
and EU umbrella associations 
− Business associations and EU 
umbrella associations 
Online consultation 
Survey of qualified entities 
Legal analysis in 28 EU MS  
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− 2008 and 2012 Commission 
reports on the application of the 
Injunctions Directive  
− Study on the application of 
Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the protection of 
consumers’ interests (2011)  
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction 
orders; f) the possible difficulties with the 
enforcement of the injunction orders both at 
national and at EU level.  









− Extent to which the current scope of protection 
under the Directive (limited to the notion of 
'advertising') provides for the effective 
protection of businesses; 
− Which MS have gone beyond the minimum 
harmonisation requirements of the Directive, 
and how?  
− What are the effects of the minimum 
harmonisation provisions on misleading 
advertising?  
− Extent to which the principle-based approach to 
misleading advertising under this Directive has 
achieved business protection; 
− What are the practical benefits of a possible 
black list? 
− What are the effects of the full harmonisation 
provisions on comparative advertising?  
− Extent to which the comparative advertising 
rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing  
− Do the current rules on enforcement set in the 
Directive provide an effective enforcement 
framework, especially in the context of cross-
border transactions? 
− Stakeholder assessment of whether a) the 
current scope of protection under the Directive; 
b) the principle-based approach to misleading 
advertising under the Directive provides for the 
effective protection of businesses 
− Identification of MS that have gone beyond the 
minimum harmonisation provisions of the 
Directive and relevant national law provisions 
− Identification of (negative/positive) effects of 
using a) minimum harmonisation provisions on 
misleading advertising; b) full harmonisation 
provisions on comparative advertising 
− Identification of practical cases in which a 
possible black list would lead to benefits for 
business protection 
− Stakeholder assessment of whether the 
comparative advertising rules provide an 
effective legal framework for modern types of 
marketing 
− Identification of problems resulting from the 
current rules on enforcement of the Directive, 
e.g. in the context of cross-border transactions 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
Legal analysis in 28 EU MS 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including:  
− Impact assessment in the context 
of the review of Directive 
2006/114/EC concerning 
misleading and comparative 
advertising (2012) 
Eliminating 







− Has the application of the general fairness clause 
in different Member States shown disparities in 
their understanding of this principle? 
− What impact, if any, have these disparities had 
on cross-border trade? 
− To what extent have the extended indicative 
lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair contract 
terms adopted in certain Member States 
− Identification of disparities in the application of 
the general fairness clause in MS 
−  Identification of cases in which these disparities 
have had an impact on cross-border trade 
− Assessment of extent to which a) indicative, 
“black” and/or “grey” lists adopted in certain MS; 
b) other extensions of the application of this 
directive in certain MS represent a barrier to 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
Legal analysis in 28 EU MS 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including:  
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
represented a barrier to cross-border trade? 
− Degree to which other extensions of the 
application of this directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the 
adequacy of price and main subject matter) in 




− Report on the implementation of 
the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive 
− Report on the integration of 







− Has the application of the principle-based 
approach under the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive in different Member States shown 
disparities in their understanding of this 
principle? 
− If yes, have these disparities had an impact on 
cross-border trade? 
− What has been the effect of the uniform black list 
of unfair commercial practices annexed to the 
Directive on the free movement of goods and 
services?  
− Extent to which the minimum harmonisation 
derogation under the Directive allowing national 
rules on financial services and immovable 
property represents a barrier to cross-border 
trade 
− Identification of disparities in the application of 
the principle-based approach under the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive in MS 
− Identification of cases in which these disparities 
have had an impact on cross-border trade 
− Stakeholder assessment of the effect of the 
uniform black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to the Directive on the free movement 
of goods and services 
− Assessment of the extent to which the minimum 
harmonisation derogation under the Directive 
allowing national rules on financial services and 




Legal analysis in 28 EU MS 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including:  
− Study on the application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 









− Has the application of the principle-based 
approach under the Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive in different Member States 
shown disparities in their understanding of this 
principle? 
− Where the application of the principle-based 
approach in different Member States has shown 
such disparities, have they had an impact on 
cross-border trade?  
− Degree to which the minimum harmonisation 
character of the provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border 
trade 
− Identification of disparities in the application of 
the principle-based approach under the 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive in MS 
− Identification of cases in which these disparities 
have had an impact on cross-border trade 
− Assessment of the extent to which the minimum 
harmonisation character of the provisions on 
misleading advertising represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade 
− Assessment of the appropriateness of legal 
framework in cross-border trade provided by the 




Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including:  
− Impact assessment in the context 
of the review of Directive 
2006/114/EC concerning 
misleading and comparative 
advertising (2012) 
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
− Extent to which the fully harmonised provisions 
on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border 
trade for advertising 
− Has the lack of a cross-border enforcement 
mechanism in B2B relations constituted a barrier 
to cross-border trade? 
advertising  
− Stakeholder assessment of the effect of a lack of 
cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B 





− What are the effects of the provisions of the 
Injunctions Directive that facilitate the use of the 
injunction procedure for cross-border 
infringements (Article 4 of the Injunctions 
Directive)?  
− To what extent are consumer organisations that 
are qualified entities aware of: a) the legal 
possibility to bring injunction actions in another 
Member State; b) the procedural modalities of 
the injunction procedure in other Member 
States, as in particular demonstrated by their 
practical application 
− What are the trends in the approaches taken by 
qualified entities while developing strategies 
regarding injunction actions for cross-border 
infringements? 
− What are the modalities, advantages, and 
disadvantages of the cooperation between 
qualified entities a) from different EU MS, b) 
which are consumer organisations and which are 
independent public bodies? 
− Degree to which the Commission measures 
encouraging consumer organisations to better 
use injunctions procedures in a cross-border 
context (CoJEP I, CoJEP II and CLEF) have been 
effective 
− Identification of the effects of the provisions of 
the Injunctions Directive that facilitate the use of 
the injunction procedure for cross-border 
infringements (Article 4 of the Injunctions 
Directive) 
− Assessment of consumer organisations which are 
qualified entities (as defined by the Injunctions 
Directive) concerning their degree of awareness 
of a) the legal possibility to bring injunction 
actions in another Member State; b) the 
procedural modalities of the injunction 
procedure in other Member States 
− Identification of cases in which injunctions 
procedures have been used in a cross-border 
context 
− Analysis of the trends in the approaches taken by 
qualified entities  
− Identification of modalities, advantages, and 
disadvantages of the cooperation between 
qualified entities a) from different EU MS, b) 
which are consumer organisations and which are 
independent public bodies 
− Evolution in the number of cases in which 
injunctions procedures have been used in a 
cross-border context 
− Assessment concerning the effectiveness of 
Commission measures as evidenced by the 
reported number of injunctions in the last five 
years compared to previous reporting periods 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Survey of qualified entities  
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including:  
− Commission Reports on the 
application of the Injunctions 
Directive (2008 and 2012) 
− 2011 Study on the application of 
the Injunctions Directive 
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 







− Costs (including time) spent by consumers for 
obtaining redress when invoking the unfairness 
in a contract they concluded; 
− What are the benefits for consumers stemming 
from the minimum and fully harmonised 
consumer rules?  
− Expert estimate of costs (including time) borne 
by consumers obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness in a contract they concluded for a 
hypothetical example 
− Assessment of benefits for consumers resulting 
from the minimum and fully harmonised 
consumer rules 
Stakeholder interviews  
Legal analysis in 28 EU MS 








− What costs (including time) related to research 
are necessary to comply with the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, the Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive and the Price Indication 
Directive for traders a) engaged exclusively in 
domestic transactions; b) for traders involved in 
cross-border transactions; 
− What costs (including time) related to legal 
advice are necessary to comply with the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive, the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, the Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive and the Price 
Indication Directive for traders a) engaged 
exclusively in domestic transactions; b) for 
traders involved in cross-border transactions; 
− What are the other costs (including time) are 
involved in the compliance of traders with the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive, the Misleading 
and Comparative Advertising Directive and the 
Price Indication Directive for traders a) engaged 
exclusively in domestic transactions; b) for 
traders involved in cross-border transactions; 
− What are the costs for traders arising from the 
information obligations under the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive and the Price 
Indication Directive? 
− Degree to which these costs impact on the prices 
and availability of goods and services in selected 
− Costs (including time) reported by SMEs related 
to research and legal advice involved for traders 
to comply with the Directives 
− Costs (including time) reported by SMEs related 
other costs (including time) involved in the 
compliance of traders with the Directives 
− Assessment of traders regarding the extent to 
which the legal basis eliminating/constraining 
dishonest market practices has created benefits  
− Assessment of traders regarding the benefits 
resulting from the protection in B2B transactions 
under the Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive 
− Assessment of traders regarding the benefits for 
traders of using fair standard contract terms (in 
line with the Unfair Contract Terms Directive) 
exercising fair market practices in line with the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, e.g. in 
attracting consumers and gaining market share 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
SME interviews and analysis of 
results  
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− Report on the implementation of 
the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive 
− Study on the application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in the EU 
(2011) 
− 2008 and 2012 Commission 
reports on the application of the 
Injunctions Directive  
− Study on the application of 
Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the protection of 
consumers’ interests (2011) 
− Review of Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising (2012) 
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
markets  
− What benefits, if any, result from eliminating/ 
constraining dishonest market practices, such as 
the use of unfair contract term and unfair 
commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive?  
− What are the benefits for traders resulting from 
the protection in business-to-business 
transactions under the Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive?  
− What are the benefits of using fair standard 
contract terms (in line with the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive) and exercising fair market 












− Extent to which the information requirements in 
the consumer law directives regarding the 
advertising stage (specifically Art 7(4) of the 
UCPD) a) duplicate one another; b) complement 
each other; 
− To what degree are traders aware of the 
information requirements at the advertising 
stage? 
− Which costs arise for businesses as a result of the 
multiplicity of information obligations?  
− Analysis of the interplay between the existing 
information requirements of the EU consumer 
law directives regarding the advertising stage 
(specifically Art 7(4) of the UCPD)  
− Stakeholder assessment of the extent to which 
these information requirements a) duplicate one 
another; b) complement each other 
− Stakeholder assessment regarding the awareness 
of traders of these information requirements  
− Identification of costs arising for businesses as a 
result of the multiplicity of information 
obligations  
Stakeholder interviews  
Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
SME interviews 
Analysis of costs (EU Standard Cost 
Model/Compliance Cost 
Assessment) 
Review of relevant previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 












− What is the legal and practical interplay between 
the Injunctions Directive and the CPC 
Regulation? 
− What has been the impact of the application of 
the CPC Regulation on a) the use of injunction 
procedure, as defined by the Directive; and b) on 
the number of injunction actions for 
infringements having a cross-border dimension 
brought by public bodies and organisations? 
− Analysis of the legal and practical interplay 
between the Injunctions Directive and CPC 
Regulation 
− Evolution of the use of injunction procedures 
since the adoption of the CPC regulation 
(including injunctions actions for infringements 
having a cross border dimension) 
− Stakeholder assessment of the need for further 
steps in order to ensure the coherence between 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Survey of qualified entities  
Review of relevant previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies.  
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
− To what extent is there a need for further steps in 
order to ensure the coherence between the 
Injunctions Directive and the CPC Regulation? 
− What is the legal and practical interplay between 
the Injunctions Directive and the enforcement 
provisions provided by other EU consumer law 
directives subject to the Fitness Check and by 
the Consumer Rights Directive?  
− Extent to which there a need for any further 
steps in order to ensure the coherence between 
the abovementioned legislative acts. 
the Injunctions Directive and the CPC 
Regulation995 
− Analysis of the legal and practical interplay 
between the Injunctions Directive and the 
enforcement provisions provided by other EU 
consumer law directives subject to the Fitness 
Check and by the Consumer Rights Directive 
− Stakeholder assessment of the need for further 
steps in order to ensure the coherence between 







3.4 − Degree to which businesses, consumers and the 
specific public enforcement bodies in the 
relevant sectors are aware of the requirements of 
the horizontal EU consumer legislation (UCPD 
and UCTD), as indicated by their practical 
application, in cases where a) one and the same 
authority is responsible for the enforcement of 
the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector 
specific rules and b) cases where different 
authorities are responsible these two sets of 
rules;  
− What are the benefits and costs arising from the 
complementary application of the general EU 
consumer legislation in the sectors concerned?  
− To what extent does the combination of 
horizontal consumer provisions and sector-
specific rules provide for a clear and coherent 
legal framework?  
− Is there a need for clarification of the interplay 
between the EU sector-specific rules and 
− Analysis of the use of UCPD and UCTD by court 
and specific public enforcement bodies in the 
relevant sectors by differentiating between cases 
where a) one and the same authority is 
responsible for the enforcement of the horizontal 
EU consumer law and the sector specific rules 
and b) cases where different authorities are 
responsible these two sets of rules 
− Stakeholder assessment regarding costs and 
benefits resulting from the complementary 
application of the general EU consumer 
legislation in sectors concerned  
− Analysis of the extent to which the combination 
of horizontal consumer provisions and sector-
specific rules provides for a clear and coherent 
legal framework 
− Analysis of the need for clarification of the 
interplay between the EU sector-specific rules 
and horizontal EU consumer law 
Stakeholder interviews with: 
− National consumer enforcement 
authorities 
− Responsible ministries 
− Relevant national regulatory 
authorities 
− National consumer organisations 
and EU umbrella associations 
− Business associations and EU 
umbrella associations 
Online consultation 
Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Literature review 
                                           
995 Taking into account the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws presented on 25 May 2016 (COM(2016) 283 final) 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
 







Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
horizontal EU consumer law?  










− To which degree would a) an extension of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions; or b) a revision of the Misleading 
and Comparative Advertising Directive; bring 
benefits for cross-border trade? 
− Extent to which a) it is appropriate to keep 
separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices; 
or b) both regimes could be aligned; 
− What is the appropriate scope of the protection 
in B2B transactions? 
− To what extent is there a need a) for a black-list 
of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area; b) to develop contractual 
consequences linked to the breaches of the 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive; c) to adapt the rules on comparative 
advertising of the current Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive? 
− What should be the enforcement cooperation 
mechanism in the business-to-business 
marketing area? 
− Identification of possible benefits for cross-
border trade resulting from a) an extension of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions and b) a revision of the Misleading 
and Comparative Advertising Directive 
− Analysis of the regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices 
and assessment of the extent to which the two 
regimes should be separate/ could be aligned 
− Analysis of the appropriate scope of protection in 
B2B transactions 
− Stakeholder assessment of whether protection in 
B2B transactions should cover only the pre-
contractual stage or also unfair commercial 
practices during and after the transaction;  
− Assessment of the extent to which is there a 
need a) for a black-list of practices in the 
business-to-business marketing area; b) to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive; c) to adapt the rules on 
comparative advertising of the current 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive 
− Identification and assessment of possible 




Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− Study on the application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in the EU 
(2011) 
− Impact assessment in the context 
of the review of Directive 
2006/114/EC concerning 










− To which degree would an extension of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B 
transactions bring benefits for cross-border 
trade? 
− What are the expected consequences of such an 
extension on innovation by or market 
opportunities for SME providers/suppliers?  
− What are the potential negative consequences 
− Consultation results regarding the expected 
effect of an extension of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive to B2B transactions on a) cross-
border trade; b) innovation by or market 
opportunities for SME providers/suppliers 
− Identification of possible negative/positive 
consequences of such an extension 
− Assessment regarding the need a) to strengthen 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
Directive and benefits of extending the scope to business-
to-business transactions? Would the benefits 
exceed these negative consequences?  
− Extent to which there is a need a) to strengthen 
the protection of businesses, especially SMEs and 
in particular micro enterprises, with regard to 
unfair contract terms; b) for contractual 
transparency requirements in B2B transactions, 
similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible 
language in the Directive;  
− What is the appropriate scope of B2B protection 
against unfair contract terms?  
− Would the system of protection established by 
the Directive be appropriate for B2B 
transactions? 
− Is there a need for the protection to extended to 
a) individually negotiated terms, b) the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy 
of the price? 
− Which specific contractual terms often used in 
B2B transactions could be regarded as unfair in 
all circumstances or presumed to be unfair? 
the protection of businesses, especially SMEs and 
in particular micro enterprises, with regard to 
unfair contract terms; b) for contractual 
transparency requirements in B2B transactions, 
similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible 
language in the Directive 
− Analysis of the appropriateness of a) the scope of 
B2B protection against unfair contract terms; c) 
the system of protection established by the 
Directive for B2B transactions 
− Assessment regarding the need for the 
protection to be extended to a) individually 
negotiated terms, b) the main subject-matter of 
the contract and the adequacy of the price 
− Identification of specific contractual terms often 
used in B2B transactions which could be 
regarded as unfair in all circumstances or 
presumed to be unfair 
− Report on the implementation of 
the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive 
− Report on the integration of 
Directive 93/13 into the national 






− To what extent is there a need for the application 
of the consumer law directives in consumer to-
business (C2B) relations? 
− What is the potential for applying consumer law 
directives to consumer-to-business (C2B) 
relations?  
− Stakeholder assessment of the need for applying 
consumer law directives to C2B relations 
− Analysis of the potential for applying consumer 
law directives to C2B relations 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Legal analysis in the 28 EU MS 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 








− Extent to which there is a potential need for 
simplification through codification or recast 
through a single horizontal EU instrument; 
− Extent to which the interpretations brought by 
the case-law of the Court of Justice could be 
integrated into the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive 
−  Assessment of the extent to which the consumer 
law directives could be simplified by codification 
or recast through a single horizontal EU 
instrument 
− Analysis of the added clarity, removal of overlaps 
and filling of gaps that could be achieved 
− Analysis of the feasibility of integrating case-law 
Stakeholder interviews with: 
− National consumer enforcement 
authorities 
− Responsible ministries 
− Relevant national regulatory 
authorities 
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
− What are the potential benefits and burden from 
integrating the requirements under the Price 
Indication Directive into the provisions of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the 
Consumer Rights Directive? 
− Which inconsistencies regarding marketing and 
contractual fairness have been identified 
between a) EU consumer law and other EU 
horizontal law with a consumer protection 
dimension; b) EU consumer law and sector-
specific EU consumer protection rules? 
− To which extent is there a need for clarification 
of the interplay between these laws or removal 
of the identified inconsistencies?  
of the Court of Justice into the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive 
− Identification of potential benefits and burdens 
resulting from integrating the requirements 
under the Price Indication Directive into the 
provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive 
− List of inconsistencies identified between a) EU 
consumer law and other EU horizontal law with a 
consumer protection dimension; b) EU consumer 
law and sector-specific EU consumer protection 
rules under evaluation criterion “Coherence”  
− Assessment concerning the need for clarification 
of the interplay between these laws or removal 
of the identified inconsistencies 
− National consumer organisations 
and EU umbrella associations 
− Business associations and EU 
umbrella associations 
Online consultation 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− Study on procedural rules and 
the ex-officio assessment by the 
court in the area of consumer law 







− What are the possible benefits of the further 
harmonisation of the injunction procedure 
across the EU under the Injunctions Directive? 
− In particular, the following issues from the 
perspective of the possible further 
harmonisation at EU level should be analysed: (i) 
scope of the Injunctions Directive; (ii) provisions 
ensuring exemption of qualified entities from 
legal costs within injunction procedure; (iii) 
mandatory summary procedure; (iv) mandatory 
publication of the injunction decision; (v) 
common rules on the burden of proof; (vi) 
sanctions for the infringements defined by the 
Injunctions Directive, taking into account 
provisions of the Directives listed in the Annex I 
to the Injunctions Directive as transposed into 
internal legal orders of the Member States; (vii) 
more precise sanctions in case of the non-
compliance with the injunction order; (viii) the 
cross-border effect of the injunction order within 
the EU.  
− What are the possible benefits of any further 
− Identification and assessment of potential 
benefits resulting from the of further 
harmonisation of the injunction procedure across 
the EU under the Injunctions Directive 
− Identification of possible benefits of further non-
legislative or legislative measures increasing the 
use of injunction procedures by consumer 
organisations and strengthening the cooperation 
between consumer organisations from different 
MS 
− Stakeholder assessment concerning the need 
and practical usefulness for a) awareness raising 
activities, e.g. on the "e-justice" portal; b) further 
measures such as CoJEF II aiming to coordinate 
injunction actions regarding infringements 
having a cross-border dimension 
− Analysis of the extent to which out-of-court 
settlements aiming at stopping infringements as 
defined by the Directive have the potential to 
improve the enforcement of EU legislation 
protecting the collective interests of consumers 
Online consultation 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Survey of qualified entities  
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− 2008 and 2012 Commission 
reports on the application of the 
Injunctions Directive 
− 2011 study on the application of 
the Injunctions Directive  
− Evaluation of the CPC Regulation 
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Required evidence and analysis/indicators Sources of evidence/ 
methodological tools 
non-legislative or legislative measures increasing 
the use of injunction procedures by consumer 
organisations and strengthening the 
cooperation between consumer organisations 
from different MS?  
−  What is the need and practical usefulness for a) 
awareness raising activities, e.g. on the "e-justice" 
portal; b) further measures such as CoJEF II 
aiming to coordinate injunction actions 
regarding infringements having a cross-border 
dimension; 
− Extent to which out-of-court settlements aiming 
at stopping infringements as defined by the 
Directive have the potential to improve the 
enforcement of EU legislation protecting the 
collective interests of consumers 
− What possible measures could encourage such 
settlements? 













− Is there a need and potential to develop 
contractual consequences linked to the use of 
unfair commercial practices? 
−  What, if any, are the national law provisions 
providing contractual consequences in case of 
breaches to the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other 
immoral behaviour? 
− What, if any, is the case law (enforcement 
decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences? 
− What is the relationship of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directives with Article 6 (1) 
of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive? 
−  Assessment concerning the need and potential 
to develop contractual consequences linked to 
the use of unfair commercial practices 
− Identification of the national law provisions 
providing contractual consequences in case of 
breaches to the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other 
immoral behaviour in the Member States 
− Identification of case law providing for such 
consequences 
− Analysis of the relationship of the UCPD with 
Article 6 (1) of the UCTD 
Stakeholder interviews 
Online consultation 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Legal analysis in 28 EU MS 
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− Study on the application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in the EU 
(2011) 
− Report on the implementation of 







− To what extent are the concepts of "consumer", 
"vulnerable consumer" and "average consumer" 
as currently defined and as applied by national 
− Expert assessment concerning the validity and 
extent to which the concepts of "consumer", 
"vulnerable consumer" and "average consumer" 
Stakeholder interviews 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Expert workshop 
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cutting authorities and courts, valid and fit for purpose?  
− What is the scope for redefining these concepts? 
− What are the possible options for redefining 
them? 
− What is the expected impact of redefining the 
concepts of the average consumers and various 
categories of vulnerable consumers (e.g. young 
consumers) in EU legislation?  
− Extent to which existing rules under the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive are adequate to 
protect vulnerable consumers 
− Should specific provisions to protect vulnerable 
consumers be introduced in other directives 
concerned, e.g. in the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive? 
as currently defined and applied are fit for 
purpose 
− Assessment of the scope for redefining the 
"consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" 
− Identification of possible new definitions, if 
relevant 
− Analysis of expected impacts of redefining the 
concepts of the average consumers and various 
categories of vulnerable consumers in EU 
legislation  
− Possible effects of introducing specific provisions 
to protect vulnerable consumers in other 
directives  
− Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
including: 
− Consumer vulnerability in key 
markets across the European 
Union  
− Study on the impact of 
marketing through social media, 
online games and mobile 
applications 
- Report on the implementation 











− What is the additional value resulting from the 
EU intervention, compared to what could be 
achieved by Member States at national and/or 
regional levels?  
− To what extent do the issues addressed by the 
intervention continue to require action at EU 
level? 
− What would be the most likely consequences of 
stopping or withdrawing the existing EU 
intervention?  
− Identification of the effects of the covered EU 
consumer law directives on consumer protection 
on eliminating obstacles to the functioning of 
the internal market (Effectiveness) 
− Identification of areas covered by the EU 
consumer law directives or that could potentially 
be covered which cannot be addressed at MS 
level 
− Analysis of extent to which some areas covered 
by the EU consumer law directives are no longer 
relevant for addressing at EU level 
− Discussion of potential effects of stopping or 
withdrawing EU consumer law directives 
Cross-cutting legal analysis 
Evaluation results  
Review of previous and 
ongoing/planned evaluations, 
reports and external studies 
Source: Civic Consulting.
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Annex VIII Analysis of levels of awareness and key trends 
since the adoption of key directives  
In this Annex we present the results of the analysis of the level of trader and 
consumer awareness of the rules in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive, the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive 
and the Price Indication Directive and of key trends and evolution of consumer 
problems, both from a general perspective and by Directive.996 
1. Trends in consumer and trader awareness  
1.1 Consumer rights in general 
Consumer awareness 
Before the Eurobarometer began including consumer knowledge questions, surveyed 
consumers were asked to self-assess their level of awareness of their consumer rights. 
The table below presents the questions and results from two consumer surveys 
conducted in 1999 and 2003.  
Table 29: Consumers’ self-assessment of their level of awareness regarding 
consumer rights, EU15. 
Year Question Base Results 
1999 Generally speaking, do you think you are well 
informed about your rights as a consumer or not?  





2003 Do you think you know enough about your rights, as a 




And, as a consumer, under European laws? 7% ‘Yes’ 
Source: Eurobarometer 51.1 and Special Eurobarometer 193. Note: Possible responses to the question in EB51.1 
included ‘No, not well informed’ / ‘Yes, by (NATIONALITY) public bodies/government’ / ‘Yes, by European public bodies’ 
/ ‘Yes, by the media’ / ‘Yes, by consumer organisations’ / ‘Yes, by industry and trade associations’ / ‘Yes, by sectoral 
associations/interest groups such as meat producers, wine producers, etc.’ / ‘Yes, by others’ / ‘Don’t know’. [Displayed 
is the proportion of ‘No’ responses; ‘Yes’ responses were calculated by subtracting the proportion of ‘No’ and ‘Don’t 
know’ responses from 100%]. 
The results of the older Eurobarometers show that while close to one third of 
consumers felt well-informed about consumer protection in their own country, less 
than one tenth felt similarly well-informed about their rights under European laws. In 
2003, the highest level of self-assessed knowledge about national consumer rights 
was in Finland, with 47% of consumers feeling well-informed, followed by Sweden 
(44%) and Denmark (39%); the lowest levels were found in Belgium (20%), Spain 
and Portugal (each 21%). With respect to knowledge about consumer rights under 
European law, consumers felt most informed in Austria (18%), Luxembourg (12%), 
the Netherlands, Greece, and Portugal (each 11%) and least informed in Sweden 
(3%), Germany (3%) and Finland (5%). A relatively high level of respondents 
                                           
996 Note that due to the limitations in data availability, it is not possible in most cases to provide a before 
and after comparison for the adoption of the relevant Directives. Even in the case of the more recently 
adopted UCPD, the Directive was transposed by the Member States in various years between 2007 and 
2010, with the result that a direct comparison based on the year of adoption is not possible. For a more 
nuanced analysis of levels of consumer trust and cross-border shopping before and after the transposition of 
the UCPD, see the panel data analysis in Part 4 of the report. 
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(ranging between 9 to 26%, depending on the Member State) answered ‘Don’t know’ 
when asked about their knowledge of European consumer rights. 
The Eurobarometer did not survey consumers on their level of knowledge again until 
2010, when specific knowledge questions about consumer protection were introduced. 
The following table lists the knowledge questions, answer items and correct response 
rates for general consumer knowledge questions up to 2014.997  
Table 30: Proportion of consumers answering correctly to knowledge 
questions about European consumer law, EU%. 




2010 Suppose you ordered a good by post, 
phone or the Internet, do you think 
you have the right to return the good 
you ordered 4 days after its delivery 
and get your money back, without 
giving any reason? 
Yes [Correct].  




2014 Yes [Correct].  
(Other items: No; It depends on the 
product; Don’t know.) 
56% 
2010 
Imagine that a new fridge you bought 
18 months ago breaks down. You 
didn't buy any extended commercial 
guarantee. Do you have the right to 
have it repaired or replaced for free? 
Yes [Correct].  




2014 Yes [Correct].  
(Other items: No; It depends on the 
product; Don’t know.) 
41% 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 342, Flash Eurobarometers 332, 358 and 397. Note: EU% comprises the EU27 until 2012, 
and the EU28 in 2014. 
There is no clear trend towards greater or lesser awareness, although correct answers 
in both of the first two questions appear to have peaked in 2011-2012. The dip in 
correct responses in 2014 could however also be due to the inclusion of a new 
(incorrect) response item (‘It depends on the product’). 
Results and trends from knowledge questions related to the Directives included in this 
study are discussed in the relevant subsections. 
Trader awareness and compliance 
In 2012, the last time this question was posed directly in the Eurobarometer, 98% of 
traders EU-wide reported feeling confident that their own business was in compliance 
with consumer legislation.998 In previous years, traders were asked to what degree 
                                           
997 Note that these knowledge questions do not directly fall under the Directives considered in this study. We 
have nonetheless provided this data in order to provide an impression of general consumer awareness in the 
EU. Knowledge questions related to specific Directives in the scope of this study are discussed in their 
respective subsections. 
998 Flash Eurobarometer 359: Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection. 
Question: Now, thinking about consumer legislation, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree 
with the following statements. Let me confirm once more that all responses are strictly anonymous. ‘You 
comply with consumer legislation’. 
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they felt informed about their legal obligations towards consumers under consumer 
legislation in their country; the figure below shows the results.  
Figure 12: Percentage of traders feeling at least well informed about their 
legal obligations under consumer legislation, EU27. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometers 224, 278 and 300. Question: How well informed are you about your legal obligations 
towards consumers arising from consumer legislation in your country? [Displayed is the combined proportion 
responding ‘well’ or ‘fully informed’]. 
More than three quarters of traders responded that they felt at least well informed 
about their legal obligations to consumers from 2008 to 2010; this proportion was 
slightly higher in the EU12 (89%) compared to the EU15999 (82%) in 2010. At the 
country level, responses in 2010 ranged from highs in Slovakia (96%), Malta (95%), 
Portugal (94%) and Estonia (94%) to lows in France (65%), Sweden (74%) and 
Belgium (75%). 
The figure below shows that a majority of traders in 2014 (the only year that such a 
question was asked directly in the Eurobarometer) agreed that compliance with 
consumer legislation is easy and that the costs of compliance are reasonable, although 
traders selling in other EU countries were less likely to agree that this applied when 
selling cross-border. 
                                           
999 EU15 refers to the countries that were members of the EU before its enlargement in 2004. EU 12/13 
refers to the accession countries, with EU12 indicating the countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 
2007, before Croatia became a member in 2013. While the EU averages presented in the figures are 
weighted averages drawn from the quoted Eurobarometer surveys, all references in text to comparisons 
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Figure 13: Percentage of traders agreeing that compliance with consumer 
legislation is easy and the costs are reasonable, EU28 in 2014. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 396. Question: I will read you three statements about compliance with consumer 
legislation in (OUR COUNTRY). Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with 
each of them: ‘It is easy to comply with consumer legislation in your sector.’ / ‘The costs of compliance with consumer 
legislation in your sector are reasonable.’ Note: For ‘own country’ data, the proportion is calculated out of all traders; 
for ‘other EU countries’, the proportion is calculated only out of traders who indicated that they sell cross-border. 
A slight majority of traders operating cross-border (52%) agreed in 2014 that the 
costs of compliance with consumer legislation in other EU countries were reasonable. 
Although the questions were not identical, this result can be favourably (albeit 
cautiously) compared with a similar Eurobarometer question asked once in 2006, 
which found that only 34% of retailers and service providers currently trading (or 
preparing to trade) cross-border would rate compliance costs for consumer legislation 
in other EU countries as ‘low or negligible’.1000  
The figure below shows that most traders across the EU believe that their competitors 
also comply with consumer legislation. The proportion of traders who believe that their 
competitors comply with consumer legislation has however steadily fallen from an EU 
average of 70% in 2009 to 65% in 2014, a trend that is reflected in both the EU15 
and the EU 12/13. Note, however, that from 2009 to 2012, the survey question asked 
about the compliance of competitors with no restriction on their location, while the 
question in 2014 was altered to ask traders about their competitors’ compliance within 
their own country, which may have influenced responses in that year. Data prior to 
2009 is not available, as previous Eurobarometers did not ask about compliance 
behaviours of competitors.  
                                           
1000 Flash Eurobarometer 186: Business attitudes towards cross-border sales and consumer protection. 
Question: Overall, how do you rate the possible extra compliance costs for cross-border sales arising from 





























In other EU countries (of traders who sell cross-border)
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
Civic Consulting  422 
Figure 14: Percentage of traders agreeing that their competitors comply with 
consumer legislation, EU%. 
  
Source: Flash Eurobarometers 278, 300, 331, 359 and 396. Question: 2009-2013: Now, thinking about consumer 
legislation, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. ‘Your competitors 
comply with consumer legislation.’ 2014: I will read you three statements about compliance with consumer legislation 
in (OUR COUNTRY). Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each of them. 
‘Your competitors comply with consumer legislation.’ Note: EU% comprises the EU27 from 2010 to 2012 and the EU28 
thereafter. 
Over the five years surveyed, there is an average difference of 12 percentage points 
between the proportion of traders agreeing that their competitors are in compliance 
with consumer legislation in the EU15 over the EU12/13. At the country level, even 
more variation can be observed, with trader confidence in the compliance of 
competitors in 2014 ranging from highs in the United Kingdom (79%), Germany 
(75%) and Ireland (75%) to lows in Bulgaria (41%), Poland (43%) and Croatia 
(47%). 
The degree to which these perceptions correspond to the reality of trader awareness 
of consumer legislation as measured by specific knowledge questions are discussed 
with respect to each Directive separately in the sections below. 
With respect to the visibility of enforcement measures, the figure below shows that a 
majority of traders agree that public authorities actively monitor and ensure 
compliance with consumer legislation in their sector, although this has declined by 8 
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Figure 15: Percentage of traders agreeing that public authorities actively 
monitor and ensure compliance with consumer legislation in their sector, 
EU%. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometers Flash Eurobarometers 278, 300, 331, 359 and 396. Question: I will read you three 
statements about compliance with consumer legislation in (OUR COUNTRY). Please tell me whether you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each of them. 'The public authorities actively monitor and ensure compliance 
with consumer legislation in your sector.' Note: EU% comprises the EU27 from 2009 to 2012 and the EU28 thereafter. 
Over the five years surveyed, traders in the EU12/13 were on average 8 percentage 
points less likely than those in the EU15 to agree that public authorities actively 
enforce consumer legislation. At the country level, confidence in public enforcement in 
2014 ranged from highs in the UK (85%), Finland (81%) and Hungary (81%) to lows 
in Poland (44%), Bulgaria (47%) and Croatia (47%). 
1.2 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
Consumer awareness 
As the figure below shows, about one third of EU consumers on average are able to 
correctly answer a knowledge question from the Eurobarometer about a specific unfair 
commercial practice (receiving unsolicited goods; see the question wording in the note 
below the following figure). This proportion has slightly decreased since 2010, from an 
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Figure 16: Percentage of consumers who correctly answered a knowledge 
question about an unfair commercial practice (receiving unsolicited goods), 
EU%. 
  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 342, Flash Eurobarometers 332, 358 and 397. Question: Imagine you receive two 
educational DVDs by post that you have not ordered, together with a EUR 20 [in 2010: EUR 50] invoice for the goods. 
Are you obliged to pay the invoice? [Correct answer: No, and you are not obliged to return the DVDs]. Note: EU% 
comprises the EU27 until 2012, and the EU28 in 2014. 
There are no major differences in the response accuracy between the EU15 and 
EU12/13 in all four years. At the country level, the proportion of consumers answering 
correctly in 2014 ranged from highs in Slovenia (51%), Finland (46%) and Germany 
(45%) to lows in Lithuania (13%), Romania (15%) and Spain (15%).  
Although just one third of respondents were able to answer the above knowledge 
question with complete accuracy (i.e., knowing that they were not obliged to pay the 
invoice, nor to return the unsolicited goods), the vast majority of consumers (95% in 
2014) answered at least semi-correctly, and were aware that they were not obliged to 
pay the invoice; however, most assumed that they were obliged to return the 
products. Only 2% of consumers in 2014 thought they would be obliged to pay the 
invoice for an unsolicited good. 
Another question regarding an unfair commercial practice (advertising a product as 
“free” when it actually entails substantial costs) was asked in 2010 but not repeated in 
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Figure 17: Percentage of consumers who correctly answered a knowledge 
question about an unfair commercial practice (falsely advertising a product 
as free), EU27 2010. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 342. Question: An advertisement in your newspaper says: ‘Free sunglasses, just call this 
number to collect them.’ You call the number and later you discover that it is a very costly premium rate telephone 
number. Was the advertisement legal or illegal? 
Although most consumers were able to answer the question correctly, nearly one in 
five thought that the practice was legal. At the country level, the highest levels of 
awareness were found in Malta (89% correctly answered that the practice was illegal), 
Lithuania (86%), Estonia (84%) and Finland (84%), with the lowest levels found in 
Ireland (53%), the UK (57%) and Belgium (6%). One third (33%) of surveyed 
consumers in the EU were able to answer both this question and the unsolicited goods 
question (presented above) correctly in 2010. 
A knowledge question on the UCPD was also asked in 2016 as part of the Consumer 
market study to support the Fitness Check of EU consumer law. The survey found that 
73% of respondents across the EU were aware that it was illegal for a trader to bother 
consumers with persistent and unwanted sales calls.1001 This proportion was slightly 
higher in the EU13 (79%) compared to the EU15 (72%). Additionally, in the same 
survey, 34% of consumers indicated that they felt they had benefited at least 
“moderately” from the right to complain against misleading and aggressive practices 
and have these practices stopped by competent authorities or the courts.1002 
Trader awareness 
The two figures that follow show trends in the responses of traders to three 
Eurobarometer questions intended to test their knowledge of unfair commercial 
practices. Each trader in the survey was presented with the same three unfair 
commercial practices (plus a fourth practice that was not unfair) and asked whether or 
not they thought the practice was prohibited. 
                                           
1001 Question: Despite your objections, you are being pressured by persistent and unwanted sales calls from 
a trader urging you to buy his products. Is the salesperson legally allowed to behave in this way? [Yes – No 
– Don’t know] 
1002 Question: Based on your experience as a consumer, please indicate to what extent you have benefitted 
from the following consumer rights. ‘The right to complain against misleading and aggressive practices and 





certain goods  2%
Don't know 8%
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The first figure in this section shows the proportion of traders who were able to 
correctly identify all three practices (listed in the caption below the figures) as unfair 
commercial practices. The second figure shows the proportion of traders who were 
unable to identify any of the three practices as unfair commercial practices. 
Note that in 2014, one of the three practices (‘Advertising products at a very low price 
compared to other offers without having a reasonable quantity of products for sale’) 
was reworded as an example of the same practice (‘To run a promotional campaign 
stating ‘We offer a discount of 60%’ although the products offered with a 60% 
discount are almost out of stock.’). The data point for that year is therefore presented 
separately in the figures below. 
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Figure 18: Percentage of traders correctly identifying all three practices as 
unfair commercial practices, EU%. 
 
Figure 19: Percentage of traders unable to identify any of the three practices 
as unfair commercial practices, EU%. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometers 278, 300, 332, 359 and 396. Question: 2009: Please state whether the following 
commercial practices are prohibited or not (IN YOUR COUNTRY). 2010-2013: I will read 4 statements concerning 
legislation in (OUR COUNTRY) related to commercial practices. Some of them are prohibited and some are not. For each 
statement, please tell me if you think it is prohibited or not: ‘To describe a product as ‘free’ although it is only available 
free of charge to consumers calling a premium rate phone number.’/ ‘To include an invoice or similar document seeking 
payment in marketing material.’ / ‘Advertising products at a very low price compared to other offers without having a 
reasonable quantity of products for sale [In 2014: ‘To run a promotional campaign stating ‘We offer a discount of 60%’ 
although the products offered with a 60% discount are almost out of stock.’]’. From 2009-2013 a fourth statement that 
was not an unfair practice was included as a decoy; this was changed to a fourth unfair practice in 2014. The figures 
above however only show the original three unfair practices. Note: No data was provided on the proportion of 
companies that were not able to identify any of the three unfair commercial practices in 2009. EU% comprises the EU27 
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The two figures above show that trader awareness of UCPD provisions is mixed. While 
the proportion of traders unable to identify any unfair practices remained reasonably 
consistent (from 16% in 2010 to 15% in 2014), the proportion of traders able to 
correctly identify all three unfair practices decreased by 5 percentage points over the 
same period, from 26% to 21%. The majority of traders therefore have a middling 
level of knowledge about unfair commercial practices, with most answering one or two 
questions correctly. 
Trader awareness of unfair commercial practices differs substantially between the 
EU15 and EU12/13. Traders in the EU15 consistently provide a greater proportion of 
correct answers (average difference of 7 percentage points over the time period 
surveyed) and a lower proportion of incorrect answers on average than traders in the 
EU12/13 (average difference of 11 percentage points). In 2014, for example, more 
than one quarter of traders (27%) in the EU12/13 were unable to correctly identify 
any unfair practices, compared to about one eighth (13%) in the EU15. 
At the country level, the Member State with the highest proportion of traders correctly 
answering all three questions in 2014 was Germany (31%), followed by Finland (27%) 
and Slovenia (26%). The lowest proportions of correct answers were given in Bulgaria 
(6%), Cyprus (9%), Latvia (10%) and Croatia (10%). Cyprus was the only country in 
which more than half of traders (53%) were unable to identify any unfair practices. 
Further detail on the results for two of the knowledge questions tested – including 
documents seeking payment in marketing material and falsely advertising products as 
‘free’ – can also be found in subsection 1.4 on the MCAD, as these practices are also 
relevant in the context of business-to-business transactions. 
1.3 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
Consumer awareness 
One knowledge question on unfair contract terms was included in the 2012 edition of 
the Flash Eurobarometer series ‘Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and 
consumer protection’, asking consumers whether they thought they were obliged to 
accept an unfair clause. A large majority of consumers (85%) responded correctly that 
they did not need to accept the clause, as shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 20: Consumer responses to a knowledge question about unfair 
contract terms, EU27% 2012. 
  
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 358. Question: Imagine that, after having purchased a bike, you realize that it is faulty. 
You also realize that the sales contract contains a clause rejecting any responsibility of the seller or producer to deal 
with the faults. Do you think that…? ‘You should accept the clause. The seller is not responsible for faults existing at the 
time of purchase/delivery of the good’ [Incorrect] / ‘You do not have to accept the clause. The seller is responsible for 
faults existing at the time of purchase/delivery, so you have the right to ask them to repair or replace it.’ [Correct] / 
‘Don’t know’. 
The proportion of correct answers were slightly higher on average in the EU15 (85%) 
compared to the EU12 (81%). At the country level, this proportion ranged highs in 
Ireland (93%), the UK (91%) and the Czech Republic (90%) to lows in Cyprus (70%), 
Romania (73%) and Hungary (74%).  
The consumer market study conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016 found a much 
lower awareness among consumers regarding particular unfair terms. When asked 
whether they would be bound by a clause in a gym contract that refused liability for 
any harm or injury caused by the use of the gym’s facilities,1003 only 40% of the 
survey respondents correctly answered that they would not be bound by this term, 
less than half the proportion of respondents that were able to answer the 
Eurobarometer question correctly. Slightly more respondents in the EU15 (41%) were 
able to answer the question correctly than in the EU13 (38%). In the same survey, 
35% of consumers indicated that they benefited at least “moderately” from the right 
to not be bound by unfair terms and conditions.1004 
The consumer market study also included behavioural experiments related to unfair 
contract terms. The behavioural experiments found that between 57% and 78% of the 
respondents were able to correctly identify certain contract terms as unfair, depending 
on the contract term. In contrast, between 30% and 72% of respondents were able to 
correctly identify contract terms that were actually fair. The ability of respondents to 
                                           
1003 Question: Imagine that you have signed a contract for one year’s membership with a local gym. Some 
time later you have an accident that you believe was caused by a malfunction of the gym's equipment. 
When you complain to the gym, you are referred to its general terms and conditions which you had 
accepted at the time of signature of the contract. These terms and conditions include a clause providing that 
the gym does not accept any liability for any harm or injury caused by the use of the gym's facilities and 
equipment. Are you bound by the above-mentioned clause of the gym's terms and conditions? [Yes, 
because you accepted the gym's general terms and conditions – No, the respective contract clause is unfair 
and is therefore not binding on you as a consumer – Don’t know.] 
1004 Question: Based on your experience as a consumer, please indicate to what extent you have benefitted 
from the following consumer rights. ‘The right to not be bound by unfair terms and conditions.’ 
10%
85%
Don't know   5% Accept the clause 
[incorrect]
Do not accept 
the clause 
[correct]
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identify both fair and unfair contract terms was significantly higher when the contract 
terms were presented to the respondent in a summarised form compared to standard 
terms and conditions in a longer form. 
Trader awareness 
Trader knowledge of unfair contract terms falling under the UCTD has so far not been 
systematically surveyed in the Eurobarometer or other standard surveys. However, 
when traders that either sell or indicated interest in selling cross-border were asked in 
a 2011 survey about how well-informed they thought they were regarding consumer 
protection provisions in the contract law of other EU countries in which they sold or 
wanted to sell to consumers, less than half (47%) considered themselves to be ‘well 
informed’ or ‘fully informed’, as seen in the figure below. 
Figure 21: Traders' self-assessed awareness regarding consumer protection 
provisions in the contract law of other EU countries in which they sell or wish 
to sell to final consumers, EU27% 2011. 
  
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 321. Question: How well-informed are you about the consumer protection provisions in 
the contract laws of the EU countries where you sell or wish to sell to final consumers? [Possible responses in figure 
above.] Note: Base consists of traders who indicated that they sell or are interested in selling cross-border. 
On average, traders in the EU12 indicated being three percentage points more 
confident about their own knowledge than those in the EU15, with 46% in the EU12 
considering themselves to be well or fully informed compared to 43% in the EU15. At 
the country level, the proportion of traders reporting themselves to be well or fully 
informed ranged from highs in Slovakia (65%), the Czech Republic (65%) and 
Luxembourg (63%) to lows in Bulgaria (19%), Sweden (22%), the Netherlands 
(32%), Finland (32%) and Greece (32%). 
Additionally, traders appear to be cognizant of variations in national consumer 
contract law to the extent that these represent a barrier to cross-border trade. The 
table below shows the proportion of traders that have identified contract problems as 
an obstacle to cross-border trade in response to various Eurobarometer questions over 




Not well informed 
32%
Not informed at 
all 18%
Don't know 2%
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Table 31: Proportion of traders identifying differences in national contract 
law as an obstacle to cross-border trade in response to Eurobarometer 
questions, EU%. 
Year Question Base Results 
2006 Please tell me how important do you think these 
obstacles are to cross-border sales. ‘Additional costs 
of compliance with different national laws regulating 
consumer transactions’ 
Traders who 




55% ‘Fairly important’ 
or ‘Very important’ 
2008 60% ‘Fairly important’ 
or ‘Very important’ 
2011 How important are the following obstacles to the 
development of your cross-border sales to other EU 
countries? ‘Additional costs of compliance with 
different consumer protection rules and contract law 
(including legal advice)’ 
All traders 
34% ‘Fairly important’ 
or ‘Very important’ 
2012 41% ‘Fairly important’ 
or ‘Very important’ 
2014 How important are the following obstacles to the 
development of online sales to other EU countries by 




39% ‘Fairly important’ 
or ‘Very important’ 
Source: Flash Eurobarometers 186, 224, 331, 358 and 396. Note: EU% comprises the EU25 in 2006, EU27 from 2008 to 
2012 and the EU28 thereafter. 
At the national level, the proportion of traders indicating that differences in national 
contract law were an important obstacle to cross-border trade in 2014 ranged 
between highs in Romania (67%), Slovakia (57%) and Portugal (56%) to lows in 
Cyprus (18%), Estonia (18%) and Sweden (19%). 
1.4 Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive 
Trader awareness 
As indicated before, the MCAD concerns misleading advertising practices in a 
business-to-business context. Specific practices that fall under this Directive are not 
usually included in Eurobarometer surveys that explore awareness of rules concerning 
advertising, as these typically focus on consumers. However, certain unfair 
commercial practices falling under the UCPD in a business-to-consumer context also 
arise in a business-to-business context, for example, marketing practices that describe 
a product as ‘free’ when it actually entails substantial costs, or including a fake invoice 
or other document seeking payment in marketing material (relevant for example in 
the context of the so-called misleading directory companies, see below, Section 
4.2.4). The following figure therefore provides more detail on the trader knowledge 
questions discussed in the UCPD section and shows the proportion of surveyed traders 
that correctly identified these two practices as prohibited. 
As the figure below shows, two-thirds of traders in 2014 knew that falsely advertising 
a product as free was a prohibited practice, while slightly more than half (55%) knew 
that fake invoices were prohibited. The proportion of traders correctly identifying the 
advertisement of false ‘free’ products as a prohibited practice slightly increased 
between 2009 and 2014, from 62% to 66%. The proportion identifying fake invoices 
as a prohibited practice also increased over the same period, from 48% to 55%. 
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Figure 22: Percentage of traders aware that certain advertising practices are 
prohibited, EU%. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometers 278, 300, 331, 359 and 396. Question: I will read 4 statements concerning legislation in 
(OUR COUNTRY) related to commercial practices. Some of them are prohibited and some are not. For each statement, 
please tell me if you think it is prohibited or not? ‘To describe a product as ‘free’ although it is only available free of 
charge to customers calling a premium rate phone number.’ / ‘To include an invoice or a similar document seeking 
payment in marketing material.’ Note: EU% comprises the EU27 from 2009 to 2012 and EU28 thereafter. 
A larger proportion of traders in the EU15 were able to correctly identify each practice 
as prohibited than in the EU12/13. In 2014, the average gap between the two groups 
was equal to 13 percentage points for the practice of falsely advertising a product as 
free (67% in the EU15 to 54% in the EU13) and 17 percentage points for the practice 
of including fake invoices in marketing material (58% to 41%). 
At the country level, the level of trader awareness regarding the prohibited nature of 
falsely advertising a product as free ranged from highs in France (78%), Germany 
(77%), Denmark (77%) and Sweden (77%) to lows in Cyprus (29%), Croatia (42%) 
and the UK (48%). in 2014. In the same year, the level of trader awareness regarding 
fake invoices ranged from highs in Finland (72%), Sweden (70%) and France (69%) 
to lows in Cyprus (20%), Bulgaria (24%) and Croatia (26%). 
1.5 Price Indication Directive 
Consumer awareness 
Consumer awareness of the PID is only sporadically addressed in European consumer 
surveys. In 2001, 68% of consumers surveyed in the EU15 indicated that they were at 
least ‘a little’ interested in being able to use displayed unit prices to compare 
goods.1005 According to a Special Eurobarometer conducted in 2010, 48% of surveyed 
consumers responded that they consulted the unit price ‘always’ or ‘often’ when 
comparing goods. The results are shown in the following figure. 
                                           
1005 Flash Eurobarometer 113. Question: In some shops, unit prices by the kilo or by the litre are displayed 
in addition to the price to pay for the pack, can, or bottle. This gives you a better opportunity to compare 























To describe a product as 'free' when it requires callling a premium rate phone number
To include an invoice or other document seeking payment in marketing material
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Figure 23: Consumer responses to how often they compare goods by looking 
at the price per unit, EU27% 2010. 
  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 342. Question: In the last 12 months, how often have you compared the price of goods 
by looking at the price per unit measure, for example, price per kilo, per metre or per litre? [Possible responses in figure 
above.] 
At the country level, more than one quarter of respondents indicated that they 
‘always’ consult the unit price in Estonia (35%), Cyprus (31%), Latvia (29%), 
Germany, France and Spain (each 26%). In contrast, at least one quarter of 
respondents indicated that they ‘never’ consult the unit price in Luxembourg (32%), 
Ireland (32%), the UK (29%), Belgium (28%) and France (25%). 
In the consumer market survey conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016, consumers 
were asked whether they thought it was legal for a supermarket to display prices for 
bottled water per bottle (where the bottle was not 1 litre) instead of per litre.1006 Two-
thirds of respondents (67%) correctly answered that the supermarket was obliged to 
show prices per litre. The proportion of correct responses was identical in the EU15 
and EU13. 58% of consumers in the survey indicated that they benefited at least 
“moderately” from the right to see prices per unit, the highest level of benefit 
indicated for any the Directives under consideration in this study.1007 
The consumer market study also included behavioural experiments related to 
consumers’ use of unit price information. The results of the behavioural experiments 
showed that respondents were highly aware of the presence of unit prices, and that 
the majority of respondents who were not shown a unit price when asked to make a 
purchase decision reported calculating or estimating the unit price themselves. The 
results also showed that the presence of unit price information reduced the average 
price paid per unit by the respondent during the course of the experiments.  
In the 2006 and 2008 Special Eurobarometers on ‘Consumer protection in the internal 
market’, consumers were asked to choose a maximum of five methods they thought 
were the best ways to protect consumers out of a list of 15. The proportion of 
                                           
1006 Question: You went to the supermarket to buy water. The shelf displayed the prices for some brands per 
bottle and per litre, whilst for others the price was only given per bottle. Should prices also be indicated per 
litre for all of the bottles of water (except where their volume is 1 litre)? [Yes, the supermarket must show 
litre prices for bottles that are not 1 litre bottles, that is the law – No, the supermarket is allowed to choose 
whether or not they show litre prices – Don’t know] 
1007 Question: Based on your experience as a consumer, please indicate to what extent you have benefitted 
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consumers who indicated price indication-related priorities is shown in the figure 
below. While more than 40% of consumers each year indicated ‘clear and transparent 
pricing’ as a priority to protect consumers – in fact, it was the most popular response 
in 2006 – the proportion that specifically selected unit prices was 20-23%. 
Figure 24: Percentage of consumers who selected price indication-related 
methods as the best ways to protect consumers, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometers 252 and 298. Question: Among the following, which are the best ways to protect 
consumers? [Maximum five answers out of 15 options.] Note: EU% comprises the EU25 in 2006 and EU27 in 2008. 
In 2008, the highest proportions of consumers selecting the unit price option were 
observed in Slovakia (33%), Romania (31%) and Belgium (31%), while the lowest 
proportions were observed in the UK (13%), Lithuania (14%) and Latvia (15%). 
Trader awareness 
The last comprehensive assessment of the trader compliance with the PID across the 
EU was conducted within the EU15 as part of an appraisal of the Directive in 2004, six 
years after it was adopted. The 2004 appraisal found that 77% of surveyed traders 
across the EU15 indicated unit price; for comparison, only 67% of traders in the EU15 
were legally required to indicate unit price (i.e. who were not subject to derogations in 
certain Member States). 59% of the traders surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed 
that consumers use unit prices in their purchasing decisions.1008 
2. Trends in problems experienced and complaints  
In the following subsections, we present trends in consumer problems, first at a 
general level and then by Directive (UCPD, UCTD and PID). In the context of the 
MCAD we also consider trader problems with misleading advertising. 
                                           
1008 Appraisal of Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of unit prices of products offered 
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2.1 Overall problems and complaints 
The figure below presents results from the European Commission’s Consumer Market 
Monitoring Survey (MMS),1009 which show that the proportion of consumers who 
reported having at least one problem in the past 12 months has declined by an 
average of about 1 percentage point across the EU since 2010. 
At the country level, the incidence of problems as measured by the MMS in 2015 – the 
most recent year for which data is available – ranges from highs in Bulgaria (17%), 
Croatia (15%) and Spain (15%) to lows in France (5%), Austria (5%), Germany (6%) 
and Luxembourg (6%). 
Figure 25: Percentage of consumers who experienced at least one problem 
with a good or service in the last 12 months, Market Monitoring Survey, EU%. 
   
Source: Consumer Market Monitoring Survey 2010-2015. Question: Did you experience a problem with 
(SERVICE/PRODUCT) or (SUPPLIER/RETAILER), where you thought you had a legitimate cause for complaint? Note: EU% 
comprises the EU27 from 2010 to 2012 and the EU28 thereafter. 
The Flash Eurobarometer series ‘Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and 
consumer protection’, shown below, also measured incidence rates of problems 
between 2008 and 2014. The Eurobarometer responses below show a more erratic 
pattern than the MMS results, a phenomenon which can be partly explained by two 
important changes in the question wording from 2008 to 2009 and again in 2012. In 
2008, the relevant question asked only indirectly about problems in a question about 
complaints; consumers were asked directly about their problems starting in 2009. In 
2012, however, rather than being asked about a ‘problem’, as in the previous and 
subsequent years of the survey, respondents were asked whether they had 
experienced ‘any legitimate cause for complaint when buying or using any goods or 
services’, a wording that invites a broader range of responses than the questions used 
in 2009-2011 and in 2014 (see the figure caption for exact question wording). These 
differences in the question wording are reflected in the figure below, where the data 
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points for 2008, 2012 and 2014 are presented separately. The series presented in this 
figure should therefore be interpreted cautiously. 
Figure 26: Percentage of consumers who experienced at least one problem 
with a good or service in the last 12 months, Eurobarometer, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 298, Flash Eurobarometers 299, 332, 358 and 397. Question: 2008: In the last 12 
months, have you made any kind of formal complaint by writing, by telephone or in person, to a seller/provider about a 
problem you encountered? [Possible responses: Yes / No, you have not encountered any problems / No, unlike to get a 
satisfactory remedy / No, sums involved too small / No, did not know how or where to complain. Displayed is the 
proportion that gave a response other than ‘No, you have not encountered any problems.’] 2009-2011: In the last 12 
months, have you encountered any problem when you bought something in (OUR COUNTRY)? 2012: In the last 12 
months, have you had legitimate cause for complaint when buying or using any goods or services in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
2014: In the past 12 months, have you encountered any problem when buying or using any goods or services in (OUR 
COUNTRY) where you thought you had a legitimate cause for complaint? Note: EU% comprises the EU27 from 2008 to 
2012 and the EU28 thereafter. 
Despite the interim variation, the average incidence of problems as measured by the 
Eurobarometer is almost identical in 2008 and 2014, at 21% and 22% respectively. At 
the country level, the proportion of consumers reporting a problem in 2014 range 
from highs in Croatia (33%), Italy (30%), Finland, Hungary and Poland (each 29%) to 
lows in Cyprus (11%), Luxembourg (11%), France (14%) and Slovenia (14%). 
Consumers were also asked whether they had encountered a problem in the last 12 
months as part of the consumer market study conducted for the Fitness Check in 
2016. The survey found that 26% of consumers reported experiencing such a 
problem, a rate reasonably similar to the results of the last two Eurobarometers.1010 
The problem rate found in the consumer market survey is much higher among 
respondents in the EU13 (37%) than in the EU15 (24%). 
After experiencing a problem, a large majority of consumers complain. The figure 
below shows the proportion of consumers who made a formal complaint after 
experiencing at least one problem with a good or service in any of the 52 markets 
                                           
1010 Question: In the past 12 months, have you experienced problem(s) with any goods or services where 
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covered by the Commission’s Market Monitoring Survey within the last 12 months. 
Between 2010 and 2014, the proportion of consumers surveyed indicating that they 
made a complaint remained stable, at an average of 79% across the EU. 
Figure 27: Percentage of consumers who complained after experiencing at 
least one problem with a good or service in the last 12 months, EU%. 
  
Source: Consumer Market Monitoring Survey Question: [When a problem was encountered] Have you complained 
about these problems? Note: EU% comprises the EU27 until 2012 and the EU28 thereafter. 
The average rate of complaining is higher in the EU15 than in the EU12/13 by an 
average of 5 percentage points; this gap has remained stable through the survey 
years. At the country level, the reported complaints rate in 2015 ranges from highs in 
Spain (90%), the Czech Republic (86%), the Netherlands and Greece (both 83%) to a 
lows in Estonia (49%), Hungary (64%) and Luxembourg (66%). 
In comparison, in the consumer market survey conducted for the Fitness Check in 
2016, out of the consumers who indicated experiencing a problem related to one of 
the Directives under consideration1011 within the last 12 months, 66% reported 
making a complaint, comprising 53% who had complained to the seller or service 
provider and a further 13% who had complained to the manufacturer.1012 
2.2. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
The figure below shows the development over time of common types of unfair 
commercial practices that consumers have reported experiencing in the pre-
contractual stage. 
                                           
1011 Also including defective goods. The full text of the screener question: Over the past 12 months, how 
often have you experienced problem(s) with any goods or services where you thought you had a legitimate 
cause for complaint related to the following five problem types? Lack of indication of the unit price / 
Defective goods / Misleading or aggressive commercial practices / Unclear or ambiguous standard contract 
terms / Unfair standard contract terms. 
1012 Question: Still thinking about the most recent problem, what action did you take to resolve the problem: 
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Figure 28: Percentage of consumers reporting that they experienced common 
types of pre-contractual unfair practices within the last 12 months, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometers 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 282, 299, 332, 358 and 397. Question 2008 – 2012: 
Have any of the following happened to you in the past 12 months? ‘You came across misleading or deceptive 
advertisements, statements or offers’ / ‘You came across fraudulent advertisements, statements or offers.’ Only in 2006 
– 2011: ‘You came across unsolicited commercial advertisements, statements or offers (cold calls, spam emails, 
commercial SMS, etc.)’. Note: EU% comprises the EU25 in 2006 and the EU27 thereafter. 
Referring to the figure above, unsolicited advertisements were the most prevalent 
practice, with 69% of consumers reporting an experience with unsolicited advertising 
within the last 12 months before the option was dropped from the Eurobarometer 
survey in 2011. The levels of reported misleading and fraudulent advertising both 
show slight increases from 2008 to 2012, in the order of 2 percentage points for 
misleading advertising and 5 percentage points for fraudulent advertising. 
The figure below provides a more detailed look at the prevalence of specific unfair 
commercial practices as reported by consumers in 2014. Consistent with the longer-
term trends in the figure above, the most common practice is unsolicited or aggressive 
advertising (feeling pressured by persistent sales calls or messages), followed by 
misleading or deceptive advertising (false time-limited offers, products falsely 
advertised as ‘free’) and fraudulent advertising (lottery scams). Other unfair 
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Figure 29: Most common unfair commercial practices experienced by 
consumers within the last 12 months, EU28% 2014. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 397. Question: I will read you some statements about unfair commercial practices. After 
each one, please tell me whether you have experienced it during the last 12 months. [Possible responses in figure 
above.] 
In the consumer market study conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016, when asked 
about their experience with types of problems in the last 12 months, 33% of 
consumers responded that they had experienced misleading or aggressive practices at 
least “sometimes” within the last 12 months, including 15% who had responded that 
they experienced misleading or aggressive commercial practices “often” or “very 
often”.1013 These problems were most likely to relate to telecom services (36%), 
financial/insurance services (23%) or utilities (18%). 
Certain markets or commercial practices have been investigated by the Commission as 
emerging problem areas under the UCPD. Price comparison websites were noted in the 
Commission’s 2013 report on the application of the UCPD as a growing concern, as the 
identity of the comparison tool operator, complete price details for the goods and 
services being compared, and other information required by the UCPD to help 
consumers make an informed decision may not be presented in a transparent manner. 
A Multi-stakeholder Group on Comparison Tools was launched in 2012 to address 
these concerns, and a dedicated Commission market study published in 2015 
confirmed the prevalence of problems with misleading and inadequate information: 
65% of consumers surveyed for the study indicated that they had experienced a 
problem with a comparison tool, most related to inaccurate information.1014  
                                           
1013 Question: In the past 12 months, have you experienced problem(s) with any goods or services where 
you thought you had a legitimate cause for complaint related to the following five problem types? 
‘Misleading or aggressive commercial practices.’ 
1014 European Commission 2015 Study on the coverage, functioning and consumer use of comparison tools 
and third-party verification schemes for such tools. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/comparison_tools/index_en.htm  
In response to these findings, the Multi-stakeholder  published a list of Key Principles for Comparison Tools 
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Other unfair commercial practices
Informed that they won a lottery they did not know
about and would have to pay money to collect a prize
Offered a product advertised as free of charge which
actually entailed substantial charges
Came across advertisements stating falsely that a
product was only available for a limited time
Felt pressured by persistent sales calls or messages
urging them to buy something or sign a contract
Percentage of All Consumers
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Along with increasing consumer sensitivity to environmental concerns, the number of 
environmental claims – the claim that a good or service is more sustainable or 
environmentally friendly than competing goods or services – in packaging and 
marketing materials has also increased in the last few years, as have complaints that 
many of these claims are vague or misleading.1015 The Commission established a 
Multi-stakeholder Dialogue on Environmental Claims in 2012 to investigate the 
problem. A dedicated Commission market study in 2014 assessed more than 50 
environmental claims against the UCPD requirements and found that ‘few’ would be 
completely in line with the legislation.1016  
Recent EU enforcement sweeps by CPC authorities have also found unfair commercial 
practices to be prevalent within certain digital markets: 
• The 2013 Travel Services Sweep of 552 air travel and hotel websites found 
69% to be non-compliant with EU consumer law, with most problems related to 
misleading or inadequate information, particularly regarding price 
transparency;1017  
• The Digital Contents Sweep in 2012 investigated 330 websites offering digital 
content for download and found that more than 50% provided misleading or 
inadequate information to consumers. Online games were identified as a 
particular problem area: many games advertising themselves as ‘free’ actually 
entail significant costs through ‘in-game/in-app’ purchases which are required 
to access key features of the game. Only 13% of the games checked in the 
sweep were found to be ‘very transparent’. As children are a key target of 
online games, unfair commercial practices in this market raise additional 
concerns regarding consumer vulnerability.1018 
The Centre for Protection against Unfair Competition (Wettbewerbszentrale) keeps 
detailed national statistics on unfair commercial practices in Germany. Out of more 
than 12,000 complaints the organisation received in 2015, 58% related to misleading 
or missing information in marketing; more than half of these cases related to 
misleading information about the price or the characteristics of either the product or 
the trader. A further 7% of total complaints were related to aggressive or nuisance 
marketing practices. Only 2% of total complaints related directly to blacklisted 
commercial practices. More than 350 complaints in 2015 referred to traders located in 
other EU countries and Switzerland, most of which related to misleading 
advertising.1019 
                                           
1015 European Commission 2014 Consumer market study on environmental claims for non-food products. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/docs/green-claims-
report.pdf 
1016 See previous footnote. In response, the Multi-stakeholder Dialogue on Environmental Claims published a 
list of compliance criteria in 2016 with the intent to clarify UCPD guidance on the use of environmental 
claims. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/unfair-trade/unfair-
practices/files/mdec_compliance_criteria_en.pdf    
1017 EU-wide screening of websites (‘SWEEPS’): Travel services. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/sweeps/travel_services/index_en.htm  
1018 European Commission 2012 Study on Digital Content Products in the EU. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/sweeps/digital_contents/index_en.htm  
1019 Wettbewerbszentrale Jahresbericht 2015. Available from: 
https://www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/de/publikationen/jahresberichte/  
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2.3 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
As the following figure shows, the proportion of consumers reporting that they have 
encountered an unfair contract term within the last 12 months has increased by 5 
percentage points since 2006, from an EU average of 10% to 15%.1020 
Figure 30: Percentage of consumers reporting that they encountered unfair 
terms and conditions in a contract within the last 12 months, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometers 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometer 376. Question: Now, I will read you some 
statements about problems consumers may have more generally when shopping. Please tell me whether you have 
experienced any of them when buying during the last 12 months. ‘You have encountered unfair terms and conditions in 
a contract (for instance, enabling the provider to change the contract terms unilaterally or imposing excessive penalties 
for breach of the contract)’. Note: EU% comprises the EU25 in 2005, EU27 in 2008 and EU28 in 2014. 
The proportion of consumers reporting encounters with unfair contract terms is slightly 
higher on average in the newer Member States than in the EU15; in 2014, the 
difference between these groups was equal to 5 percentage points (12% in the EU15 
compared to 17% in the EU13), up from 3 percentage points in 2006 (9% in the EU15 
compared to 12% in the EU10). This growing gap may be driven by higher reports of 
unfair contract terms in the newest Member States, with more than 20% of consumers 
surveyed reporting encounters with unfair contract terms in Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Croatia in 2014. The lowest proportions were found in Denmark (5%), the Netherlands 
(6%), and Sweden (7%). 
In the consumer market conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016, 23% of consumers 
indicated that they had experienced unfair contract terms at least “sometimes” within 
the last year, including 9% who indicated that they had experienced unfair contract 
terms “often” or “very often”. Most of these problems were reported in the telecom 
sector (31%), financial/insurance sector (18%), or utilities sector (14%). Additionally, 
28% of consumers indicated that they had encountered unclear or ambiguous 
                                           
1020 As only one knowledge question has been asked in the Eurobarometer regarding unfair contract terms in 
2012, it is not possible to determine whether this increase is due to greater consumer awareness of unfair 
contract terms. However, consumer performance on other general knowledge questions about consumer law 
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standard contract terms at least “sometimes” in the last year, including 11% who 
indicated that they encountered unclear or ambiguous terms “often” or “very 
often”.1021 Unclear terms, like unfair terms, were most often reported in the telecom 
sector (32%), financial/insurance sector (21%), or utilities sector (16%). 
An average of 13% of surveyed traders across the EU indicated that they were aware 
of their competitors using unfair contract terms in 2009, the only year that such a 
question was included in the Eurobarometer.1022 On average, 21% of traders in the 
EU12 reported their competitors using unfair contract terms compared to 14% in the 
EU15. At a country level, the responses varied from highs in Poland (39%), Slovenia 
(31%) and Greece (26%) to lows in Ireland (6%), Latvia (6%) and Sweden (7%). 
Additionally, in 2014, 15% of traders reported receiving complaints in the last year 
regarding their own contact terms, up threefold from the last time the question was 
surveyed in 2009.1023 The average proportions were not different in the EU15 and 
EU12/13 in either year. Nationally, the proportion of traders reporting complaints 
about their contract terms in 2014 ranged from highs in Germany (21%), France 
(20%) and Belgium (19%) to lows in Portugal (4%), Cyprus (6%), Luxembourg and 
Ireland (both 7%) . 
Data from other European-level studies and national authorities suggest that utilities 
markets are a particular problem area for unfair contract terms:  
• The retail energy sector was selected for a Commission market study in 2010, 
which found that consumers have low trust in suppliers to use fair contract 
terms and often have difficulty understanding complex electricity contracts. A 
survey that was conducted in support of the market study found that 11% of 
respondents in Denmark and 12% in the Netherlands had reported a problem 
with the terms and conditions of their electricity contract within the last two 
years;1024  
• In 2014, the French Directorate General for Competition Policy, Consumer 
Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) noted 200 unresolved cases with illegal 
contract terms (“clauses illicites”), 100 with unfair terms (“clauses abusives”) 
and 400 with presumed unfair terms (“clauses présumées abusives”) in the 
retail water distribution sector, often involving small distributors that claimed 
to not have the technical or legal resources to update their terms and 
conditions;1025  
• In the internet services provision (ISP) market, a 2012 European Commission 
market found that 35% of surveyed stakeholders (national regulators, 
                                           
1021 Question: In the past 12 months, have you experienced problem(s) with any goods or services where 
you thought you had a legitimate cause for complaint related to the following five problem types? ‘Unfair 
standard contract terms. / Unclear or ambiguous standard contract terms.’ 
1022 Flash Eurobarometer 278. Question: In the past twelve months, are you aware that your competitors 
used what you regard as unfair consumer contract terms? 
1023 Flash Eurobarometers 278 and 397. Questions: 2009: What were the main issues consumers 
complained about in the past twelve months? ‘Contract terms or guarantees’. 2014: What type of 
complaints has your company received from consumers located in (OUR COUNTRY) during the past 12 
months? Were they complaints… ‘About contractual terms’. 
1024 European Commission 2012 Study on the functioning of retail electricity markets for consumers in the 
European Union. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/retail_electricity_full_stud
y_en.pdf  
1025 Clauses illicites ou abusives dans les contrats de fourniture d’eau potable, DGCCRF, available at: 
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/clauses-illicites-ou-abusives-dans-contrats-fourniture-deau-potable  
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consumer organisations, and ADR entities) thought that unfair terms in ISP 
contracts were ‘fairly’ or ‘very common’, with the most common complaints 
relating to termination fees, contract duration, cancellation notice periods, and 
automatic rollovers.1026 
National studies suggest that the length and legalistic language of standard terms and 
conditions poses an obstacle for consumers to identify unfair terms, a problem also 
discussed in the 2016 European Commission study on consumers’ attitudes towards 
Terms and Conditions (T&Cs). A report by Which? in the UK found that the terms and 
conditions for digital services such as PayPal and Apple iTunes contained more than 
20,000 words, making them longer than Shakespeare’s Macbeth.1027 A separate study 
by consumer law experts in 2015 found that many of the terms used by these digital 
service providers would be unlikely to pass the unfairness test of the UCTD.1028 A 
public consultation on simplifying and shortening terms and conditions was launched 
in March 2016 by the Department for Business Innovation & Skills in the UK; results of 
this consultation have not yet been released.1029 
2.4 Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive 
Key issues related to misleading and comparative advertising in the B2B context are 
not currently measured by Eurobarometer surveys. Additionally, few Member States 
consistently collect data on such problems, making it difficult to draw conclusions 
about trends over time. However, a public consultation launched by the Commission in 
2011 provides some data on the nature and extent of the B2B problems falling within 
the scope of the MCAD.1030 
Misleading directory company schemes1031 are the most commonly reported problem 
regarding misleading marketing in the B2B context. In these schemes, businesses 
receive forms asking them to update their details for a directory, and are then 
informed that they have signed a contract and must pay a yearly fee. Nearly half of 
the responses to the Commission’s 2011 public consultation came from companies 
that had encountered these schemes. A report prepared by Civic Consulting for the 
European Parliament in 2008 surveyed complaint-handling bodies in 16 Member 
States and recorded more than 13,000 complaints regarding misleading directory 
schemes in the period of 2003-2008.1032 
                                           
1026 European Commission 2012 Consumer market study on the functioning of the market for internet access 
and provision from a consumer perspective. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/internet-service-study-
full_en.pdf  
1027 Which? Conversation: Online T&Cs longer than Shakespeare plays – Who reads them? 
https://conversation.which.co.uk/technology/length-of-website-terms-and-conditions/  
1028 Loos, M. & J. Luzak (2015). Wanted: A Bigger Stick. On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts with Online 
Service Providers. Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper No. 2015-01 
1029 More information available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/improving-terms-and-
conditions  
1030 Results summarised in the Communication from the Commission on protecting businesses against 
misleading marketing practices and ensuring effective enforcement: Review of Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising. COM/2012/0702. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0702  
1031 Misleading directory companies are traders who use misleading marketing practices and send out forms 
asking businesses to update details in their directories, seemingly for free. If the targeted business signs the 
form, they are however told that they have signed a contract and will be charged a yearly sum. 
1032 Misleading practices of ‘directory companies’ in the context of current and future internal market 
legislation aimed at the protection of consumers and SMEs. IP/A/IMCO/ST/2008-06. Study prepared for the 
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Other common misleading marketing practices identified in the Commission’s public 
consultation in 2011 include: 
• Misleading payment forms, e.g. fake invoices for unsolicited goods or services; 
• Offers to extend internet domain names (e.g. to other country domains) at 
exaggerated prices; 
• Offers to extend protection for trademarks in other countries from businesses 
that have no formal authority to provide these services; 
• Companies that charge high prices for ‘exclusive’ legal advice that is actually 
based on freely-accessible information; 
• Misleading offers to provide certain social media marketing services at high 
prices, when the social media companies themselves offer the same services at 
much lower rates. 
Additionally, online review platforms were acknowledged as a new problem area in the 
2014 edition of the Flash Eurobarometer series on ‘Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-
border trade and consumer protection’, which included a new metric to ask traders 
whether they had come across their competitors writing fake reviews which were 
actually hidden advertisements or hidden attacks on other businesses. More than one-
third (35%) of traders reported encountering this behaviour from their competitors in 
2014, with country values ranging from a high of 61% in Bulgaria to a low of 16% in 
Denmark. More than half of traders reported encountering this practice in Bulgaria, 
Poland and the Czech Republic.1033 
An investigation by the General Secretariat of the Benelux countries in 2014 found 
that 928 out of 1,153 surveyed businesses (80%) had been targeted by misleading 
advertising. Of the targeted businesses, 22% (201) indicated that they had signed on 
to the misleading proposal, and 12% (107) had made a payment as a result, totalling 
EUR 556 000 between the affected businesses in the last year. Only 12% of targeted 
businesses and 68% of the businesses that had made a payment reported the scam to 
national authorities. Extrapolating to the entire Benelux region, the General 
Secretariat estimated that between EUR 850 million – 1.1 billion was paid out by 
businesses each year based on misleading advertising.1034 
2.5 Price Indication Directive 
Consumer problems related to the PID are not tracked in Eurobarometers. However, 
the consumer market study conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016 found that 30% 
of consumers had encountered problems with the unit price at least “sometimes” in 
the last year, including 11% who had encountered problems “often” or “very 
often”.1035 59% of consumers reported that their problems with the unit price related 
                                                                                                                               
European Parliament by Civic Consulting. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2008/408562/IPOL-
IMCO_ET(2008)408562_EN.pdf  
1033 Flash Eurobarometer 396. Question: Please tell me if you have come across any of the following unfair 
commercial practices by your competitors in (OUR COUNTRY) in the last 12 months. ‘Writing fake reviews 
which are in fact hidden adverts or hidden attacks on competitors’. 
1034 Rapport final – Enquête Benelux Pratiques commerciales trompeuses visant les professionels. Available 
at: http://www.benelux.int/fr/les-themes-cles/fraude/les-arnaques-visant-les-professionnels  
1035 Question: In the past 12 months, have you experienced problem(s) with any goods or services where 
you thought you had a legitimate cause for complaint related to the following five problem types? ‘Lack of 
indication of the unit price.’ 
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to food products, compared to drinks (41%), detergents/cleaning products (28%) or 
other products (8%). 
Additionally, reports and investigations at the national level provide insight into some 
of the problems faced by consumers. In Germany, the Consumer Centres 
(Verbraucherzentrale) conducted a market check of unit price indication in 10 national 
supermarket chains in all 16 federal states in 2010. The investigation found that 60% 
(1,929) of the 3,225 price tags examined were not in compliance with price indication 
laws. The main problems identified were:1036 
• Unit price missing entirely (19% of price tags checked); 
• Mathematical errors in the unit price calculation (9% of price tags checked); 
• Unit price calculated using the wrong reference, e.g. dehydrated soup priced 
per weight of the soup mix rather than by volume of the end product (34% of 
price tags checked); 
• Unit price calculation not matched with the product, e.g. where the product is 
sold in different sizes with unit prices given as a range, making the unit price of 
any one product unclear (5% of price tags checked). 
In the UK, the consumer organisation Which? filed a ‘super-complaint' regarding 
misleading and confusing unit price indication in supermarkets with the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA) in 2015. As part of their complaint, Which? conducted an 
investigation and commissioned a survey of more than 2000 UK adults on their 
experiences using unit price indications in supermarkets. Three main problems were 
identified in their report:1037 
• Unit price not displayed clearly on the grocery price tag, making it difficult for 
consumers to find or read the price (noted by 23% of poll respondents); 
• Unit price of like products displayed in different units. For example, packaged 
food may be priced per weight or per item, or certain goods may be priced per 
100g or 100ml (noted by 35% of poll respondents); 
• Updated unit prices often not provided for products that are part of a special 
offer (noted by 33% of poll respondents). 
In response to the complaint, the CMA commissioned BDRC Continental to conduct a 
qualitative focus group study in the summer of 2015 which confirmed the main results 
of the Which? investigation.1038 
Older compliance investigations were carried out in other Member States shortly after 
the transposition of the PID, between 2002 and 2004. Although compliance was found 
to be generally high, authorities in Belgium and Denmark noted problems with 
enforcement, particularly for smaller retailers, as these countries had chosen not to 
                                           
1036 Grundpreisangaben im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel: Eine Gemeinschaftsaktion der Verbraucherzentralen. 
Available at: 
http://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/bericht_grundpreisangaben_29_10_2010.pdf 
1037 Which? super-complaint to the Competition and Markets Authority: Misleading and opaque pricing 
practices in the grocery market. Available at: http://www.staticwhich.co.uk/documents/pdf/misleading-
pricing-practices---which-super-complaint-401125.pdf  
1038 Pricing practices in the groceries market: CMA response to a super-complaint made by Which? on 21 
April 2015. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/groceries-pricing-super-complaint  
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use the derogation for small businesses. Additionally, in Belgium, Spain and Italy, 
compliance was found to be higher for food products than for non-food products.1039  
Evidence from recent investigations by national organisations in Germany and the UK 
and older post-transposition compliance checks suggest therefore that consumers 
continue to encounter problems with unit price indication, particularly in 
supermarkets. Additional surveys would need to be done on unit price indication at the 
European level to determine whether these problems are more widespread and in 
which direction they are trending. 
3. Trends in the internal market  
The following subsections present trends related to the internal market, focusing on 
trends in consumer trust, confidence, and cross-border shopping. 
3.1 General trends in consumer trust 
The figure below presents the percentage of EU consumers who feel their rights as 
consumers are adequately protected in their own country based on Eurobarometer 
data from 2001 to 2012. Note that the question was phrased differently in 2001 and 
2003 (see figure caption). 
                                           
1039 Appraisal of Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of unit prices of products offered 
to consumers. Final report prepared for the European Commission by EIM Business & Policy Research. 
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Figure 31: Percentage of consumers who feel their rights as consumers are 
adequately protected, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 193, 252, and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 117, 282, 299, 332 and 358. Question: 2001: If 
you had a dispute with a seller or a manufacturer here in (OUR COUNTRY), do you think that your consumer rights 
would be: [Very well protected - well protected - badly protected - very badly protected. Displayed is the proportion 
that responded ‘well’ or ‘very well protected’.] 2003: Do you think that, as a consumer, you have a high level of 
protection in (OUR COUNTRY)? 2006-2012: For each of the following statements, please tell me if you agree or disagree 
with it. In (OUR COUNTRY)... ‘You feel that you are protected by existing measures to protect consumers.’ Note: EU% 
comprises the EU15 until 2004, the EU25 until 2007, and the EU27 from 2008 to 2012. 
As the figure above shows, a majority of surveyed consumers feel that their consumer 
rights are adequately protected in their own country. Over the more than 10 year 
period between 2001 and 2012, the proportion of consumers feeling adequately 
protected has fluctuated around an EU average of 54%, reaching a peak of 58% in 
2011. In 2012, the most recent year to survey consumers’ general perceptions of 
being protected, 55% of consumers felt that their rights were adequately protected. 
Furthermore, the proportion of consumers feeling protected is notably higher in the 
EU15 than in the newer Member States, although this difference has narrowed from 
15 percentage points in 2006 (59% in the EU15 compared to 44% in the EU10) to 12 
percentage points in 2012 (60% in the EU15 compared to 48% in the EU12). At the 
country level, the proportion of consumers feeling adequately protected in 2012 
ranged from highs in the UK (76%), Austria (76%) and Luxembourg (73%) to lows of 
in Greece (18%), Bulgaria (30%) and Croatia (31%). 
The figure below presents the proportion of consumers who agree that in general, 
retailers and service providers respect the rules and regulations of consumer law. As 
the figure shows, between 2006 and 2014, the average proportion of consumers 
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Figure 32: Percentage of consumers agreeing that in general, traders respect 
the rules and regulations of consumer law, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 282, 299, 332, 358 and 397. Question: For each of 
the following statements, please tell me if you agree or disagree with it. In (OUR COUNTRY)… ‘In general, retailers and 
service providers respect your rights as a consumer.’ Note: EU% comprises the EU25 in 2006, the EU27 from 2007 to 
2012, and the EU28 thereafter. 
This overall rise in confidence was driven mostly by the EU12/13, which saw an 
average increase of 15 percentage points (from 52% to 67%) compared to 7 
percentage points in the EU15 (67% to 74%). The gap in consumer trust between the 
EU15 and the EU12/13 decreased in size by almost half between 2006 and 2014, from 
15 to 7 percentage points. At the country level, levels of trust in retailers and service 
providers in 2014 ranged from highs in Luxembourg (84%), the UK (84%), and 
Austria (83%) to lows in Greece (51%), Cyprus (52%) and Bulgaria (53%). 
In the consumer market study conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016, 63% of 
consumers indicated that they thought traders selling in shops in their own country 
were “very” or “completely” compliant with their obligations toward consumers. This 
proportion dropped to 59% for domestic traders operating online. However, when 
asked about traders from other EU countries, less than half of consumers thought that 
they were “very” or “completely” compliant when selling in shops (47%) or online 
(45%).1040 
As the figure below shows, in addition to retailers and service providers, a majority of 
consumers trust public authorities and consumer organisations to protect their rights. 
In general, consumers are more likely to trust consumer organisations than public 
authorities: between 2006 and 2012, trust in consumer organisations was an average 
of 10 percentage points higher than trust in public authorities. However, this gap has 
nearly closed in 2014, with 62% of respondents agreeing that they trusted consumer 
organisations compared to 61% for public authorities. 
                                           
1040 Question: How strongly do you agree or disagree that the following types of traders comply with their 
obligations towards consumers? ‘Traders selling in shops in your country / Online traders based in your 
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Figure 33: Percentage of consumers agreeing that they trust public 
authorities and consumer organisations to protect consumer rights, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometers 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 282, 299, 332, 358 and 397. Question: How 
strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. In (OUR COUNTRY)… ‘you trust public 
authorities to protect your rights as a consumer.’ / ‘you trust non-governmental [in 2006: independent] consumer 
organisations to protect your rights as a consumer.’ Note: EU% comprises the EU25 in 2006, the EU27 from 2008 to 
2012 and the EU28 thereafter. 
While the proportion of respondents expressing trust in public authorities rose slightly 
from 2006 to 2014, from 57% to 61%, the proportion expressing trust in consumer 
organisations slightly declined over the same period, from 66% to 62%. These trends 
are largely driven by changes in the EU15, which showed a larger increase in trust of 
public authorities compared to the EU12/13 (8 percentage point increase from 2008 to 
2014 compared to 6 percentage point increase) and a decrease in trust of consumer 
organisations during the same time period (3 percentage point decline in trust in the 
EU15 compared to a 2 percentage point increase in trust in the EU12/13).  
Among individual Member States, levels of trust in public authorities in 2014 ranged 
from highs in Finland (85%), Austria (81%), and Denmark (80%) to lows in Croatia 
(34%), Slovenia (34%), and Cyprus (41%), while levels of trust in consumer 
organisations ranged from highs in Luxembourg (78%), the Netherlands (77%), and 
Hungary (76%) to lows in Bulgaria (37%), Cyprus (43%) and Greece (44%). 
In the consumer market study conducted for the Fitness Check in 2016, in 
comparison, 46% of consumers agreed that they had confidence that national 
authorities took measures to stop traders from breaching consumer rights. 58% of 
consumers felt the same level of confidence in consumer organisations, a 12 
percentage point gap over national authorities.1041  
                                           
1041 Question: How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? ‘You feel 
confident that competent national authorities take measures to stop traders from breaching these consumer 
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3.2 General trends in cross-border purchases 
Consumer confidence in cross-border shopping within the internal market has 
increased since the early 1990s. The following figure shows the proportion of 
consumers who indicated that they would feel confident purchasing certain goods or 
services in another EU country, and is one of the few data series for which consistent 
data is available as far back as the 1990s. The series is available up until 2002, when 
the question set was discontinued in favour of more general questions regarding 
cross-border e-commerce (see the figure after next). 
Figure 34: Percentage of consumers feeling confident purchasing certain 
goods or services in another EU country, EU%. 
 
Source: Eurobarometers 35.1, 39.1, 43.1bis and 57.2. Question: 1991-1995: Please tell me for each of these whether 
you would purchase it, with complete confidence, in another member state of the EC/EU, if you needed it? 2002: If you 
were buying (SERVICE/GOOD), would you be more confident, as confident or less confident buying from a shop or seller 
located in another EU country as from one located in (OUR COUNTRY)? [Displayed is the combined proportion 
responding ‘as’ or ‘more confident’]. Note: More goods and services were tested in each year of the survey; the figure 
shows only the three that remained unchanged through the survey years. EU% comprises the EU12 from 1991-1993 and 
the EU15 thereafter. 
As indicated in the figure above, consumer confidence in shopping cross-border for all 
three goods and services presented above increased slightly over survey period, 
particularly between 1993 and 1995, before returning to almost the same level in 
2002 as at the start of the series in 1991, except in the case of financial services.  
In addition, from 2003 onwards, consumer confidence in purchasing online from 
another EU country has grown dramatically, as the figure below shows. Note, 
however, that the survey questions in the Eurobarometer which address consumer 
confidence making cross-border purchases online has significantly changed twice, 
between 2003-2006 and between 2011-2012 (see figure caption). As question 
wording has an influence on consumer response, this trend should therefore be 
interpreted with care. 
In 2003, only 10% of consumers felt that they had a high level of protection buying 
something on the internet from another Member State. By 2006, however, nearly one 
third reported that they felt at least “as confident” shopping online in another Member 
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indicating that they feel confident shopping online in other Member States has 
fluctuated around an EU average of 38%. 
Figure 35: Percentage of consumers feeling confident purchasing online from 
another EU country, EU%. 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometers 193, 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 299, 332, 358 and 397. Question: 2003: Do 
you think that, as a consumer, you have a high level of protection or not when you buy something on the Internet from 
a seller/company located in another country of the European Union? 2006-2011: Would you be more confident, as 
confident or less confident purchasing goods or services via the Internet from providers located in other European 
Union countries compared to purchases from providers located in (OUR COUNTRY)? [Displayed are the combined 
responses for ‘as confident’ and ‘more confident’]. 2012-2014: How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements. ‘You feel confident purchasing goods or services via the Internet from retailers or service 
providers in another EU country.’ Note: EU% comprises the EU 15 in 2003, EU25 in 2006, EU27 from 2008 to 2012 and 
EU28 thereafter. 
There is no consistent difference between the EU15 and EU12/13 with respect to 
consumer confidence to shop in another EU country online. Between individual 
Member States, levels of confidence in 2014 ranged from highs in Ireland (62%), 
Luxembourg (56%) and Malta (55%) to lows in Croatia (27%), Hungary (28%) and 
Bulgaria (29%). 
In tandem with increased consumer confidence, cross-border shopping in the internal 
market has experienced a steep increase since the 1990s. The following table shows 
the proportion of Eurobarometer respondents who indicated that they made at least 
one ‘major purchase’ (of EUR 100 or greater) in another country within the last six 
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Table 32: Proportion of Eurobarometer respondents having made a major 
purchase in another EU country within the last 6 months, EU%. 
Year Question Base Results 
1991 Over the last 6 months, did you make a major 
purchase yourself [in one of the EC countries], 
when travelling on holiday or on business. By a 
major expense, I mean at least (equivalent of 100 
ECU [EUR] in national currency), excluding hotels, 




1995 All respondents, 
EU15 
8.3% 
Source: Eurobarometers 35.1 and 43.1bis. 
As the Eurobarometers from the 1990s only asked about ‘major’ purchases from the 
last 6 months, the results are not directly comparable to more recent Eurobarometer 
surveys, which ask more general questions about cross-border shopping within a 
longer timeframe (i.e., within last 12 months). The results of these more recent 
Eurobarometers from 2002 onwards are presented in the following figure, which shows 
that between 2003 and 2006 alone, the average proportion of survey respondents in 
the EU reporting at least one cross-border purchase in the previous year more than 
doubled, from 12% to 26%.1042  
Also indicated in the following figure is the growth in cross-border shopping over the 
internet, which has also more than doubled since 2006, due in part to technological 
progress and the mainstreaming of internet shopping in general. In 2014, 16% of all 
Eurobarometer respondents reported that they made an online purchase from another 
EU country, compared to only 6% in 2006. 
                                           
1042 The Eurobarometer definition of a cross-border purchase for this question includes distance purchasing 
and purchasing as a result of physical travel (e.g. shopping while on holiday). However, in the case of 
physical travel, it does not include purchases linked to the trip itself (transportation, accommodation, meals, 
leisure activities, etc.). 
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Figure 36: Percentage of consumers who made at least one (online) cross-
border purchase in the EU within the last 12 months, EU%. 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 57.2, Special Eurobarometers 128, 252 and 298, Flash Eurobarometers 299, 332, 358 
and 397. Questions for general cross-border purchase: 2001-2003: Over the last 12 months, have you bought or 
ordered products or services for private use from shops or sellers located in another EU country, or not? 2006-2008: 
Please tell me if you have purchased any goods or services in the last 12 months, in (OUR COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any 
of the following ways? [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another EU country]. Questions for online cross-border 
purchase: 2001-2003: [If the respondent indicated a cross-border purchase] How did you buy or order them? [On the 
internet] 2006-2008: Please tell me if you have purchased any goods or services in the last 12 months, in (OUR 
COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any of the following ways? ‘Via the Internet.’ [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another 
EU country] 2009-2011: In the past 12 months, have you purchased any goods or services, by internet, phone or post in 
(OUR COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any of the following ways? [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another EU country] 
2012-2014: In the past 12 months, have you purchased any goods or services via the internet (website, email etc. …) in 
(OUR COUNTRY) or elsewhere in any of the following ways? [Yes, from a seller/provider located in another EU country]. 
Note: EU% comprises the EU15 up to 2004, the EU25 from 2004 to 2007, EU27 from 2007 to 2013, and EU28 thereafter. 
The prevalence of online cross-border purchases is consistently higher in the EU15 
states than in the EU12/13 by nearly 10 percentage points since 2006, with the gap 
showing no signs so far of convergence. At the country level, the rates of online cross-
border shopping show large differences between Member States. In 2014, fewer than 
10% of consumers made a purchase online from another EU country in three Member 
States (Romania, Poland, and Hungary), while in four Member States (Luxembourg, 
Austria, Ireland and Malta), more than 40% of consumers had made an online cross-
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Annex IX Synopsis report  
This annex presents a summary of the consultation activities conducted for the 
present evaluation.  
1. Introduction 
The Consultation Strategy for the Fitness Check emphasises the importance of 
stakeholder involvement for the success of the Fitness Check "in order to identify the 
problems, collect facts and data and, on this basis, assess the impacts of the 
consumer legislation as well as collect views on potential options for future action".1043 
It also explains that the Fitness Check is "a major opportunity for the Commission to 
reach out to citizens and businesses, to inform them of what the EU regulation does 
for them in this field, and to involve them in the evaluation process to make it even 
better". The objectives of the consultation provided in the strategy are as follows: 
• Collect additional relevant facts and data on the implementation of the relevant 
consumer legislation (compliance); 
• Identify provisions that work well and the added value of EU regulation in this 
area; 
• Identify problems, including any implementation problems, excessive 
regulatory burdens, overlaps, inconsistencies, obsolete measures and 
regulatory gaps which may have appeared over time; 
• Analyse the effects of the national divergences in the transposition of minimum 
harmonisation directives; 
• Collect views on the potential options for future action. 
In line with the Consultation Strategy, the following broad categories of stakeholders 
were identified as relevant for the Fitness Check: 
•  Consumers; 
•  National consumer associations and their EU umbrella organisations; 
•  Businesses; 
•  Organisations representing businesses; 
•  Member States' authorities; 
•  European networks/organisations of sector-specific national regulators; 
•  Network of European Consumer Centres. 
Other stakeholders such as lawyers' associations, university/research institutes 
dealing with consumer law or third country authorities and organisations could also 
provide their views during the consultation if they were interested to do so. 
In the context of this study, various stakeholder consultation activities were 
undertaken. These activities were designed taking into account the objectives listed 
above, the evaluation questions to be answered, and with the aim of covering all 
                                           
1043 Consultation Strategy REFIT Fitness check of Consumer law, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/documents/ 
2016.01.06_consultation_strategy_final.pdf 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
Civic Consulting  455 
categories of stakeholders relevant for the Fitness Check.1044 All relevant activities are 
documented below. 
2. Overall consultation strategy 
The following activities were carried out as part of the consultation task for this study: 
• Open public consultation organised by the Commission for the Fitness Check of 
EU consumer and marketing law. The responses were analysed and 
summarised in the present study; 
• Extensive interview process in all 28 Member States with national consumer 
enforcement authorities, responsible ministries and the relevant national 
regulatory authorities in the selected areas where sector-specific EU consumer 
protection rules exist, the European Consumer Centres (ECCs), national 
consumer associations, including associations in the selected areas subject to 
sector-specific EU consumer protection rules, and business associations, as well 
as with EU umbrella associations; 
• Sectoral business interviews with individual companies in all 28 Member 
States; 
• Evidence collection survey of qualified entities; 
• Participation in and contribution to the  Consumer Summit, which is a 
stakeholder event organised by the Commission and open to all categories of 
stakeholders in the field of consumer law, focusing on the Fitness Check of EU 
consumer and marketing law for its 2016 edition. 
The consultation process started in the inception phase of the evaluation with the 
operationalisation of the consultation strategy, the development of methodological 
tools and the identification of relevant stakeholders. Exploratory interviews were first 
conducted with EC policy officers and key stakeholders. During this stage, we also 
informed key stakeholder organisations at both EU and national levels by email about 
the evaluation and the consultation tools planned in the framework of this study. DG 
Justice and Consumers supported this step by informing all stakeholders by email 
about the launch of the online public consultation for the Fitness Check of consumer 
and marketing law and about the studies undertaken by the Commission, including the 
present study. We further identified contact persons by complementing the contact 
information from our stakeholder database with contact information obtained directly 
from the Commission, EU stakeholder associations and web-based research.  
All identified stakeholders were invited to participate in the relevant consultation 
activities once they were launched. The interview process was first launched in April 
2016, followed by the open public consultation in May 2016, and the survey of 
qualified entities and the business interviews launched in June 2016, concurrently with 
other consultation activities undertaken as part of the other studies conducted in the 
framework of the Fitness Check.  
The following section sets out the principal components of the consultation strategy 
and the main stakeholder groups consulted. 
                                           
1044 As regards consumers, while consumer respondents participated in the open public consultation, the 
consultation with consumers mainly took place in the framework of the consumer market study to support 
the Fitness Check, which activities are not covered in this synopsis report. 
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3. Overview of the consultation activities, stakeholder groups consulted and 
findings 
3.1 Open public consultation 
Approach and implementation 
From 12 May to 12 September 2016, the European Commission carried out an open 
public consultation for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law and also 
covering the evaluation of the Consumer Rights Directive. The consultation was 
designed to obtain views on whether EU consumer and marketing rules are still up to 
date and fit for purpose. The consultation was structured in three questionnaires. The 
consumer questionnaire was available only to respondents that indicated that they 
were “a citizen/consumer”. The business questionnaire was available only to 
respondents that indicated that they were “a company (or group of companies)”. The 
“full” questionnaire was targeted at the other types of respondents and was optional 
for those consumers and companies who wanted to continue after completing their 
respective short questionnaires. The three survey questionnaires used closed 
questions and gave respondents the possibility to comment in each section. Some of 
the respondents also chose to upload a position paper with additional comments after 
completing the survey. 
Overview of respondents 
In total, 436 respondents filled in the online questionnaire, with 97 respondents 
completing the consumer questionnaire, 176 respondents completing the business 
questionnaire and 237 respondents completing the full questionnaire.1045 For the 
analysis of responses to the full questionnaire, respondents other than "consumers" 
and "companies" are grouped into four broader categories (consumer associations, 
business associations, public authorities, and other). In addition, 55 position papers 
were received. The table below presents the number of responses received from each 
category of respondent. 
                                           
1045 The number of responses to the consumer, business and full questionnaires does not sum to the number 
of total responses, as some respondents who answered the consumer or business questionnaires also 
submitted answers to the full questionnaire. 
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Table 33: Responses to the open public consultation by category of 
respondent 
Category Total survey responses 
(% of total) 
Position papers 
submitted (% of total) 
Consumers 97 (22%) 0 (0%) 
Businesses 176 (40%) 6 (11%) 
Business associations 86 (20%) 33 (60%) 
Consumer associations 20 (5%) 3 (5%) 
Public authorities 28 (28%) 8 (15%) 
Other 29 (7%) 5 (9%) 
Total 436 (100%) 55 (100%) 
Source: Public consultation for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law. Question: Are you replying as/on 
behalf of: Note: further details on the respondents are presented in Part 2 of this report. 
Responses were received from all 28 Member States and “other” countries including 
Switzerland, Norway, Turkey and the United States. 
Analysis of results 
The 436 responses to the online survey that were received from stakeholders across 
the EU, as well as from non-EU countries, were analysed both overall and by type of 
stakeholder. Additionally, the 55 open submissions received in the context of the 
consultation, either by email or submitted together with an online survey response, 
were reviewed in depth, categorised according to recurring topics, and summarised by 
key theme and by type of respondent. The report on the consultation results is 
presented as Part 2 of this report. 
Overview of main findings – Open public consultation 
• Stakeholders generally agreed that: the consumer acquis should be streamlined 
and consolidated where possible; information requirements are currently too 
extensive and overwhelming for consumers and traders; the consumer acquis 
needs to be updated to better address the challenges of the digital market; better 
and more consistent enforcement of the rules across Member States is needed.  
• Business stakeholders commented that current protections against unfair 
commercial practices were sufficient, but should be better enforced. Consumer 
organisations and public authorities saw opportunities to improve protection under 
the UCPD. While most business respondents agree that businesses are well-
protected against comparative and misleading advertisements of other businesses, 
39% of businesses indicated that they were confronted with misleading B2B 
marketing in the last 12 months. 
• Stakeholders argued that price indication requirements should be consolidated and 
streamlined and commented that the PID should be made more consistent across 
the EU with respect to allowable units and exemptions.  
• The most-agreed upon potential areas to improve EU consumer and marketing 
rules for the benefit of consumers are that the information given at the advertising 
stage should focus on the essentials while more detailed information should be 
required only at the moment before the contract is concluded, and that information 
requirements in the UCPD/PID/CRD should be regrouped and streamlined. 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
Civic Consulting  458 
• Consumer organisations emphasised that the UCTD should remain minimum 
harmonised, and proposed improvements for consumers, including an extension to 
cover the adequacy of the price, main subject matter, and individually negotiated 
terms, a black list of unfair terms, and suggested that the presentation of standard 
terms and conditions should be simplified. Business stakeholders were generally in 
favour of the status quo regarding the UCTD and considered an EU-wide blacklist 
of unfair terms to be unworkable in practice.  
• Respondents’ opinions are largely divided with respect to potential areas of 
improvement for the protection of businesses. The most agreed upon potential 
areas are the introduction of a black list of prohibited B2B practices (39% of 
agreement among all respondents) and the introduction of a cooperation 
enforcement mechanism for cross-border B2B infringements (38%). Most business 
stakeholders however (especially business associations) opposed an extension of 
the UCTD to B2B relations. 
• Regarding injunctions, business stakeholders generally argued to preserve the 
status quo, and did not want revisions to include sanctions or EU-level class action 
lawsuits in particular. Consumer organisations and public authorities thought that 
injunctions were useful, but needed improvement, e.g. in relation to the associated 
costs and risks, effect on trader behaviour, and substantive redress for consumers. 
Close to half of all respondents agreed that there was a need to ensure coherence 
and clarify the interplay between the ID and other enforcement mechanisms. 
• Consumer associations considered injunctions to be effective enforcement 
measures, but emphasised that their effectiveness could be increased. Consumer 
organisations also emphasised that enforcement must be clearly linked with 
substantive remedies/redress. Businesses and business associations generally 
considered the current range of enforcement and redress options to be sufficient, 
and emphasised that most problems are ideally solved through direct negotiation 
between the trader and consumer, with court action as a last resort.  
 
3.2 Interviews with stakeholders in the Member States and EU umbrella associations 
Approach and implementation 
Country level interviews were one of the main sources of information for the country 
level legal analysis. This interview process consisted of the following activities: 
• Interviews targeting national consumer enforcement authorities, responsible 
ministries and the relevant national regulatory authorities in the selected areas 
where sector-specific EU consumer protection rules exist as well as the 
European Consumer Centres (ECCs) in all 28 Member States; 
• Interviews targeting national consumer associations in all 28 Member States as 
well as their EU umbrella associations, including associations in the selected 
areas subject to sector-specific EU consumer protection rules; 
• Interviews targeting business associations in all 28 Member States as well as 
their EU umbrella associations, including associations in the selected areas 
subject to sector-specific EU consumer protection rules. 
The interviews were conducted based on tailored questionnaires developed for each 
target group in coordination with the Commission.  
Legal country experts and researchers in the Member States interviewed relevant 
stakeholders, by phone or face-to-face, with a few exceptions where answers were 
provided in writing. In addition, the evaluation team conducted interviews with EU 
level stakeholders. 
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Overview of interviewees 
In the Member States, a total of 243 interviews were conducted with responsible 
ministries and authorities, consumer organisations and ECCs, sectoral regulatory 
authorities and business associations. At the EU level, 12 stakeholder interviews were 
conducted. The detailed list of interviews conducted in the framework of this 
evaluation is presented in Annex II. The table below presents the number of 
interviews by type of stakeholder. 
Table 34: Number of interviews by type of stakeholder 
Stakeholder type Number of 
interviews 
National consumer enforcement authorities, responsible ministries, sectoral 
regulatory authorities, and European Consumer Centres* 
147 
National consumer associations as well as their EU umbrella associations 49 
Business associations as well as their EU umbrella associations 59 
Total 255 
Source: Civic Consulting. Note: (*) including also one self-regulatory institution for the enforcement of rule against 
unfair competition.  
In each Member State, between 4 and 14 interviews were conducted with relevant 
stakeholders. In a small number of countries, such as Latvia, Spain or the UK, the 
interview process proved more difficult than in the other Member States and less 
interviews could be conducted as a result (respectively 4, 5 and 5 interviews).  
Analysis of results 
The results of these interviews fed into the country-level legal analysis that is 
presented in Part 3 of this report, and which was further analysed and synthesised at 
the EU level in the cross-cutting analysis.  
Overview of main findings – Stakeholder interviews 
• Consumer organisations especially, but also enforcement agencies and some 
business stakeholders, were in favour of an update of the black list of the UCPD, to 
address new problematic practices in the context of digital markets, e-commerce 
and innovative marketing methods. However, other of the interviewed 
stakeholders did not report any necessity to extend or modify the black list, and 
rather expressed their opposition to it.  
• Stakeholders noted that the European Commission’s Guidance document facilitates 
more effective application of the implementing national legislation. 
• Stakeholders were divided in their opinion on whether or not there is a need to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair practices. 
• In most Member States, stakeholders considered that there were no major 
problems in respect to unit price information. However, stakeholders emphasised 
that the amount of information that must be provided to consumers under Article 
7(4) UCPD and/or Article 5 CRD is pushing the “information-model” to its limits, 
creating “information overload” and confusion amongst consumers and also 
creating costs for businesses. 
• Stakeholders in a significant number of Member States confirmed that overall the 
principle-based approach of the MCAD is effective and that the MCAD provides a 
rather solid framework for a considerable part of the B2B advertising market.  
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• While stakeholders in some Member States saw a need for an extension of the 
UCPD to B2B transactions or a revision/extension of the MCAD with a view to 
ensuring more extensive protection for traders and competitors, stakeholders in 
other Member States did not consider a better protection of businesses against 
unfair commercial practices during and after the transaction to be necessary.  
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under the UCTD was 
confirmed through the assessment of stakeholders across the EU.  
• Stakeholders however identified needs for clarifications or guidance regarding the 
interpretation and application of the UCTD, including in relation to the legal 
consequences of a lack of transparency, the general test of unfairness (the ‘open 
norm’), the exact scope of the obligations of the national courts, and the indicative 
list of unfair terms.  
• In general a preference for a black list of unfair terms – and to a lesser extent grey 
list – over a mere indicative list is quite clear for some stakeholder groups (mostly 
consumer organisations and public authorities, as in the results of the open 
consultation), which are also strongly in favour of a (limited) black list at the EU 
level. Stakeholders also indicated that black and grey lists need to be updated 
regularly to be effective. 
• Regarding injunctions, stakeholders named court fees and lawyers’ fees for 
injunction procedures brought by consumer organisations and even by public 
authorities as key obstacles to the effectiveness of the injunction procedure 
generally, including domestically.  
• Stakeholders regarded sanctions for the breach of an injunction order as an 
effective element of the injunction procedure.  
• It appears from the country research, and from earlier consultations and studies, 
that stakeholders continue to disagree on the desired level of harmonisation. 
 
3.3 Sectoral business interviews  
Approach and implementation 
Business interviews targeting individual companies in five sectors (large household 
appliances, electronic and ICT products, gas and electricity services, 
telecommunication services, and pre-packaged food and detergents) were conducted 
in all 28 Member States with the aim to better understand their experience with 
legislation regarding advertising, marketing, standard contract terms and price 
indication, and to collect data concerning related costs and benefits. The interviews 
were conducted by phone between June and September 2016 using a questionnaire 
that was developed on the basis of the exploratory research and adapted after it was 
tested during test interviews with businesses.1046 
Target companies were companies that sell products or services to consumers in the 
selected sectors, including both traders that engage in domestic transactions and 
traders that are involved in cross-border transactions. The original focus of the 
exercise on small and micro companies was broadened in light of the selected sectors 
(e.g. telecommunications). We identified potential target companies by consulting our 
business database, by identifying members of relevant business associations on the 
websites of the associations, by directly asking the associations, and by conducting 
                                           
1046 While the interview questionnaire was designed for interviews to last for around 25-30 minutes on 
average, interviewers often had to contact interviewees several times to complete the questionnaire and ask 
for clarifications. Information was also provided in writing. 
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structured internet research. Overall, we identified over 2 800 target companies in the 
five target sectors across the EU. In countries and/or sectors where the response rate 
was low, additional target companies were identified through further internet research 
and through the support of national business associations. It was generally difficult to 
reach the relevant staff at the target companies, and to obtain positive responses 
regarding their participation. 
Overview of respondents 
In total, 282 business interviews were completed throughout the EU, i.e. an average 
of 10 business interviews per Member State, which was the target set for this 
exercise. While slightly more than two thirds of case study interviews focused on 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, the remainder focused on large 
businesses with 250 or more employees. 
Analysis of results 
The completed interviews were checked for quality and analysed. Results were then 
extrapolated to the EU level. The results of the business interviews and of the 
extrapolation are presented in Part 4 of this report and fed into the cross-cutting 
analysis of costs and benefits. 
Overview of main findings – Sectoral business interviews 
• The estimated median one-off costs per business for compliance checks and 
adjusting business practices when entering another EU country’s market range 
from EUR 1 727 per business in the sector for electronic and ICT products to 
EUR 12 029 per business in the sector for gas and electricity services.  
• Total one-off costs may be substantial if a trader plans to operate at an EU-wide 
level, especially in the two network services sectors reviewed. 
• The annual costs incurred by businesses in the EU28 for checking that their 
advertising/marketing and standard contract terms still comply with national 
legislation and adjusting business practices if needed are estimated to amount to 
EUR 278 million in the five sectors reviewed, which amounts to approximately 
0.024 percent of turnover in the five sectors.  
• Of these annual costs, the largest share of 46% is caused by compliance checks 
and adjusting business practices related to advertising and marketing targeted at 
consumers and 16% is related to advertising and marketing targeted at 
businesses, with the remaining share of 39% of costs related to standard contract 
terms in consumer contracts. This is similar to the pattern observed at company 
level regarding the one-off costs when entering another EU country’s market.  
• The costs of (unit) price indication do not seem to imply disproportionate burdens 
on businesses. 
• In terms of benefits, between 63% and 46% of the businesses that sell their 
products/services in other EU countries indicated that they benefited at least 
slightly from the EU legislative framework subject to the Fitness Check.  
• In particular, these businesses benefited most from the harmonised legislation that 
facilitates selling cross-border to consumers in other EU countries, and from the 
level playing field that was created across the EU for businesses regarding 
contracts with consumers by safeguarding that standard contract terms are fair. 
• A significantly lower proportion (between 51% and 29%) of the businesses that do 
not sell their products/services in other EU countries indicated that they benefited 
at least slightly from the legal framework. 
 
 Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law - Final report 
Civic Consulting  462 
3.4 Survey of qualified entities 
Approach and implementation 
We conducted a targeted evidence collection survey to collect data regarding the use 
of the injunctions procedure directly from qualified entities. The survey questionnaire 
was developed with the aim to complement the information provided in the country 
reports and included questions on the use of the injunctions procedure, obstacles to 
the effective use of the injunctions procedure, cooperation with qualified entities in 
other Member States, and possible future measures. The survey of qualified entities 
was implemented on an online platform and launched in June 2016. All the qualified 
entities identified on the basis of the 2016 Notification from the Commission 
concerning Article 4(3) of the Injunctions Directive as well as complementary research 
were invited to participate. We first invited participants by email, and then undertook 
a number of follow-up actions in order to ensure an appropriate response rate.  
Overview of respondents 
In total, 29 qualified entities completed the questionnaire from the following 21 EU 
Member States: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
In some countries, the total number of qualified entities (for example, 78 in Germany 
and 75 in Greece) is much higher than in the other countries. These include a large 
number of regional organisations, as well as organisations focused on very specific 
matters such as renters’ organisations (‘Mietervereine’), which were therefore more 
difficult to reach or less relevant in the context of the study. Conversely, some 
Member States have only recognised one entity as being qualified to bring actions for 
an injunction under Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/22/EC. In most of these countries 
(i.e. in Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden), the qualified entity 
responded to the survey.  
Of the responding entities, 61% were consumer organisations. The remainder 
consisted of public authorities/bodies (32%) and ‘other’ entities, such as business 
associations (7%). 
Analysis of results 
The results of the survey are presented in Part 4 of this report and fed into the cross-
cutting analysis on the Injunctions Directive. 
Overview of main findings – Survey of qualified entities 
• In the five year period since June 2011, responding qualified entities initiated a 
total of 5 763 injunction actions. While in most countries the number of reported 
injunction actions is a few hundred or less, the notable exceptions are qualified 
entities in Germany which reported the highest number of injunction actions (4 
579) of all Member States, and Latvia (794). 
• The survey of qualified entities (and the country research) showed that the 
injunction procedure is not used at all, or rarely used, in Member States where 
qualified entities have public law mechanisms available that are faster, cheaper or 
more effective to use. 
• Qualified entities considered the most important obstacles to the effective use of 
the injunction procedure with respect to national infringements to be costs and the 
associated financial risks of the injunction procedure, complexity of the injunction 
procedure, and length of court procedures. These obstacles were also listed as 
crucial obstacles in the other relevant consultation activities. 
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• The potential obstacles to the effective use of the injunctions procedure related to 
cross border infringements were assessed on average as being significantly more 
important than concerning national infringements. 
• The possible future harmonisation measure viewed by qualified entities, on 
average, as the most beneficial was the possibility to bring an action for damages 
or redress to be paid to the consumers concerned within the injunction procedure. 
The second was exemption from legal costs.  
• Qualified entities (as well as several interviewed stakeholders) have criticised the 
limited scope of application of the Injunctions Directive and suggested to adjust it 
to the scope of application of the CPC Regulation or to extend it to consumer law in 
general.  
• Qualified entities ranked the publication of the decision and corrective statements 
highest as to the effectiveness of measures taken in the national implementation 
of the Injunctions Directive. 
 
3.5 Consumer Summit  
Approach and implementation 
The European Commission's Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers hosted the 
2016 edition of the European Consumer Summit: "EU consumer law: still fit for 
purpose? Achievements and challenges", on 17 October 2016 in Brussels. The 2016 
Summit was entirely dedicated to the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing 
law.  
Initial evaluation results were presented at the three thematic workshops: Workshop 1 
on simplifying consumer information requirements; Workshop 2 on increasing fairness 
of commercial practices and of contract terms; and Workshop 3 on enhancing the 
effectiveness of the injunction procedure. Speakers representing various groups of 
stakeholders and various countries participated in panel discussions and/or made 
presentations, and participants were invited to contribute to the discussions. 
Overview of participants 
Around 450 representatives of national authorities, European institutions, consumer 
organisations, businesses and academics took part in the Summit.1047 
Analysis of results 
The initial evaluation results were refined to take into account the outcomes of the 
discussion, which were also taken into account in the subsequent analysis. The views 
expressed at the Consumer Summit are very much in line with the results of the other 
consultation activities, particularly the country research and the open consultation. 
This can be explained by the fact that these three consultation activities targeted and 
reached a wide range of stakeholder groups across the EU and that numerous 
stakeholders participated in several of these activities (although a complete list of 
participants to the Consumer Summit is not available). The summary below is based 
on the reporting from the workshops presented at the Consumer Summit. 
                                           
1047 According to the dedicated webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=34204 
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Overview of main findings – Consumer Summit 
• Participants generally called for more effective and consistent enforcement of the 
directives, including cross-border. 
• Participants generally considered the co-existence of the principle-based approach 
of the UCPD and the black list to be useful against unfair commercial practices.  
• Participants suggested extending the blacklist of practices to facilitate proof in 
court and update the list to emerging practices, and were in favour of a right to 
claim nullity of contract for the breach of the UCPD.  
• Participants also suggested extending the UCPD to B2B, by introducing a black list 
and prohibiting aggressive practices to protect SMEs. 
• Participants argued that the information requirements under the CRD are relevant 
and necessary while information requirements laid down by Article 7(4) UCPD are 
considered redundant. Participants also suggested that information should be 
improved through simplified language and clear requirements for printed text. 
• Participants agreed that all price indication requirements should be merged in one 
instrument, but had divergent views on the exemption for small businesses. 
• Participants expressed general support for a black/grey list of unfair terms at the 
EU level. In line with the findings of the stakeholder interviews, some workshop 
participants specified that they would prefer a short black list at a minimum 
harmonisation level.  
• Participants expressed needs for clarifications; in particular by defining clear and 
balanced responsibilities of platforms, consumers and traders, defining EU 
standard on what is a trader, and clarifying what is B2C, C2C, and B2B. 
• Participants commented on well-functioning national varieties of the injunctions 
procedure, including: the option for swift out of court settlement, final decision 
according to the rules applicable to summary proceedings, the erga omnes effect 
of injunctions decisions, the individual’s right to rely on the decision in later 
proceedings, periodic penalties or criminal fines for non-compliance, and a duty to 
remove the consequences of the breach. 
• Participants expressed general support for a single horizontal EU instrument. 
 
4. Results of the consultation activities 
The various consultation activities served as complementary sources of evidence for 
the evaluation. As described above, the open public consultation and the stakeholder 
interviews covered a wide range of topics and targeted a wide range of stakeholder 
groups. They were complemented by activities targeted at specific stakeholder groups, 
namely the sectoral business interviews and the survey of qualified entities. The 
results of the stakeholder interviews covered all evaluation criteria and directly fed 
into the country level analysis, which was then further analysed and synthesised at 
the EU level in the cross-cutting analysis. The results of the open consultation also 
covered aspects of all the evaluation criteria and were a key source of information for 
the cross-cutting analysis. The results of the business interviews were used in the 
analysis of costs and benefits of the legislative framework subject to the Fitness Check 
for businesses, which further fed into the conclusions regarding the efficiency of the 
framework. The results of the survey of qualified entities covered all evaluation criteria 
and fed into the cross-cutting analysis on injunctions. Lastly, the Consumer Summit 
served to present and discuss interim results of the study.  
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Evidence obtained from the different consultation activities and other methodological 
tools employed in the study were processed and cross-checked, and served to answer 
the evaluation questions, arrive at conclusions, and develop recommendations for EU 
legislative and/or non-legislative actions regarding identified gaps, obsolete provisions 
or codification needs of the current rules.  
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